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Summary 
 
This thesis examines French efforts to project their power onto Britain during the 
Middle Ages, engaging the Welsh as their partners. The subsequent chapters contribute 
fresh analysis on a range of leaders and periods. This has been done using new theories, 
particularly military ones, and pushes the boundaries of this area of studies. The 
concepts of ‘bracketing alliances’ and the strategy of ‘cultivate and eradicate’ have been 
introduced and applied to this research. In addition, the thesis includes works not 
commonly found in such a study; reaching outside the field to help clarify points of 
analysis. For example, Sun Tzu has been included to demonstrate that medieval rulers 
were practising the most effective methods of warfare, as we recognise them today. 
Also, by applying modern diplomatic theory, such as ‘Soft Power’, this research not 
only gives these ideas a wider conceptual use but also connects and makes relevant 
medieval events to the modern world.   
  On a broader level, these French-Welsh links demand wider exposure, whether 
from the perspective of the French attempting to articulate their power within Britain or 
the Welsh playing a role on the continental stage. This thesis presents new perceptions 
of these leaders, the conflicts of their times, their diplomatic initiatives and the power 
relations of the age. Its primary thrusts, therefore, are the dissection of the form and 
impact of these diplomatic and military relations, focussing on French efforts to project 
their power onto Britain at moments when friendship was co-ordinated with Welsh 
leaders. In recognition of the many subjects researched, and to borrow shamelessly from 
William of Malmesbury, and certainly others, I give note; ‘uolo enim hoc opus esse 
multarum historiarum breuiarium.’1  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 R. A. B. Mynors, R. M. Thomson, and M. Winterbottom, trans., William of Malmesbury, Gesta regum 
Anglorum (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 13, ‘I would like this work to serve as a summary of many fields of 
history.’; L. M. Diggelmann, Unpublished PhD Thesis, ‘Marriage, Inheritance, and the Balance of Power 
in Twelfth-Century England and France’, The University of Auckland, 2004, 11. 
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1: Introduction 
 
Aim: 
This thesis examines French efforts to project their power onto Britain during the middle 
ages, engaging the Welsh as their partners. This research therefore describes elements of 
French diplomatic and military practice during this period, delineating the exercise of a 
foreign policy in the middle ages. This is an area which some academics feel has been 
neglected.
1
 The subsequent chapters illustrate international relations between leaders in 
France and Wales and, because this thesis highlights the interconnectivity of medieval states 
and their rulers, they also encompass the conduct and leaders of other European powers.  
 This research challenges any notion that medieval Anglo-French relations can be 
viewed in terms of successful English actions enabling the domination of their seemingly 
supine French counterparts. The subsequent chapters argue to the contrary, exposing the 
existence of an intelligent, flexible and aggressive French diplomatic strategy underpinned by 
military power. Such practices inevitably experience success and failure, and the following 
cases detail the evolution of this policy, focussing on its liaison with Welsh leaders. This 
study of French policy begins with a position reliant on the vagaries of the overlord-vassal 
relationship, which was developed to suit security needs. This progressed over time into a 
more sophisticated structure which actively sought factional alliances with a variety of 
powers to suit specific campaign goals. At times, these friendships appear to have been 
maintained simply as a latent threat, at others they were energetically pursued in attempts to 
topple the incumbent king of England. The fact that this strategy was retained and nurtured 
over a timescale of centuries proves its value to successive French governments. Due to the 
fact that they ultimately triumphed in the medieval phase of their conflict with England, a 
victory to which this strategy contributed, these efforts merit examination and illumination.   
 Another main aim of this research is to disprove the perception that the Welsh were a 
largely ignored irrelevance who played no notable role in contemporary actions. The 
argument is consistently made that they were able to participate in the key moments 
considered within this study. These encompass some of the foremost events of the period 
1163-1417, namely relations between Louis VII and Henry II, Prince Louis’s invasion and 
the Magna Carta rebellion, the French resurgence after Brétigny and the brief return of native 
                                                          
1
 I. W. Rowlands, ‘King John and Wales’ and N. Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ in S. D. Church, ed., King John: 
New Interpretations (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1999), 283, 336.  
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governance over Wales in the early fifteenth century. In most of these events the French 
actively sought Welsh involvement. By illustrating the fact that the Welsh repeatedly 
engaged with major powers and factions, the thesis aims to disprove any perceived 
irrelevancy. Moreover, the thesis will prove that the Welsh were able to organise themselves 
in a manner similar to their peers, as well as standing among them on a footing proportionate 
to their strength. As that power waned or rose, so did the degree to which they were involved 
in the key moments of their time.   
Little of the following subject matter has been directly covered to date; therefore 
much of this thesis is new and pushes the boundaries of several fields of study. While 
principally concerned with medieval diplomatic relations, it clearly engages with the 
historical narrative of several European nations over the span of two and a half centuries, and 
makes contributions to studies of military affairs and the politics of power relations. In 
particular, this research examines the evolution of alliances between great and lesser powers, 
and considers the value of such arrangements within the framework of local and continental-
scale conflicts.  
Uncommonly, this also evaluates the actions and machinations of smaller, now 
extinct, states. They clearly merit inclusion in studies of European history, along with the 
stories of those larger, still present, states responsible for their disappearance or 
incorporation. This direction seems to be in tune with current thinking; the first such work on 
the stories of smaller, now lost, states emerged at the end of 2011.
2
 Therefore, this also adds 
to this developing field of study.  
 
                                                          
2
 N. Davies, Vanished Kingdoms, The History of Half-Forgotten Europe (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 
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Method and Content: 
The methodology used in this thesis is deliberately uncomplicated. Each of the four research 
chapters follows a three-stage method of examining its subject. All begin by introducing and 
contextualising the principal engagés within the events and issues of their time. Next, follows 
a close reading of all of the alliance documents between French and Welsh leaders, 
examining their form, language, message and intent. Finally, each chapter considers the 
consequences of these alliances on those who forged them and those within their influence, as 
well as on their enemies.  
 The following argument also employs a particular method to support its findings by 
evaluating the behaviour of those involved where contemporary evidence or secondary 
analysis proves conflictual or inadequate. Due to the fact that medieval leaders projected a 
certain image of themselves and generally followed an identifiable pattern of conduct, their 
reigns leave signatures of their behaviour within the records. This has led to later writers 
highlighting and labelling their attributes and characteristics; pious, brutal, indecisive, ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’, for instance. While the more volatile and erratic leaders, such as King John of 
England, are more difficult to evaluate in this way, the behaviour of most medieval rulers 
appears sufficiently predictable. When they deviated from expected or distinctive ways, their 
actions commonly attracted comment in contemporary records. By studying the primary 
sources of the nations involved, a determinable pattern of behaviour and expectations 
emerges. Therefore, this research stands on contemporary observations, or indeed a lack 
thereof, to support its assertions. This thesis explores the effectiveness of this method in 
providing solutions to long-standing problems, and determines that in several cases it offers a 
fuller and more plausible picture than currently exists.  
In addition, this thesis creates a framework drawing on concepts to which the author 
has been introduced through military education, training and action, translated into the 
diplomatic sphere. Elements of current military and diplomacy theories are adapted and 
applied within a medieval context. This has primarily been done to draw attention to the 
wider relevance of medieval events and their evident relation to contemporary issues and 
conflicts. In so doing, this also shows the broader utility of these theories, giving them a 
conceptual value beyond their current use. Aspects of modern military practice have been 
applied to this subject and are introduced to a wider audience through this thesis. These 
military and diplomatic adaptations help make this research original and conceptually alive. 
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A number of original concepts are introduced within the course of the four subsequent 
research chapters. Two of these are founded on current military practice and the other, the 
theory of ‘Soft Power’, has not previously been applied to the medieval period. These 
subjects recur throughout the thesis and so require brief description here.  
 The first two chapters study the alliances between Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII, 
and between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth. Within these two examples, the term 
‘bracketing alliances’ is used. The notion that states arrange alliances to surround other states 
seems inadequate – it is rare that one geographic entity becomes truly encompassed on all 
sides and hence becomes surrounded. Therefore the term bracketing is introduced here to 
describe how one state formed a union with another on the far side of its enemy’s frontier. 
While this is contextualised below, simple examples could suggest the French alliance with 
Castile to bracket English-ruled Aquitaine, or the English bracketing of Castile through 
Portugal and Gascony.
3
 Although not surrounded, the bracketed state faced the prospect of a 
conflict on two or more fronts already on their borders, should violent dispute arise. This 
strategy can clearly be seen to be played out across western Europe during the period. Of 
course, the ideal scenario would see an enemy constricted between several brackets, facing 
multiple enemies in several places, thereby reducing its ability to act decisively in any one 
direction. Such a situation offers small powers acting in concert the possibility of defeating a 
larger enemy. This is demonstrated below in these two earlier examples, and is notably 
pursued by Philip Augustus and Prince Louis in their ultimately unsuccessful strike against 
King John. The creation of such a network of supportive alliances required a great deal of 
diplomatic effort, and this is also discussed below. While the term ‘bracketing’ can be easily 
understood from an understanding of grammatical parentheses, it is derived from the military 
practice of ‘bracketing fire’. This is a tactic in which ordnance is fired short and long of an 
enemy position to establish measurable points of conflict, creating a ‘bracket’ around the 
target. Subsequent volleys are respectively and continually lengthened and shortened, closing 
the bracket and, in theory, effectively striking and destroying the enemy. The establishment 
of a military alliance on the far side of an enemy appears consistent with the longer shot of 
bracketing fire, while the near side is formed by a state’s border with the enemy. Multiple 
brackets of course serve to flank an enemy. This term is the author’s own and does not appear 
elsewhere.   
                                                          
3
 Note: I am aware that England also made efforts to ally with Castile through marriages, but French efforts to 
acquire their amity were more successful, so for the ease of this example, I describe Castile as a French ally. 
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 A second contemporary military-diplomatic strategy is also introduced; ‘cultivate and 
eradicate.’ This is a method in which one power selects a faction or individual for 
advancement or destruction and takes diplomatic and military steps to achieve this end. 
Straightforward examples of this come from the activities of the popes of this period, and are 
further detailed within the thesis. However, in order to acquire victory for their preferred 
candidate or ally and defeat for their enemy, the papacy clearly involved itself in temporal 
power politics. In examples given in more detail below, the popes eroded the power base of 
an enemy, Philip of Swabia or King John of England, for example, by removing their 
ecclesiastical supporters and undermining their temporal authority through absolution of their 
vassals’ allegiance, interdict and excommunication. Eradication is perhaps best characterised 
by efforts to intimidate, wither, isolate and attack an adversary, in order to defeat them but 
not necessarily to achieve their death. Obliging obedience appears to be the goal of the 
strategy, with physical attack as a last resort.  
The other side of this strategy involves the empowerment of others, usually factions 
hostile to their opponent. In the cases studied here this took on several forms, for example, 
through the absolution of oaths of allegiance, but also by the granting of indulgences, 
appointments to supporters and, most drastically, through the proclamation of crusades. This 
step-by-step papal approach to dealing with their enemies has not been identified elsewhere. 
The granting favours to one side evidently forms part of the ‘cultivate’ strategy. So, the use of 
moral, spiritual, financial and military support largely defined the papal means of cultivating 
a faction. This model appears several times in this study. However, it clearly has wider use in 
studies of diplomacy, politics and warfare. That is to say that one power developing the 
strength of another by influencing, legitimising, encouraging, defending and supporting it 
through supply or reinforcement is perhaps the simplest means of describing cultivation. In 
relation to this research, it is asserted that Philip Augustus and Prince Louis cultivated 
factions within Britain to support Louis’s attempt on the throne of England; the treaty with 
Llywelyn formed part of that effort. Equally, Louis of Orleans appears to have cultivated the 
alliance with Owain Glyn Dŵr in order to support and further his conflict with Henry IV. 
However, this practice can easily be applied to a variety of other scenarios and time periods, 
ancient, medieval and modern.  
Although it is possible to separate these two ploys and use them independently, they 
appear most effective when used in combination to reduce an adversary while simultaneously 
bolstering an ally. Although this strategy describes widespread and long-standing military 
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and diplomatic practice, ‘cultivate and eradicate’ is the author’s term, in part based on his 
military experiences.  
 Although ‘Soft Power’ has long been part of oriental warfare concepts, Joseph Nye 
further developed the theory as a conceptual measure explaining aspects of the Cold War era 
in the Twentieth-century, and it has undergone several evolutionary developments since 
then.
4
 However, this research applies it to the medieval period and therefore it requires brief 
description here to justify its use.  
 It is perhaps simplest to start with its antithesis, ‘Hard Power.’ This describes the use 
of force, violent threat, or coercive means to achieve obedience, such as paying troops to 
fight or bribing garrisons to surrender. Therefore, the actual use of kinetic military force, or 
intimidating displays of hardware or troops, diplomatic threats, economic sanctions, trade 
embargoes, blockades, the deployment of mercenaries, bribery and other similar methods are 
forms of hard power. It is any means of obliging co-operation, retreat or submission, but 
nevertheless hard power depends on varying degrees of coercion to achieve unwilling 
obedience. It seems reasonable to suggest that historical studies tend to focus on the measure 
and display of hard power forces rather than the alternatives and Nye, while writing about 
modern political concerns, identified that as a grave error.
5
  
 In stark contrast, ‘Soft Power’ is the strategy of co-option over coercion, attraction not 
intimidation, and seduction rather than invasion. Nye described soft power as ‘the ability to 
affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or 
payment. A country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies.’6 
Although Nye used this to explain the global appeal of 1950s America, and thereby to 
influence other states to lean towards the West rather than the Communist East, this clearly 
has broader application. He explained soft power in terms of attraction and enticement, 
revealing it as the ‘ability to shape the preferences of others … [and] to establish preferences 
tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, 
political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral 
                                                          
4
 J. S. Nye Jr., ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, Fall 1990, (80), 153-72; Sun-tzu, ed. and trans., J. Minford, The Art of 
War (London: Penguin, 2003), 103-4;  J. S. Nye Jr., ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 2008, (616), 94-109; G. M. Gallarotti, ‘Soft Power: 
what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use’, Journal of Political Power, 2011, (4), 25-
47.  
5
 Nye, ‘Soft Power’, 172. 
6
 Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, 94. 
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authority.’7 The oath made to Louis VII by magnates and prelates at the 1155 Council of 
Soissons formally secured the supremacy of the French Crown in the lands of those present. 
It also established the concept of an accepted pattern of behaviour which bound those men to 
maintain this practice, recognising Louis as the leader they legitimised and recognised of 
their own volition. Influencing, even subtly dictating, the behaviour of others and freely, 
peacefully drawing them into this mode of conduct placing Louis above them clearly 
demonstrates an application of Nye’s ‘soft power’ in the Twelfth century.  
 Soft power can show interdependence rather than necessarily depicting a state of 
harmony. So, in order to sustain a mutually beneficial relationship, it might also include the 
use of subtle threat, such as the withdrawal of supporting troops or the promise of more, to 
oblige the partner to agree to further demands, for example.
8
  
Soft power is a theory which describes a method of shaping the behaviour of others. 
This is generally achieved through largely intangible means such as achieving the projection 
of a desirable culture, practices, institutions and society. This gives it legitimacy in the eyes 
of others which can assist in the establishment of a notion of desirable norms, and thereby 
influence the aspirations of its neighbours. This gives the culture or state in question 
influence, and with it power, beyond its borders, without recourse to deploying costly armies, 
thus making it more difficult to defeat.
9
 This research identifies numerous examples of soft 
power in action throughout the period studied.  
 
The four research chapters examine alliances forged between French and Welsh leaders 
during the period, 1163-1417. In each case the leader who appears to have initiated and 
pursued the creation of the alliance is named first in the chapter title. However, it is 
noteworthy that only the first appears to have been instigated by the Welsh. This considers 
the context and evidence of the exchange between Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII between 
1163 and 1168. The latter addressed his powerful vassal, Henry II, king of England, on a 
point of feudal order and, at the same time, represented Owain Gwynedd and a number of 
other small entities in their complaints against Henry. This was a remarkable evolution in 
Welsh political life; the first such occasion when the leader of the Welsh had approached the 
king of France for aid. Through a re-evaluation of the subtle, seductive yet potent forces of 
                                                          
7
 Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, 95. 
8
 Nye, ‘Soft Power’, 169-70. 
9
 Nye, ‘Soft Power’, 153-72; Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, 94-109. 
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European power relations of the moment, this chapter concludes that Louis dominated Henry 
at that time.  
 The next chapter deconstructs current learning on the still poorly-known alliance 
between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth. So far, this first written treaty between 
the French and the Welsh, perhaps with any British power, has been outshone by other 
contemporary events; the culmination of King John’s reign, the barons’ revolt, Magna Carta 
and Prince Louis’s invasion. Due to that, little work has been dedicated to the alliance. 
Therefore, this chapter challenges the sole article addressing the subject, which has been 
taken as the first, last and only word on the matter by academics. This has resulted in a re-
dating of the treaty to 1215-7; situating it at a later time enables it to fit seamlessly with 
contemporary records and events, but also satisfies the otherwise unexplained actions of the 
leaders involved.  
 The third chapter discusses the years when two fleets were raised by Charles V and 
placed under Owain Lawgoch, a Welsh mercenary commander fighting under French 
colours. The armadas of 1369 and 1372 signalled the first overseas invasion projects in which 
French and Welsh troops combined. Such a moment therefore deserves illumination. The 
contemporary state of Wales is also discussed and once more the established view is 
vigorously disputed. 
 The final chapter thoroughly evaluates and contextualises for the first time Franco-
Welsh relations from 1404 to 1417. It describes how little of this frequently discussed subject 
has been set within the events of its time and analysed accordingly. Considering the Glyn 
Dŵr rising in isolation, in effect as a solely Welsh-English conflict with minor foreign 
intervention, makes it more difficult to comprehend. This work finds that Owain was allied to 
the Orleanist-Armagnacs who dominated Charles VI’s government at that time, rather than to 
the king in person. It also reveals the complex factional warfare that wracked the French 
court. This chapter demonstrates that the Welsh acted in concert with the leading French 
faction along with France’s allies, the Bretons and the Castilians. In light of that wide 
connectivity, it is proposed that their joint campaigns constitute another conflict of the 
Hundred Years’ War, such as those in Brittany or Spain.10 Charles IV’s court and Owain’s 
council exchanged a number of documents, therefore this chapter forms the largest part of 
this thesis.  
                                                          
10
 R. Vaughan, Valois Burgundy (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 48-73 (offers an excellent overview of Burgundian 
connectivity across Europe). 
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Historiographical Survey: 
Due to the fact that this subject has not been specifically researched previously, this study has 
revealed a number of lacunæ in extant learning. This is not necessarily a criticism, since it 
highlights potential for future study. However, although a number of publications address 
certain aspects of this research, some are notably poor in terms of their accuracy, analysis and 
neutrality. Nevertheless, it is worth stating that there are many excellent publications that 
contribute substantially to learning in this field, and these are evidenced by their inclusion 
throughout the subsequent chapter footnotes. This study is therefore supported by a wide 
corpus of academic materials which are included in the argument below, and require no 
further discussion here. These include original documents, as well as a substantial number of 
contemporary chronicles which have been published in more recent times. This thesis focuses 
on the close reading of original sources as far as possible, applying their analysis to the 
narrative stream. Of secondary importance is the supporting modern literature, mostly from 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This extensive literature comprises published works, 
chapters and articles, though largely on related or peripheral themes, since few works directly 
address the subject in hand. Nevertheless, many of these will be familiar and require no 
expansive justification for inclusion here. Instead, the purpose of this survey is to reveal some 
of the difficulties encountered and to show some of the disappointing discoveries uncovered 
during this research. The principal observation is that this study area has, to a surprising 
degree, either been ignored or poorly researched. So, a selection of the problematic gaps and 
publications which presented obstacles to this cross-period, polythematic research is 
discussed below.  
 
Before discussing observations on the literature relevant to each chapter, it is perhaps 
appropriate to begin with a further general criticism. Surprisingly few aspects of these 
historical narratives have been written in context, connecting the subject to contemporary 
events and leaders. While the numerous monographs inevitably discuss their subject’s direct 
neighbours or foes, few paint a broader picture. This is particularly noteworthy in works by 
Welsh historians, none of which situate their subjects within the broader European milieu. 
Similarly, few, if any, publications concerning the better-known leaders of France or England 
for example, are viewed from any other perspective than their own or that of their principal 
adversary. While bilateral studies are evidently useful, no leader solely engaged with just one 
other in isolation. The point here is that extant works tend to neglect the degree to which 
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medieval Europe’s states and leaders were connected and, perhaps with the exception of 
studies of the Black Death, how they were all touched by movements within the continent’s 
economy, politics and so on.   
 
The first research chapter deals with relations between Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII from 
1163-8. The only monograph on Owain Gwynedd is over a century old and was based on a 
piece composed for an eisteddfod at the end of the nineteenth century.  It contains a four-
sentence paragraph which incorrectly related Owain’s contact with the French, identifying 
two letters rather than three.
11
 Given the absence of a definitive work on this subject, research 
into this subject has necessarily been undertaken piecemeal, investigating general histories 
and works on the other leaders involved. The usually garrulous, enthusiastic promoter of 
Welsh history, J. E. Lloyd, missed the opportunity to expound Owain Gwynedd’s letters to 
France.
12
 In 1971, an article by J. Beverley Smith gave a summary of Owain’s career. Even 
though he mentioned Louis VII in the text and Lloyd’s work in the footnotes, Smith made no 
mention of Owain’s contact with France.13 David Walker, John Davies, Rees Davies and Kari 
Maund also took 1168 as the starting point of Owain’s relationship with Louis when, in fact, 
that date appears to have marked its conclusion.
14
 Walker, Maund and Rees Davies also 
imbued Owain with impossible foresight; an ability to predict that future generations of 
native rulers would need to call upon France for aid, and they suggest that he created the 
framework within which such discussions could take place. This is best exemplified by 
Davies who dealt with the matter in one subordinate clause; ‘he anticipated the policies of his 
successors by forming a Franco-Welsh alliance to embarrass Henry II.’15 Even this brief 
analysis seems riddled with errors. Realistically Owain could not have foreseen his 
successors’ policies, needs or any other circumstances, nor did they establish or follow any 
such ‘policy’. Finally, the aim of the union with Louis was to help Gwynedd to survive, not 
‘to embarrass Henry’, whatever that might mean. 
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Of primary importance to this project is Huw Pryce’s article on the two leaders, which 
presented, translated and dated three letters from Owain Gwynedd to Louis VII.
16
 There is no 
reason to question the translations or the dating, especially when taking account of the other 
scholars Pryce credited with assisting his work.
17
 The article paraphrased evidence of a 
meeting between the nobles and messengers of a number of rulers described in one of The 
Letters of John of Salisbury.
18
 Although an immensely useful and sound contribution, Pryce’s 
article only partially described the relevant meeting. I will show that this was not solely a 
conference between France, England and emissaries from Scotland and Wales, as could be 
understood by reading Pryce’s article, but a broader meeting entirely involving the Bretons, 
Poitevins and Gascons, as well as the kings, Louis and Henry.19  
Looking further afield brought additional problems. There is a critical difficulty 
entrenched at the heart of this research; the analyses offered by English- and French-language 
secondary sources are diametrically opposed to one another, despite citing from the same 
sources. For example, Warren and Dunbabin bullishly asserted Henry’s ascendency at the 
conference held at La Ferté-Bernard and wrote of Louis’s subsequent enforced withdrawal of 
support from those who appealed to him in 1168, while Pacaut and Sassier arrived at the 
exact opposite position, saying that the French king refused to abandon them.
20
 Others 
writing on the same kings, neatly exemplified by Gillingham and Aurell, also describe their 
relationship from positions far distant from one another.
21
 This clear division in opinion 
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indicates that there is a lack of consensus and therefore further analysis is justified. In 
addition, there is no English language work on Louis VII, and French-language materials 
appear woefully inadequate in presenting French efforts beyond their shores.
22
  
The lionisation of Henry II in particular has hindered the pursuit of a balanced opinion 
of this exchange. Even the most modern and well-respected anthology concerning Henry II’s 
reign discourages the reader from being critical, by describing Warren’s work in terms of 
perfection.
23
 Warren’s well-written 1974 opus is the appropriate place to begin studying 
Henry’s reign, however, it now appears so factional that its value must be intrinsically 
reduced. Other points raised by Vincent on Henry’s reign also give cause for concern but are 
not directly relevant to Welsh-French relations; however they raise concerns over the 
analytical strength and academic neutrality of the work.
24
 Henry II: New Interpretations, 
although an anthology of well-written chapters by respected academics, did little to clarify 
matters critical to this research. It confidently reiterated notions of Henry’s military 
dominance and inferred Louis’s weakness due to the fact that he attracted and made use of 
allies.
25
 The relevant chapter will contend that Louis was able to dominate Henry and that his 
network of alliances formed part of that successful strategy. So, while Henry II: New 
Interpretations provides some useful analysis, on these central issues it appears to present a 
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rehash of old, prejudiced positions, rather than offering new interpretations. Elsewhere, a 
brief section touched upon the matter of Owain’s contacts with Louis. This followed the 
argument laid out by Huw Pryce’s article, but also added two noteworthy points. The first 
held that while the French were not at odds with the English because of affections they felt 
towards the Welsh, the fact that they were in conflict and included the Welsh at peace talks 
demonstrated that Owain’s dispute with Henry was no minor British affair.  Also, that the 
Welsh were able to make such offers at the talks of 1168 presumed that an alliance of some 
degree existed.
26
 
The recent and most troubling authorship on Henry, Louis and the Welsh comes from 
John Hosler. While this commentary by no means intentionally constitutes an attack on 
Hosler, his work encapsulates my prime criticism of the treatment of medieval Welsh history: 
it is poorly and inaccurately done throughout. Hosler’s work is well-referenced and therefore 
his mistakes are all the more surprising. His work is symptomatic of the feeble presentation 
and promotion of medieval Welsh history to a broader audience, for which Hosler bears no 
responsibility. In addition, its endemic bias and strikingly inaccurate analysis not only renders 
his works unusable as texts, but threatens to elevate them as ‘bad examples’. Perhaps of more 
concern, given that he has two mainstream publications on this subject, his errors risk being 
reproduced and becoming established as a position from which other writers could argue. 
This urgently needs to be averted, and the following gives selected examples of assertions 
from his two recent publications.
27
  
 Firstly, Hosler failed to correctly name Owain Gwynedd and Rhys ap Gruffudd, 
consistently calling them ‘Owain ap Gwynedd’ and ‘Rhys ap Deheubarth’.28 In this he seems 
linguistically out of his depth; ‘ap’ means ‘son of’ not ‘from’ or ‘of’. This demonstrates a 
significant failure to comprehend the basic facts of the subject.  Hosler commits other 
surprising errors, such as resurrecting ‘the Picts’ and inserting contingents of them into Henry 
II’s armies; this is obviously a mistranslation of ‘Pictavi’ or Poitevins.29 
 This work is significantly tainted by its overweening admiration for Henry and his 
‘greatness’, leading to Hosler’s concoction of euphemisms for Henry’s defeats in Wales 
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while struggling to admit such a thing had occurred.
30
 His position on the Welsh is Anglo-
centric and poorly phrased: ‘the Welsh were an intractable bunch’ and ‘the Welsh leadership 
perhaps saw an opportunity to rid itself of English rule.’31 There was no recognition that the 
Welsh did not accept Henry’s claim over them and they were not ruled by the ‘English’ at 
that time. He also pondered whether ‘the collected lands’ constituted ‘an Empire of Britain.’32 
Yet Henry did not collect lands in Britain, no Welsh title was appropriated, and, crucially, in 
the period covered here, none of the native Welsh held any territory of him, nor served him 
except as mercenaries, and none swore fealty to him. The question of homage is discussed in 
the relevant chapter. A final point regarding Henry, Louis and Owain will suffice. Hosler 
painted a scene where Henry acted powerfully beyond his borders, but where Louis was too 
weak or unable to act.
33
 However, John of Salisbury’s letters show that the Welsh, Bretons, 
Scots, Poitevins and Gascons were all within Louis’s amity and influence at that time; Hosler 
is therefore incorrect.
34
 He described Owain Gwynedd’s efforts to win Louis’s support in 
terms of boasting of victory against Henry, but ultimately being fruitless. In the subsequent 
chapter I will demonstrate that Hosler’s claim of Owain’s diplomatic failure is also incorrect. 
Although he acknowledged that the Welsh had defeated Henry in 1165, he asserted that 
‘given Henry’s recent military victories their (those at the conference) temerity seems ever so 
foolish, but in 1168 these particular rebels had little reason to fear him.’35 This typifies the 
confused and frequently illogical analysis that runs throughout these two publications. 
In summary, Warren dealt with the matter of the alliance in half a sentence and 
erroneously attached it solely to 1168. In the most recent work on Louis VII, Sassier simply 
drew reference to the Welsh in one passing mention. Pryce’s article excellently presented the 
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letters and translated them, but did not contextualise them and curiously only gave a partial 
list of those represented at the conference.
36
  
 
A similar scenario of limited engagement and questionable execution is replayed in reference 
to the third chapter, describing the relationship between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ap 
Iorwerth. Although Lloyd’s major work The History of Wales post-dated Matthews’ 1910 
publication of Llywelyn’s reply to Philip, it surprisingly did not discuss the treaty.37 The key 
secondary text studying the relationship between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ab Iorwerth 
is R. F. Treharne’s 1958 article, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’.38 Since 
publication, this work has been used or credited by all writers on this subject, most notably by 
Huw Pryce, Christopher Cheney, David Carpenter, Anthony Carr, Rees Davies, Natalie 
Fryde, Kari Maund, John Smith and Ifor Rowlands, the last of whom wrote of ‘the still 
somewhat neglected matter of the treaty between Llywelyn and Philip Augustus.’39 The 
chapter below demonstrates, however, that the study on which they relied is incorrect, and 
that the alliance was made with Prince Louis’s invasion in mind. 
Although a well-constructed article, Treharne’s argument is fatally flawed, and the 
discussion of it forms a major theme within the relevant chapter below.  Treharne pointed out 
certain of Matthews’ translation and transcription errors, and provided his own transcription, 
but no complete translation from the Latin; instead he inserted fragments of reworked 
sentences at various points throughout the text. He also pointed out that before his publication 
no Welsh writer had mentioned the treaty since Matthews, and none prior to him. He traced 
its French origins and its reproduction in a small number of French works between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, mentioning in passing how it had not surfaced in any 
English work prior to 1951, and even then just as a footnote citing a French source. 
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Treharne’s article made a number of simple mistakes, such as identifying the treaty as ‘the 
oldest surviving witness to an independent foreign policy pursued by a medieval Welsh 
ruler.’40 Of course, Owain Gwynedd’s letters pre-date this, but also it seems that the use of 
the word ‘policy’ is not just a semantic choice but rather an attempt to construct a notion of a 
defined political strategy designed by Llywelyn. This is a contentious and probably erroneous 
suggestion. Treharne’s work is discussed in detail below and requires no further debate here.  
Rees Davies’s seminal work, The Age of Conquest, made surprisingly scant reference 
to Owain Gwynedd’s contacts with France; he dedicated only half a sentence to Llywelyn’s 
treaty with Philip. Elsewhere in the same work he drew attention to the debate over the two 
possible dates for the treaty, 1212 and 1216.
41
 In Medieval Wales, Walker referred to 
Llywelyn’s negotiations with the nobles of Wales and Philip of France during 1212. No 
analysis of the relevance or text of the treaty was given.
42
 John Davies gave the treaty no 
more than a passing mention and claimed Pope Innocent III as its originator.
43
 Tony Carr also 
suggested that the idea for a French-Welsh treaty might have come from Innocent.
44
 No 
evidence was presented for this intriguing proposition, nor is the treaty or its relevance 
discussed in these works. Ralph Turner’s King John clearly outlined the problems which 
brought the Welsh to war with John in 1212. He identified widespread anger with John’s 
authoritarian rule as the main cause, but John’s punitive demands on Llywelyn in 1211 and 
his murder of Welsh hostages – the children of Welsh nobles – also hardened attitudes 
against the king. This was not solely a Welsh affair, however, as discontented English barons 
plotted to kill John on campaign or to hand him over to the Welsh. French involvement was 
linked to a letter to an English noble, John de Lacy, in 1209 and to 1216. This work also 
neglected to engage with the subject of the French-Welsh alliance.
45
 
The most recent wide-ranging publication to consider numerous facets of John’s reign 
emerged in 1999. Although there is an excellent chapter on King John and Wales, it simply 
rehashed unquestioned Treharne’s 1212 assertion.46 
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In The Struggle for Mastery, Carpenter dealt with Llywelyn the Great’s alliance with 
Philip of France in half a sentence.
47
  The most recent work on Llywelyn is Roger Turvey’s 
non-academic, populist account, Llywelyn the Great. This short work, the only monograph 
dedicated to Llywelyn’s life, career and importance deals with the alliance with France in just 
three sentences.48 The considerable corpus of works on the other protagonists, Philip 
Augustus and Innocent III, shed no light on the alliance at all.
49
   
 
A similar pattern of limited engagement emerges regarding Charles V’s compact with Owain 
Lawgoch. Interest in Owain began with a 100-page article by Edward Owen, published in 
1901.
50
 This work brought together many elements critical to Lawgoch’s story. It established 
his identity as the well-known Yvain de Galles, then described his career in France, England, 
Switzerland and Lombardy, his lineage and his murder. Although there are a few small flaws, 
such as mistaking Christine of Pisa’s gender, the argument throughout is persuasive; and this 
article forms the bedrock for subsequent work on this Welsh nobleman. Although this 
included a translation, but no original, of the declaration of 10 May 1372, there was no 
analysis of the alliance. This work also revealed the role of the Spanish and their 
unwillingness to sail to Wales to make war. Vivid details of Lawgoch’s role in the land 
campaign around Soubise and La Rochelle were also presented.
51
 This article, though dated 
now, was critical in bringing Lawgoch’s name and deeds to any audience. 
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Owen’s discovery was not followed by any noticeable surge in interest in Owain 
Lawgoch or his relations with Charles V. The next article on Lawgoch, in 1928, focussed on 
his unsuccessful adventures against the Swiss in 1375-6, and simply summarised his naval 
missions as an attack on the Channel Islands and a voyage to Spain.
52
  
Tony Carr is the only writer to carry the flag forward for Lawgoch. A small but 
notable section of ‘Welshmen and the Hundred Years’ War’ provided a résumé of Lawgoch’s 
career from Poitiers in 1356 to Mortagne in 1378. Carr contentiously claimed that ‘from 1369 
onwards, plans were being laid for a full-scale invasion of Wales. … In 1372 the attempted 
invasion took place.’ The facts appear to be at odds with these statements; this thesis will 
argue that two unconnected opportunities arose or were created by the French almost three 
years apart. He went on to retell the by-now familiar tale of the 1372 fleet’s attack on 
Guernsey and redirection to La Rochelle to campaign in Saintonge.
53
 That campaign was 
again described by Carr in a later article detailing the life of Sir Gregory Sais, a Welsh knight 
in English service. Curiously, although Lawgoch resurfaced in that text, no mention was 
made of his connection to Charles V, nor his declaration, nor his attempted invasions of 
Wales.
54
 
 More than sixty years after Owen’s groundbreaking article, Michael Siddons 
produced a thorough investigation, charting evidence of ‘Welshmen in the Service of France’, 
which traced Welsh soldiers in French muster lists between the 1360s and 1451. Using the 
same sources as Owen and Carr, Siddons also confirmed Lawgoch as commander of invasion 
fleets destined for Wales in 1369 and 1372. He went into no further detail and only 
mentioned the treaty between Lawgoch and Charles V in one footnote.
55
 Rees Davies 
recounted much the same story in ‘Age of Conquest’, while a similar, unrevealing line was 
followed by David Walker and Carr in their respective tomes, ‘Medieval Wales’.56 John 
Davies followed suit in his Welsh- and English-language publications.
57
 David Moore also 
summarised Lawgoch’s career in the same terms.58 None of these publications examined the 
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treaty or provided any further insight into the relationship between Charles and Owain or the 
relevance of these machinations within the context of the conflict between France and 
England.  
Surprisingly, but similarly to the treatment of Owain Gwynedd and Llywelyn ap 
Iorwerth, there is only one monograph on this Welshman, Tony Carr’s notable Owen of 
Wales.
59
 The fact that Carr’s text is only 98 pages long, including maps and family trees, 
suggests that there is more work to do on a thirty-year military career that was cut short by a 
team of assassins, only one of whom appears to have escaped. The cast of French greats with 
whom Owain associated is impressive and included Charles V, Bertand du Guesclin, 
Enguerrand de Coucy and Christine de Pisan. Carr’s work contains a significant section 
dedicated to Owain’s contacts with the French nobility.60 However, Carr did not discuss the 
treaty between Owain and Charles V. It is noteworthy and perhaps curious that although 
Lawgoch moved among the highest echelons of French society, and participated in some of 
the critical actions of the period including the recapture of La Rochelle, the tale of a Welsh 
pretender leading French armies has failed to ignite the imaginations of French historians 
since the late nineteenth century, or Spanish historians since 1780.
61
 His omission from the 
narrative of the period has continued up to modern times, however, with all recent editions of 
Froissart’s chronicles erasing him entirely.62  
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Modern studies of Owain Glyn Dŵr began in 1931 with Lloyd’s ‘Owen Glendower, Owain 
Glyndŵr’.63 This work was a masterpiece for its time and, although it no longer meets 
modern academic standards in places, it is still a credible presentation of the story and 
relevant sources. Lloyd wrote passionately throughout this work, but also imbued his text 
with evocative, emotive imagery which lessens its usefulness to the more detached modern 
reader.
64
 Nevertheless, this work is the blueprint upon which more recent writers, notably 
Rees Davies, have based their work. Lloyd devoted three chapters to Glyn Dŵr’s dealings 
with the French and one further chapter on his ecclesiastical initiatives, engaging with 
elements of the tale of the alliance in just a few paragraphs.
65
  
The three chapters which discussed Franco-Welsh diplomatic and military affairs 
mapped out the course of their joint actions, from late 1403 to the withdrawal from Worcester 
in autumn 1405. Curiously, neither Lloyd nor any other writer has seriously examined the 
issue that French-Breton-Welsh military co-ordination began on the ground at Kidwelly and 
Caernarfon in October and November 1403 respectively, yet overt diplomatic relations only 
appear to date from May 1404.
66
 Lloyd laid out the diplomatic exchanges of 1404, the failed 
mission of that year under Jacques de Bourbon, the resumption of efforts in 1405 along with 
the successful landing in Wales and the course of the expedition of that year. It was revealed 
within this section that Glyn Dŵr made overt the connection between himself and Yvain de 
Galles to the French, as noted by the Saint-Denys chronicler.
67
 The fact that this was 
something to which Glyn Dŵr could safely allude demonstrated Lawgoch’s ongoing 
significance in French noble and military circles. The chapter ‘Glyn Dŵr and the Church’ 
dealt with Welsh ecclesiastics and the Pennal Declaration.
68
 Here, Lloyd briefly identified the 
clauses of the declaration relevant to Wales. He did not offer analysis on them, or on where 
Owain’s declaration fitted into the geo-political machinations of the period that were played 
out between the two papal factions and those in their respective adherence. Although he made 
no connection with the dispute at the Council of Constance, Lloyd astutely observed that 
Welsh adherence to the French papal candidate, Benedict XIII, was intended to form a breach 
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with England as definite in the ecclesiastical sphere as did military action in the civil.
69
 This 
work was of immense value in advancing the study of Owain Glyn Dŵr and exposed notable 
elements of his contacts with France.  
French secondary sources, beginning in the 1960s, have proven frustrating. For 
example, in the often-cited work, ‘Clos des Galées’, there are extraordinary errors and 
inconsistencies in standards. Owain Glyn Dŵr is confused with Owain Lawgoch, for 
example, ‘Owen Glandower dit Yves ou Yvain de Galles ou Gales’ even though the 
references cited by Chazelas also detail the murder of Lawgoch in 1378. Also, numerous 
important subjects are found in the text of the book but are not listed in the index, ‘Henry IV 
ou Henry de Lancastre’ for example, adding to the complexity of the task. Moreover, these 
records seem inexplicably incomplete; four years were randomly sampled for measurement 
of the number of entries under each date. Despite the usual maritime commerce, intermittent 
warfare and launch of at least three war fleets, there were just 41 entries for the decade 1400-
10, whereas 1370 recorded 114 entries, 1371 had 40 entries and the period of 1380-5, when a 
large fleet was prepared for 1385, had 224 entries. In addition there is a long, unexplained 
break in the texts presented marking the years 1396 to 1411.
70
 Other well-known French 
works make similar, perhaps more striking errors. Françoise Lehoux also confused Owain 
Glyn Dŵr and Owain Lawgoch. She also inexplicably mistook the armed rising in Henry 
IV’s reign as being led by the Scots and the Welsh in support of a Mortimer claim to the 
throne. This was then compounded by her reporting that the Welsh were heavily defeated at 
‘Humbledon’, clearly Homildon Hill, where the Scots were routed by Percy-led armies in 
September 1402. In reality, it is unlikely that even a single Welshman fell at Homildon. She 
also wrote that they continued the struggle until the Welsh and Scots were defeated on 21 
July 1403 – the battle of Shrewsbury, where in fact neither side fought. Other major French 
works covering the same subject include no mention of the alliance or the expeditions at all.
71
 
The most recent French publication on the period mentioned the unsuccessful Bourbon 
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mission, but did not detail its failure, nor make any reference the more successful expedition 
the following year.
72
 
Age of Conquest barely mentioned Glyn Dŵr’s foreign initiatives, summing them up in 
one line. Although Davies recalled elements of the language used in the Pennal Declaration, 
nothing else of note is said on French-Welsh relations.
73
 Walker, Carr and John Davies retold 
the story of Glyn Dŵr’s conflict with Henry IV, noting his acquisition of allies, but not 
exploring any diplomatic communications or their relevance.
74
  
Currently, the principal work on Owain Glyn Dŵr is Rees Davies’s The Revolt of 
Owain Glyn Dŵr.75 This detailed, well-crafted work explored many facets of the story, the 
personalities involved and some of the context of the events of the time. It stands as the 
authoritative reference for any study related to Glyn Dŵr. On the subject of the Franco-Welsh 
alliance during the early 1400s, Davies fluently told the story first outlined by Lloyd in 1931, 
which requires no retelling here, but also made some intuitive observations. He suggested 
that the collapse of French support was due to their military failures against English 
territories in France in 1406 and to their deteriorating internal political situation, where 
factional disputes erupted into full-blown civil war. Paraphrasing a large section of work, he 
also considered that had the French simply wished to use aggression against England to bring 
Henry to the discussion table, determined assaults on Calais and Bordeaux would have been 
more effective. Therefore, their alliance with Wales was more than just an effort to irritate the 
English crown. Davies did not present the treaty texts, and his analysis tended to follow the 
line established by Lloyd; that the letters of 1404-1406 were extraordinary initiatives from 
Glyn Dŵr, demonstrating his prowess and reputation, as well as showing French willingness 
to exploit the opportunity offered to damage England.
76
 This thesis shows that the initiative 
came from France, and that a better understanding of the French courtly factions is critical to 
furthering study in this field.  
David Moore’s account borrowed from Lloyd and Davies, but includes a number of 
odd inconsistencies, perhaps epitomised by this comment on the diplomatic union of 1404: 
‘The French declined to make any promise of military aid, but a fleet of 60 ships soon left for 
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Wales.’ Apart from the obvious point that promises must have been made for a fleet to 
assemble, be armed, equipped, populated, paid and set sail in both 1404 and 1405, these two 
missions were plain examples of military aid.
77
 He made a number of confused points, for 
example, in reference to rebellions after Edward I’s invasion, he stated that Wales would not 
have an ‘Auld Alliance’ with France because of its location.78 Yet this ignores the fact that 
Scotland enjoyed an ‘Auld Alliance’ with France despite being more geographically isolated 
and having the same neighbour; therefore geography cannot be the determining factor Moore 
claimed. The Bretons sustained their independence by playing off English and French 
interests, and fears over one another’s movements on the Breton peninsula. Their duke 
became a puppet of the alternating power balance between France and England who 
forwarded their own candidates in the wars of succession. Also, despite nominal 
independence, Brittany found itself occupied by foreign forces for long periods, for example, 
an English mandate there lasted from 1364-1398.  
He presented the defeat of independent Wales as inexorable, because the historical facts 
bear out that notion. However, this seems deterministic and, when considering the efforts 
they made with Wales, the French clearly did not share that view. Moore praised the Scots for 
avoiding paying homage to English kings and identified that as the reason for their survival, 
yet he wrote that the opposite actions condemned the Welsh. He then listed examples where 
states, such as Brittany, survived because they accepted overlordship, thus removing reason 
to invade. In a further contradiction, he confusingly added that ‘It was arguably better, then, 
to accept royal overlordship.’79 This seems at odds with his own findings; Scotland’s 
independence persisted because it remained aloof with the support of their French ally, 
whereas Breton liberty endured because they accepted the superiority of a foreign lord.  
In contrast to the diplomatic and military movements, more has been written 
concerning the 1406 Pennal Declaration and the question raised at the Council of Constance 
which alluded to the ecclesiastical independence of the Welsh, among others. In 1923, an 
article gave an account of the personnel who formed Glyn Dŵr’s ecclesiastical upper 
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echelon, his bishops, and also drew attention to the Welsh presence at Constance.
80
 A. 
Jarman’s 1951 article ‘Wales at the Council of Constance’ gave a very brief outline of the 
Welsh question raised at the Council by the French. It suggested that the French protest was 
probably an effort to destroy the conference although he provided no explanation as to why 
that might have been desirable.
81
 Glanmor Williams raised a number of effective points in his 
work of 1962 concerning the history of the Welsh church. Although he gave a fleeting list of 
the clauses, significantly, he identified the Pennal Declaration as a political document rather 
than an ecclesiastical or civil one. He argued that it was designed to break ties with 
Canterbury in order to act as an organ of a new Welsh state. In reading more deeply into the 
nature of this document, Williams made a creditable advance in the study of Glyn Dŵr’s 
diplomatic effort.
82
 
C. M. D. Crowder’s later publication featured a translation of the English response to 
the question posed by the French which included the matter of the Welsh.
83
 Although in 
essence incomplete, Crowder’s work is essential to the study of the Welsh question at 
Constance. Oddly, Rees Davies devoted only a relatively small amount of space to the Pennal 
Declaration. He enthusiastically described it as being ‘extraordinarily ambitious’ and offered 
a justification against any accusations of it being a ‘hare-brained’ project.84 Gwyn Alf 
Williams offered a different perspective, waxing lyrical over the Welsh presence at the 
Council of Constance as Glyn Dŵr’s last stand.85  
 
There is one final point to make regarding the secondary literature, unfortunately a negative 
one. A surprising and unforeseen difficulty in conducting this research was the jingoism often 
found secondary sources.
86
 For example, N. H. Nicolas wrote of an Anglo-French clash at 
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sea, ‘success depended entirely upon courage and physical strength; and in such contests the 
English have almost always been victorious.’87 French works can also be similarly jingoistic 
and inaccurate, describing how France’s tiny ships made England tremble for a hundred 
years.
88
 This closing comment acts as a reflection on the amount of patriotic bias encountered 
during this project; however, it is acknowledged that similar material can be found in works 
covering all periods.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and as all his victories only terminated in fame, they are scarce worth a place in the page of history. It will be 
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2.1:   Personalities and Power. 
 
The Bretons, the Poitevins and the messengers of the Scottish king and of the Welsh 
kings, were all present at this meeting; they promised aid to the French king and offered 
him hostages; and they departed under an obligation; so too the nobles of Gascony.
1
 
 
This telling sentence from a letter by the English clergyman, John of Salisbury, referred to 
the 1168 conference at La Ferté-Bernard, where those powers sought French intercession on 
their behalf in their struggles against Henry II of England. John’s principal reason for writing 
this letter to his exiled tutor at the Roman Curia was to report on relations between the kings 
of England and France, as well as the behaviour of Thomas Becket, titular archbishop of 
Canterbury, but then in exile. John appears to have maintained a largely balanced view of the 
political crises of his time, although this was understandably tempered by his adherence to 
the papacy over his king, and coloured by his vision of the world, dictated by his profession. 
It might be unfair to say that he consistently favoured any side except that of the Church and, 
in spite of losing favour in the English court, it would be inaccurate to portray him as pro-
French. These works provide a substantial collection of first-hand commentary on a wide 
spectrum of events and personalities.
2
 The details of the involvement of those other nations, 
which chiefly touched on the complaints of the Bretons and Poitevins, were a consequence of 
the manoeuvring, confrontations and interplay between Kings Louis and Henry and form part 
of the discussion on power relations below. This lone sentence appears to be the only primary 
account which directly recalls the presence of all the plaintiffs, and it is also the only source 
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to mention the conference in any detail, however scant.
3
 John appears to have attended the 
conference and written to Rome in the same month of the meeting, July 1168.
4
  
Welsh inclusion in that conference was the result of a diplomatic exchange between 
Owain ap Gruffudd ap Cynan, known as Owain Gwynedd, the most influential native ruler at 
that time, and the court of Louis VII of France. That sequence of letters marks the earliest 
known diplomatic contact between a ruler of an independent Welsh territory and a French 
king. Firm evidence of three such letters has been credibly dated to the years 1163-1168.
5
 
This chapter will therefore introduce the personalities associated with the relevant events of 
these years, and expose the political landscape into which these letters can be situated. Then, 
due to Huw Pryce’s work on the letters, only a brief discussion of them seems necessary 
before, most importantly, an analysis of their impact. That final section will consider the 
nature of the ‘obligation’ cryptically referred to by John of Salisbury, and also comment on 
the apparent power relations between the principal engagés.  
The little-reported conference at La Ferté-Bernard involved a number of plaintiffs 
opposed to Henry II, and although the panoply of their individual causes no doubt merits 
broader exposure, this chapter will only study the Welsh case, making reference to those 
others where appropriate.
6
 Their plurality however is indicative of a troubled period where 
Henry’s intrusions or attempts to assert his dominance provoked grievances to arise across a 
broad area of western Europe. That they all approached Louis VII is significant and therefore 
the relationship between Louis and Henry requires examination. Given the dichotomy in 
scholarly opinion on their relationship mentioned in the first chapter, a re-evaluation of the 
behaviour of these leaders offers a new perspective on the power relations of the moment.  
 
Owain ap Gruffudd ap Cynan, known as Owain Gwynedd, was the native ruler of Gwynedd 
from his accession at the death of his father, Gruffudd ap Cynan, in 1137, until his own death 
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in 1170.
7
 He has long drawn praise from historians for his balance of military skills, cautious 
governance and diplomatic talent.
8
 The exchange with Louis VII arguably marked his finest 
hour in diplomatic terms, as the result of the 1168 conference, discussed below, bears out. 
Owain’s relationship with Henry II was as complex as any other of the period, in which the 
vagueness of many of the arrangements concerning territorial limits and personal power 
relations both suited and antagonised those involved.
9
 Although Owain did pay him homage, 
he never gave Henry feudal homage; that is publicly acknowledging the king as his overlord 
from whom he held his lands. He also faced and defeated Henry twice in battle. John 
Gillingham makes great play of the declining value of the different forms of homage. In 
Gillingham’s case it served to lessen the perception of Henry’s inferiority to his French 
overlord. Since Owain Gwynedd did not hold his lands of Henry, nor owe him tribute or 
service and never recognised him as his overlord, his acknowledgement of Henry II should 
therefore only be read as hommage en marche; normally occurring on a frontier, it was ‘an 
act symbolising peace between equals.’10 Marcel Pacaut had also previously described these 
different forms in a manner largely in accordance with Gillingham.
11
 In addition, the practice 
of meeting at the border to resolve a dispute and negotiate future conduct fits entirely with 
native Welsh custom measurable throughout the medieval period.
12
 Therefore, even in the act 
of making peace, it cannot be shown that Henry obliged Owain to behave as if subject to 
alien feudal customs. 
Moreover, Owain successfully opposed Henry on the battlefield on two occasions. 
The first was at Ewloe in July 1157 where the English king was wounded and the royal 
standard was dropped to the ground – a contemporary gesture symbolising acceptance of 
defeat. This act might have provoked Crown forces to rout and the result is unequivocal; 
Henry went down in the fighting, his army fled. Owain’s troops held the field and had 
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undoubtedly won the day.
13
 Peace was made between the two leaders the following month 
where it was reported that an act of homage took place.
14
 Therefore homage paid to Henry 
later that season should be viewed as homage ‘en marche’ or as an act of expediency to avoid 
further confrontation. This was certainly not a case where Henry dragged his foe to the 
negotiating table because Owain Gwynedd had won the battle against a theoretically superior 
force and bought peace with a gesture; the recognition of Henry Plantagenet’s position and 
power was not an acceptance of subservience. Rather, this use of the symbolic media of the 
time appears a shrewd move to mollify the sting of defeat of his larger, aggressive neighbour. 
It seems right to identify Henry’s territorial ambitions as the prime factor behind his second 
attack on Gwynedd in 1165. This time, at Berwyn, Owain led a coalition of Welsh armies 
that stood against Henry, forcing the king of England once more to retreat humiliated.
15
  
The confrontation at Berwyn took place within the years of Owain’s correspondence 
with France, and is noted in his third letter.
16
 The first letter can be pinned to 1163-4, a period 
following the 1163 meeting at Woodstock in which Henry II obliged Welsh nobles, Owain 
Gwynedd and Rhys ap Gruffudd foremost among them, along with Malcolm IV, king of 
Scotland, to perform homage. Once that homage had been rendered and in due course its 
implications became plain, the Welsh revolted.
17
 It is probable that Henry’s insistence on 
redefining relations between these rulers and their lands in terms favourable to him provoked 
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Owain to seek the assistance of Henry II’s overlord, Louis VII. It could be argued therefore 
that Henry inadvertently opened the conduit essential for this petition to the French to be 
perceived by all as legally and morally valid; by insisting that he was Owain’s overlord, 
Owain could legitimately appeal to Henry’s overlord. The confrontation at Berwyn, two years 
after the conference at Woodstock, explicitly demonstrated that Owain did not accept Henry 
as his overlord and would dispute that claim on the battlefield.  
 
Louis VII, king of France 1137-1180, also shared a complex relationship with his Angevin 
vassal, the powerful Henry II, king of England 1154-1189, whose territories stretched from 
the Pyrenees to the Scots’ border, and after 1174, included Scotland within his power.18 
Louis’s hegemony encompassed his personal lands focussed around the Île-de-France, 
seemingly diminutive in comparison to those of Henry, although Louis was nominally 
overlord of those lands held by others in French-speaking areas, including Henry II’s 
substantial continental inheritance.
19
 Additionally, Henry’s governance of this wide expanse 
of lands did not imply that he was the master of them all, as subsequent revolts and 
disturbances would demonstrate. Neither did these expansive territories necessarily equate to 
comparably large resources becoming available to Henry; perhaps the opposite was true, 
these lands required a huge outlay in expense and effort in order to retain any measure of 
authority.
20
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Map 1: French territories circa 1170.
21
 
 
As the second son of Louis VI, an ecclesiastical career had been prepared for Prince Louis 
until the death of his elder brother Philip in 1131 made him heir, he acceded in 1137.
22
 His 
connections to the Church were a significant feature throughout his reign, and he was also a 
notable figurehead of the Second Crusade, in which he participated between 1147-9, and 
from which he gained in reputation.
23
 Louis’s first marriage, to Eleanor of Aquitaine, was 
annulled at his behest on grounds of consanguinity in 1152, although their deteriorating 
relations, provoked by Eleanor’s alleged infidelity, and therefore the decreasing likelihood of 
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producing Louis’s male heir, were also significant. Just weeks after her divorce, Eleanor 
married Henry, count of Anjou; although destined to become king of England just two years 
later, this could not have been firmly predicted in 1152. Perhaps in light of Henry’s crowning 
in England, Louis married Constance, daughter of the king of Castile in 1154. This union to a 
power south of Eleanor’s – and therefore Henry’s also – lands in Aquitaine, also formed a 
feature of the strategic tussle between the two kings. While these and other features of 
Louis’s reign are notable, they require no further elaboration here; Henry had married 
Eleanor without his overlord’s permission and this was a further, personal point of tension 
between them.  Henry was to have five sons and three daughters with her, to some degree this 
is noteworthy, perhaps even viewed as insulting to the French king, since Louis’s near 
fifteen-year union with her failed to produce a male heir. Once he became king of England in 
1154, Henry might have also appeared to be more powerful than his overlord.
24
  
An intriguing factor that emerges from studies of these two monarchs is the 
consistency of the message concerning the disparity between their respective powers. Henry 
is continually portrayed as being the dominant military force.
25
 Louis however, has been 
widely acknowledged as weak and fearful of Henry – although this notion is increasingly 
under revision.
26
 Indeed, when considered within a broader European context, including 
relations with the other eminent nations; the German empire, the Spanish kingdoms and the 
Papacy, Louis’s oft-referred to weakness appears out of place with his high position among 
his contemporaries. It is not only smaller powers that sought the intimacy of alliance with 
Louis; Castile, England, Hungary and the Byzantine Empire also confirmed marriage 
alliances with Louis and his family.
27
 In the case of Castile, for example, this was a mutually 
beneficial strategic alliance poised to counter possible threats to their interests in the region 
from Aragon and Henry II.
28
 Due to skilful political manoeuvring, the Angevin king of 
England gained valuable territory in Normandy in the first such marriage alliance between 
the young Henry and Princess Margaret in 1160. However, Henry’s betrothal of both of his 
heirs, Henry and Richard, to Capetian princesses demonstrated the enduring desirability of 
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union and amicable relations with Louis.
29
 Finally, and to relate this to the matter in hand, 
were Louis so weak, it seems improbable that the Bretons, Gascons, Poitevins, Welsh and 
Scots would seek him as their key ally in 1168. The expediency of his geographical proximity 
might account for their appeals in part, as might an occasionally, even increasingly, 
adversarial relationship between the rulers of France and England. However, such an ardent 
desire to secure the involvement of a weak ally seems at odds with the facts. While Henry II 
was evidently a major force, he was not all-powerful, a point recognised by his 
contemporaries and also one Warren conceded.
30
 The two defeats delivered to him by Owain 
Gwynedd also serve as ample example of that, and were reported in a letter by John of 
Salisbury in 1166 in the following way:  
 
Let anyone turn his mind’s eye to view the number and the quality of the enemies which 
the Lord has raised against the king [Henry II] since he lifted his heel against God to 
crush the Church. He will surely be astonished and, if he is wise, filled with reverence for 
God’s judgement: for he has chosen not emperors or kings or the princes of the nations to 
quell him, but chose first the remotest of men, the Welsh of Snowdon; and later he fired 
them to withstand in open fight the king whose footprints they had been used to 
worship.
31
 
 
 Louis’s style has been characterised as preferring ‘to put diplomatic pressure on 
Henry, to support the military initiatives of others rather than to fight himself, because he 
knew what the result would be.’32 This appears to convey a sense that, in comparison to 
Henry’s energetic and bellicose ways, Louis was a lesser ruler in style and substance. 
Nevertheless, for all of his apparent military might, Henry did not vanquish or take territory 
from Louis, neither did the German emperor, Frederick I Barbarossa, whose much-vaunted 
military prowess appears only to have been paralleled or even eclipsed by that of Henry II. 
The German emperor viewed the kings of England and France as minor rulers, and was more 
profoundly engaged in a struggle with the Papacy to determine whether the empire was a 
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papal fief; an assumption which would challenge and render impotent the emperor’s rights to 
legitimacy.
33
 A different perspective on Dunbabin’s assertion suggests that Louis was a far 
more skilled political operator; inducing conflict elsewhere not only kept his adversary off-
balance in a number of theatres while preserving the integrity of his own forces and economy, 
but ensured that other powers developed a vested interest in Louis’s survival. To recruit allies 
of differing sizes and locations therefore appears an intelligent, rather than a desperate 
strategy. The wide polarity in opinion of these two monarchs betrays the fact that a deeper 
point on their power relations has perhaps not yet been fully or satisfactorily exposed. Given 
the scale of any study tackling that matter, only a small part can be discussed here, and the 
key elements of the power relations between Louis and Henry can be briefly detailed 
referring to a small number of crucial events.  
While perhaps exaggerated, the military superiority of Louis’s adversarial neighbours, 
Henry and Frederick, has been long held. Louis therefore needed to be more intelligent than 
his more powerful neighbours in order for his line and kingdom to survive. The most overt 
strategy was a proliferation of supportive alliances to counter the interests and influence of 
his rivals; in 1168 this can be seen to also include the Welsh.
34
 Another view of Louis’s 
alliance structure can be identified as territorial and personal. A brief analysis of the former 
reveals the extent to Louis’s diplomatic arrangements and offers a good example of the 
engagement of ‘bracketing’ alliances. Although this notion became more distinct in the 
succeeding generation and is therefore more sharply defined in the following chapter, this 
model can be seen to be used in this period too.  
As established above, Louis’s territories were smaller than Henry’s, but contiguous, 
unlike Henry’s which were separated by the Channel and were home to numerous languages 
and dialects in regions which maintained notions of distinct, separate identities. This was 
probably an advantage to Louis since it presented a smaller front for Henry to exploit and 
provided clear, though extensive, areas in which to apply Capetian diplomatic and military 
efforts. In comparison, the Plantagenet ‘empire’, though vast, was a collection of disparate 
territories some of whom had no interest in adhering to their new Angevin overlord.
35
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Map 2: A general map of Angevin, Capetian and allied territories.
36
 
To the north and east of the French royal domains, Louis pursued the friendships of the great 
families of Flanders and Champagne. The acquisition of these powers as allies, even without 
the brokering of a formal treaty, was crucial to France. It not only extended a buffer between 
the Île-de-France and lands held by Henry but swelled those lands deemed to be in the French 
obedience, in some measure countering the vastness of the Angevin domain. These unions 
were sealed with a series of marriages, binding the influential families, as well as the granting 
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of favours and promotion to offices within the realm. They also entailed Louis sending forces 
to assist his allies in conflicts within their homelands. Securing ties with Flanders also offered 
the opportunity to probe Normandy from the east. The connection between Paris and 
Champagne became personally close; the king took Count Henry the Liberal’s sister, Adela 
of Champagne, as his third wife in 1160. In return, Louis’s daughters Mary and Alice were 
married to Henry and his brother, Count Theobald of Blois, in 1162. Before becoming count, 
Henry of Champagne had been on crusade with Louis, and the alliance between them, 
personal and territorial, aggrandised and provided support for both. Their friendship, which 
grew throughout the 1150s, was not only intended to provide a bulwark against any German 
threat, but as this alliance also encompassed Blois, it offered a potential pressure point in the 
west. This broad position of strength gave Henry the Liberal an advantageous position that he 
was able to exploit to further his ambitions by engaging with Louis and Frederick.
37
 
 
Map 3: The lands of 
Blois-Champagne.
38
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Across the south of France, a similar picture of Louis’s diplomatic and military activities is 
discernible. As Henry asserted the marriage rights to Aquitaine gained in 1152, Louis turned 
                                                          
37
 Pacaut, Louis VII, 179-82; Warren, Henry II, 78 n. 1, 88-90; Duby, trans., Vale, France in the Middle Ages, 195; 
Sassier, Louis VII, 251-6, 300-1.  
38 Map 3: The lands of Blois-Champagne in the later twelfth century, demonstrating their geographic 
proximities to Henry II’s lands in the west, and the Louis VII’s territory centred on Paris. Source: Hallam and 
Everard, Capetian France, 987-1328, 44. 
 44 
 
his attention to his south-west frontier. He made the above-mentioned marriage alliance with 
Castile in 1154, an agreement that bracketed Aquitaine and Aragon, the other major threat in 
the south. He also married his sister, Constance, to Count Raymond V of Toulouse, creating 
another unit of power in the region and acting as a further bracket and a block to the eastward 
aspirations of Barcelona and Angevin Aquitaine. The other powers involved also sought to 
use bracketing relations in the region. Henry II struck up a friendship with Raymond-
Berenger IV of Aragon, while Frederick Barbarossa also played a hand in the south, 
squeezing the southern provinces between the competing interests of larger powers.
39
  
 
Map 4: The territories of south-west Europe.
40
 
Although the Toulouse marriage did not last, at its arrangement it appeared to be a strategic 
coup for the Capetian monarchy. While it stood however, Toulouse bore witness to a critical 
display of personal and feudal power between Henry II and Louis in 1159, and Louis 
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emerged victorious. This is discussed below within the context of feudal relations. Louis 
advanced his influence in Languedoc and the Auvergne during this time too, cleverly 
bestowing favours and rights on the Church throughout the region and thus gaining their 
support, before conducting military campaigns there in person. While Capetian influence 
there would wax and wane over the years, primarily through a lack of resources to impose his 
will permanently in the region as well as through foreign intervention, the French king 
remained an important figure in terms of patronage and support, as well as appeal, showing 
that many in the south recognised his legitimacy as senior arbiter and regional overlord.
41
  
As Pacaut conceded, friendship with the French throne did not stop provinces on the 
periphery of the larger states from seeking security and union with other external powers, for 
many endured undulating relations with their neighbours. For example, the Flemish and 
Toulousains experienced periods of war, peace and commercial expansion with the English, 
Aragonese and the Germans.
42
 Establishing that point as acceptable as well as fact also 
justifies territories on the Angevin periphery acting similarly. In the case of the Welsh, the 
perception that Owain Gwynedd’s marriage to Cristin was incestuous probably posed a 
significant obstacle to Owain and Louis developing personal ties. Having had his marriage to 
Eleanor of Aquitaine annulled on grounds of consanguinity, it would be difficult for Louis to 
nurture a close amity in the face of the evident ecclesiastical displeasure.
43
 Despite the 
seeming bonhomie expressed between Owain and the French Chancellor in the letters, it was 
success in war against Henry that gained the Welsh a place at the conference table.
44
 
Therefore, the Welsh offered a territorial interest, rather than an opportunity to extend 
Louis’s carefully cultivated personal cabal.  
Louis can also be seen acting beyond his borders; for example his inveigling of 
Henry’s family. In 1156, Louis encouraged the revolt of Geoffrey, Henry’s brother, who had 
established himself in Brittany. Although it was ultimately unsuccessful, Henry was obliged 
to spend time, effort and resources to re-establish his superiority. This was a pattern that was 
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repeated during their reigns, particularly in Brittany where there was genuine native 
resistance to Henry’s claim to power, and most famously in collaborating and supporting the 
revolt of Henry’s sons in 1173.45 There also is a faintly traceable contact between France and 
Scotland in the 1160s, demonstrating not only Louis’s appeal as an ally, but also his capacity 
to reach and react far beyond the Île-de-France. In addition, this shows that Louis was willing 
and able to cultivate good relations and conduct affairs with all ranks of the nobility, 
whatever their region or mother tongue.
46
 
However, since Louis is generally perceived as being weaker than Henry or Frederick, 
and apparently restricted to a smaller territory surrounding his influential core in the Île-de-
France, he must have possessed something desirable to those others who sought his 
friendship or agreed to his alliance proposals. It might be fair to accuse writers on the subject 
of attaching too great a significance to visible or even assumed military force, when there is 
clearly far more at play than the simple deployment of armies. This prevailing and superficial 
measure ignores the obvious; it would have been folly for any small powers to align 
themselves with a weak, remote ally when faced with enemies such as Henry II or Frederick 
I. Yet Louis regularly attracted alliance offers and also wooed factions and leaders to bond 
with him in some manner. This can be attributed to Louis’s possession and intelligent 
wielding of ‘power’, which attracted others to him, and provoked others, such as Henry II, to 
defer to and even to emulate him. As Thomas Bisson and Michel Foucault compellingly 
argued, power could also be personal, difficult to measure and intangible, but also inducing, 
seductive, enticing, suggestive and more potent than a tally of soldiers.
47
 Louis’s survival, or 
victory, perhaps depended then on being able to draw Henry, rather than a myriad of allies, 
into his power.   
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 A critical step in the establishment of this ethereal quality came at the council of 
Soissons in 1155. The desire for peace and unity within the country had long been urged by 
the Church and, at that moment, it seemed desirable to the temporal powers also. In addition, 
the French monarch sought to bind the loyalties of the magnates of France to him. In a move 
that would reconcile the aims of all three groups, Louis assembled France’s spiritual and 
secular leaders in a grand council, where, in the presence of their peers, each swore an 
elegantly worded oath that not only bound them to keep the peace but to act in concert 
against any who broke it. The ecclesiastical contingent was headed by the archbishops of 
Sens and Rheims, and included their suffragans, while the landed nobility included the 
French barony and notably the duke of Burgundy and the counts of Flanders, Champagne, 
Nevers and Soissons.
48
 This agreement was a major coup for it effectively created a coalition 
of powers willing to collaborate, and placed the French throne in the centre of this new, 
formal fraternity. The use of ceremony, public declaration and the instilling of a notion of 
unity for collective interest appears very shrewd. Equally, the lack of threat or coercion is 
obvious by its absence. Bisson agreed with the notion that Louis VII’s governance 
demonstrates an ‘intellectual approach to power’.49 Although he introduced the ideas of 
sociologist Max Weber on this matter to good effect, other writers have made valuable 
contributions that can equally be applied to this matter.
50
 However, this enticement, 
influencing, even subtly dictating, the behaviour of other magnates and freely, peacefully 
drawing them in to this mode of conduct placing Louis above them clearly demonstrates an 
application of Nye’s ‘soft power’ in the Twelfth century.51  
The oath made by many at Soissons in 1155 formally secured the supremacy of the 
French Crown in the lands of those present. It also established the concept of a pattern of 
behaviour which bound those men to maintain this practice, and it enticed Henry II into a 
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similar peaceful arrangement with Louis to whom he swore homage as early as 1158. The 
promise rendered to the French king then was unequivocal; Henry was Louis’s man and held 
his continental lands of him.
52
 In spite of his clarifying of certain ambiguities, John 
Gillingham’s passionate, yet speculative denial of Henry’s submission at this early stage 
contrasts with Henry’s own words and actions.53 The contemporary evidence explicitly 
admitted Henry’s acceptance of Louis’s superior position.54 In addition, Henry’s own 
behaviour before Toulouse in 1159 vitiates Gillingham’s argument.55 While those promising 
to adhere to their vassalic pledges did so, such agreements endowed the French monarch with 
power, influence and authority over them all. Equally, they had bound themselves to 
guaranteeing that each held faith with the terms. This complex example of co-opting and 
consent, forms an essential part of the power relations of the time. Although Foucault 
explained the transmission of information through symbolic media, such as ritual, as 
‘relationships of communication’, he saw these as being inextricably linked to relationships 
of power, which he described as being ‘rooted in the system of social networks.’ In those 
terms, this analysis comfortably encompasses Louis’s relationship with his vassals. Bisson 
also saw such developments as being at the forefront of the advances of the age; consensus 
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and a notion of communal cohesion legitimised those in positions of authority.
56
 Consent then 
is an instrument of power, in that it enables one element of those locked together in the power 
relationship to determine the limits of another’s actions.57  
This vision of co-operation enticed or repulsed the excluded. It is worth making that 
distinction here, for soft power needs to be sensitively and intelligently deployed in order to 
be effective; Louis enticed Henry between 1155-8 and this resulted in an oath of fealty. 
Henry’s loyalty to his word was tested and convincingly proved by his withdrawal before 
Toulouse in 1159. The simple act of refusing to attack because his lord, Louis, was present in 
the town evidently demonstrated Louis’s superior rank within the feudal hierarchy and, in 
that measure, his dominance.
58
 In contrast, Henry failed to bind the Welsh to a similar 
agreement in 1163, and war between them followed. These efforts to emulate Louis’s 
methods of power are testimony to the strength of soft power; not only was Henry drawn into 
behaving in a way that disadvantaged him, by paying homage to Louis and accepting a 
subservient position within the European noble fraternity, but he also attempted to replicate 
that form of power with those people he deemed to fall within his influence. It could be 
argued that Henry’s attempt to duplicate Louis’s methods unwittingly paid him compliment 
by giving recognition to their effectiveness. Moreover, in gaining ascendency over Henry 
without needing to defeat him in battle, Louis had demonstrated a military aphorism that is as 
prized in modern warfare as it was when written by Sun Tzu.
59
 This axiom also clearly 
applied to the medieval period. 
 The assertion of Louis’s rights over his vassals, including Henry, reinforced their 
positions within an established power structure which delineated ways of behaving, through 
precedent, ritual and appeal. The latter formed an important role, and the kings of France 
figured among the most respected arbiters of noble disputes within Europe. Even Geoffrey of 
Anjou and his son Henry petitioned King Louis to complain that King Stephen of England 
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was withholding from them rights over Normandy and England, Louis interceded on their 
side.
60
 Accepting the French kings’ right and ability to adjudicate in such matters, manifestly 
accorded them a superior rank above their peers in that regard. This also highlighted the valid 
rationale behind Owain Gwynedd’s approaches to Louis during the years 1163-8.  
Yet Louis’s acquisition and deployment of power appears to extend further. While he 
was reputedly far more than conventionally pious, he does not appear to have been unaware 
of the political role and influence of the Church.
61
 Although it seems reasonable to state that 
Louis’s motivations in protecting and promoting the Church appear genuine, the political 
ramifications of his actions and policies contributed to his authority, and require brief 
consideration. He took pains to bind the Church and monarchy close, to some degree one 
supporting and legitimising the other.  
 It can be argued that the schism of 1159 helped this cause further. During 1163-5, 
France offered a safe refuge for Pope Alexander III in times of schism and enforced flight 
from Rome.
62
 Once openly committed, Louis was guaranteed ecclesiastical support due to his 
steadfast support for the Roman popes, even to the point of agreeing to two, ultimately 
aborted meetings with Barbarossa to argue Alexander’s case. Henry II’s policy toward the 
schism was steered by French churchmen. The prelates in Henry’s continental possessions 
naturally followed the direction of the Gallican church, which not only adhered to Alexander 
but enjoyed closer ties to the French throne than it did to that of England.
63
 Although Henry 
flirted with the idea of supporting Barbarossa’s candidate, ultimately he was obliged to avoid 
alienating his own clergy. Being able to influence those men consequently possibly enabled 
Louis to sway Henry to declare fidelity with Alexander in 1160.
64
 A third perspective is also 
credible, that the clergy resident in the lands of both kings were able to draw the two 
                                                          
60
 Pacaut, Louis VII, 161-4; Sassier, Louis VII, 219-20; D. Power, ‘Henry, Duke of the Normans (1149/50-1189), in 
Henry II: New Interpretations, 85; Bisson, The Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 229-33. 
61
 Pacaut, Louis VII, 75, 77-90; Warren, Henry II, 451, 489-90; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 19-24; Sassier, Louis 
VII, 338-9, 343-4; Dunbabin, ‘Henry II and Louis VII’, 51, 58. 
62
 M. Pacaut, Alexandre III (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1956), 213-5; Pacaut, Louis VII, 70-1, 75; R. 
Somerville, Pope Alexander III and the Council of Tours (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press, 1977), 1; Ellis, trans., Boso’s Life of Alexander III 1; Sassier, Louis VII, 293-357; Aurell, L’ Empire des 
Plantagenêt, 241; Aurell, trans., Crouch, The Plantagenet Empire, 220. 
63
 Warren, Henry II, 451-2, it is noteworthy however, that even the event of declaring for a papal candidate has 
also been viewed from Henry’s perspective: ‘Louis could not risk declaring for one pope and seeing his rival 
take western France into the other obedience.’; Somerville, Pope Alexander III and the Council of Tours, 2. 
64
 Pacaut, Alexandre III, 137-9, 222-30; Pacaut, Louis VII, 70-5, 77, 197; Pacaut, trans., Pomerans, Barbarossa, 
104-7; Warren, Henry II, 492-3; Somerville, Pope Alexander III and the Council of Tours, 4-5; Duby, France in the 
Middle Ages, 197. 
 51 
 
monarchs to supporting their preferred candidate, Alexander, by playing on their mutual 
fears.
65
  
France was also Thomas Becket’s safe haven following the well-known dispute with 
Henry II that resulted in his fleeing England in 1164.
66
 The French king appears to have 
played his hand intelligently in the Becket case, steering a prudent path between over-
committing to Becket and thus antagonising Henry, and yielding to the king of England’s 
demands and delivering the archbishop. Nevertheless, his legitimate receipt and sustenance of 
Becket demonstrated an arbitration role expected of an overlord which Henry did not 
dishonour.
67
 As described above, the king of France’s role as a legitimate receptacle for 
appeal was founded on well-established precedent, a responsibility of which even Henry 
Plantagenet had availed himself.
68
 Therefore, by protecting the Church and its leaders, such 
as the pope in exile, and by promoting its various causes, for example in the face of imperial 
aggression, Louis appears to be consciously investing himself in the recognised and 
legitimate sources of power. This combining of hegemonic cores; founded on precedent, 
oaths and feudal rights, and also the protection of clergy from France’s aggressive 
neighbours, bestowed a wide and profound claim to authority on the French king. 
Contemporary literature represents another front in the power struggles of the age. 
The twelfth century enjoyed a literary flourishing which served many purposes. One such 
role was a political function designed to legitimise perceived or claimed rights and to imbue 
leaders of the time with connections to a tradition and a figure of mythical authority – such as 
the legendary deeds performed by King Arthur, Lancelot or Charlemagne.
69
 Many of these 
works were justifications, instructive or moralising, and even moulded extant prophetic 
messages to suit the purposes of the figures of the day. One of the most relevant examples is 
‘Draco Normannicus’ in which a Breton noble, Rolland de Dinan, was portrayed writing a 
letter to King Arthur in Avalon, and in turn, the mythical leader wrote to King Henry II. In 
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his telling but imaginary reply, Henry blamed the tenth-century French king Charles the 
Simple for according the Normans overlordship of the Bretons. This was a justification for 
Henry’s assertions over Brittany, and an attempt to establish a precedent and a traditional 
claim over the Bretons, while simultaneously blaming the French king for that predicament.
70
 
This century not only saw the continuation and even expansion of chronicle and monastic 
records, but also many Gestæ and Vitæ were produced, expounding the heroic or tragic nature 
of their subjects, and passing on lessons to the next generation. A good example of such is the 
work recording the life of Owain Gwynedd’s father, Gruffudd ap Cynan, which was almost 
certainly commissioned during the decade in focus here.
71
 In addition, studies of people and 
places were made, in which all manner of observations appeared; from interpretive lessons on 
moral standards, to advice relating to military conquest. Among the most significant were 
those made by Giraldus Cambrensis on Wales and Ireland.
72
 Other works created during this 
period purposefully told the histories, real and imagined, of many of the French and British 
peoples.
73
 Although the myriad texts of the period did not bring any nation to its knees, their 
role in enflaming the glories of their subject had an effect that was felt throughout 
contemporary society, and helped shape perceptions of a peoples’ standing. As propaganda 
with a far-reaching psychological effect, these literary works therefore formed part of the 
struggle of the time. Even the simple act of writing down a certain language gave it a status 
above a spoken dialect, and this elevation can be seen to be repeated across the region at this 
time, from Anglo-Norman to Welsh.
74
  
This array of mostly successful ploys and investment in recognised roles of influence 
show Louis was strategically superior to Henry. By securing ascendency in the accepted, 
legitimate sources of power of his age, with perhaps the exception of military force, Louis 
was able to maintain his position and to extend his influence not only over Henry, but also 
over the king of England’s vassals, from the south of France to Scotland. Not all his efforts 
blossomed, and Henry undoubtedly scored diplomatic points of his own creation. However, 
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the successful cultivation of an unchallengeable idea of the supremacy of his position 
inculcated Louis with an authoritative but notional position of power – and it was solely a 
concept after all – and this disparity in power goes some distance to explaining why 
Plantagenet military might failed to unseat or dominate the Capetians.  
 
 
 54 
 
2.2:   Letters from Owain, king and prince of Gwynedd. 
 
The evidence for the first Welsh connection to France comes in the form of three letters sent 
to Louis VII’s court by Owain Gwynedd. Huw Pryce speculated that there were four letters, 
or at least four missions from Snowdonia, however only copies of three such examples have 
been discovered and no French replies are known to exist.
75
 Although John of Salisbury’s 
evidence clearly shows that a number of Welsh representatives attended, only letters from 
Owain have received mention or survived in some form. It has been assumed that these 
representatives were from the courts of Rhys ap Gruffudd and Owain Gwynedd, however 
those of other Welsh nobles might have been included.
76
 While this gives rise to the 
intriguing possibility that letters from Rhys and others might exist, this work will focus on 
those of Owain, who appears to have initiated and pursued this contact with France. 
 The survival of these letters is due to the efforts of Hugh de Champfleury, chancellor 
of France, 1150-72, and bishop of Soissons, 1159-75, who ordered copies to be made of 
much of Louis VII’s correspondence.77 An overview of Owain's letters demonstrates a 
notable evolution in his diplomatic methods. While many of the most noteworthy details are 
discussed in Pryce’s article, they have not been fully contextualised nor have their 
consequences been analysed.
78
  
 The first letter appears naive in form; while sufficiently humble and polite, it was not 
directed through common diplomatic channels but sent straight to the king. The language 
used is less florid than the later letters, which acknowledges a need for Owain to change 
style. Its message is quite direct; he admits that the two leaders are strangers to one another, 
yet Owain offers himself and his possessions to Louis.
79
  
 
To Louis, very glorious king of the French, Owain, king of Wales, greeting and very 
devoted service. Since I have heard of the magnificence of your virtue and the very 
eminent excellence of your dignity and nobility from the announcement of rumour and 
the truthful report of many, I have for a long time desired with the greatest desire to 
come to the notice of your highness and have your very delightful friendship. But that 
which up to now I have not obtained, having been prevented by the rarity of travellers 
coming and going and the distances of places [between us], from now on I shall 
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endeavour diligently to obtain by both writing and messenger. Placing myself and my 
possessions, if by any chance they are pleasing to you, at the command of your will, I ask 
with the greatest perseverance of prayers that you may now deign from now to consider 
me, largely unknown up to now to your discretion, amongst your faithful and devoted 
friends. Do not delay to inform me through the bearer of the present letter what it shall 
please your dearest amiability concerning the proposed petition. May they fare well who 
desire that you reign happily and long. Farewell.
80
  
 
Pryce dated this letter as probably following the act of homage paid to Henry at Woodstock 
in July 1163.
81
 That event is the outstanding trigger of the time for such a deliberate pursuit 
of an alliance with the Capetian monarchy, and therefore seems the most obvious and 
reasonable catalyst. However, it should not simply be held that fear of invasion compelled the 
Welsh to write to the French, homage to Henry provided the acceptable expedient to allow 
such an appeal. The precedent, even long history of such appeals to the kings of France has 
been established above.
82
 It also seems fair to criticise Pryce’s underestimation of Owain’s 
value to Louis, since the French king was known to deal sympathetically with nobles and 
ecclesiastics of all ranks, mother-tongue and nation. While perhaps just ‘a minor player’ who 
was geographically isolated from the Capetian domains, Owain, his forces and his allies 
offered a military and a diplomatic opportunity for Louis to exploit.
83
  The point concerning 
isolation requires brief consideration here. In this first letter, Owain wrote of the lack of 
previous amicable ties between them due to ‘the rarity of travellers coming and going and the 
distances of places [between us].’84 It is worth clarifying that this sentence shows that there 
were no diplomatic bonds between the courts, not that the Welsh were isolated or unknown, 
for there is significant evidence of Welshmen in French courts at the time which 
demonstrates the Welsh were more visible than might be supposed.
85
 Nevertheless, it is an 
important consideration that the diplomatic isolation of the Welsh was a result of the 
assertion of Canterbury’s primacy during the reign of Henry I. When Archbishop Anselm 
demanded that the bishops of Wales swore allegiance to Canterbury, this effectively 
relinquished Welsh control or influence of future elections and candidates to those posts. The 
consequence was that in times of need, the Welsh leaders only had low-ranking and therefore 
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poorly connected clergymen to rely on as messengers. Perhaps alone among western 
Europe’s peoples, there was no powerful Welsh voice in Rome, nor anyone of rank in 
Europe’s royal courts. Those Welshmen who did rise to positions of prominence in the 
church were, by necessity, loyal to Canterbury. A good example of this comes from Owain’s 
reign, where Meurig, bishop of Bangor, was isolated by the princes of Gwynedd for being 
their outspoken critic, as well as being a sworn adherent of Canterbury and the king of 
England.
86
  
The French king declined to formally respond to the first Welsh petition, for reasons 
unknown. It seems that this was not viewed as a rebuff, however, because Owain pursued the 
matter and subsequently received an apparently friendly response.  In some sense the first 
letter appears to be relatively basic in its construction, that is to say it is an uncomplicated, 
straight-forward message directly addressing the interlocutor. Although it contained elements 
of the politesses required in courtly dialogue, it nonetheless reads as blunt when compared to 
other similar diplomatic approaches, such as Owain’s third letter. In Welsh society of the day, 
according to the contemporary observer Gerald of Wales, anyone in Wales could speak their 
mind even in the presence of their ruler.
87
 It might be therefore, that this straight-forwardness 
and lack of elaboration in direct personal communications denoted a norm among the Welsh.  
The second letter is a better-crafted proposition; the language is noticeably more 
elaborate, the theme of religion, key in dealing with Louis’s regime, runs strongly through it 
and it was directed through an intermediary, the French chancellor.
88
 This letter also 
acknowledges that the chancellor had instructed Owain how to improve his petitions, notably 
through intercession.  
 
Owain, king of Wales, his very devoted friend, [sends] due and voluntary friendship with 
[his] greeting to his very beloved friend and father in Christ, Hugh, bishop of Soissons 
and chancellor to the king of France. I give thanks to God the Father, my venerable one, 
and to your discretion concerning that which you committed to writing in your letter to 
me through my messenger Moses, namely that if I should again send my messenger to 
the lord king of France, I should make him come through you, so that with your help his 
purpose might be accomplished more effectively. Whence we are now sending this 
Moses as my messenger to consult with you concerning his business, and vigorously 
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entreat you to support him vis-à-vis the king and to assist our side for the love of God 
and us. Farewell.
89
  
 
The content of the letter clearly placed it between the first letter, which probably 
dated to late 1163 or early 1164, and the third, which was certainly written between late 
summer 1165 and Easter 1166.
90
 It is worth also situating that letter within the broader 
spectrum of contemporary affairs, for within this period Pope Alexander III and Archbishop 
Becket sought Louis’s protection from the military efforts and political machinations of their 
enemies – Frederick and Henry – and conflict arose in Italy and western France, while the 
Welsh advanced against Crown interests in Wales.
91
 Within that landscape, it is believable 
that Welsh appeals to France might be given an increasingly fertile reception.  
The style and substance of Owain’s last known letter to Louis mark impressive 
improvements in the form of his diplomacy.
92
  
 
To the very excellent Louis, by the grace of God king of the French, Owain, prince of 
Wales, his very faithful man and friend, [sends] very devoted service with [his] greeting. 
Although the report of all, most serene king, proclaims you to be conspicuous as one in 
whom all can and should have complete trust, the clemency known to me by experience, 
and the kindness towards subjects and those having complete trust in you, make me 
choose you as the sole adviser to whom in difficulties I may complain loudly of my 
necessity. For as often as I have informed you about myself and my cares by the writing 
of letters, you have received not only the letters but their bearers benevolently and treated 
them kindly. Through the latter you have counselled me, thanks be to God and you, as a 
pious king should counsel someone having complete trust in him. Now that, therefore, 
difficulties are all around me at present, I do not wish my kind adviser to be ignorant of 
the situation. Preceded by no evil deeds of mine, in the past summer the king of England 
has waged against me the war which, as is known to you, he has planned for many days 
with the harshness of his tyranny. But when in the conflict the five armies of our side 
came together, thanks be to God and you, more of his men fell than mine. Having seen 
this, he wrongfully and harmfully mutilated my hostages, although he had not presented 
them previously for the keeping of peace. But, because all things are disposed of not by 
the wishes of man but by the will of God, he moved the army towards England, not 
through our merits, perhaps, but through the prayers of the humble to the saints, and by 
the saints’ intercession to God; however, he left me uncertain of the outcome to the end, 
because he arranged neither a peace nor a truce with us. Angered therefore because the 
result had not turned out as he had hoped, on his departure he ordered the foreigners and 
all whom he gathered together to defeat us to come with him against us again after next 
Easter. On that account I vigorously entreat your clemency that you will inform me 
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through the bearer of this present letter whether you are resolved to wage war against 
him, so that in that war I may both serve you by harming him according to your advice 
and take vengeance for the war he waged against me. But if you do not propose this, 
inform me by this bearer what you advise, what help you wish to bestow on me. I have 
no way of evading his snares unless you grant me advice and help. I commend to you 
moreover my private and familiar cleric and kinsman, Guiardus, that you may provide 
him with necessities for the love of God and us. I sent him before into your presence with 
my letters, which you did not believe were mine, so we were told. But they were mine, I 
bring in God as my witness, and through them I commended him to you from the depths 
of my heart. I vigorously entreat your clemency concerning this as well, that just as you 
have begun to render peaceful towards me the prelates of the Church, namely the pope 
and the archbishop of Canterbury, so you will continue to do so. Farewell.
93
  
 
Owain began with an appropriate greeting introducing the two interlocutors, praising and 
thanking Louis. He sprinkled themes of piety and trust into his message, demonstrating that 
he had learned more about Louis’s character. The manner in which Owain explained the 
causes and identified the agent of his distress, and in so doing gave the reason for his 
contacting Louis, were far more mature and conventional than his previous missives. His 
depiction of the Welsh victory over Henry’s unprovoked invasion was intelligently presented; 
he let it be known that Henry had been beaten but acknowledged the influence of prayer and 
saintly intercession. The sub-text to this delivered two important messages; he was able to 
defeat Henry in battle and was therefore a worthy ally, but he was also respectful and pious 
and so, perhaps, deserved Louis’s friendship and support. Then Owain revealed the crux of 
the message; his need for French intercession, as he had learned that Henry was due to muster 
another army destined for Wales after Easter 1166.
94
 The third letter ends by clarifying any 
confusion over the previous letters and thanking Louis for his help in another matter. In doing 
so, Owain presented his messenger as a man of the cloth and a man of the blood, touching on 
common qualities among courtly messengers throughout the period.
95
 Owain’s final lines 
thanking Louis for his intercession with Thomas Becket and the pope suggest that the French 
king’s barely discernible hand was, to a certain degree, already at work on Owain’s behalf. 
This third letter is a bold and ultimately successful attempt at inducing Louis to take up 
Owain’s cause.96 
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 Owain’s victory at Berwyn has not yet received the wider recognition it perhaps 
deserves. Even before conflict was joined Owain Gwynedd had scored a staggering 
diplomatic success in Wales, creating an unprecedented alliance of the native powers:  
 
And against him [Henry II] came Owain and Cadwaladr, sons of Gruffudd ap Cynan, and 
all the host of Gwynedd with them, and Rhys ap Gruffudd and with him the host of 
Deheubarth, and Owain Cyfeiliog and Iorwerth Goch ap Maredudd and the sons of 
Madoc ap Maredudd and the host of all Powys with them, and the two sons of Madog ab 
Idnerth and their host.
97
 
 
Of course, this event has not entirely escaped the attention of historians, and it is mostly 
recognised as a victory of sorts.
98
 However, as a military victory against a far superior force, 
Welsh efforts at Berwyn have not reached the standing they seem to be due. Although there is 
no room for an account of the campaign here, it seems that several salient points have been 
missed. Firstly, on a political and diplomatic level, it is noteworthy that the hosts of the 
Welsh territories allied themselves under Owain Gwynedd and gathered on his lands, at 
Corwen. Owain was not militarily strong enough to coerce these other Welsh rulers to join 
him, nor did they owe him military service required within a feudal arrangement; therefore 
they did so voluntarily. Next, it is also striking that these Welsh leaders were not naturally 
allies, and several of them had opposed each other at certain moments; Gwynedd and Powys 
were long-standing adversaries.
99
 In addition, more than half of these hosts were mustered 
and moved from areas outside Gwynedd and Deheubarth, therefore from areas normally 
considered Marcher or Crown lands. The ability to raise forces and relocate many miles 
away, crossing other territories also considered to be under non-native control suggests a 
serious extant over-estimation of the breadth and strength of Norman power in twelfth-
century Wales.
100
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Map 5: general map of medieval Wales.
101
 
From a military perspective, a key feature of Henry II’s campaign has not been sufficiently 
illuminated. Following the clashes in the Vale of Ceiriog, where Owain claimed to have 
inflicted more significant casualties on Crown forces than those his troops had suffered, 
Henry moved in a southerly direction to high ground.
102
 That action undertaken by Henry, 
moving away from the enemy and up onto higher ground, denotes a perceived need for 
security. This supports an idea that the Angevin army suffered more than Henry wished to 
countenance at that stage of the advance. With that, Henry showed marked caution or a lack 
of confidence. In the ensuing stand-off, two factors are named as crucial to Henry’s 
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withdrawal; dwindling supplies and a severe storm striking the area.
103
 If not simply cited as 
a contributory factor for the defeat, then the former suggests poor strategic planning; the duty 
of the commander. The latter however, is intriguing for two reasons. The campaign broke up 
due to the storm during August, which was of course possible but would have been unusual 
for such an army to be deterred by a summer storm. However, it has never been mentioned 
that the assembled Welsh forces stood under the same skies, yet were not driven from the 
field by the same weather conditions. With Henry’s near-death experience at Owain’s hands 
in 1157 in mind, it is worth considering that the defiance of a far larger enemy force camped 
at Corwen caused Henry to blink first in this face-off.  
 Having met defeat in Wales, Henry left for France in early 1166 and did not return for 
four years.
104
 In that time, Henry’s Welsh enemies continued their conflict against him, 
making notable advances, including the capture of several castles such as Cardigan and 
Rhuddlan from Crown and Marcher forces.
105
 Events on the continent between 1166-8 served 
to illuminate the value and credibility of Owain Gwynedd as an ally; Barbarossa’s forces 
sacked Rome while Henry II moved against the Bretons, deposed Duke Conan IV and began 
to reduce the native nobles.
106
  
It is in the light of these numerous factors, whether to frustrate or curb Henry’s 
territorial ambitions, or to support the liberties of a fellow Christian prince, which made all of 
those powers present at La Ferté-Bernard of interest to the French. These letters and the 
events which encompassed them provide a number of relevant points. Clearly, the first of 
which is that there does not seem to have been any Franco-Welsh relationship before Owain’s 
initiative. Therefore, these letters are the first important step in the course of external 
relations between Welsh rulers and European powers. They also demonstrate dimensions to 
Owain’s personality that are not otherwise revealed by other sources concerning his life. The 
notion of acquiring allies of the magnitude of France shows an appreciation of the broader 
strategy needed to ensure a secure future for his territory. These letters also demonstrate 
Owain as a man of some ambition; he was willing to reject Henry’s overlordship and to meet 
him in battle. Also, he adopted the titles of ‘king’ and ‘prince’ of Wales, the significance of 
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which are discussed by Pryce.
107
 These documents also provide evidence of his evolving 
diplomatic skills. The third letter, written in the expected meter and form of such 
correspondence, comprised perhaps the peak of Owain’s diplomatic education.108 The energy 
put into these relations show the extent to which Owain desired an alliance with Louis. The 
result of which was the 1168 conference, about which Seán Duffy cautiously but credibly 
suggested that it demonstrated that an alliance of sorts existed between them.
109
 The 
following investigation into the ‘obligation’ reported by John of Salisbury sheds further light 
on the consequences of any such alliance. 
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2.3: The nature of ‘an obligation’ 
 
The somewhat insubstantial evidence from John of Salisbury revealing that the powers 
opposed to Henry left La Ferté-Bernard with ‘an obligation’ invites comment on two critical 
matters; the apparent consequences of the 1168 conference and an observation on the 
interplay of these leaders.  
No sources consulted explain or adequately engage with John’s ‘obligation’, yet it is 
critical since it describes the culmination of Owain Gwynedd’s diplomatic drive. However, 
analysis of the overt consequences of the conference contributes to an alternative vision of 
the power relations between those present. This is demonstrated by a survey of the 
subsequent actions of those powers represented. Since Louis VII’s intercession was sought 
because of conflict, the military actions that followed should indicate the nature of the 
obligation in question. Equally, in the absence of irrefutable written evidence, the consequent 
diplomatic manoeuvring might also provide a compelling answer. In this regard, Scotland, 
Brittany and Wales appear to provide a consistent response in the aftermath of the 
conference.
110
 Therefore, this section will examine whether Louis required military action 
from his ‘allies’ – or at least those opposed to Henry at that time – or whether there was 
something more subtle, but decidedly more powerful at play.  
To begin with Scotland, from where originates the most simplistic, but perhaps 
prevailing notion that Louis instructed the representatives of the powers in attendance to 
return home and make war on Henry II.  This view is forwarded by Geoffrey Barrow, who 
identified the conference as perhaps forming the root of the Franco-Scottish ‘Auld Alliance’, 
isolating Henry’s reticence to resolve the matter of the English northern counties as the 
reason for William the Lion approaching Louis in 1168. Barrow declared that 1173 began 
with William’s ‘crucial and foolish decision to invade England in support of the young King 
Henry’s revolt against his father, and in undisguised alliance with the French.’111 However, 
research into these events has failed to reveal any connection between Scotland and France in 
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the five years spanning the 1168 conference to the 1173 revolt by the young King Henry. 
Therefore this casts a shadow over any suggestion of an ongoing but lost link between the 
Scots and the French that resulted in William’s involvement in young Henry’s revolt.  In the 
absence of any such military action, threats or diplomatic evidence, then William the Lion’s 
attack on northern England cannot credibly be linked to any unrecorded obligations to Louis 
in 1168. In addition, there is nothing to connect the Scots and the French in 1173, except 
through their mutual support, though for different reasons, of the young King Henry’s 
rebellion; Scots’ interests were fixed on the long drawn-out question of the northern 
counties.
112
 Therefore this is a tenuous connection to France and cannot reasonably equate to 
an ‘undisguised alliance’, as Barrow asserts. Moreover, Barrow’s point is countered by 
Archibald Duncan, who simply connected William’s support for young Henry to a promise to 
award him the northern counties. No union with France is linked to Scotland’s short-lived 
involvement in that revolt against Henry II.
113
 The idea that the pronouncements given at La 
Ferté-Bernard and William’s adherence to the rebellion of young Henry were unconnected 
was echoed by Gordon Donaldson. While he accepted that 1168 could conceivably be 
construed as the faint origin of the heralded ‘Auld Alliance’ of 1295, he plainly stated that 
there was no evidence of a formal alliance between Scotland and France in 1168 and indeed 
nothing ‘to fill the gap between 1168 and the treaty of 1295’.114 It seems reasonable therefore 
to say that Scotland did not go to war with Henry II following any military obligations 
received at the 1168 conference. Rather, the state of affairs that emerge from La Ferté-
Bernard suggest peaceful compliance rather than conflict. 
 The evidence for Brittany, more detailed and factionally complex than Scotland or 
Wales, also suggests the same conclusion. Galliou and Jones failed to identify any 
specifically anti-Henrician action that could be connected to the conference. While there is an 
acknowledgement of noteworthy turbulence during the rule of Conan IV, 1156–1171, none of 
it is viewed as action taken against Henry on Louis’s command. In fact, for reasons 
developed below, the period seems to mark relatively peaceful relations between the king and 
the duke: Conan frequently visited England where he held estates and to attend the 1164 
Assize of Clarendon, for example. Things turned sour between the duke and the king in 1166, 
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when Henry staged a coup against Conan, yet retained him thereafter as a loyal, landed 
official within the duchy. In that year, Conan betrothed his first-born, Constance, to Geoffrey, 
Henry’s son. Noble resistance in Brittany was portrayed as related to a historic lack of ducal 
control which Henry sought to reverse by manipulating Conan and then through the Angevin 
administration he installed there.
115
  
 A more detailed picture of contemporary Brittany emerges from Judith Everard’s 
study which covers the years critical to this research.
116
 Henry’s claim to Brittany was 
founded on terms of precedence and strategic rationale. Duke Alan I had rendered homage to 
Henry II’s grandfather who, although King Henry I of England, was duke of Normandy. 
Additionally, as recently as 1113, Louis VI acknowledged that the Breton duke held his 
territories of the duke of Normandy. The Angevins also held a historic claim to the county of 
Nantes.
117
 In strategic terms, Brittany shared a land border with Henry II’s possessions; 
Normandy, Maine, Anjou and Poitou, and also, but of secondary importance, it occupied a 
significant geographic point for the passage of naval forces and ship-borne commerce.
118
 
Therefore, Henry’s involvement in Breton affairs began prior to his elevation to kingship. For 
example, before 1154 he had already campaigned with Breton allies and consistently 
supported the independence of the Breton Church from that of France. The latter, while 
popular with Bretons, also served Henry’s later political interest in fracturing the power of 
the French Church in order to weaken its – and the French king’s – ability to interfere in 
Brittany. With English support, Dol’s defiance of Tours lasted until Innocent III ruled in 
favour of Tours in 1199, in a measure intended to please Philip Augustus, whose support that 
pope tried to cultivate.
119
 It should also be established here that this extension of authority in 
the peninsula was not simply a case of the Angevin king of England coveting and acquiring 
land and influence in Brittany, for many Breton nobles held lands and titles in England, and 
relations appear to have been bi-lateral.
120
   
 As England’s king and Normandy’s duke, and therefore direct overlord of the duchy, 
it could be reasonably expected that Henry’s involvement in Breton internal politics would 
deepen. Although the king of England’s involvement in that would outlive Henry, the salient 
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events that resulted in Breton involvement at La Ferté-Bernard can be simplified to the 
following points.  Since the death of Duke Conan III in 1148, there had not been a 
universally-recognised successor. There were two principal candidates who exercised some 
form of power over significant areas of Brittany, while a small proportion of the duchy 
obeyed no-one but the local pre-eminent noble. The main protagonists were Eudo de Porhoët 
and Conan, son of the late Alan of Penthièvre, heir to the honour of Richmond. Conan’s right 
to the title came through his mother, Bertha, who had been favoured to succeed her father, 
Conan III, instead of her brother Hoël. However, Bertha did not gain final ascendancy in that 
struggle until 1155, and the following year Hoël was ejected from his last stronghold in 
Nantes. That region was swiftly seized by Geoffrey, Henry II’s younger brother, who held it 
until his untimely death in 1158, an event which directly engaged Henry II in Breton 
territorial affairs as he claimed to be his brother’s heir. Bertha’s husband, Alan, earl of 
Richmond, died in 1146 and she subsequently married Eudo de Porhoët, who exercised 
power as the heir’s husband. Although raised in England, Conan returned to Brittany in 1156 
to claim what he saw as his right. Before the end of the year, his campaigns had been 
successful enough to earn him widespread recognition as Duke Conan IV. Therefore, by the 
close of 1156, the Breton factions were split between supporting the new claimant Conan IV, 
Eudo, the previous and to some extent the de facto duke; they could also look to the Angevin 
presence in Nantes or opt to maintain an independent stance. This resulted in a decade of 
intermittent, unresolved civil war.
121
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Map 6: Brittany in the 1160s.
122
 
For reasons for that seem unclear or, as Everard asserted, were based on rumours of 
conspiracy, Henry began to take direct military action in Brittany.
123
 In summer 1164 his 
forces invaded and held certain important lands on the Breton side of its border with 
Normandy, immediately transferring their administration into the hands of Henry’s Norman 
officials. Two years later, after crossing to the continent following his defeat at Berwyn, he 
attacked and took Fougères, destroying the castle there. Ralph, its lord, was one of Conan’s 
closest allies; the duke failed to defend him in any form. Then, in late summer 1166, Henry 
staged a coup over the leadership and administration of the duchy. Henry organised the 
marriage of the infant Constance, Conan’s only surviving child, to his young son, Geoffrey. 
At the same moment, he deposed the duke, obliging him to hand over administrative control 
of the duchy.  Henry then took the homage of most of the Breton nobles at Thouars and then 
advanced on and entered Rennes, where Brittany’s dukes were invested. In the meantime he 
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appointed a small number of his Norman followers to key posts in the duchy and also took 
custody of Constance.
124
 
 There is no defined spark for the revolt of certain Breton nobles that erupted the 
following year, however likely reasons were tighter administrative control and, perhaps, the 
ceding of the ducal crown to a non-Breton interloper, all the while set in a background of 
ongoing factional conflict. The most prominent native rebels were Eudo de Porhoët, 
Guihomar de Léon, Ralph de Fougères and Rolland de Dinan, although others clearly 
participated. They did not form a rebel coalition, and remained divided between themselves 
although Eudo married Guihomar’s daughter in late 1167, forming an alliance between those 
factions. Several Gascon nobles, the viscount of Thouars and Louis VII were also implicated 
as supporters of this revolt.
125
 It is telling that before undertaking military action against the 
Breton rebels in 1167, Henry met Louis to request a truce, just as he had done in 1158, when 
equally, Henry had also sought his overlord’s permission to act against the Bretons.126 
Although Henry was initially successful during the campaigns of late summer 1167, the death 
of his mother in September brought a premature end to campaigning that year, obliging him 
to resume the subjugation of the rebels in spring 1168. Critically, before restarting the 
offensive, he arranged another truce with Louis, to last from 7 April to 1 July, 1168. The 
fighting ended shortly before that truce elapsed, with the situation still not finally determined, 
although conditions largely favoured Henry’s forces.127 
 The situation in Wales prior to the conference of July 1168 needs only brief re-
illumination at this stage. Following Berwyn, the Welsh pressed attacks against Crown and 
Marcher interests across Wales and, by the end of 1167, they had captured Basingwerk, 
Prestatyn and Rhuddlan in the north-east, and Cardigan in the south-west.
128
 It is noteworthy 
that there is a dearth of reported military activity in Wales after mid-1168.  
The conference at La Ferté-Bernard took place in July 1168, where, among the Scots 
and the Welsh petitioners, the Breton lords Eudo de Porhoët and Rolland de Dinan, made 
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allegations against Henry that amounted to bad lordship and abuse of his lordly power.
129
 
Evidence emerges from John of Salisbury’s letter, which focussed more on troop movements 
than on discussion content, that Louis threatened Henry with the release of his vassals of their 
pledges, and it is then that the Welsh and others retired with their ‘obligations’.130 As Thomas 
Bisson postulated, the notion of wilful, violent or lawless rule was one of the important issues 
of the century and its consequences were visible in an abundance of pan-European examples. 
He also discussed whether many of the revolts of the period could, in fact, be more 
specifically attributed to a violent reaction against the ruler in question.
131
 Although Bisson 
did not specifically examine these examples of resistance to Henry II, complaints against his 
use of royal power, such as his mistreatment of hostages and reputation for breaking oaths, 
easily fit within the scope of his descriptions.
132
 
Perhaps because of the lack of a thorough account of its proceedings, other than the 
few lines rendered by John of Salisbury, the importance of that conference between the 
representatives of both major crowns, as well as those appealing to Louis, seems to have been 
overlooked. This gathering of so many rulers or their agents deserves more attention since it 
appears to mark a watershed in the comportment of those in attendance. The Breton 
complaints are noted above, and Henry’s apparently heavy-handed assertion of Angevin 
administration there might have further justified appeals to Louis as Henry’s overlord. For the 
Scots, the issue of the northern counties had gone unresolved for too long, arguably 
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deliberately so on Henry’s part. There was an established precedence of Scots holding those 
titles; Henry’s vacillation might easily be viewed as a deliberate denial of their rights. Welsh 
complaints also easily appear valid; they never held their lands of the English king, they were 
not his vassals and owed him no service at all. The nominal acts of homage they had recently 
paid him and his grandfather had never been characterized as feudal homage; at Woodstock 
in 1163 Henry had redefined that relationship without notice or conference. Moreover, it 
might be arguable that the oaths they took at Woodstock had been made under a certain 
duress; Rhys was Henry’s prisoner and the king held some of their children hostages.133 Even 
if it were held that Henry was their notional overlord, any justification for invasion was 
dubious at best – the Welsh had not refused to comply with any requests and had not 
challenged or attacked him. Also, it might be reasonably argued that he precipitated the revolt 
against him by his actions at Woodstock. Moreover, his mutilation of Welsh noble hostages, 
not expressly handed over as guarantors of compliance or prisoners of war, gravely 
contravened the behaviour expected of a king.
134
 Therefore, the session at La Ferté-Bernard 
contained all of the necessary components for a significant expression of complaint against 
Henry’s actions and offered Louis an opportunity to hand his adversary a pointed lesson. The 
actions of the plaintiffs following the conference again offer an answer to the significance of 
the probable verdict given by Louis.  
 
The post-conference evidence from Brittany recalls a situation similar, if more turbulent, to 
that of Wales and Scotland, that being a picture of relative peace and compliance. There 
appears to have been no more fighting that year, despite the conference ending in early July. 
In January 1169, a treaty was drawn up at Montmirail, following another meeting of the two 
kings. This was a significant agreement; it brought about a notable reduction in Henry’s 
direct authority in France and led to almost five years of peace. Perhaps the key point 
concerned the oaths of fidelity given by Henry’s sons. His heir, the young Henry, did homage 
to Louis for Brittany and Anjou, effectively making the French king his direct overlord. 
Geoffrey swore homage to young Henry for Brittany, also connecting him to Louis. Shortly 
after, Richard was made count of Poitou and duke of Aquitaine at the age of twelve. This 
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demonstrates that Henry was following a code of conduct which diffused his power, placing 
overlordship – and with it avenues of access and appeal – for these prime possessions in 
Louis’s hands. This, it has been noted, was part of Louis’s strategy, designed to weaken 
Plantagenet power by dismembering it.
135
 From that perspective, this treaty appears to mark a 
notable success for the French king. It was at Montmirail that Louis returned the Breton and 
Poitevin rebels to their previous obedience within the feudal hierarchy of the time. On so 
doing, those rebels were pardoned. It is perhaps this act which provoked modern writers to 
level accusations that Louis abandoned his allies.
136
 The fact that their obedience was Louis’s 
to return, and that they do not appear to have resisted that act, strongly implies that the 
French monarch was the accepted senior noble within this arrangement. In addition, the fact 
that the Bretons did not rise against the outcome of Montmirail, nor denounce it in literature, 
demonstrates that it was acceptable to them at that moment. Henry was no longer their ruler, 
but also the chain of Geoffrey and the young Henry had been placed between the Bretons and 
the covetous kings of France and England. If Bisson is correct, that such anti-seigneurial 
revolts were due to a desire to change ruler, then at Montmirail, Louis secured that goal for 
those on the continent who petitioned him.
137
 In that light, the removal of Henry from direct 
lordship over Brittany cannot constitute desertion of the Bretons by Louis, quite the contrary. 
If, as has been postulated, Henry planned for all of his sons to rule sizeable territories 
as princes, then the 1169 Treaty of Montmirail stands as evidence of that.
138
 While this might 
have prepared them for their careers as rulers, this devolution of power clearly offered Louis 
a freer hand over Henry’s continental possessions, by creating more factions to play upon and 
fissures to exploit. When viewed through the lens of Louis’s ambitions, the notion that the 
French king abandoned his allies, notably here the Bretons, seems superficial and inaccurate. 
In consideration of the broader picture of power relations between the factions engaged, La 
Ferté-Bernard can be seen as the moment after which peace largely descends on these 
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theatres of war. This seems to have facilitated a more complex peace six months later at 
Montmirail, which oversaw the wide-scale change in regional leadership, enabling Henry to 
send Geoffrey, still a minor, to the duchy in May 1169. This five-year period of peace also 
demonstrated further compelling examples of French ‘soft power’; in 1170 Henry II copied 
the Capetian practice of crowning the heir while the old king still lived.
139
 In addition, Louis 
was able to develop amicable and profitable relations with Henry’s sons, then induce and 
support their revolt just four years after Montmirail. 
The story of the 1173 revolt of the young King Henry, crowned as heir in 1170, was 
not born of a son’s dissatisfaction with his father prior to 1168. That revolt, conducted with 
French connivance, needs no elaboration here, other than to acknowledge that certain, though 
few, of those Breton nobles who still harboured grievances against Henry II joined the 
rebellion, and also submitted when the elder Henry was victorious the following year.
140
 It 
has been credibly suggested that certain factions who rebelled in 1173, the king of Scotland 
among them, did so because Henry had not fulfilled promises made in 1168 at La Ferté-
Bernard.
141
 It was the failure to resolve those ongoing issues rather than a secret or ongoing 
alliance with the French that brought William into the 1173 conflict. In the settlement of that 
conflict, made at Falaise, Henry also extended his feudal power over Scotland whose king 
had been captured while campaigning in the disputed northern counties.
142
 While in Brittany, 
the only confirmed violence recorded between 1168 and 1173 were actions by Conan IV 
against the recalcitrant Guihomar de Léon in 1170 on his overlord’s behalf, and a 
continuation of the same campaign by Henry himself in 1171, following Conan’s death 
through illness.
143
 Those leaders present at La Ferté-Bernard seem to have kept their peace 
during this period, so following Conan’s death, Henry appears justified in acting to suppress a 
contumacious vassal, Guihomar. Military actions against Eudo de Porhoët in the period up to 
1173 are more obscure. When he refused to obey Henry’s summons to do homage in 
Geoffrey’s presence at Christmas 1169, at which homage was rendered by most of Brittany’s 
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elite, Henry first made a diplomatic approach to him. The evidence for military action that 
followed has, according to Everard, been confused with the events of early 1168.
144
 
Nevertheless, in late December 1169 Henry, Geoffrey and their host toured Brittany’s castles 
receiving homage from the duchy’s nobles and free men who had not previously offered it.145 
Eudo appears to have remained aloof but peaceful, only returning to action in 1173. Even 
during the revolt of that year, he did not join the other Breton rebels. Instead he returned from 
exile in the Île-de-France, refortified his home territory at Josselin which Henry had 
destroyed in early 1168. Probably symbolically, he also reoccupied the ducal seat at Ploërmel 
which he had previously held. It is in that context that he remained as an adversary of the 
Angevins and their supporters governing Brittany, rather than as an active rebel. There does 
not appear to have been any broader conflict between Eudo’s and Henry’s forces during the 
revolt of the young Henry.
146
 
Following the suppression of young Henry’s revolt, Henry II never campaigned again 
in person in the duchy, handing over responsibility to Geoffrey who, for a number of years, 
struggled to suppress the forces of Eudo and Guihomar.
147
 However, the limited conflicts that 
did take place in Brittany during these years have been largely explained by a series of 
personal reasons unrelated to any machination by Louis VII, and might be justified in a 
broader perspective of power relations due to the disobedience of certain nobles.
148
 
Nevertheless, the picture of Breton-Angevin relations following La Ferté-Bernard is not one 
of baronial revolt or outright war against Henry or his adherents, but largely one of 
compliance and the studied maintenance of peace. 
 Events in Wales appear to mirror those in Brittany and Scotland following the 1168 
conference. Although Henry’s declared plans to attack Gwynedd after Easter 1166 were 
aborted, principally due to his journey to Brittany to depose Conan that year, the ongoing 
conflict with the Welsh princes remained unresolved. After retreating from Berwyn in 1165, 
he mutilated those Welsh noble hostages in his keep, including two of Owain Gwynedd’s 
sons, before crossing the Channel in March 1166.
149
 Following Berwyn, the Welsh advanced 
                                                          
144
 Everard, Brittany and the Angevins, 48 n. 57. 
145
 Everard, Brittany and the Angevins, 48, ‘accepientes fidelates et obligantias a comitibus et baronibus et 
liberis hominibus Britannie de quibus antea non accepterant.’ The use of the term ‘obligantias’ here is 
noteworthy and tallies with John of Salisbury’s ‘obligati’ used in relation to La Ferté-Bernard. 
146
 Millor et al, The Letters of John of Salisbury, II, 606; Everard, Brittany and the Angevins, 45, 48, n.57, 49-50. 
147
 Everard, Brittany and the Angevins, 51, 58. 
148
 Everard, Brittany and the Angevins, 52-61. 
149
 Eyton, Itinerary, 92; Lloyd, History of Wales, vol 2, 517, 540; Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 63-4; Warren, Henry 
II, 92-3, 100, 164; Davies, Age of Conquest, 52; Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’, 7-8, 11; Maund, Welsh 
 74 
 
against Crown and Marcher territories capturing Basingwerk, Prestatyn, Rhuddlan and 
Cardigan before the end of 1167.
150
 After La Ferté-Bernard, events in Wales follow the 
pattern discerned elsewhere; there was no violence by any faction. Perhaps evocatively, even 
after Henry’s return to Britain in 1170, no attack followed the peaceful death of Owain 
Gwynedd in late November that year.
151
 Despite the opportunity presented by Gwynedd’s 
subsequent predictable descent into an internecine struggle for succession, and its power 
waned, Henry desisted from attacking it in its years of weakness. Given his firm intentions of 
crushing Gwynedd in the dozen years prior to 1168, this remarkable change in policy and 
method is highly significant.
152
 Clearly, peace elsewhere in his domains would have granted 
Henry more time, manpower and resources to conduct a more efficient campaign against his 
Welsh enemies. There is no reason to suggest a unilateral peace was attempted by any side, 
and the first, indeed only communication between all of the powers that suddenly found 
themselves at peace can be traced to La Ferté-Bernard. Although Montmirail in 1169 settled 
the lordship issues of certain continental possessions, it certainly did not affect Wales or 
Scotland. 
This changed approach was highlighted further by Henry’s dealings with Rhys ap 
Gruffudd. The two men had maintained a hostile relationship throughout the late 1150s and 
1160s. Rhys attended a parley in good faith but was taken prisoner and incarcerated. He was 
released to attend Woodstock in July 1163, where he did homage to Henry. In the ensuing 
revolt by the Welsh, Rhys led the host of Deheubarth to stand with Owain Gwynedd against 
Henry at Berwyn. Their relations clearly did not improve during Henry’s absence in France, 
since Rhys appears to have been represented as a plaintiff at La Ferté-Bernard.
153
 However, 
following that conference, Henry’s attitude became inexplicably pacific towards these 
previously bitter enemies for the remaining twenty-one years of his reign. In fact, relations 
between Rhys and Henry rapidly evolved after 1171. Following his return from France, 
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Henry made peaceful overtures towards Rhys, rather than the Welshman submitting to the 
king.
154
 Rhys assumed the mantle of Welsh leadership after 1170, and Henry requested a 
meeting in early September 1171, at which a new, peaceful relationship was forged. The 
following month they met in Pembroke, while Henry was en route to Ireland. He confirmed 
Rhys’s possessions – lands he had taken from Anglo-Norman lords – effectively 
acknowledging the resurrected principality of Deheubarth. In return, Rhys acknowledged 
Henry as his overlord.
155
 Henry clearly required a foil to the ambitions and growing power of 
the Cambro-Norman lords in Wales and those who had been ousted from Wales to Ireland by 
Rhys. On his return from Ireland in 1172, Rhys and Henry met again, and the title of Justiciar 
was conferred on Rhys.
156
 This was not the simple granting of a title to a local noble; this 
gave Rhys judicial and military power over native, Norman and English alike. While this 
legitimised Rhys within the circles of Henry’s wider realm, it also acknowledged Rhys’s 
evident military successes over all inhabitants of south-west Wales. At Cardigan and 
Dryslwyn, Rhys established two power centres to dominate Anglo-Norman and native 
elements. This changed relationship bore fruit for both parties; for the rest of Henry’s reign 
there was no more fighting between Crown and native forces, although Rhys still prosecuted 
sporadic campaigns against marcher interests. When the rebels showed their hand in 1173, 
Rhys sent his son, Hywel, to France to fight for Henry senior, while he personally led Welsh 
troops against the king’s opponents at Tutbury the following year. It would be inaccurate to 
describe their relationship as friendly, but it was of mutual benefit and both made efforts to 
maintain it.
157
 Nevertheless, the catalyst for this mutual change in attitude only appears 
traceable to the conference of July 1168.  
Rather than crediting Henry with the unlikely development of ‘a more liberal attitude’ 
towards those whose children he had mutilated as recently as 1165, and to whom he had lost 
territory and not yet reached peace terms, it is worth postulating whether Henry’s volte-face 
from aggression to peace might have been dictated by Louis.
158
 Henry had shown no previous 
softening or delicacy in his politics, and this dramatic change demands consideration. 
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Following the conference at La Ferté-Bernard, there is little trace of factional violence until 
the revolt of 1173. That rebellion, it seems, changed the political landscape and permitted 
violence to erupt again in Henry’s continental interests and in northern England.159 Louis’s 
commands to those seeking his aid in 1168 therefore cannot have been to make war against 
Henry, for the opposite is demonstrated by all of the examples examined.  Therefore, if Louis 
had demanded war and resistance to Henry, he was ignored. This is not credible; such an 
event would certainly have drawn chronicle commentary somewhere and had enduring 
political ramifications for all sides involved. It is noteworthy that no sources mention the 
shame that widespread disobedience of Louis would have caused. Relations between Louis 
and the other parties appear to continue in largely the same vein until Henry’s sons rebelled. 
In contrast to Dunbabin’s claim of Louis’s desertion and ensuing unpopularity, this suggests 
that there was no point of friction between Louis and his allies, if that word applies.
160
 
Indeed, the fact that Eudo de Porhoët sought and found refuge in Île-de-France up to 1173 
appears to categorically disprove Dunbabin’s claim.161 The relationship between Louis and 
the plaintiffs is difficult to define, however, Bisson suggested that ‘under Louis VII the 
homages of dukes and counts, often in border lands, had tended to define alliance rather than 
submission.’162 Gillingham and Warren reached a similar conclusion and used it to devalue 
the oaths of submission Henry swore to the French king, dismissing such homage and the 
obsequious language that accompanied such gestures as ‘vague and cheap’.163 Such a 
portrayal of insincerity must surely be equally applicable to any similar homage rendered to 
Henry. However, Bisson’s proposal might offer a reasonable vision of the nature of those 
relations formed and revealed by John of Salisbury’s letter. The acts described in that letter 
therefore denote the recognition of an alliance with the king of France; in this period the 
vassal was required to offer his king aid and counsel, and Louis’s allies in 1168 can clearly be 
seen proposing aid and no doubt intelligence on Henry’s activities, as well as offering 
hostages as pledges of their faith.
164
 The plaintiffs of 1168 can be shown to be acting in 
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accordance of the norms and customs of their time, and therefore they should be considered 
as allies of France at that time, despite the changing nature of that particular term and idea. 
Therefore, a different conclusion to any extant notion is required; the most obvious 
arrives at a two-fold hypothesis that can be tested against the evidence from all powers 
represented at La Ferté-Bernard. Firstly, that their ‘obligation’ was that Louis required them 
to keep the peace and to conduct themselves like responsible subject-rulers; their peaceful 
actions in the wake of the conference bear out this hypothesis. That all the plaintiffs made 
and maintained peace with Henry appears too broad, common, simultaneous and 
extraordinary a coincidence to have been a genuine accident of history. More importantly, the 
second assertion is that Louis commanded Henry to act towards those territories in a manner 
befitting a responsible overlord. He ceased campaigning in person in Brittany and Wales, for 
example, and sought accommodation with principal nobles who had opposed him to the 
extent of appointing Rhys ap Gruffudd and Rolland de Dinan as his justiciars or seneschals 
within their home territories.
165
 This does not make them Henry’s lackeys any more that it 
represents Henry surrendering rule of those respective regions, rather a realistic settlement 
that denotes an entirely new direction in power relations. However, it is possible to perceive a 
darker side to this notion that Louis drew Henry to peaceful ways and a change of political 
strategy. Henry had previously acknowledged his subordinate status before Louis, his 
withdrawal from Toulouse in 1159 for example, and the 1168 conference might also indicate 
a powerful articulation of Louis’s supremacy. Its message is implicit in its resolution; if Louis 
could bring Henry’s vassals to peace, he might also bring them to war. This satisfies a theme 
current throughout this period concerning the dangers of contumacy.
166
  
 This chapter proposes a fresh vision of the first Franco-Welsh alliance. Although it 
alters the dynamic of this first contact and reduces Owain Gwynedd’s role and position away 
from being the prime interlocutor with Louis, as perhaps might be understood from Pryce’s 
article, it places him instead within an elite group of leaders.
167
 This perhaps more 
realistically realigns the conference as being between Louis, hearing the appeals of these 
nobles, and Henry, his powerful vassal. Given the relative disparity in wealth and standing 
between Owain and Louis, and the lack of a prior relationship, it seems reasonable to 
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envisage events in this light; that Owain was respected for his position and rank, and stood as 
a relative equal with other similar rulers. Above them, stood Louis and Henry, whose 
political power and ambitions enabled them to encompass far broader horizons that 
comprised much of western Europe, but also tied into the broader spectrum of power 
relations engaging the Papacy, the German empire and the Spanish kingdoms, among others. 
Within their machinations then, the ‘regum Gwalliae’ and the others played their important, 
contributory roles. This, of course, attributes a weightier recognition to the meeting at La 
Ferté-Bernard than it has previously attracted and doing so, without irrefutable evidence, 
might draw criticism. However, the notion of Louis encouraging Henry to a more diplomatic, 
unaggressive style of kingship fits entirely with Louis’s actions from his 1155 council at 
Soissons onwards. The fact that Henry appears to have enthusiastically worn the coat of the 
warrior prior to July 1168, and only rarely seems to have done so thereafter, and even then 
only against wayward even contumacious sons or vassals, has not been adequately pinpointed 
or explained by experts on either monarch. Therefore, this Welsh-French contact does not 
appear to demonstrate a direct attempt to project French power onto Britain. Instead, this case 
appears to highlight one fragment of the power struggle between the king of France and his 
vassals, notably the burgeoning Angevins. In addition, this sequence of letters opens a door 
onto the otherwise hidden affairs of medieval rulers and their political conflicts and, in that 
sense alone, seems to represent an invaluable contribution to such studies. 
To assess Owain Gwynedd’s diplomatic efforts between 1163 and 1168 appears 
relatively straightforward after investigating the wider background and examining the 
interplay between the factions involved. The letters’ survival allows the accurate placement 
of his efforts within their historical context, no similar course of correspondence between the 
other plaintiffs and Louis, for example, appears to have been recorded or exposed to a wider 
audience. In that role, these letters are highly instructive on the form and function of 
medieval diplomatic methods, and show that all powers could correspond and inter-relate, 
irrespective of their remoteness or ignorance of one another. From the viewpoint of Welsh 
history, these letters not only chart the first known communications with France, but also 
demonstrate the rapid evolution of Owain Gwynedd’s diplomatic style and success. However, 
there is a more hard-nosed conclusion to draw here; in writing to Louis, Owain aimed to gain 
the French king’s intercession and halt future invasions of native Welsh territories. In that 
respect, these letters clearly demonstrate a nascent idea of native collectivity. Also, Owain’s 
strategy formed part of a wider process that resulted in peace, and therefore marked a success 
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unparalleled by any of his predecessors. This contact also elevated the Welsh to being 
recognisable players within the events of their time and continent. While certain historians 
class Scotland’s ‘achievement’ as breaking with its ‘traditional Celtic’ past and becoming 
ranked among other European nations by adopting Anglo-Norman mores and methods, 
Owain Gwynedd here proved that there was no need to forsake the traditions and ways of the 
Welsh in order to gain wider acceptance. In fact there is a direct parallel, since the man 
credited with transforming Scotland into a society that integrated with Anglo-French culture, 
was King David I, Owain’s contemporary.168 
To conclude with a comment on power relations, it seems that the most efficient, 
qualitative measure of power in the relationship between Henry and Louis was determined by 
its deployment. While Henry’s much-vaunted military power is a noteworthy feature of the 
period, he did not overcome Louis by force and thereby release himself or his heirs from the 
constraining overlord-vassal relationship. In fact, he freely engaged in that association and 
assumed a subordinate position within the European feudal hierarchy. In that light, it can be 
shown that Henry was the weaker partner, while Louis triumphed with an economy of 
resource deployment. It might be concluded that the most efficient use of power is not in the 
measure of its vastness, but in its effective use. Unfettered by attachment to either monarch, it 
would be difficult to view their relationship in a different light. However, if ascendancy, 
rather than victory, can be awarded to Louis, it was insufficient to allow his heirs to 
unconditionally dominate those who inherited from Henry. Therefore, these unresolved 
power relations would be handed on to the next generation to play out in a similar, but 
evolving political landscape.
169
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 Barrell, Medieval Scotland, 1, 15-20. 
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 Benjamin, ‘The Angevin Empire’ in Saul, ed., England in Europe, 73. 
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3.1:   Context and Personalities 
Introduction. 
This second French-Welsh diplomatic contact joined Philip Augustus, king of France, and 
Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, prince of Gwynedd. Due to the geo-political orbit to which Welsh 
leaders were by this time tied, this union inevitably related to events in England, then under 
King John. However, the influential popes Innocent III and Honorius III also provided an 
essential aspect of this alliance, particularly during the lustrum in question, 1212-1217. Their 
careers require no detailed discussion here. However, it will be helpful to give a brief 
presentation of the context of the moment, illustrating events which contributed to the 
forming of this alliance and outlining the actions of the leading personalities within this 
environment. This preludes the re-evaluation of the dating of the treaty between Philip and 
Llywelyn and discusses concomitant arguments. Despite the fact that most historians writing 
on this period agree that the alliance between Philip and Llywelyn dates from 1212, this 
chapter will demonstrate that it was made in 1215 or 1216. Among the daunting list of 
historians who have identified 1212 as the correct date are David Carpenter, Anthony Carr, 
Christopher Cheney, Rees Davies, Natalie Fryde, Huw Pryce, John Beverly Smith and Ifor 
Rowlands, the last of whom wrote of ‘the still somewhat neglected matter of the treaty 
between Llywelyn and Philip Augustus.’1 This study brings this largely ignored matter into 
light and demonstrates that however impressive this list of academics, because they base their 
work on Treharne’s flawed article of 1958, they are all wrong.2 The argument for 1215-16 is 
more persuasive and supported by reliable contemporary sources, unlike the 1212 dating. 
This chapter concludes with an exploration of the significance and consequences of this 
alliance, proposing that this union, in the long-term, was utterly detrimental to native rule in 
Wales. 
 
                                                          
1 C. R. Cheney, Pope Innocent III and England (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1976), 326; Smith, ‘Magna Carta and the 
Charters of the Welsh Princes’, 356; Walker, Medieval Wales, 101; Davies, Age of Conquest, 215, n.1, 243; Carr 
, Medieval Wales, 56; I. W. Rowlands, ‘King John and Wales’, 278, 283, and N. Fryde, ‘King John and the 
Empire’, 345 n. 60, King John: New Interpretations; Maund, The Welsh Kings (2006), 194; Carpenter, The 
Struggle for Mastery, 320-1.; Moore, Welsh Wars of Independence, 112-3; Pryce, Acts of Welsh Rulers, 392-3; 
Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 58. Note: I am aware of the existence of the following work but I have not been 
able include in this research: S. McGlynn, Blood Cries Afar: The Forgotten Invasion of England 1216 (Stroud: 
The History Press, 2012). 
2 Treharne, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’, 60-75.  
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Context 
The context of the treaty between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth cannot be 
sufficiently described through extant studies of bilateral relations or monographs. This 
relationship was not simply a feature of the fluctuating conflict between England and France, 
but part of a wider concurrent struggle in which numerous states, rulers, powerful individuals 
and movements all played significant roles. For example, in this chapter, which initially and 
broadly considers the first quarter of the thirteenth century before focussing on a shorter 
period, at least a dozen states, factions or entities play roles directly connected to this 
alliance. To briefly illuminate them; Fryde identified as critical ‘the awesome figure of Pope 
Innocent III’, although his successor Honorius III is also relevant, as were the papal legates 
and the clergy at large, whatever their allegiance. Also important were the German candidates 
for the imperial crown and the king of Castile’s ambitions for Gascony. She also signalled the 
importance of leaders and bishops in the Low Countries, and believed that ‘their allegiances 
eventually decide the fate of Europe and, in England, precipitate Magna Carta.’3 Since this 
treaty can be connected to the revolt surrounding Magna Carta and involves factions and 
leaders not mentioned by Fryde, the central characters linked with that famous event also 
merit inclusion here. In brief, they were the Welsh leaders, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, Maelgwn 
ap Rhys and Gwenwynwyn ab Owain, as well as the kings of England, France and Scotland 
and their heirs, and of course, England’s rebel and loyal baronial factions.  
There is inadequate space to consider all of the motives and subtleties of their actions, 
so a passing mention amid the critical details will have to suffice for most. To focus this 
study more precisely, the timeframe will be narrowed to 1212-1217 and the perspective 
contracted from a continental scale, to present a scene encompassing Paris, Gwynedd and all 
in between, but remaining mindful of the extensive influence of the papacy. It is also 
necessary to consider the main personalities; Innocent III, John, Llywelyn, Otto and Philip 
Augustus, and the context of the moment which produced the alliance between the French 
king and the Welsh princes, headed by Llywelyn. 
Louis’s invasion of England offers an excellent example of ‘bracketing’ mentioned in 
the introduction and this model can be seen across Western Europe in this period. To 
exemplify that point; the papacy in this period was engaged in a number of power struggles, 
                                                          
3
 Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, 335-6. 
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but principally with the Empire.
4
 It sought good relations with France to act as a foil to its 
puissant enemy faction in Germany.
5
 Similarly, German rulers acquired allies in England and 
the Low Countries, bracketing Philip Augustus’s lands.6 Equally, the Empire had acquired 
through marriage the southern portion of Italy, the Kingdom of Sicily, so bracketing the Papal 
States on whom successive German Emperors applied pressure.
7
 The bracketing principle can 
be applied elsewhere within Europe too. England welcomed and developed friendships with 
German states and Flanders to aid its struggle against Philip Augustus.
8
 The English also 
allied themselves with the county of Toulouse and the kingdom of Navarre to protect 
Gascony, from the French on one side and the Castilians on the other.
9
 These bracketing 
alliances can also be seen to be played out across Iberia. English diplomacy wooed Navarre 
and Portugal to pose as counters to Castilian ambitions north of the Pyrenees. At one point 
John of England also held friendly discussions with the Muslims of southern Spain.
10
 
International relations at this time can thus be shown to be unfettered by national, linguistic 
and even religious strictures. It seems reasonable to apply the same freedom of thought and 
action to all contemporary states and leaders. This chapter will show that the treaty between 
Philip Augustus and Llywelyn is a similar move by Philip, to attach a western ally to his 
son’s alliance to the English barons who invited the French heir to cross to England and 
assume the throne in 1215. 
                                                          
4
 Cheney, Pope Innocent III and England 9, 271-93; A. Hauck, ‘Innocent III Desired To Rule The World’, in J. M. 
Powell, ed., Innocent III, Vicar of Christ or Lord of the World? (Washington D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1994, 
orig. 1963), 16; J. Sayers, Innocent III, Leader of Europe, 1198-1216 (London: Longman, 1997, orig. 1994), 49-
51;  
5 Powell, ‘Innocent III and the Crusade’ in Powell, ed., Innocent III, 121-7; B. Bolton, Innocent III: Studies on 
Papal Authority and Pastoral Care (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), V, 114-34; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 186-94. 
6
 Powell, ‘Innocent III and the Crusade’ 121-7; R. V. Turner, King John (London and New York: Longman, 1994); 
131, 134; B. Arnold, ‘Germany and England, 1066-1453’, in Saul, ed., England in Europe, 1066-1453, 82; 
Warren, King John, 218,223-4; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ 340-6. Note: I am aware that England and 
certain areas of the Low Countries and the Empire had historical connections that pre- and post-date this 
event. However, the fact that they were re-affirmed in this period shows a need to reconnect those allies for 
political purposes.    
7
 Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, 37-8, 327-33, 362-4, 366 n.2; Cheney, Innocent III, 9; E. T. Kennan, ‘The Political 
Crusades’ in Powell, Innocent III, 135-8, 147-8; Sayers, Innocent III, 49-51; Arnold, ‘Germany and England, 1066-
1453’, 78-83. 
8
 Powell, ‘Innocent III and the Crusade’ 121-7; Turner, King John, 131, 134; Arnold, ‘Germany and England, 
1066-1453’, 82; Warren, King John, 218,223-4; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, 340-6. 
9
 Cheney, Innocent III, 14, 324-5, 357, 395-6; Turner, King John, 165; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ 341. 
10
 K. Norgate, John Lackland (London: MacMillan, 1902), 182, n. 2; Cheney, Innocent III, 14-5; Turner, King 
John, 148. Note: I also acknowledge that connections with these entities also pre-date this period and have 
stronger regional importance (ie, historic connections between regional families) rather than being primarily 
international concerns. However, the fact that these friendships were relevant at this time also makes them of 
import to this chapter.  
 84 
 
    
Map 7: French and Iberian lands mentioned in the text.
11
 
Contemporary political machinations were not solely led by the personal relations of leaders, 
but also operated on a state-level. This involved a ‘cultivate and eradicate’ strategy where 
simple invasion and destruction of an enemy was not desired or possible. This can also be 
seen repeated across the continent at this time. The papacy employed such a strategy to 
ensure its favoured candidate was elected Emperor. It favoured and furthered the careers of 
its preferred candidate, Otto of Brunswick, and his supporters, early in his competition with 
Philip of Swabia for the imperial crown, thus cultivating Otto’s faction.12 In contrast, it 
sought to weaken Philip, absolving his adherents from their oaths to him and removing 
ecclesiastical members of his party, thus eradicating his support.
13
 
 These strategies can be seen to be deployed within the context of the treaty between 
Philip and Llywelyn, and is played out in some detail below. However, briefly introduced 
here, this Franco-Welsh alliance is tied to the Papacy’s struggle with the Empire. That in turn 
is connected to Rome’s struggle with England, since John and Otto were allies, although 
Innocent also had other issues which solely concerned his relationship with John. Innocent’s 
preference for Otto waned notably prior to the death of Philip of Swabia, murdered over a 
matter apparently unconnected to the imperial election.
14
 As well as the papacy’s own, 
independent disputes with England, principally over Stephen Langton’s appointment as the 
archbishop of Canterbury, it moved to strengthen its position against the Emperor by 
                                                          
11
 Map 7: This borrows from map 4 and map 2 from the previous chapter, used here for the benefit of the 
reader.  
12
 Cheney, Innocent III, 277, 282-3, 291-2; Sayers, Innocent III, 52-62. 
13
 Sayers, Innocent III, 58-62; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, 340-1. 
14
 Cheney, Innocent III, 291-2; Sayers, Innocent III, 62-5; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ 343-4. 
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weakening his supporters. With those two reasons in hand, in 1208 the pope can be seen to be 
enforcing his will upon John, but also eradicating Otto’s main external support by imposing 
an interdict on England and by later excommunicating John.
15
 Although this failed to find a 
swift resolution to the problem, even after Innocent excommunicated Otto in 1210 for his 
aggression against Italian territory, by 1212 the pope also cultivated factions which might 
prove hostile to John.
16
 He absolved the Welsh princes of their allegiance to John, and 
encouraged them to unite and attack the king of England.
17
 Shortly after that, the papacy 
added the southern side to that bracket by asking the French to attack England.
18
 When the 
French eventually committed to a campaign in England, the English barons were in full revolt 
against John and had forced him to agree to Magna Carta in the summer of 1215.
19
 At the 
outset of their war with John, the rebel barons, whose centres of influence were northern and 
eastern England, secured a firm alliance with the Welsh, and later did likewise with the 
Scots.
20
 Before Philip allowed his heir, Louis, to cross to England, he established a firm 
alliance with the English rebels who had invited the French heir to become king of England.
21
 
French forces invaded England in late 1215 and remained until the conflict was resolved to 
their detriment in September 1217.
22
 This chapter will demonstrate that within the context of 
that attempt to gain the throne of England, the French also allied themselves with the Welsh. 
This can be viewed as an effort to cultivate their own friendly relations with powers on the 
British mainland or, at the very least, a strategy to remove Welsh troops from John’s musters. 
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 Cheney, Innocent III, 303-8, 319-25; Turner, King John, 155-66; Sayers, Innocent III, 62-5; Fryde, ‘King John 
and the Empire’, 343-4. 
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 Cheney, Innocent III, 321; Arnold, ‘Germany and England, 1066-1453’, 82; Sayers, Innocent III, 62-5; Fryde, 
‘King John and the Empire’, 344. 
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 J. A. Giles, Roger of Wendover’s Flowers of History (London: H. G. Bohn, 2 vols, 1849) vol 2, 259-60; Norgate, 
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326, 367-86,  391; Turner, King John, 175-257; Warren, King John, 224-40, 246-52; Fryde, ‘King John and the 
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Norgate, John Lackland, 256-7; Cheney, Innocent III, 391; Turner, King John, 252; Warren, King John, 251-2; D. 
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The treaty text binding the French and the Welsh still exists, and that document is at the heart 
of this chapter.
23
  
The conflicts that precipitated this French–Welsh treaty can be identified as the 
papacy’s campaign to enforce its will over John as well as local noble resentment caused by 
John’s exploitation of his subjects to fund his continental ambitions. Within these, the 
baronial struggle that erupted against John, in the face of papal opposition, allied the French, 
Welsh and Scots with rebel English nobles.  
 
Personalities 
Many of the machinations of the secular rulers, particularly those of John, Llywelyn and 
Philip, are developed below in the second section of this chapter and cover the years 1212-7. 
Therefore the purpose of this brief narrative is to focus more sharply on their related dealings 
leading up to 1212. That year marks the descent into five years of conflict, politicking and 
alliances in which the focus of this study occurred. Although the pope’s actions are palpable 
during that lustrum, there is less analysis of his character and politics. Therefore, since 
Innocent III helped to create an environment which encouraged revolt in England and Wales, 
a short interpretation of his papacy prior to that point seems appropriate. 
 
Innocent III, secular ruler and religious leader. 
Innocent III, pope from 1198 to 1216, played a critical role in the years key to this alliance. 
His actions ensured that his influence was felt across Europe throughout his reign and he has 
been identified as one of the medieval papacy’s most powerful leaders.24 During this period 
the papacy demonstrated a capacity, indeed an enthusiasm, for increasing its involvement in 
secular affairs and extending its role within the spiritual lives of Europe’s states. Innocent III 
is seen as one of the most important advocates of this more robust, engaged approach.
25
 As 
will be discussed below, his politicking in English and French affairs between 1212 and 1216 
in particular provided the impetus for the conflict to which this treaty belongs.  
                                                          
23
 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 3-4 (Latin), 57-8 (English); D.C. Douglas, gen. ed., H. Rothwell, ed., English 
Historical Documents, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 12 vols, 1968-77), vol 3, 1189-1327 (1975), 306-7; 
Pryce, Acts of Welsh Rulers, 392-3 (entry 235). 
24
 Cheney, Innocent III, vii, 1-10; Sayers, Innocent III, 94; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 186; Fryde, ‘King John and 
the Empire’, 335 
25
 Cheney, Innocent III, 1-10, 401-8; Hauck, ‘Innocent III Desired To Rule The World’, and Cheney, ‘England and 
France’ in Powell, Innocent III, 15-8, 153-6; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, 335. 
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Innocent’s principal aims were three-fold. Firstly, the reform of the Church; stamping 
out corrupt practices, reorganising financial and legal structures, and enforcing conformity to 
approved religious practices across western Christianity.
26
 This would assist Rome 
financially, identify irregular or heretical practices to correct, and ensure a commonality of 
worship and administrative practice across Western Europe. Secondly, the pope wanted to 
bring to peace the leaders of all peoples in his obedience, as a necessary step in order to 
achieve his third aim, the raising of a crusading army powerful and united enough to regain 
the Holy Land.
27
 Throughout his pontificate, Innocent demonstrated a continual willingness 
to interfere in the internal affairs of secular states in order to accomplish his goals, primarily 
by enforcing obedience to his commands.
28
 He proved to be prepared to deal with leaders and 
states individually, by imposing interdicts or excommunicating kings, for example, or to deal 
with the entirety of those in his influence at the same time, as happened at the Fourth Lateran 
Council in November 1215.
29
 It was the pope’s readiness to become involved in internal and 
secular affairs that brought him into conflict with Europe’s rulers and, in so doing, helped 
create the environment and the catalyst for the war in which the French-Welsh treaty was 
created.  
       Innocent acted in several ways which brought him into contact and conflict with 
European rulers and factions. Firstly, as the secular ruler of the Papal States he took measures 
to consolidate those areas within his dominion; reorganising the administration and military 
presence within them as a first step.
30
 He then expanded his territories, at times subtly 
exploiting factional divisions, at others by taking direct military action.
31
 The power of the 
German imperial factions within Italian territories was the main threat to Roman security and 
stability within Italy. At his accession, much of northern Italy and the whole of the Kingdom 
of Sicily were under German control.
32
 Although his administrative, military and political 
efforts helped to stabilise his secular position, Innocent also used his papal powers to combat 
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 Cheney, Innocent III, 260; Powell, ‘Innocent III and the Crusade’ in Powell, Innocent III, 128-34; Sayers, 
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 Cheney, Innocent III, 43-9, Powell, ‘Innocent III and the Crusade’ in Powell, Innocent III, 128-34; Sayers, 
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 Sayers, Innocent III, 49-51. 
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the threat posed by German interests in Italy. In 1199, he granted indulgences to troops 
willing to fight Markward of Anweiler, the German commander in southern Italy.
33
 As the 
man charged with crowning the Emperor, he sought to influence which candidate ascended 
the imperial throne. In the pursuit of a preferred candidate, Innocent entered into secular 
politics while exercising his papal authority. He initially opted for Otto of Brunswick, who 
appeared to pose the least threat militarily and seemed an ideal opponent to the Hohenstaufer, 
the traditionally dominant German imperial faction. The pope promoted Otto over his popular 
rival, Philip of Swabia, and used his power to eradicate Philip’s support, by absolving his 
adherents of their oaths to him and by removing from their posts those clergymen who sided 
with him. In addition, the pope cultivated Otto’s power by undertaking such measures as 
requesting that King John paid his nephew large sums of money.
34
 This stance reversed from 
1204, with the pope appearing to prefer Philip over Otto, however both parties put their trust 
into Innocent’s hands to mediate a final settlement in 1206. This change might also reflect 
John’s loss of Normandy to Philip Augustus, as the alliance between John and Otto lost 
power, so that of the two Philips, Augustus and Swabia, was ascendant. A feeble Emperor 
would not be able to protect the papacy nor lead a crusade. However, the imperial contest was 
concluded abruptly by the murder of Philip in June 1208 by a former potential son-in-law.
35
 
Following his election in October 1209, Otto IV became the sort of aggressive, imperialistic 
Emperor the papacy feared. He took possession of numerous towns and territories within 
Italy, in consequence the pope excommunicated the Emperor in November 1210. Although 
he subsequently sought peace, Otto was deposed in favour of the young Frederick II, and he 
eventually retired to Germany in 1212. Although weakened, he was still able to construct and 
lead an impressive coalition army that attacked northern France in 1214.
36
 However, the 
conflict with the Empire had repercussions beyond Germany and Italy, as all sides sought 
allies and favours from powers further afield, as events in England and France illustrated.  
However, as the spiritual head of Western Europe, Innocent sought to extend papal 
influence far and wide. It was in this sphere of activity that Innocent was arguably most 
active. Although he sponsored missionary projects which expanded Catholicism’s frontiers to 
                                                          
33
 Cheney, Innocent III, 260; Kennan, ‘The Political Crusades’, 135-8; Sayers, Innocent III, 77-80, 182-4. 
34
 Norgate, John Lackland, 164-5; Cheney, Innocent III, 285-7, 291-2; Sayers, Innocent III, 58-62; Fryde, ‘King 
John and the Empire’, 345. 
35
 Cheney, Innocent III, 292; Arnold, ‘Germany and England, 1066-1453’, 82; Sayers, Innocent III, 62.  
36
 Cheney, Innocent III, 277, 282-3; Turner, King John, 169; Hauck, ‘Innocent III Desired To Rule The World’, and 
Cheney, ‘England and France’ in Powell, Innocent III, 16-8, 155-6; Arnold, ‘Germany and England, 1066-1453’, 
82-3; Sayers, Innocent III, 52-65; 
 89 
 
the east, into territories traditionally considered the preserve of the eastern Church, he also 
acted directly against eastern Christians.
37
 Although he issued threats and sentences against 
the leaders of the Fourth Crusade which captured Constantinople and Zadar, he kept the 
financial rewards reaped from the mission and absolved those involved with little 
persuasion.
38
 Not only did Rome benefit financially from the assault and capture of 
Constantinople, which saw nuns raped and thousands of Christians killed by other Christians, 
but it also weakened the hegemony of the Greek Orthodox Church.
39
 
Medieval popes possessed considerable powers which reached into every state under 
their obedience. Innocent used his immense moral authority and papal powers to apply 
pressure to secular rulers who did not comply with his wishes. From early in his pontificate 
he threatened those leaders who resisted his demands and passed sentences on a number of 
them.  Two of the prime papal powers were those of interdict and excommunication. The 
former denied religious service to an individual or group, diocese, city or country interdicted. 
This affected marriages, funerals, church services and other roles for which the Church or the 
clergy were responsible. Cheney described the interdict as ‘a form of warfare between the 
pope and the king’.40 Innocent used this power quite freely; interdicts were passed against 
Leon 1198-1204, Normandy 1199 and 1203, France 1199 and 1200, Norway 1200, England 
1209-1214, and London 1215-16.
41
 Excommunication denied the sacraments to an individual, 
which had potentially difficult repercussions for a Christian king, whose moral authority to 
govern could be questioned if he was banned from and by the Church. Innocent used this 
measure against rulers and their supporters too; Philip of Swabia in 1198, King Sverre of 
Norway in 1200, Henry, the Count Palatine and the duke of Brabant, both over 1204-5, and 
King John from 1209 to 1213.
42
 Innocent and his successor, Honorius III, 1216-1227, also 
excommunicated the Welsh, Scots, French and English factions involved in the 1215-17 
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conflict against John and the government of Henry III.
43
 In the aftermath of that conflict, 
interdicts were placed on Wales and Scotland when they failed to obey papal directives and, 
in the view of the papacy, return to the obedience of ‘their own lawful lord, the new king [of 
England]’.44 It has long been contemplated how effective these measures actually were; there 
was no formal guide describing how to impose and conduct an interdict, no consistently 
reliable record of its application or effect, and in the case of the English interdict 1208-1213, 
the papacy allowed the relaxation of certain strictures.
45
 
 The most formidable weapon in the papal armoury however was the crusade, which 
Innocent also used a number of times. Several crusades and papal military missions were 
launched during Innocent’s pontificate; against Markward of Anweiler in 1199, the Baltic 
states to expand the boundaries of Christendom from 1204 onwards, the Fourth Crusade 
against Constantinople in 1204-5, the Albigensian crusades from 1207 and those intended to 
reconquer Spain, particularly after 1210.
46
 These were not solely used for religious reasons, 
as the political mission against Markward of Anweiler, for example, clearly demonstrated. 
Although there was no crusade called against King John initially, during 1212 the pope began 
to engage him with military forces.
47
 As will be shown below, while augmenting pressure on 
the king of England, the pope appears to have requested the Welsh princes to form an alliance 
and make war on King John in 1212.
48
 There is a degree of uncertainty over the timing of the 
French role in this papal project against John. One of the leading voices on the matter, 
Christopher Cheney, rejected that notion of a papally-inspired mission claimed by the 
chronicler Roger of Wendover. However, French evidence including letters from Philip 
Augustus as well as English sources confirm preparations to invade during the early summer 
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of 1213, the evidence for any French military activity prior to that date is scant and 
unreliable.
49
 
The Welsh, who had been drawn into the pope’s political wars in 1212, found 
themselves and the allies they joined to fight John, excommunicated by the same power that 
had encouraged them to take up arms.
50
 Much of the confusion surrounding the papal role in 
the French-Welsh treaty, evident in the suggestion that Innocent was the originator of the 
alliance, stems from Innocent’s drive to force John to obey papal commands over the 
Canterbury election, and the political sea-change which occurred following John’s surrender 
of the crown in May 1213.
51
 It is within that moment, fickly encouraging revolt then 
forbidding it because John agreed to become a papal vassal and pay regular tribute to Rome, 
that Innocent created the framework for both conflicts on the British mainland; that of 1212-
13 between the Welsh and John, and the larger 1215-17 French invasion of England in 
support of the Magna Carta rebels. These are explored below. The pope’s conflicts with the 
Empire and England, as well as his desire to impose his will and expand papal power 
throughout Christendom, led to moves to form alliances with factions within and outside 
John’s domain. The separate engagement of the Welsh and the French to achieve Innocent’s 
desire appears partly responsible for the subsequent unions between the French crown and 
parties on mainland Britain. The motives for war that bonded those factions aligned against 
John had not been washed away by John’s apparently political surrender to Rome and, having 
encouraged conflict, Innocent found it impossible to prevent the war of 1215-17.
52
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John, Otto, Philip Augustus and Llywelyn. 
Richard I made his nephew, Otto of Brunswick, duke of Aquitaine in 1196.
53
 While this 
strengthened ties between these dynasties, it also gave Otto a direct stake in Anglo-French 
affairs. As a consequence, Philip Augustus sought alliances with rival German factions to 
counteract that threat and engaged with the Castilians, to menace Gascony from the south. On 
his accession in 1199, John sought similar allies to check the ambitions of France and her 
allies.
54
 Meanwhile, he meddled in Welsh affairs, promoting dynastic rivals to Llywelyn ap 
Iorwerth, who had recently risen to prominence in Gwynedd. Having gained supremacy over 
other native candidates in a two-year campaign, Llywelyn signed a treaty with John, 
recognising one another’s positions and John’s dominance.55  
John’s continental struggles pre-occupied him for the next five years. Critical to which, 
Philip Augustus took up the Bretons’ case against John for his murder of his nephew, Arthur 
of Brittany, in 1202.
56
 Philip declared forfeit the lands John held of the king of France, and 
successfully captured Normandy by the close of 1204. He subsequently seized Anjou and the 
other Angevin territories, bar Gascony, the following year.
57
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Map 8: Philip Augustus’s territorial gains from defeating King John.58  
John was initially slow to engage Otto as his ally and therefore failed to present a united front 
to deter or menace France.
59
  The loss of most of England’s continental lands was largely due 
to Philip’s proactive confrontation of the issue, although the English king’s intransigence was 
also a significant factor.
60
 This fracture between England and the Angevin possessions 
proved critical to the Anglo-French struggle of that period. The state of relative financial 
parity between the two tipped dramatically in Philip’s favour thereafter. Within two decades 
the English king’s income stood at just a sixth of that of his French adversary.61 Innocent III 
washed his hands of any intervention in the wars in France, advising the local Norman lords 
to act as their customs dictated, thereby effectively releasing them to pay homage to Philip 
and ensuring a smooth Capetian takeover.
62
 In 1206, John invaded Anjou through Gascony 
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but failed to gain a decisive victory, and retired, settling for a two-year truce.
63
 Otto’s cause 
waned due to Philip of Swabia’s popularity, weakening John’s position further. His loss of 
standing helped the French king’s cause, which in turn served to further promote that of his 
ally, Philip of Swabia, again affecting the Welf-Angevin alliance in consequence. 
The dispute between England and Rome began and led to the interdict of lands under 
Canterbury’s jurisdiction, including Welsh dioceses, followed by the excommunication of 
King John.
64
 The struggle between John and the Pope requires no further elucidation at this 
point. During the interdict, John began to act firmly to ensure the obedience of England’s 
nobles.
65
 These measures included increased tax and demands of feudal service. He 
prosecuted military campaigns against nobles who fell out of favour, such as William de 
Braose, often deploying foreign mercenaries.
66
 John also moved against those territories on 
the periphery of his kingdom, by campaigning against Scotland in 1209, Ireland in 1210, 
ostensibly in pursuit of William de Braose, and in 1211 against Llywelyn, his son-in-law 
since 1205.
67
 He imposed harsh terms on his adversaries when they sued for peace, and even 
mocked William the Lion, king of Scotland, for surrendering without battle.
68
 While none in 
the British Isles were ignorant of the power of John’s army, his seemingly unprovoked 
aggression against these factions and apparently unacceptable treatment of his English nobles 
began to stir discontent within his domains.
69
 David Crouch compellingly made the case that 
the dissatisfaction of England’s nobility began a number of years previously and probably 
extended into previous reigns, but that it was John’s mishandling of his elites, among others, 
that eventually provoked this apparently conservative element of society to take such drastic 
measures.
70
  The seeds of the revolt against John that bloomed later began to grow notably 
during these years. It is possible that Philip Augustus began to investigate the possibility of 
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fomenting revolt on the British mainland as early as 1209, although these efforts, if real, were 
intangible, unsuccessful and irrelevant when compared to subsequent events.
71
  
As Otto exhausted Innocent’s patience and was excommunicated for attacking papal 
lands in 1210, further opportunities to machinate in England’s affairs appear to have arisen.72 
During 1212, the Welsh under Llywelyn were incited to revolt by Innocent III, seeking to 
increase pressure on John during the interdict.
73
 This was followed up in the first months of 
1213 by the conception of a French invasion project.
74
 Although Philip’s fleet was destroyed 
at Damme during that summer, this only removed the immediate means of invading, and did 
not nullify the desire to cause harm in England.
75
 In fact, the English victory at Damme, 
might have served as notice to the French that they needed support from forces across the 
channel in order to effect a successful attack. The tide of papal pressure was reversed from 
May 1213 when John surrendered the crown to the papacy, quite probably as a means of 
avoiding attack.
76
 However, Rome’s new support for John did not assuage the brewing 
enmities the king had roused in preceding years. Although John had surrendered to the pope, 
he continued to construct an alliance and, in 1214, launched a large-scale, two-fronted 
campaign in France.
77
 Instead of intervening to halt the effusion of Christian blood, the pope 
notably failed to order John’s excommunication for his aggression, and appeared to await an 
outcome.
78
 John’s withdrawal before Prince Louis at La Roche-au-Moine and Otto’s defeat to 
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Philip Augustus at Bouvines might have convinced the French that they also were entitled to 
engage in warfare against their Christian neighbours, irrespective of their papal protection.
79
 
Meanwhile, the English barons’ discontent with John blossomed from rumoured regicidal 
plots into full warfare which culminated in Magna Carta. It also saw Louis, the French heir, 
invited to become king of England. That act proves that the French were not dissuaded from 
attacking by the threat of papal censure.
80
 It was within the febrile environment that existed 
on the British mainland, particularly in England, from 1212 to 1217 that alliances between 
English, Welsh, French and Scots factions were made.
81
 The treaty between Philip Augustus 
and Llywelyn was made in this period.  
The next section will present the source, debate the predominant 1212 theory and 
demonstrate that this alliance clearly dates to either 1215 or 1216. This will also show that 
the French-Welsh alliance was well-known during the war in England, 1215-1217, and was 
referred to in a number of contemporary sources, while few, if any credible ones suggest 
1212. Also, certain supporting events, actions and considerations help corroborate the 1215-6 
date, and serve to further undermine 1212. 
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3.2:   Dating the Treaty 
Nothing in the treaty unequivocally reveals the year it was written, and the lack of an explicit 
reference to it in any contemporary source therefore invites speculation. This section will 
present the source and engage in a short discussion of related details, before moving on to 
debate the arguments for 1212 given in Treharne’s article.  The evidence supporting the case 
for 1215-16 as the real date of the treaty is presented here, as are other factors that also 
indicate those years as the correct date. These debates focus on the existence and timings of 
meetings of the Welsh nobles, a brief study of the tactics of the contemporary papacy as well 
as problems with Treharne’s primary source. Then, the primary sources asserting that the 
alliance took place in 1215-16 are presented. To test this theory further, there is an attempt to 
build a case for 1212 using primary sources. Finally, the notion that a crusade against 
England was being planned will be examined. 
 
The Source. 
This union was sought by the king of France sometime between 1212 and 1216.
82
 The 
opening contact, a letter from Philip Augustus to Llewelyn ap Iorwerth, is lost. Although 
there is no known copy and no evidence for its preparation or delivery, Philip’s motives 
appear evident in Llywelyn's reply. His response has therefore become the principal 
document in this alliance. The original is held in French archives and is no longer available to 
view due to its poor condition.
83
 It was first transcribed and translated by Thomas Matthews 
in 1910, although elements of that work were challenged by R. F. Treharne’s landmark 1958 
article, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’.84 This article has been taken as the 
benchmark for all study on this matter, and it has guided two later treaty translations.
85
  
However, there are many vagaries in this treaty; no dates, no places and only two names are 
mentioned, therefore other contemporary sources required examination in order to 
corroborate Treharne’s dating. Research on the matter provided compelling evidence 
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signposting a later date. In light of this, scrutiny of Treharne’s interpretation also exposed 
fatal flaws in the 1212 supposition and reset the timeframe of this alliance to 1215-16. 
 
To his most excellent lord, Philip, by God’s grace the illustrious king of the French, 
Llywelyn prince of North Wales his faithful subject greeting and devoted and due service 
of fealty and reverence. How am I to repay the excellence of your nobility for the 
singular honour and priceless gift with which you the king of the French, nay foremost of 
kings on earth, anticipated me, not so much munificently as magnificently, in sending 
me, your knight, your letter sealed with the seal of gold in testimony of the treaty 
between the kingdom of the French and the principality of North Wales – which letter I 
will have kept in the aumbreys of the church as if it were a sacred relic, to be a perpetual 
memorial and an inviolable witness that I and my heirs, adhering inseparably to you and 
your heirs, will be friends to your friends and enemies to your enemies and I confidently 
ask and request that the very same be observed in all respects by your royal dignity in 
royal fashion towards me and my friends. That it may be inviolably observed, by the 
testimony of my seal, having summoned the council of my chief men and having 
obtained the common assent of all the princes of Wales, all of whom I have bound to you 
in the friendship of this treaty, I promise that I will be faithful to you for ever and just as 
I faithfully promise I will most faithfully fulfil my promise. Furthermore, from the time I 
received your highness’s letter, I have made neither truce nor peace, nor even parley, 
with the English, but, by God’s grace, I and all the princes of Wales, unanimously 
leagued together have manfully resisted our – and your – enemies, and with God’s help 
we have by force of arms recovered from the yoke of their tyranny a large part of the 
land and the strongly defended castles which they by fraud and deceit had occupied and 
having recovered them we hold them strongly in the might of the Lord. Hence we, all the 
princes of Wales, ask and request that you make no truce with the English without us, 
knowing that we will not for any terms or price bind ourselves to them by any peace or 
treaty unless we know in advance we have your approval.
86
  
 
A discussion of the text is necessary here, as a preface to a more thorough debate on the 
dating of the document, because the message delivered by this treaty will inevitably correlate 
to the milieu in which it was written. Wales, France and England experienced very different 
political environments in 1212 and 1216. To offer a brief synopsis here, the English were 
living under papal interdict in 1212 and rumours of serious discontent among the barons 
drove the king to summon foreign mercenaries to protect him. While John still planned an 
invasion of France, there were also fears of a French attack on England and the Welsh, 
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crushed the year before, took up arms in the second half of that year.
87
 By 1216, England was 
a vassal of the papacy, there was open warfare throughout the land. The king and those loyal 
to him faced a formidable alliance led by a significant proportion of the English nobility, 
leagued with the French, the Scots and the Welsh. The rebel barons had invited Louis, the 
French heir, to invade and be crowned king of England. Louis landed in May 1216 and, with 
his baronial allies, seized London and much of England. In spite of the excommunication and 
eventual absolution of ‘Rex Ludovico’, as his father addressed him, and many of his English, 
French, Scots and Welsh supporters, his involvement in the conflict lasted until the end of 
1217. The overt, military aspect of the struggle against King John began in 1215 and 
produced the first ‘Magna Carta’, which was re-issued a number of times over the following 
years.
88
 Therefore, when assigning this treaty to either date, the same terms refer to different 
factors, and so are likely to have different connotations. Consequently, a thorough debate on 
the dating of the treaty will be essential to the understanding, relevance and timing of this 
alliance.  
 The translations found in the appendices reveal largely the same message; however 
the text included above is used as the prime document. In the early clauses Llywelyn greeted 
Philip, presented himself as his servant, even describing himself as Philip’s ‘knight’. He 
thanked him humbly for the offer of alliance contained in the now lost initial letter. He went 
on to confirm his and his heirs’ loyalty to Philip, his heirs and their causes. This is highly 
significant, since it therefore established a permanency to their union, such a clause was 
lacking in Owain Gwynedd’s correspondence with Louis VII. It might be relevant that 
Philip’s heirs were mentioned, particularly if Prince Louis were entering the stage around that 
time. The explicit references to servitude and fealty to Philip should be construed as an 
acknowledgement of Welsh homage to the king of France. The prince of Gwynedd also asked 
that the act of support be reciprocated to him and other Welsh leaders. He authenticated the 
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treaty with his seal, having discussed it with his own council as well as with the other Welsh 
leaders, whom he bound into the agreement. He sincerely promised to keep his word to 
Philip, and stated that he had not treated with the English since entering into the French 
king’s friendship. He reported that they had already attacked and inflicted defeats on their 
mutual enemy, retaking some of the land and castles of which the Welsh had been 
dispossessed. Llywelyn concluded by promising not to make peace unilaterally with the 
English and requested Philip to act similarly. From this response it seems reasonable to 
deduce that Philip offered Llywelyn alliance and asked him to bind to the venture those in his 
obedience - his nobles and subjects. In addition, it appears evident that Philip requested that 
the Welsh made war on John. In addition, it is possible that Philip suggested that Llywelyn 
recognised him, although the reply given might simply show the prince’s effusive 
enthusiasm. Finally, Philip’s initial letter might have asked that the Welsh did not make peace 
unilaterally, hence Llywelyn’s request for the same.89  
 The treaty text is ambiguous, no events or places are explicitly named, and so might 
be applied to either proposed treaty dates; 1212 or 1215-16. Over three short pages, Matthews 
mused innocuously over 1212, 1215 or 1216 as the year the two rulers corresponded. In 1910, 
Matthews wrote that ‘the choice lies between 1212 and 1216; but a definite decision can only 
be made with some hesitation.’ This meant that the letters were exchanged sometime within 
that timeframe, rather than there solely being two years from which to choose. Although he 
initially identified 1212 as the ‘very probable’ date, the case Matthews created for 1215, or 
possibly early 1216, was far more compelling; summarising that the evidence ‘decides in 
favour of the later rather than the earlier date.’90 Matthews’ position was solidly rejected by 
Treharne, whose claims have gone unchallenged since 1958.
91
 In fact, Treharne’s 1212 dating 
has been regurgitated by the imposing list of historians mentioned above, and it has been used 
as recently as 2005 and 2007.
92
 Irrespective of their impressive credentials, they are incorrect 
in ascribing this treaty to 1212. The evidence and the context of the moment definitely place 
the treaty in 1215 or 1216.  
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 The language used in the treaty indicates that the author had a well-developed 
expressive style, comparable in standard to other contemporary documents, as Treharne 
concurred.
93
 It began with an extremely polite, perhaps flattering, greeting from Llewelyn, 
humbly submitting his lower status before Philip. While this realistically reflected the pre-
eminence of France over Gwynedd, it also appears to be an intelligent way of opening a 
discourse with such a power. While it might be tempting to view Llywelyn as prostrating 
himself before Philip, it seems more reasonable to suppose that this document uses certain 
phraseology that was in keeping with contemporary practice. These softly rhyming phrases, 
for example, ‘non tam munifice quam magnifice’ and ‘vestris amicis amici erimus et inimici 
inimicis’ are arguably as important to the style and presentation of the letter, as they are in the 
actual message they conveyed.
94
 Throughout the period, the manner in which leaders 
projected themselves was of great importance to their status; how interlocutors perceived one 
another and reflected how they perceived and acted towards one another.  
 Attached to the bold, overt promises of perpetual alliance to the French kings and 
their allies, was a request that they acted similarly toward Llewelyn and his confederates. The 
same clause also appears in the Welsh princes’ agreement with the English barons in 1215 
and between the Scots and the barons during the winter 1215-16.
95
 While formulaic, the 
commonality of language in use between all parties at the same moment is suggestive of a 
contemporary link. This also demonstrates that Llywelyn was au fait with contemporary 
diplomatic procedure and the appropriate language to employ. This inclusive clause might 
also denote that while pleased at the union of the French king and the Welsh leaders, he was 
unwilling to act as Philip’s sole pawn on the British mainland. Unilaterally attacking England 
would have almost certainly been disastrous for Llywelyn and, although it might have 
temporarily curtailed English actions across the channel, it would probably have resulted in a 
defeat similar to that of 1211. However, operating as part of a mutually-supportive and 
probably multi-factional alliance might make joint actions viable, that environment only 
existed from 1215.  
These clauses concerning mutual attachment and consideration when treating suggests 
that other alliances were being formed or at least discussed, because the French alone, on the 
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southern shore of the Channel could not have offered any realistic military or logistical 
assistance against English armies sent to Wales. The Welsh leaders would have been keenly 
aware of that fact. Equally, it is inconceivable that Philip would request that Llywelyn sent 
Welsh troops to fight in French territories. The Welsh could not send soldiers to France for 
want of shipping; also the voyage to France through English-controlled waters was 
logistically arduous and, more importantly, the Welsh were reluctant to send troops out of 
Wales for fear of English invasion in their absence. The latter point is amply demonstrated by 
a letter written between July 1199 and January 1201 to Innocent III from the Welsh 
beseeching his intervention against the interdicts of the archbishop of Canterbury against 
them. The underlying messages in that letter are that the Welsh could not send troops on the 
proposed crusade due to the likelihood of English invasion of their territories in their absence 
and also that they were disinclined to do so unless the pope aided them against Canterbury’s 
excesses.
96
   
These points delineate the operational boundaries for this alliance; land-based action 
by a largely infantry force. Due to the movement restrictions of a force on foot, and the 
practical impossibilities of transporting Welsh troops by boat, this limited Welsh involvement 
to Wales, the border or at most within the western or southern part of the British Isles. 
Significantly, Llywelyn promised to make war on lands lost ‘by fraud and guile’, but made 
no mention of operating outside Wales. Although not dated, it has clearly and reasonably 
been assumed that this referred to lands lost in the settlement of 1211.
97
 However, it cannot 
be safely asserted that this exclusively meant those lands, neither does the text stipulate that 
Llywelyn was targeting those lands ceded to John in the north. Since Llywelyn frequently 
campaigned across Wales, this statement could be fairly applied to any other territory no 
longer under native control at that time. The enthusiasm to fight is easily recognisable in this 
treaty, and it is clear that the Welsh had already retaken some territory. There is no indication 
when or where those lands were taken; whether in recent months or recent years, however 
any such victory would obviously be worth highlighting in a letter to the French king, their 
new ally.   
 Another vital point arising from this treaty is the mention of assemblies of the leading 
men of Gwynedd and the native princes, possibly the clergy too, although the latter is 
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disputed.
98
 Since these meetings are vital to the dating issue, they must be debated in depth 
below. However, gatherings of nobles appear in contemporary records which, while not 
entirely trustworthy, offer some dates and events on which to construct a timeline where this 
alliance seems possible and desirable. These two elements are essential, and both must be 
identified in any possible treaty date. 
In overview, this treaty appears to be a cautious but enthusiastic diplomatic 
manoeuvre aligning Gwynedd and its allies with the ascendant force at that time. Philip had 
defeated John in 1204, dispossessing him of Normandy, Poitou, Maine and part of Aquitaine, 
fracturing forever the Angevin dominions of his father.
99
 John’s 1206 attempt to recover 
territory in France ended in failure, while in 1214 Philip convincingly defeated John and 
crushed his continental allies.
100
 By November 1215 London had fallen to the barons, French 
troops had arrived in England and, in May 1216, Prince Louis landed and was proclaimed 
king.
101
 If the Welsh suspected the French were coming, or knew that they were already in 
England, that would present a realistic opportunity to have such an alliance with France. If 
the French were still in France, as they were in 1212, then such an alliance would not be in 
Welsh interests and would imperil them to John’s well-noted wrath. 
Clearly, such vague treaty terms can be perceived differently depending on the 
circumstances. The ambiguities of this treaty are numerous and critical; no dates, no specific 
events, no place names and no forenames other than Philip and Llywelyn are included. Those 
absences have allowed questions to arise over the dating of the treaty. Therefore a detailed 
examination of Treharne’s reasoning, combined with a consideration of other contemporary 
sources and fresh analysis is required.  
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Treharne’s treaty of 1212. 
In his 1958 article, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’, Treharne made a strong 
case for 1212 as the year that Llywelyn replied to Philip’s original, lost letter.102 No one has 
speculated whether Llywelyn’s reply was drafted and sent in the same year as Philip’s 
mission to Gwynedd. The assumption that it was returned in the same year appears implicit. 
As noted above, Treharne’s article has found such favour that it has been widely accepted by 
all later writers as the accurate date of the treaty. However, there has not been any previous 
rationalisation of Treharne’s influential work, nor has anyone attempted to establish when 
this alliance was both possible and desirable. The 1212 argument was constructed on half a 
dozen main arguments to act as a counter to Matthews’ work. The points of contention from 
this landmark article are deconstructed here, finding the overall conclusion to be fatally 
flawed, although his first assertion, that the treaty must post-date 1210 due to Llywelyn’s 
‘long understanding’ with John, is reasonable.103  
 
Welsh noble councils 
The argument centred on the Welsh noble councils convened during this time is critical.  If 
inaccurate on this matter, then Treharne’s argument largely collapses on this point. He 
claimed that ‘the letter was written after the formation of the successful confederation of the 
Welsh princes early in 1212’, yet he later conceded that there was a good case for there 
having been no such council in that year.
104
 The contemporary source on which Treharne 
depended, Brut y Tywysogion, gives details too inconclusive to support the 1212 theory alone, 
instead it rather illuminates the noble gatherings of the years 1215 and 1216 as being more 
eventful, relevant and showing textual similarities with clauses from this Franco-Welsh 
treaty.
105
 That evidence from the Brut for these years merits exposure here, as well as the 
inclusion of material from other corroborating contemporary sources.  
To further define the context, on the advice of the noble council of Gwynedd, 
Llywelyn had submitted to John in 1211.
106
 In the same year, John began constructing castles 
across Wales and also ordered Welsh leaders to combine with marcher forces from 
Glamorgan and Pembroke and move against two minor Deheubarth nobles who had not 
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heeded the king’s summons, Rhys and Owain ap Gruffudd, grandsons of the Lord Rhys.107 
Faced with such powerful combined enemies they sued for peace with little further 
opposition.
108
 Before the end of 1211 however, two of those called to John’s side to face 
Llywelyn that summer, Maelgwn ap Rhys and Rhys Fychan ‘repented of their reconciliation 
with the king, and they fell upon the new castle at Aberystwyth and razed it to the ground.’109 
In light of that evidence, it might in fact be more realistic to redefine the ‘1212 revolt’ as one 
which broke out in 1211 and continued the following year. In addition, the Brut entry for 
1212 reveals: 
 
A year after that, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, prince of Gwynedd, being unable to suffer the 
injuries which the men from the new castles were inflicting upon him, made a solemn 
pact with the princes of Wales, namely Gwenwynwyn, Maelgwn ap Rhys, Madog ap 
Gruffudd Maelor, Maredudd ap Rhobert. And he rose up against the king, and by the end 
of two months he laid siege to all the castles the king had built in Gwynedd, and he took 
them all except two, Degannwy and Rhuddlan. And they laid siege to the castle of 
Mathrafal in Powys, which Robert Vieuxpont had built. ... And in that year Robert 
Vieuxpont hanged at Shrewsbury Rhys ap Maelgwn, an excellent boy not seven years 
old, who was a hostage with the king.
110
 
 
This evidence clearly states, with no mention of the French or the pope, that Llywelyn and 
other Welsh leaders rose in reaction to English military activity in Wales, and that fighting 
took place in Gwynedd and Powys. It seems likely that conflict arose elsewhere in Wales too; 
Maelgwn ap Rhys, was arguably the leading Deheubarth noble of the moment, and Madog ap 
Gruffudd Maelor of Northern Powys and the Perfeddwlad, which comprised the territory 
which ran east of the Conway to the English border, were among the revolt leaders. It seems 
reasonable to assume that they would have fought against Crown and Marcher interests in 
their territories also, but their conflicts went unrecorded by this brief, general campaign 
summary. This notion that the Welsh uprising was provoked by the harsh conditions imposed 
by the 1211 settlement is supported by another contemporary source unconnected with 
Wales. The Winchester Monastery annals included a noteworthy entry which followed the 
account of that peace agreement and the construction of new castles. That brief note 
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explicitly connected the subsequent Welsh destruction of the king’s recent fortifications to 
the harsh regime imposed by those garrisons.
111
 
 
 
Map 9: This general map of medieval Wales.112 
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Papal Tactics and Revolt 
Although there is contemporary evidence of external encouragement to attack John in 1212, 
none of it mentions the French.  
 
In that year Pope Innocent the Third absolved three princes, namely, Llywelyn ap 
Iorwerth and Gwenwynwyn and Maelgwn ap Rhys, from the oath and allegiance they 
owed to the king of England. And he enjoined upon them, for the remission of their sins, 
to direct friendly endeavour and action against the iniquity of that king. And he 
interdicted the churches for five years in all England and Wales, except for the territory 
of those three princes and those who were leagued with them. And they by unanimous 
counsel gained possession of Perfeddwlad, which was before that in the hands of the 
king, and that with spirited manliness.
113
 
 
Their absolution cannot be dated with any certainty before the resumption of hostilities in 
summer 1212 which, as shown above, appear to have begun in late 1211. This absolution 
therefore could only cautiously be considered as a spark that reignited the conflict against 
John; it might have arrived after the fact and simply served as an encouragement, albeit a 
powerful one. In addition, papal encouragement would certainly have legitimised the Welsh 
offensive and so its mention might appear prominent in order to further serve that end. The 
1212 campaign appears to have been well-executed by Llywelyn; other sources support the 
claims made in the Brut.
114
 Another, Roger of Wendover, described the Welsh decapitating 
all within the castles they took.
115
  
The idea that the pope incited the Welsh to revolt also appears in contemporary 
sources such as the chronicle of Walter of Coventry, and in the monastic Annals of Osney 
and Waverley.
116
  It is perhaps noteworthy that the Waverley Annals also included a more 
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general release for all ‘earls, barons, knights, freemen, clergy, laymen’ from loyalty to 
John.
117
 The Burton monastery annals also tell of Pandulf, the papal legate in England, 
absolving the English from their allegiance to John in 1212, although the Waverley and 
Burton texts are practically identical, suggesting they emanated from a common source.
118
 
The chroniclers Roger of Wendover and, later, Matthew Paris also wrote that Innocent 
encouraged English disobedience and revolt.
119
 These are recognisable elements of a 
‘cultivate and eradicate’ strategy; empowering John’s opponents, attacking his legitimacy 
among the clergy, nobles and the general populace. John appears to have surrendered shortly 
after. 
Curiously, although the British sources appear conclusive enough, no papal record has 
emerged for the absolution of the Welsh. For the period 1208-1213, the only mentions of 
Wales or its leaders in Innocent’s letters post-date John’s surrender to the papacy in May 
1213. The two most obvious are the initial truce between the Welsh and the English of June 
1213 and the instruction of 28 October 1213 commanding all the clergy, nobles and people of 
Wales and England to obey John and his heirs.
120
 The issue of the absolution of the princes is 
of some import and requires one further consideration. Without concrete evidence of its 
veracity and timing, the treaty seems likely to post-date the lifting of the interdict due to the 
fact that Llywelyn had access to sacrosanct relics on which to swear and to the interior of a 
church in which to reverently store it. This, of course, assumes that the interdict was enforced 
in Wales, which is neither proven nor refuted by the sources. Were this papal absolution 
proven to have come in 1212, this would still not connect Philip Augustus and Llywelyn or 
rectify certain problems with that year’s entry of Brut y Tywysogion, discussed below. This 
argument proceeds on the notion that the pope did absolve the Welsh princes, despite there 
being no papal record, and that he also primed the English to disobey. 
The act of absolving supporters from the king’s obedience demonstrated a profound 
intrusion into the politics and peace of the kingdom by Innocent III, and was entirely 
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consistent with papal tactics of the time. These procedures; writing to a potential adversary, 
sending legates to hold discussions with them, removing their ecclesiastical officials to 
undermine their authority, then absolving their temporal supporters before pronouncing an 
interdict and declaring them excommunicate, all served as stages preceding military action 
against the pope’s enemy. This is classic ‘cultivate and eradicate’, but with a heavier 
emphasis on the eradication element of this strategy. Alongside, the pope might promote, 
legitimise and empower adversaries of the papal enemy, thus cultivating a counter-force. 
Apart from King John, other good contemporary examples include Philip of Swabia, the 
Cathars and, slightly later, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth. Philip stood against Innocent’s preferred 
imperial candidate, Otto, and experienced the initial stages of those papal actions described 
above, being employed against him in 1204-5.
121
 Raymond of Toulouse and the Cathars 
suffered the entirety of that papal strategy, culminating in the Albigensian crusades.
122
 During 
the pontificate of Honorius III, 1216-1227, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth incurred papal wrath for 
ongoing warfare against Henry III. For failing to react swiftly enough to Rome’s overtures, 
which can be dated to 1219 initially, the pope issued this order on 5 October 1223: 
 
Mandate to the archbishop of York and his suffragans to place under interdict the lands 
in their dioceses belonging to Llywelyn, called prince of Wales, and his followers, and to 
excommunicate him and his supporters and after six months to declare all to be free of 
allegiance to them unless they go personally to the apostolic see  for absolution.
123
 
 
In 1212 therefore, Innocent III can be identified as taking definable steps to break John’s 
obstinacy. Having sent legates to England, laid an interdict against the country and 
excommunicated the king, the absolving of the Welsh from obedience and actively 
encouraging them to unite against the king followed the pattern of papal tactics deployed 
against other adversaries of Rome. If the evidence from the Burton, Waverley and Wendover 
chronicles is reliable, as well as that of Matthew Paris, then Innocent also removed English 
obedience from John. In addition, sanctions against the king and any clergy who supported 
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him over the pope increased noticeably in the early months of 1213.
124
 According to the papal 
modus operandi indentified here, having encouraged local dissent and action against John, 
the next step would be to mobilise powerful, possibly external, help in this cause. It is at this 
point that direct French involvement can first be traced. Perhaps prompted by a bold baronial 
approach to the pope in 1212, requesting external intervention against John,
125
 Innocent 
might have recognised an opportunity to act more decisively to end the papacy’s dispute with 
John. He sent letters to Philip Augustus in January or February 1213, requesting him to take 
military action against England.
126
 It is only from this point onward that plans to attack John 
emerge in the records of Philip Augustus’s reign. The papal correspondence apparently 
declaring John’s deposition was read out to Philip’s parliament during Easter 1213.127 Philip 
called for a campaign against Flanders in May, which he announced would be followed by an 
invasion of England. Although the proposed attack on England might have been a ruse to 
discourage John from taking armies to France, negotiations for Philip’s mission against on 
Flanders continued into June and an invasion fleet was fatefully assembled at Damme.
128
 
These invasion preparations in early summer 1213 came to the attention of English 
chroniclers.
129
 It appears probable that John, considering this apparently imminent French 
attack, combined with his limited English baronial support, Innocent’s actions against him 
and the ongoing conflict with the Welsh, was then persuaded to sue for peace with Rome. On 
15 May 1213, John surrendered the crown of England into the hands of Pandulf, the papal 
legate.
130
 Following that, the papacy caused a truce to be made between the Welsh and the 
English.
131
 This was prolonged and included in the general peace ordered by the pope 
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between all of John’s nobles and all of the people of England and Wales.132 In these sources, 
there is a notable absence of any of the contact or co-operation between the French and the 
Welsh in 1212 which becomes apparent in 1215-17. This shows that the primary evidence 
connects to 1213, an escalation of the quarrel between John and Innocent, and thereafter the 
direct engagement of Philip and Louis.
133
  This was founded on the internal dissent against 
John by the barons and the Welsh from 1212. There is no overt or suggested link between 
Paris and Gwynedd in 1212 except in Treharne’s article.  
 
Problems with the Brut 
Treharne relied upon Brut y Tywysogion as his principal, and apparently his only, primary 
source. This appears to lack caution, especially considering the following weaknesses in this 
otherwise noteworthy chronicle. In addition, his argument rested heavily on the entry for 
1212. Therefore, the source requires some scrutiny, and it appears fallible. Several entries in 
the Brut confusingly contain more than one year in each entry, for example 1207-1208, 1208-
1209, 1209-1210, 1210-1211, 1211-1212, whereas others contain two entries for just one 
year, 1203-1203, 1204-1204, 1205-1205, for example.
134
 In entries spanning two years, the 
events described are not ascribed to a year within that two-year period; they are all contained 
in a common entry. This mixing of two years’ events in one entry prevents a simple 
chronological comprehension. Other years were accorded more than one entry adding to this 
source’s complexity, for example, 1212 has two entries, 1211-1212 and 1212-1212.135 In 
other entries some of the key facts are incorrectly dated. The most relevant example of that 
comes from the 1212 entry, which claimed that the pope laid the interdict against ‘the 
churches for five years in all England and Wales.’ Clearly this is incorrect, since the interdict 
was imposed in 1208 and lasted until its full relaxation in 1214.
136
 These points should draw 
sufficient doubt over the reliability of the 1212 entry. Since that entry appears confused, and 
perhaps unreliable, it was unsound for Treharne to base his theory on this evidence alone.  
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1215 and 1216 
However, due to the fact that the Brut forms the core of this argument, the entries for 1215 
and 1216 demand comparison in order to test Treharne’s faith in 1212.  In 1215, the Welsh 
and the English barons became allies, some of the alliance terms match clauses found in 
Philip’s proposal to Llywelyn:  
 
And the strife that spread so much that all the leading men of England and the princes of 
Wales made a pact together against the king that no one of them, without the consent of 
all the others, would make peace or agreement or truce with the king until ... there should 
be restored to each one of them their laws and their power and their castles, which he had 
taken from them without law or truth or justice.
137
 
 
Although a coincidence is conceivable and that these terms were formulaic, it bears 
comparison with the treaty with Philip which stated:  
 
Furthermore, from the time I received your highness’s letter, I have made neither truce 
nor peace, nor even parley, with the English, but, by God’s grace, I and all the princes of 
Wales, unanimously leagued together have manfully resisted our – and your – enemies, 
and with God’s help we have by force of arms recovered from the yoke of their tyranny a 
large part of the land and the strongly defended castles which they by fraud and deceit 
had occupied and having recovered them we hold them strongly in the might of the Lord. 
Hence we, all the princes of Wales, ask and request that you make no truce with the 
English without us, knowing that we will not for any terms or price bind ourselves to 
them by any peace or treaty unless we know in advance we have your approval.
138
  
 
Another use of this phraseology comes from the agreement Louis and the English barons 
made with Alexander II, king of Scotland. The contemporary Melrose Chronicle recorded that 
Louis and the barons swore ‘upon holy gospels, that they would never enter into any 
agreement for peace or truce with the king of England, unless the king of the Scots were 
included.’139 Although this does not claim a uniqueness of the use of these precise treaty 
terms, similar articles of mutual faith can be found elsewhere, but the fact that the four 
factions of the alliance can be tied to the same terms at the same time by independent 
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corroborative evidence suggests that the treaty document dates from the same period as the 
examples from the Brut and Melrose of 1215 and 1216 respectively.
140
  
The union between the Welsh and the English barons in 1215 is also mentioned in 
another contemporary source, unconnected to Wales, that of Walter of Coventry.
141
 There is 
no doubt that the English barons were also allied to the French in 1215.
142
 These overt and 
active alliances between the English barons, the French and the Welsh opened up a conduit 
between Paris and Gwynedd. This link does not appear to have existed in 1212.  
The Brut described how the Welsh and English rebels met in 1215 to discuss their 
reasons for revolt, one of which was to restore the rights and liberty of the Church. The 
presence of clergy at such a discussion is likely.
143  In 1216, the same chronicle noted at least 
two congresses of the Welsh nobility which included the clergy:  
 
A year after that, there was an apportioning of land between the sons of the Lord Rhys, 
Maelgwn and Rhys Gryg, and Rhys and Owain, sons of Gruffudd, son of the Lord Rhys, 
at Aberdyfi, after almost all the leading men of Wales had been assembled there before 
the Lord Llywelyn and all the learned men of Gwynedd. ... 
That year Gwenwynwyn, lord of Powys, made a solemn pact with John, king of England, 
and he renounced and scorned the oaths and pledges and charters which he had given to 
Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and to the princes and the leading men of Wales and England, and 
he renounced the homage he had done to Llywelyn ... And he [Llywelyn] sent bishops 
and abbots and other men of great authority to him ... to beseech him to return. And when 
he had gained nothing thereby, he gathered a host and summoned to him all the princes 
of Wales, and went to Powys and drove Gwenwynwyn in flight to the earl of Chester; 
and he subdued for himself all his land and gained possession of it.
144
 
 
Therefore, Llywelyn met with ‘the learned men’ and ‘bishops and abbots and other men of 
great authority’ in order to mediate between him and Gwenwynwyn of Powys; these are the 
only assemblies of Welsh clergy mentioned in the timeframe in question.
145
 While it is 
conceivable that he met the clergy in 1212, there is no record of it, in stark contrast to this 
later date. As the entry above shows, Llywelyn was accepted as the leading noble in 1216 and 
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displayed his dominance by fulfilling the role of adjudicator in the Deheubarth land 
settlement.
146
 The role of receiving appeals and judging disputes mirrors the responsibilities 
of the English and French kings, demonstrating that Llywelyn acted according to the mores 
of the time and the expectation accorded to his position.  
The Brut also gave its account of Prince Louis’s invited invasion of 1216 and described 
how John turned to campaign in the Welsh March. This appears to have been an effort to 
secure his rear before facing the threat in the east. While at Hereford, John ‘sent envoys to 
Reginald de Braose and to the princes of Wales, and begged of them to be reconciled to him 
in every way; but they would not have it.’147 As well as being a major Marcher power, the de 
Braose family had, at this point, intermarried with Welsh noble lines and had certain common 
interests.
148
 Another effort to win Welsh favour might have been John’s appointment of two 
Welshmen as bishops to Welsh sees in 1215.
149
 The lack of natives in these positions had 
long been a point of contention to the Welsh.
150
 With the rejection of John’s rapprochement 
after Louis’s arrival in mind, the treaty provides this resonant line;  
 
Furthermore, from the time I received your highness’s letter, I have made neither truce 
nor peace, nor even parley, with the English, but, by God’s grace, I and all the princes of 
Wales, unanimously leagued together have manfully resisted our – and your – 
enemies.
151
  
While this clause might simply reflect Llywelyn’s intent to keep John at a distance during the 
crisis, it might also be indicative of the treaty being validated after John’s attempt to win over 
the Welsh princes. Therefore, in 1216, there were the same ingredients identified by Treharne 
for 1212; noble councils, followed by violence that was ongoing at the time the treaty was 
signed. In parallel to the chronicle entry of 1215, that of 1216 also met these criteria and also 
confirmed the Welsh-English alliance extant at that time, which did not exist in 1212. In 
addition, 1216 includes meetings with ‘Llywelyn and all the learned men of Gwynedd’ as 
well as ‘bishops and abbots and other men of great authority’.152 
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  It must be concluded therefore, that on the matter of the councils gathering and the 
campaign that followed, 1212 appears an entirely less credible candidate year than either 
1215 or 1216.  
 
More Contemporary Evidence 
Moreover, even the papacy was aware of the Welsh alliance to the French, although Louis 
was viewed as their partner, rather than Philip. As Louis had openly invaded England, and 
Philip was powerful enough to appear immune to overt accusation, it seems perhaps natural 
that the heir alone was connected with the conflict and its aftermath. The letters of the papal 
legate show that he excommunicated Louis and all of his supporters in May 1216. He 
renewed that sentence and specifically placed the whole of Wales under an interdict on 11 
November 1216.
153
 In early 1217, Pope Honorius III issued orders to the barons, the Scots 
and the Welsh, specifically ‘Lewelin’ and his supporters, to disregard the oaths they had 
taken to Louis.
154
  
The French-Welsh connection was also proclaimed in the contemporary Waverley 
Annals, which described the Welsh being punished for being in league with Louis.
155
 That 
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entry fell between John’s death and Henry III’s coronation, respectively 19 and 28 October, 
1216. This very clearly sited the Franco-Welsh alliance as extant in 1216.  
First-hand contemporary English evidence, L’Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, 
dated to 1226, also linked the Welsh and Louis through oath-taking:  
 
I almost forgot to mention that, 
Once the talks had taken place 
And the truce was concluded 
And agreed by all parties, 
Lord Louis told and ordered those loyal to him, 
Namely his own French, 
The Scots [and the] Welsh 
And English, come what may to 
Observe the truce throughout the land.
156 
 
The fact that William the Marshal, earl of Pembroke, and at that moment a partisan of the 
king during the baronial wars, linked the Welsh and the French at that instant is highly 
significant. As a marcher lord with lands in Wales, and a key adversary of the French and the 
Welsh at that crucial time, he was well-placed to identify when and to whom the Welsh were 
allied. In this evidence, they are clearly placed among Louis’s supporters in the aftermath of 
the conflict, in 1217.  
Yet another source from 1217 recognised the oath the Welsh had taken to the French, 
the Brut y Tywysogion.
157
 Matthews identified that link, but Treharne saw no merit in that 
argument, insisting that the entry appeared vague.
158
 In isolation, it might appear so, however 
in conjunction with the other sources linking the Welsh and the French by oath, the Brut 
entry appears to corroborate that connection. It was set in the context of the Treaty of 
Lambeth made between the barons and the new king of England, the minor Henry III. Peace 
had been made with Louis who, for a sum of money, would relinquish his claim to the 
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English throne.
159
 The excommunication of Louis and his adherents was ended, he returned 
to France and peace largely returned to England.
160
 The terms of the treaty were unfavourable 
to Llywelyn and the Welsh, who had not been consulted in any case.
161
 In that light, the 
Welsh fought on: ‘for the Welsh had no desire to agree to the peace which the barons had 
made, because they were still bound to their oath or else had been scorned and ignored in that 
peace.’162 This excerpt established that the Welsh continued to fight after the Treaty of 
Lambeth, giving two compelling reasons for that. The second reason offered, that they had 
been excluded from the peace, appears quite plausible. It seems that despite promises to the 
contrary, Louis made peace without reference to his new Scottish vassals either, who learned 
of his settlement and departure while campaigning in Northumbria.
163
 While a point of 
honour might be considered – the barons had broken their word by negotiating peace 
independently – more pragmatically this would show Welsh dissatisfaction at the terms, 
which agreed to restore lands, possessions and other matters to their pre-conflict 
arrangement.
164
 Clearly, having regained and then advanced their territorial possessions, the 
Welsh would not be satisfied with that Anglo-French agreement. Had the resulting treaty 
been good enough to accept, it is reasonable to suppose that they would have desisted from 
further campaigning, irrespective of their absence from the Lambeth negotiations.  The more 
intriguing, first reason describing them as still bound to their oath, implies their promise to 
Philip. It seems unrealistic that they were unilaterally holding to an oath made to the barons 
or Louis; the only agreement still in contention therefore was with Philip Augustus. As 
established above, the parties to that friendship promised not to seek peace without mutual 
consultation. Since it was widely known that the Welsh had freely negotiated and maintained 
truces with the English, under the guidance of the papal legates during 1213-14, this mention 
of remaining faithful to their word cannot refer to an oath they had would have already 
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openly broken.
165
 This must therefore deny the 1212 dating and reaffirm that the oath in 
question must have been made as or after war broke out again in 1215.  
Therefore, according to unconnected Welsh, English and Papal sources, the Welsh 
were allied to the French in 1215 at the earliest, but there is no mention of any link, treaty, 
oath or even correspondence in any source between any Welshman and any Frenchman in 
1212.  
 
The English Crusade? 
Another central pillar of the 1212 argument is the suggestion that the French and Welsh had 
been enjoined by Innocent III to conduct a crusade against England. Treharne used this claim 
to firmly date the treaty prior to John’s 1213 surrender because Innocent would not proclaim 
war against a papal vassal. Importantly, he also used the ‘holy war’ notion as a device with 
which to attack Matthews.
166
 Treharne’s article depended on his defeating the ‘holy war’ and 
‘crusade’ idea, both terms he used. He built a case for the holy war being a gathering force 
which he then described as coming to ‘a sudden end’ when John became a papal vassal in 
1213. As he put it, ‘The frequent appeals to divine grace and favour in the latter part of the 
letter strongly suggest the conception of a ‘holy war’, an idea no longer valid, even for 
propaganda purposes, after 15
th
 May 1213.’167 This, according to the article, dated the treaty 
prior to 1213. 
However, there are two fatal flaws in Treharne’s ‘crusade’ argument. The first is that 
neither Matthews nor the Brut made such claims and, as Sayers put it, ‘there is no convincing 
evidence that the pope sanctioned a crusade against England.’168 No source describes a direct 
appeal for such a mission. Matthews wrote cautiously and used neither term, nor did he make 
a case for such a cause. Instead he claimed that Innocent had ‘called upon Philip Augustus to 
make war upon John in order to reduce him to ‘the subjection of the Holy Church.’’169 He 
then noted the Brut evidence absolving the Welsh princes of their oaths to John, and assumed 
that any joint French-Welsh action would therefore ‘be acting under Papal authority against 
John.’170 Matthews also thought it noteworthy that the Brut discussed the 1214 truce and 
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treaty between England and France – which would have transgressed Philip’s treaty with 
Llywelyn by not involving him – but that same local source made no reference to any French-
Welsh union around 1212.
171
 Also, and critically, there is no supporting evidence of a call for 
a crusade by Innocent; there was no proclamation, no recruiting drive, no procession of the 
Cross, no granting of indulgences for crusaders and no issuing of crusade symbols or other 
paraphernalia. By 1212 Innocent had previously called for crusades, the Fourth, Fifth and 
Albigensian crusades for example, for which he had deployed the classic crusading 
mechanisms such as the granting of indulgences and preaching tours.
172
 Therefore, it is 
compelling that none of the conventional, recognisable means of declaring a crusade appear 
in this case; calling a crusade was a well-publicised event. While there might be scope to 
speculate that Innocent might have believed a war against John would be a ‘just’ war, there is 
no trace of a proclamation or military or financial support for a ‘crusade’ against England.173 
The conclusion must be that there was no proposition of a holy war against England.  
The second argument against Treharne’s ‘crusade’ theory is the dating of Innocent’s 
request to Philip. As seen above, the period connecting the papacy to Paris falls around Easter 
1213, and Philip began to make noises about attacking England thereafter.
174
 Correctly, there 
is no suggestion anywhere that Philip pre-empted the pope’s appeal of 1213 and constructed 
an alliance before that point. Therefore, if Treharne’s claim was true, that the pope was the 
motivating force for the treaty, then the French-Welsh alliance must postdate January 
1213.
175
 
Turning now to the tone of the language used in the treaty which Treharne presented 
as having particularly religious overtones, writing that the letter ‘strongly suggested the 
conception of a ‘holy war.’’176 However, there is nothing in this treaty that explicitly 
mentioned holy war, nor is there even a subtle flirting with the notion. In comparison, later 
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Welsh-French correspondence from Owain Glyn Dŵr specifically asked for remission of sins 
for men of all nations for spilling Christian blood in a war against Henry of Lancaster, which 
appears a more credible description of such a call.
177
 Moreover, the treaty between Philip and 
Llywelyn does not mention the pope, papal encouragement or support, or his absolution of 
the Welsh princes. These are critical omissions for a treaty in 1212 when the pope was 
overtly moving against John.  
In fact, the occasionally religious tone of the treaty appears in keeping with other 
communications of the time; both interlocutors were reputed to be pious and therefore 
respectful reverence of God in a letter between Christian rulers would be expected rather than 
revelatory. If anything, this treaty is relatively free of religious flavour. The formulaic 
recognition that they held their titles ‘by the grace of God’ and Llywelyn’s reference to his 
swearing on sacrosanct relics, would serve to demonstrate the value he placed in Philip’s 
friendship, and also to show that Llywelyn had made a recognisably strong pledge on the 
matter. Other contemporary friendships were formed using similar symbolic behaviour; when 
the English barons paid homage to Alexander of Scotland in 1216, they also touched sacred 
relics and swore an oath to him.178  
 
The omission of any papal references in Philip and Llywelyn’s treaty is notable and probably 
helps to place it after 1212. Philip’s relations with the papacy soured dramatically after 
John’s submission in 1213 and the French king was threatened with excommunication if he 
invaded England.
179
 The fact that this treaty appears to avoid mention of papal favour 
probably places it more firmly during the period of poor relations between Paris and Rome; 
that is 1215-1217, rather than pre-1213, when they might have revelled in papal support.  
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Treharne wrote that Philip would certainly not have been willing to risk papal 
punishment for invading England, but it is difficult to measure the true strength of Innocent’s 
influence or accurately weigh the fear of excommunication.
180
 However, this displayed a 
startling ignorance of contemporary events. The main European geo-political struggle was 
arguably that between papacy and Empire, and the English surrender was an important but 
lesser issue in comparison.
181
 In addition, Innocent III had placed interdicts and passed 
sentences of excommunication on other rulers and factions during his pontificate without the 
recipients being crushed by the experience.
182
 In addition, it seems fair to suppose that if the 
English barons, Scots and Welsh nobles were willing to risk and endure excommunication, 
then there is no justification for thinking Philip would be too scared to expose himself to such 
a danger. Moreover, Philip had been placed under an interdict by Innocent in 1200 and 
throughout his reign he strove to keep papal influence to a minimum in French lands.
183
 
Innocent needed Philip’s support in the struggle with the empire and also to realise his 
crusade projects. Although Innocent threatened and then excommunicated John’s enemies, 
the king of France appears too powerful to offend directly, and wily enough to have his son 
bear the sentence for the invasion which could not have been effected without Philip's 
support.
184
 Although Innocent delivered threats to his vassal’s enemy by writing to Louis via 
Philip, he evidently intended to include Philip in this correspondence. France however, 
appeared to be politically too important to papal crusade plans, moreover, it was militarily 
stronger than any conceivable coalition the papacy could align against it at that time. This is 
evident in the different ways Innocent treated John and Philip. He excommunicated John and 
maintained an interdict against England until John surrendered. He lifted the 1200 interdict 
against Philip in a matter of months and allowed disputes such as those over Philip’s strategic 
marriages to continue for over a decade without serious sanction.
185
 Therefore, contrary to 
Treharne’s assertion, the French were not too frightened of excommunication to risk 
attacking John. This is borne out by events; they did invade England, Louis was 
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excommunicated, the campaign continued and, when unsuccessful, he was absolved in the 
aftermath.  
 
The Treaty Text, the Hostages and the rest. 
Next, Llywelyn’s claim that ‘we will recover from the yoke of the tyrants themselves the 
great part of the land and the strongly fortified castles, which they by fraud and guile have 
occupied’ was portrayed as evidence that the successful campaign of late 1212 and early 
1213 had not yet taken place.
186
 However, this statement of Llywelyn’s is too vague to be 
accurately ascribed to any date, region or campaign. Given that it is so unspecific, it is no 
more valid to apply to his 1212-3 recapture of the Perfeddwlad in north-east Wales, than it is 
to measure his campaigns in south-west Wales in 1215, or those against Powys, the English 
border and the south-west once more in 1216. For that matter, the statement could be used in 
relation to any non-native held castle in Wales or any territory that he or the other Welsh 
princes intended to retake. It is not credible to suppose that the Welsh wished only to 
recapture lands lost in the harsh terms of the 1211 treaty and there is no evidence he was 
referring to those areas.  
Another of Treharne’s key points claimed that Llywelyn’s identification of his enemies as 
‘English’ could only happen in 1212 when the enemy was a more generic ‘English’ foe, 
rather than in the 1215 conflict in which the enemy was King John but the ‘English’ barons 
were his allies. This is a weak argument and questionable from several angles. As illustrated 
above, there was believed to be a measure of collusion between the barons and the Welsh in 
the alleged 1212 plot. As already detailed, John took the threat seriously enough to disband 
the army mustered at Chester in August that year.
187
 However, the obvious point is that it 
seems natural for a Welsh ruler writing to a French king to describe the enemy as ‘English’. 
There was no need to detail to whom Llywelyn was precisely referring; it would have been 
evident to his audience. Since this alliance was intended to be perpetual, then the authors 
were obliged to describe the enemy as English; they were the permanent adversary of both 
parties, irrespective of the incumbent monarch. Also, there is an additional and so far 
unmentioned consideration to this; from a Welsh perspective it would have been crucial to 
describe the enemy as ‘English’. Contemporary Welsh poetry and chronicles identified John, 
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the nobles of England and the men of the Welsh Marches as ‘Frenchmen’, with Philip in 
mind, such a precision of terms was therefore essential. The Brut y Tywysogion, the source 
upon which Treharne relied, referred to Marchers and their troops as ‘French’, whether allied 
to or fighting against Welsh forces. Prince Louis and his army were also identified as 
‘French’ and so a distinction seems to be necessary.188 Other contemporary Welsh sources 
also refer to John as a ‘Frenchman’, obliging the conclusion that this was a commonly-
employed term.
189
  
Treharne’s dating of the treaty also depended on the fact that there is no mention of 
John’s murder of the Welsh hostages at Nottingham in August 1212.190 This enabled 
Treharne to propose July or early August 1212 as the timeframe of the treaty, pre-dating 
John’s brutal act. Although possible from that perspective, this ignores two clear but contrary 
points. Not mentioning the killings does not mean that they had not happened; it could 
equally mean that they had happened a few years in the past and were not included as events 
had moved on, therefore pointing to a later date. It is perhaps more likely that, although heart-
breaking for the Welsh, the incident would have been irrelevant to a treaty with Philip, 
especially if it had occurred more than three years previously. However, the main counter-
point stands; not mentioning the event does not prove that the document pre-dated it, 
especially when the matter in question was not key to the establishment of the treaty.  
Treharne made a number of other points, perhaps best dealt with briefly here. He 
speculated over the reasons for the disappearance of the original letter, but then agreed that 
many documents from this time had been lost, and that there was no reason to ponder that 
further.
191
 He also made a number of inaccurate statements, perhaps best exemplified by this 
claim that the Welsh uprising in 1212 was ‘the nearest approach yet to a national rising in 
Welsh history.’192 Putting aside the difficulties inherent in the terms ‘national’, which is 
difficult to relate to medieval ‘Wales’, or ‘rising’, which assumes subjugation at a time when 
much of Wales was still native-ruled, it would be simple to make the case that Owain 
Gwynedd’s alliance at Berwyn in 1165, the events of the reign of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd or 
Owain Glyn Dŵr’s campaigns overshadow Llywelyn ap Iorwerth’s 1212 campaign in terms 
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of their size, impact or universality of Welsh adherence. On the matter of John’s intention to 
build an army to invade France, he also claimed that ‘the Welsh rising of 1212 removed the 
immediate danger to Philip and altered the course of events.’193 While this attributed to the 
Welsh a substantial role in European history at that moment, it should be treated as 
unreliable. John’s barons were plainly opposed to service in France at that time and allegedly 
plotted against him that year, which is a far more likely reason to postpone an attack on 
France.
194
 Were the Welsh truly such a standing threat in 1212, it seems likely that John 
would have taken the army he built-up and finally took to France in 1214 directly to 
Gwynedd to crush any threat he faced on the mainland. As 1211 had demonstrated, Gwynedd 
was no match for a large, determined English army. It lacks credibility to believe that John 
could have left England in 1214 if the Welsh posed any real threat to his rule. The Welsh did 
not alter the course of events but, with the barons, contributed to another postponement to 
John’s desired attack on Philip. Treharne’s article does make other contributory points, 
however, the main pillars of his argument have been dealt with above. Once closely 
scrutinised, the overall argument for 1212 appears impossible to sustain.  
Deconstructing Treharne’s 1212 argument appears relatively simple. His dependence 
on the theory that the 1212 council of nobles was the correct one out of three possibilities is 
refuted by contemporary evidence, which compellingly recommends either the 1215 or 1216 
gatherings. His dependence on the Brut y Tywysogion is also telling, and that source also 
appears to favour a later date. Treharne’s raising and banishing the spectre of a holy war 
against England was unconvincing, there was no evidence for it and no-one claimed such a 
project was attempted. The language used in the treaty is more easily connected with other 
corroborating evidence that also points to 1215-16. Equally, Treharne showed a surprising 
naivety towards the broader geo-political concerns of the time; the struggle between the 
papacy and the empire, the relationship between Philip and Innocent, Philip’s dominance of 
John, for example. However, in Treharne’s defence, it seems noteworthy that none of the 
Welsh historians writing on this matter have highlighted the linguistic issues surrounding the 
term ‘Frenchmen’ in native sources either. The 1212 dating also depended on the vague 
treaty terms which could have applied to a number of circumstances beyond that year. His 
rejection of Matthews’ was questionable; Matthews offered a number of reasonable, 
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cautiously expressed points. Finally, although a well-received article, in all, little 
recommends Treharne’s theory of 1212.  
 
 126 
 
Other factors in favour of the alliance being formed in 1215-16. 
The merits and shortcomings of Matthews’ three-page comment on the matter are interwoven 
in the treatment of Treharne’s article above and need no additional analysis here. Although 
the evidence makes it impossible to identify any precise date, there are more substantial 
arguments to propose the French arrival in England, that is to say late 1215 or perhaps early 
1216, when Louis arrived, as the probable timeframe for the treaty.
195
 Although the 
arguments already presented substantially make that case, scrutiny of other issues also points 
towards the later years. These additional matters concern French strategic and logistical 
affairs, Scotland, the presence of traitors at the heart of Llywelyn's court and also Welsh 
strategic concerns. These arguments naturally contain a speculative element, since they are 
new considerations of this subject. However, since the historian ‘must be ready to speculate’, 
this seems the appropriate place to consider further inconsistencies in the 1212 case and 
further strengthen the argument for 1215-16.
196
 
 
French logistical issues 
Communication was evidently a major logistical consideration in the medieval period. With 
this treaty in mind, it is worth considering, how Philip contacted Llywelyn. Although it is 
possible that clergymen could pass through regions largely unmolested, during the period of 
upheaval between Rome and London, it is worth considering the intricacies of this matter. 
Prior to the 1215 baron’s revolt, the presence of a French envoy in Gwynedd, so far from any 
legitimate business in the land, would have been remarkable. In the chaos of the conflict of 
1215-17, which saw French armies and their English allies control London and large parts of 
England, a message-bearer might well have passed unrecorded to Llywelyn. During the war 
Worcester declared for the rebels and Glamorgan was held by one of the rebel leaders, the 
earl of Essex, giving the barons and their French ally direct access to Wales.
197
 In 1215, the 
rebel bishop of Hereford, Giles de Braose, rallied support in south-east Wales and co-
ordinated diplomatic missions in the March through his brother, Reginald, who was well-
received by the Welsh.
198
 It seems that the active revolt of the English barons is key; without 
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their aid there is little chance of a messenger passing safely between Paris and Snowdonia. 
Such favourable conditions only existed from 1215 onwards. 
Contemporary sources are clear that the English rebels had met and treated with the 
French.
199
 They had also allied themselves with the Welsh, the fruits of which were visible in 
the Welsh clauses in the ‘Articles of the Barons’ and ‘Magna Carta’, as well as Welsh 
representation at the Council of Oxford in July 1215.
200
 The northern barons also united with 
Alexander of Scotland, paying him homage in late 1215 and early 1216.
201
 The argument 
concerning the Scots’ friendship with John prior to 1215 and the reasons for their enmity 
thereafter is developed below.
202
 Following the receipt of the homage of the northern barons 
in 1216, the Scots met with the French later that year and became more engaged in the 
struggle.
203
 Given the evident formation of connections between these factions in late 1215 
and early 1216, it seems likely therefore that the French would also communicate with the 
Welsh. Where they could not meet in person – there is no suggestion that Louis went to 
Gwynedd – as did the other three rebel elements, then committing the proposal and 
agreement to parchment seems a likely, practical measure. The treaty therefore fits within 
that timeframe but also with other events and movements, diplomatic and military, which it 
does not in 1212. 
The opportunity presented by the 1215 conflict offers a more realistic vision of how 
this alliance was structured; within the framework of friendly contacts and active alliances 
between the barons, the Welsh, the French and the Scots, a treaty-bearing messenger seems 
relatively easy to place in Gwynedd. In comparison, sending any such proposal in 1212 
appears rather an ad hoc, opportunistic mission to Gwynedd within a very small window of 
opportunity late in the year, with no obvious mechanism for delivery and returning the 
agreement. This seems unworkable from a French perspective and also the desired outcome 
of the conflict in 1212 is unclear, contrary to the baronial war. Moreover, the lack of a French 
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army on the horizon in 1212, or any tangible allies on the British mainland, might possibly 
have appeared unappealing, even dangerous, to Welsh interests.   
 
 
Map 10: Louis’s England, 1215-17.204 
 
French Strategic Interests 
The treaty text is clear that this alliance proposal was a French initiative. In contrast to Owain 
Gwynedd’s letters to Louis VII, this cannot be seen as a Welsh appeal for assistance.205 
                                                          
204
 Map 10: ‘Louis’s England, 1215-17’, showing the factional divisions in Britain during the conflict. This is a 
classic, if ultimately unsuccessful, example of a bracketing strategy in action. Sources: Warren, King John, 250; 
Turner, King John, 290, 294. 
205
 Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’, 4, 26 (letter 1, English, Latin), 6, 27-8 (letter 2, English, Latin), 7-8, 27-
8 (letter 3, English, Latin). 
 129 
 
Therefore, having established the originator of the treaty as the king of France, it would also 
be instructive to outline the likely reasons behind this move, the theatre in which it might be 
realised, and to examine the opportunities that might have enabled this alliance to be brought 
to life. Establishing these parameters should help narrow the timeframe for this contact. 
From a strategic viewpoint, the Welsh offered the French very little in the aftermath 
of 1211. Gwynedd had been humbled and Llywelyn shackled to harsh treaty terms which 
drained his finances and resources, critical for a war effort. Also, many Welsh leaders had 
gone to John’s side when summoned to take the field against the prince of Gwynedd. Even 
though some initiated conflicts with Marcher or Crown forces towards the end of 1211, they 
were for their personal interests, not in alliance with Llywelyn.
206
 He was in attendance at 
court in the king’s presence at Easter 1212, and fighting in Wales broke out in the summer.207 
As late as June 1212, the Welsh were disunited and in no position to fight England. It might 
be possible to connect a stiffening of Welsh resolve and growth of the rebellion to John’s 
murder of Welsh hostages, the children of Welsh leaders, in August that year.
208
 In view of 
the threat John posed to Welsh autonomous rule in the aftermath of 1211, it is most credible 
to suggest that Llywelyn and others revolted over the menace implicit in the terms and 
application of that settlement, as stated by the contemporary sources included above. 
Gwynedd was the strongest of the native areas; if it fell, then the other, lesser territories 
would fall too. The other princes would have been well aware of that. As shown above, 
contemporary sources explicitly named the actions of John’s troops in the recently-built 
castles as the reason for the revolt in late 1211 and in mid-1212. Although papal orders might 
have encouraged that summer’s action, there is no mention of an alliance with the French. 
Unsubstantiated rumours gave the barons and the Welsh the common goal of killing John.
209
 
The conflict of 1212 therefore appears to have been one involving the disaffected, the 
outraged and those fearful of John’s burgeoning power over them, rather than a war 
manipulated by imperceptible French hands. It seems extremely doubtful that France 
conceived and activated this alliance in 1212; the political tides were wrong and the 
opportunity for Gallic mischief in Wales was not apparent until the latter part of the year.  It 
is unsound therefore to suppose Philip reacted with any urgency to news, if it ever arrived in 
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Paris, of four cantrefs being overrun in north-east Wales by Welsh forces. No record of such 
news has emerged from French sources; however there is much material on the baron’s war 
and Louis’s invasion. There was no indication, at its outbreak, that the 1212 revolt would be 
successful and therefore no reason for the French to pursue an alliance with the Welsh with 
the resolve signalled within this treaty. The French had not militarily supported any previous 
conflict, and there is no evidence of French involvement in the 1212 war either; the time-line 
of that year’s events and opportunities offered them precious little opportunity to engage.  
 
Philip did not seek an alliance with Llywelyn for altruistic reasons; he had no use of weak 
allies who would be a drain on his resources; in seeking this alliance he no doubt wished 
Welsh forces to perform a military task. In reality, there are only two such tasks for which the 
Welsh could have been considered: either to attack John, dividing his forces and resources to 
lessen his ability to act elsewhere, or as an active support to a military initiative in Britain. 
Since the former would have entailed fighting John alone on the British mainland, it is a less 
attractive option to Llywelyn, carrying a far higher risk of experiencing another crushing 
defeat such as 1211. The latter option appears a better prospect for Welsh strategic interests. 
With the loyal barons distracted with enemies in England, Welsh military goals were more 
realistically attainable. This therefore determines that any joint military action would have to 
take place on the British mainland.  
In practical terms, it is almost impossible to imagine French troops landing in Wales 
at that time. The cost of raising, equipping and transporting an army to and from north Wales 
in a fleet paid for by the French king would have been prohibitive in balance of the return 
such a mission could bring. In addition, the route from France to Wales was difficult; any 
such fleet would have to pass coasts that were English or English-governed. Detection, and 
consequently military challenge, would probably have been unavoidable. The journey would 
have been relatively long, through largely hostile waters, and a region known for 
unpredictable weather and difficult sea states. Extracting that force would prove equally 
difficult. Although short sea crossings were possible, soldiers and mercenaries crossed the 
channel from Flanders and France during 1215-16 for example, sea crossings were dangerous 
endeavours. As if to underline that point, John’s entire relief army under Hugh de Boves was 
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lost in storms while crossing the Channel in late 1215, at the cost of many lives.
210
  
Therefore, because of the risks, difficulties and cost involved, a French naval military mission 
to Gwynedd in this period seems unviable.   
Next, the mechanism of delivery of the treaty to Wales should be considered. In the 
first instance, a solely nautical route appears doubtful for reasons given above. Also, there is 
no trace of such a mission being raised, costed or sighted in any sources. When Charles VI 
sent a fleet to Wales in 1405 it earned abundant references in French and English sources.
211
 
It seems unlikely that a naval mission in 1212 would have entirely vanished from all records.  
This leaves the overland route from Paris to Gwynedd. Logically, this can only be 
done with the connivance of English rebels, for it is too far for such a mission to move 
unseen across hostile England. As Llywelyn’s reply is kept in the French archives, Philip’s 
diplomatic party must also have safely returned to Paris. The overland means of transporting 
the treaty appears perhaps impossible in 1212 due to a lack of sure English allies – baronial 
discontentment with the king did not mean they were French allies. However, the mission 
seems entirely possible in 1215-16 when the barons invited Louis to become king of England.  
In addition, a military envoy seems more likely than an ecclesiastical one. During the 
interdict the movement of French clergy and soldiers across England to Gwynedd seems 
likely to have been noticed and prevented. After England’s surrender to Rome and the 
English clergy were unequivocally loyal to pope and king, the use of an ecclesiastical envoy 
seems impossible. However, during the baronial revolt, connections between the English, 
French and Scots elements of the alliance were all made by military parties; it seems likely 
that the same method was used with the Welsh. The only realistic possibility to do that was 
after 1215.  
The final discussion involving the French contacting the Welsh derives directly from 
the treaty text, which stated that the prince discussed the matter with his nobles and then with 
those of the rest of Wales. The drafting and witnessing, preceded by this amount of 
consultation, either travelling or dispersing messengers to the other Welsh princes, would 
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take time, and most likely lack secrecy. Several sources, mentioned above, recorded after the 
first Magna Carta, linked the Welsh and French by an oath, yet none mention their 
connections in 1212, even when the conflict with John was ended by papal legates in summer 
1213. John’s own actions suggest that 1215 was the earliest possible date of the alliance, for 
he made no move or threat against Llywelyn after August 1212, even though strong enough 
to lead a powerful two-pronged multi-factional alliance against France in 1214. The window 
of diplomatic opportunity for 1212 was small and only opened in autumn. However in 1215, 
when they were also building alliances with the English barons who in turn seem to have also 
recruited the Scots, the French had a great deal of time and opportunity to conceive and 
complete this project with Gwynedd. By late 1215, when beset by his own nobles, the French 
and the Scots, John was in no position to act against the Welsh in any authoritative way.  
 
Scotland and the Barons 
In reality, it is inconceivable that the French would be interested in the Welsh as their lone 
alliance partner in 1212; there was no tradition between them, no extant connection, Wales 
was weak, isolated and remote. The other two potential allies in a conflict against John were 
the Scots and the English barons. The matter of the Scots’ involvement has yielded 
previously unconsidered views. Duncan reveals that for 1212 ‘historians have generally lined 
William and Alexander up among John’s enemies by then; there is no evidence for this, and 
much for the contrary view,’ while Maxwell wrote that from February 1212 to his death in 
1214, William and John ‘remained on excellent terms.’212 Contemporary sources certainly 
point to a close bond between England and Scotland at this time; John knighted William’s 
heir, Alexander, and also asked for Scots troops to assist in his campaign against Llywelyn 
later in 1212.
213
 It is also noteworthy that although John had advanced against William in 
1209, mocked him when he sued for peace without a fight and then demanded thousands of 
marks from him, William still turned to John for aid in 1212 during a crisis.
214
 One reason for 
John’s aggression in 1209 is the rumour of a marriage negotiation between Philip Augustus 
and one of William’s daughters, and the English attack demonstrated John’s displeasure. As a 
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result Alexander did homage to John for lands the Scottish crown held of the king in August 
1209 and the Scots overtly aided John from that point. However, marriage discussions 
between the ruling French and Scots dynasties were nothing new and had occurred 
previously, even as recently as 1201.
215
 Among a number of examples of Scottish aid to John 
are the handing over of Matilda de Braose and her children in 1210 to John by one of 
William’s nobles, Duncan of Carrick, and William sent intelligence to John of the baronial 
plot against him in 1212.
216
 When an internal revolt proved difficult to quell in 1211, William 
turned to John for help. That rebellion, led by Guthred mac William, might be more broadly 
viewed as a threat to kings of the chivalric order, since it was a native revolt against the 
French-speaking rulers of Scotland, and therefore in John’s interests to support William. 
Irrespective of the rebels’ motivations, John made a binding friendship with the king of Scots 
in February 1212, knighted Alexander at Lent and sent troops to suppress Guthred’s uprising 
later that summer. In that agreement John and William agreed to protect one another in just 
quarrels, and that the Scots king and his heir, Alexander, would maintain fealty to Henry and 
preserve him in England, irrespective of what happened to John. Duncan read this as though 
John gave the same oath to support William’s heir, as this matches the actions of that year. 
Also, John’s knighting of Alexander does not simply denote an acknowledgement of rank but 
has a practical significance; as a peer of the realm he was entitled to lead English troops, 
which John then gave him for the campaign against Guthred. John went a stage further 
though; he moved his army to Carlisle and also summoned Reginald of Man, king of the 
Isles, and forced him to swear allegiance, even though he held his title of the king of Norway. 
This obliged Reginald to act in closing off the western point of entry for Guthred’s Irish 
support, isolating the rebels in Scotland where they could be dealt with effectively.
217
 It was 
while he was in the north at Durham that John heard of the Welsh rising and the baronial plot 
against him. All of these Anglo-Scots dealings took place while John was excommunicate, 
demonstrating the weakness of the papal writ.
218
 Therefore, the Scots must be ruled out of 
involvement in any 1212 coalition against John, weakening further that theory. 
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Far from being enemies in perpetual conflict, relations between England and Scotland 
in this period appear to have been largely peaceful and usually cordial. John was arguably 
provoked to attack Scotland in 1216 by Alexander’s receipt of the homage of some of the 
northern barons. That offensive was the first such invasion since the reign of William Rufus 
in 1097. It has been postulated that Scots nobles, though perhaps held as poor relations, were 
still viewed as distant cousins of the English magnates, therefore part of the chivalric order 
and the rightful masters of their lands. In this period there was cooperation between leaders; 
William’s brother, Earl David, campaigned in France with John between 1199 and 1203.219 
The point of friction which led to Scots involvement in Louis’s invasion of England dated to 
the previous century. The previous chapter described the struggle for lordship over the 
northern counties which led to William the Lion’s fateful incursion in 1173 in conjunction 
with the revolt of Henry II’s sons. In 1194, William raised the issue of a restoration of his 
predecessors’ traditional rights and dignities in England.220 This included the request that 
Richard I returned to him Northumbria, Cumberland and Westmorland. When Richard 
refused, claiming that the war with the French precluded such discussions, William offered 
money for the territory. On advice, Richard agreed on the condition that the English retained 
and garrisoned the castles in those lands. Unsurprisingly, William withdrew dissatisfied.
221
 
This did not stop friendly relations between William and Richard. In 1195, a serious illness 
provoked debate on William’s succession since he had no male heir. William and Richard 
negotiated a marriage agreement between one of William’s daughters and Otto of Brunswick, 
arranging for Lothian and the northern English counties as a wedding gift for the couple. 
William ceased the matter however when he recovered and his wife fell pregnant again. 
Although another daughter was born negotiations were not revived, and in September 1196 
Richard granted Otto, his nephew, the county of Poitou and the title of duke of Aquitaine as 
recompense. This was shrewd on Richard’s part though, giving Otto a stake in France helped 
cement their friendship against Philip Augustus. The birth of Alexander in August 1198 
altered the viewpoint of the Scots king however.
222
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It appears that in 1215 the seventeen year old king of Scotland, with no identified 
connection to the rebels or the French, attempted to profit from John’s woes by pressing his 
claims to Northumbria by force.
223
 Following the barons’ council sessions which followed 
Magna Carta, on 22 October 1215 he received the homage of the northern barons for the 
northern counties. They had been ordered to do so by letters from ‘The Twenty-Five’, the 
barons who composed the council, who had also granted seisin of the counties to 
Alexander.
224
 Probably in riposte to this rendering of homage, and also because he was 
clearly militarily able, John advanced north in late 1215. In the face of that action, some 
northern barons are recorded as crossing the border and swearing homage to Alexander again 
at Melrose.
225
 John’s pursued them; his action in Scotland was brief but destructive, burning 
several key towns in the space of a few short days. While this did not destroy John’s northern 
and Scottish enemies, it appears to have weakened or dissuaded them, notably the barons.
226
 
The north saw no effective riposte until August 1216, when Alexander finally succeeded in 
taking Carlisle. By that time Louis had landed in the south and the French and the rebels were 
ascendant. The French heir, by then styling himself king of England, appears to have written 
to Alexander and those English magnates who had not come to him to swear fealty, to do so 
or to leave England.
227
 In light of that, Alexander made the journey south to pay Louis 
homage for the northern counties, whom he would hold of the new French king of 
England.
228
 This might explain why no Welsh representatives are recorded as meeting with 
Louis in southern England, they held no lands of the king of England and so had no reason to 
swear fealty to him on those grounds. In view of that, the French had to deal with the Welsh 
differently, hence the treaty, and the most likely and legitimate French figure with whom the 
Welsh could form an alliance remained Philip.  
The English barons did offer the French an exploitable source of discontentment in 
1212. As described above, there was baronial opposition to John for a number of reasons, 
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principally objections to an increase in tax and feudal service. His alienation and persecution 
of noblemen such as William de Braose and Hugh de Lacy ensured that by 1212 John had the 
confidence of few of his nobles.
229
 The consequent alleged plot against him that year might 
be viewed, with hindsight, as offering a very slim possibility of three-way collusion between 
Philip, any English rebels and Llywelyn. Even if true, these connections are ethereal 
however, and pale further when compared to the full-blooded, overt alliances that existed 
after 1215 between the barons and all other parties. It is striking how difficult it appears to 
bring to life this French-Welsh contact without the involvement of the English barons who, in 
1215 fought a war against their king, but in 1212 John confronted nothing more harmful than 
rumours. 
 
Traitors in Gwynedd? 
There is an English element to this matter too; Joan, Llywelyn’s wife, stands accused of 
warning John, her father, of the alleged baronial conspiracy in 1212 to kill or seize him and 
hand him over to the Welsh.
230
 On those grounds, it seems likely that had Joan known about 
the treaty with France she would also have apprised her father of it. Had John known about 
the treaty, in which Llywelyn declared loyalty to Philip, he would have been compelled to act 
against the French acquisition of Welsh homage. The fact that he did not signals that 
Llywelyn did not receive Philip’s letters, nor discuss the matter with his council or the 
princes of Wales, before 1215. John came to the Welsh border with an army during the 1215-
17 conflict, even though the rebels and the French held London.
231
 This advance seems likely 
to have been an attempt to rebuild relations with the Welsh or at least to neutralise any threat.  
With so many people apparently involved in the discussion stages mentioned, the 
treaty could not, realistically, have been kept secret within Welsh princely circles. Although 
they might have excluded Joan at the moment of its inception; it is implausible however that 
she would not have become aware of it at some point between 1212 and 1215. Considering 
previous behaviour, it seems likely that she would have informed her father. The absence of 
such evidence from Joan regarding the alliance in 1215-6 does not mean that it did not 
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happen then or that she did not discuss the matter with her father; by then he was unable to 
enforce his dominance over Gwynedd. The fact that unrelated English, Welsh and papal 
primary sources substantiate that the French-Welsh union existed by 1216-7 probably 
indicates that it was commonly known within the relevant circles of the time. Joan poses a 
remarkable figure; she apparently betrayed the alleged 1212 plot, harming her husband’s 
interests in favour of those of her father, and was later unfaithful to Llywelyn with William 
de Braose, who was executed for his crime.
232
  
While dealing with the subject of treachery from within Wales, to counter Llywelyn’s 
successes in Wales in 1212, John encouraged the rebellions of two dynastic rivals in 
Gwynedd, just as he had in 1199-1200.
233
 Although Llywelyn’s cousins, Owain ap Dafydd 
and Gruffudd ap Rhodri took up the hopeless venture in 1212, these pretenders seem not to 
have informed the king of Llywelyn’s treacherous and dangerous union with France that year 
or at any point thereafter. As men of Llywelyn’s line, they are likely to have been among, or 
at least connected to, those with whom Llywelyn discussed the treaty. Had it happened 
therefore, it seems probable that they, or Joan, or a marcher source would have learned of it 
and passed on such information to the Crown at some point between 1212 and the start of 
1215. The fact that no such thing was recorded and John took no retribution against Llywelyn 
also strongly suggests that the alliance was not born in 1212.  
  
Welsh Strategic Interests 
From Llywelyn’s perspective, an alliance with France might prove dangerous prior to 1215; 
had news of the agreement reached John before that date, the king had the power to return 
and annihilate Gwynedd, Llywelyn’s line and Welsh independent rule with it. Therefore 
Llywelyn might not have welcomed or responded so positively to an approach in 1212. 
Logistical difficulties dictated that Philip could not have sent troops to intervene in Wales, 
the Welsh nobles would have been aware of this. Although notional French support would 
probably have been welcome during any conflict, any knowledge of the Welsh promising 
allegiance to France would also have indicated that the Welsh had moved decisively against 
the king of England and could therefore be crushed finally and legitimately, according to the 
mores of the day. As any hint of English action against John evaporated by the end of 
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September 1212, a union with France would have been highly risky for the Welsh. By 1215 
however, Llywelyn had recovered from the disaster of 1211 and inflicted defeats on royal 
troops in north Wales during the conflict of 1212-13, perhaps bringing himself to the 
attention of the French as a result.  As Louis prepared to cross the channel in later 1215, the 
Welsh might have appeared desirable allies to open another front to distract John from the 
French invasion. If this treaty were made in 1215-16, the king of France might, more 
realistically, have been seeking Welsh aid for his son’s invasion of England, where a land-
based ally, particularly one in a secure mountainous area, would have been of interest to the 
French and their English allies, who were already confederated with the Welsh. An alliance 
then, sought by Philip at a moment of French need, seems far more credible than an offer of 
support to Llewelyn after he had been humbled by John’s victory of 1211. It seems more 
likely that the French would look for friends in a strike against John while he was struggling 
with his barons, rather in the aftermath of a successful campaign in Wales. The contemporary 
evidence claimed that the Welsh sent a powerful force to fight John, probably in 1216, and 
that the king withdrew. In the same breath, Alexander was at Dover paying homage to Louis 
for the northern counties.
234
 
 There is a final, Welsh factor to consider; Llywelyn’s character. As with all rulers, 
there are several signature features to their reigns. Perhaps the most outstanding of those is 
that the prince of Gwynedd can be largely seen to keep his word with notable dependability, 
even predictability, throughout his supremacy in Wales which spanned five decades. Other 
key themes of his rule would be his caution and deliberation in matters requiring diplomatic 
or military action. One example of this is his deliberated, even-handed settling a long-running 
dispute between multiple claimants at the council of Aberdyfi in 1216.
235
 In so doing it seems 
that Llywelyn wished to be seen as a fair and worthy leader among the native princes. 
Another feature would be his commitment to military action once he had taken that option, as 
his campaigns in 1212-13 and 1215-17, as well as others during Henry III’s reign, amply 
demonstrated. Once committed to action, Llywelyn applied himself with determination until 
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a military outcome had been decided or an externally-mediated settlement had been reached. 
For example, he continued to fight after the Treaty of Lambeth, perhaps because of his oath 
to Philip, perhaps also because the terms did not suit him. Nevertheless, he was difficult to 
bring to peace. The papacy had to intercede in these Anglo-Welsh conflicts, for example, in 
1213, 1217, 1218, 1219 and 1220 as well as at other junctures during Llywelyn’s reign.236 
Even his long-standing adversaries portrayed him as an honourable man of his word. A good 
example of this came from William Marshal, who described Llywelyn mediating in a conflict 
between Marshal and a Welsh noble from Caerleon in 1218.
237
  
However, if the treaty is applied to 1212, then Llywelyn can be shown to break his 
word repeatedly by holding discussions and making truces the following year with the 
English through the intercession of a papal legate, even though he was militarily ascendant in 
1213. Yet no taint of such plainly dishonourable behaviour was recorded in any 
contemporary source. Advancing the earlier date allowed Treharne, Pryce and Turvey to 
accuse Llewelyn of such disreputable actions ‘So much for the perpetual alliance!’ wrote 
Treharne.
238
 Pryce and Turvey also cite Llewelyn’s failure to support Philip against John in 
1214 as evidence of Llewelyn’s perfidy towards the French.239 However, it is noteworthy that 
there is a lack of a riposte against him by the French. Had he betrayed his word, it is 
reasonable to expect some slight or accusation to appear in chronicles or documents. It does 
not, and Llywelyn’s attachment to the conflict of 1215-17 has been shown to be connected by 
French desire. It is unlikely that they would court his friendship if he had recently betrayed 
them. Although possible that he acted out of character, no such treachery was mentioned at 
the time, even by his enemies. Missing such an opportunity to tarnish an enemy’s name and 
reputation seems unlikely, were such a stain actually applicable. None of his contemporaries 
accused Llywelyn of perfidy in relation to any facet of the alliance, only recent writers. 
No case has been made by Treharne, or anyone else, detailing how Llywelyn was 
supposed to aid Philip in 1214; Llywelyn’s letter certainly limits his military actions to 
Wales. Even without Llywelyn, Philip won a crushing victory that year. If 1212 is correct 
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then it was Philip who was perfidious because the Welsh rose and fought, but the French did 
not. The 1212 theory fails to explain why Llywelyn then allied himself to the barons and their 
French pretender in 1215. As he had received no support from the barons or the French in 
1212, there seems little incentive to stand by them in 1215. On the contrary, had he sided 
with John in 1215, he stood to gain much as a loyal subject of the king and his heirs. There 
was no such fallout from the failure of the 1212 alliance, because there was no alliance in that 
year. However, if the treaty were signed in 1215 or 1216, then Llywelyn clearly kept to his 
word, and the evidence from the treaty text and the other contemporary sources precisely fits 
the known events of the time.  
It is clear that the Welsh princes, the barons, the Scots and the French were all guilty 
of defying a papal order against attacking John.
240
 The fact that this was war fought by the 
four-nation coalition against John, in the face of papal threats, clearly overturns Treharne’s 
assertion that Innocent was too powerful to defy.
241
 The conclusion must be that the prince of 
Gwynedd did not break his word to Philip but did risk papal anger along with his three allies; 
underlining that Philip was more powerful than the pope in 1215, in this region of Europe at 
least. Mass defiance of the pope could only realistically have led to a negotiated settlement 
rather than punishment; the papacy could not enforce sanctions against so large an alliance. 
The 1216 entry in Brut y Tywysogion recorded pointedly Llywelyn’s refusal to treat with 
John.
242
 Therefore, this demonstrates that from 1215 Llywelyn religiously kept his word by 
spurning John’s overtures. If Llewelyn’s claim in the treaty not to have entered discussions or 
made peace with John is applied to the historical context of late 1215 or early 1216, then it 
rings true.
243
 Situating the treaty around the later dates, and observing the subsequent 
behaviour of the prince of Gwynedd, correlates with the posture he typically exhibited and by 
which he conducted his affairs over many decades. This is another signpost indicating that 
the alliance with France occurred in 1215 at the earliest. 
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3.3:    Significance, Effectiveness and Consequences of the Treaty 
 
This final chapter section exploring the treaty’s significance and consequences proceeds on 
the assertion that the alliance was formed sometime during 1215 or 1216. Determining the 
significance of the Welsh role in this period might help to explain Wales’s position within 
Europe in the early thirteenth-century. The reasons for the short duration of this friendship 
are also explored here, along with considerations of the treaty’s consequences. 
 
The prime observation must focus on the significance of the Welsh role within the political 
and historical context of this well-known struggle. Clearly, the Welsh princes were 
considered a distinct, identifiable part of the international community of the time. While it 
could be reasonably argued that they habitually played a role commensurate to their size, and 
therefore do not register frequently in the records of the larger powers, on this occasion their 
role was highly important to those more dominant entities. The enticements of Innocent III, 
Philip Augustus and King John elevate the Welsh into their influential circles. Wales was not 
therefore a parochial oddity, but part of a continental community and engaged as such by 
these three powers. In addition to these direct approaches, other diplomatic moves of the time 
serve to underline the existence and appeal of the Welsh as a distinct entity. It can be 
concluded that the papacy considered Ireland to be part of England’s domain; the papal 
decree following John’s surrender charter of 1213 demanded he paid 300 marks per year for 
authority over Ireland. Also, in the 1217 Treaty of Lambeth, and in several consequent papal 
orders, the Scots were ordered to return to the obedience of the king of England.
244
  However, 
there is no record of an absolution of the Scots or the Irish in 1212, for example, outlining 
Welsh prominence in that papal project against John. The Welsh might be portrayed as acting 
faithfully to these papal pronouncements because they duly attacked the English in summer 
1212, although they also had other, personal motivations to do so at that time. Although there 
is some proof of a generic absolution of the English, it is not evident in a majority of 
sources.
245
 No specifically defined areas of England, such as Kent, East Anglia or the North, 
were absolved and encouraged to assist in the struggle against John, and there was no English 
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civil war in that year. The papal absolution of the Welsh princes of their oaths to John 
demonstrates that they were recognised and treated by the pope as not only as legitimate 
entities separate from, but capable of acting against England. If the contemporary evidence 
cited previously is reliable on this matter, then Innocent III selected only the French and the 
Welsh as allies in his fight with John. This demonstrates clearly that the Welsh held a certain 
distinction and attraction to Rome’s strategic planning to bracket and combat John. 
Similarly, the French king, with perhaps a better grasp of regional matters than the 
pope, also sought an alliance with the Welsh. It is reasonable therefore to say that they must 
have appealed more to Philip’s court than the Irish, for example, who did not feature in this 
conflict. In addition, the Scots do not appear to have been directly approached by the French 
during this campaign, and there is no evidence of a comparable treaty between Philip and 
Alexander. The Scots commitment to Louis came after union with the barons in 1216 and 
appears to have been a recognition of Alexander’s need to pay homage for the lands he would 
hold of Louis, who at that moment appeared the likely next king of England.
246
 However, the 
French firstly established bonds with the English rebels in 1215 and also desired Welsh 
participation in order to pursue their objectives in England. It is noteworthy that the rebel 
barons secured union with the Welsh and delivered their demands, including Welsh clauses in 
their Articles and Magna Carta, before inviting French involvement. Although the precise 
details of John’s approaches to the Welsh remain unknown, it is recorded that he sent them 
the bishop of Coventry in March 1215 and also came in person when he advanced to the 
border seeking parley in 1216.
247
 These three powers’ approaches to the Welsh, at different 
times and for different motivations, demonstrate that the Welsh were recognised and their 
help was sought by these powerful parties.  
This is not to overstate the Welsh role either, they were not instrumental in resolving 
Innocent’s, the rebels’ or Philip’s disputes with John, but they were an element of similar 
importance to other factions involved. Papal absolution of oaths of allegiance can be seen 
elsewhere, in the earlier case of Philip of Swabia for example.
248
 Therefore, this is not a 
unique treatment of the Welsh, or recognition of any special circumstances the Welsh faced. 
However, this equitable treatment in line with other parts of Europe shows that they were 
viewed in a similar light. In turn, this also elevates Wales from being an irrelevance on the 
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fringe of greater states and firmly, actively placed it within the contemporary European 
context.   
It is clear that Innocent did not show any favours to the Welsh; their appeal of 1199-
1201, in which they asked for papal aid against Canterbury as well as for Welsh-speaking 
clergy in Welsh dioceses, fell on deaf ears.
249
 This fitted with Innocent’s approach to the 
politics of the time. He wanted to see large, powerful states from which he could recruit 
crusader armies.
250
 This could not be done from a divided, patchwork landscape of mutually 
distrustful nations. The case of the 1200 invasion and subjection of Navarre by Castile stands 
as an allegory for Wales and England. Castile invaded on a pretext and consumed the smaller 
nation; its many and arguably justified appeals to the pope for intercession went unheeded.
251
 
Simply put, Wales and its issues did not feature in the papal Grand Plan of retaking the Holy 
Land, reforming the Catholic Church and expanding the boundaries of western 
Christendom.
252
 Therefore he would stand by and see small nations extinguished or 
overborne, if deemed to be for a higher cause, in this case to create a large state that could 
fuel the crusading imperative. A further illustration of this followed Prince Louis’s absolution 
in 1217, and the papacy ordered the English, the Scots and the Welsh to return to the 
obedience of the king of England.
253
 This was of course a two-fold order, firstly to forsake 
their recent pledges of homage to the French in order to limit Paris’s power, as well as the 
more superficial directive placing them within the orbit of Rome’s fiefdom, England; 
effectively expanding papal power through the cultivation of their English proxy. This 
command is unlikely to have been made deliberately or prejudicially against the Scots and the 
Welsh, but rather out of Rome’s desire to create potent states whose rulers and populace 
could be induced to take the Cross. It would also want to see its own vassal become as 
powerful as possible, since that would directly benefit the papacy in financial, military and 
influential terms. Irrespective of native designs on sustaining their liberty, the examples of 
Ireland, Navarre, Scotland and Wales show that the fates of smaller nations were of little 
import compared to the grand schemes of Rome. 
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 With this treaty, Wales provides a well-documented microcosm of the broader 
struggle taking place across Europe between the vying sovereign states as well as with the 
papacy. This document, when taken in conjunction with its supporting evidence, and 
correctly contextualised to the events of 1215-16, allows a rare glimpse into the form and 
application of the international diplomatic machinations of the period. The agreements 
between the barons, the Scots and the French, if they were committed to writing, have not 
survived. In that regard, this treaty is not only a notable feature of Welsh, French and English 
history, but it also appeals to the far broader study of effective diplomacy and alliances within 
the medieval world.  
From a Welsh perspective, this treaty illuminates a moment when their friendship was 
sought by perhaps the dominant western European power, France, in a period when other 
conflicting parties, the papacy, King John and the English barons, also desired union with 
them. The rare survival of this document is of great significance to any understanding of how 
the Welsh were perceived and how they presented themselves to their contemporaries. It also 
marks the beginning of a short period, probably only the last few months of John’s reign and 
the first few months of that of Henry III, when the Welsh considered their notional overlord 
to be the king of France.  
As for France, this treaty offers an insight into the form and extent to which the 
French government was able to successfully encourage discord in its enemies’ territories. 
Few other such documents survive and so this treaty is important in that regard also. Philip 
Augustus can be rightly considered as one of medieval France’s most powerful monarchs, 
and witnessing his methods of interference is instructive. Not only had Philip dispossessed 
the Angevins of their home territory of Anjou and their long-held lands of Normandy, Maine 
and much of Aquitaine, in essence killing the Anglo-Norman realm and isolating the English 
kings in England, but this alliance with Llywelyn also demonstrates how far Philip was able 
to penetrate the other lands considered, perhaps incorrectly, as obedient to England.
254
 This 
aspect of his reign has yet to be successfully portrayed in any publications, and further marks 
Philip as a king of talent and appeal. In that sense, Philip Augustus can be viewed as a 
capable exponent of hard and soft power. 
The treaty’s role within English history is also of note as it came when noble English 
rebels were also allied to the Welsh, Scots and French, proving interaction and co-operation 
in the face of the immense moral influences of the king and the pope. These English rebels 
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were well-organised and their great baronial movement resulted in Magna Carta, a document 
whose multidisciplinary importance requires no expansive discussion here. This French-
Welsh treaty bound those two parties together, both of whom were united to the English 
barons. Without the strong foundations of these alliances, the movement against John would 
have been far less stable. This treaty therefore should be considered as part of the broader 
story of Magna Carta.  
Although not a unique or guiding part of Magna Carta, this alliance was made during 
the conflict which produced the first three drafts of that famous document, and for that reason 
also it should be connected to the charter.
255
 Certainly, warfare and the Anglo-French alliance 
were essential factors in the baron’s adherence to and sustained promotion of that document. 
With their allies’ support, the barons were confident enough to present their demands to the 
king and then prosecute a campaign against him. With that same support they were able not 
only to fight John’s loyalists, but to withstand excommunication and eventually bring Magna 
Carta into existence. There is no place for a discussion on the origins and ramifications of 
that charter here. However, the clauses relevant to Llywelyn and the Welsh require inclusion. 
 
56. If we have disseised or deprived any Welshmen of lands, liberties or other things 
without lawful judgement of their peers, in England or in Wales, they are to be returned 
to them at once; and if a dispute arises over this it shall be settled in the March by 
judgement of their peers; for tenements in England according to the law of England, for 
tenements in Wales according to the law of Wales, for tenements in the March according 
to the law of the March. The Welsh are to do the same to us and ours. 
 
57. For all those things, however, of which any Welshman has been disseised or deprived 
without lawful judgement of his peers by King Henry our father, or King Richard our 
brother, which we have in our possession or which others hold under our legal warranty, 
we shall have respite for the usual crusader’s term; excepting those cases in which a plea 
was begun or inquest made on our order before we took the cross. However, when we 
return, or if perhaps we do not go on our pilgrimage, we will at once give them full 
justice in accordance with the laws of the Welsh and the aforesaid regions.  
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58. We will restore at once the son of Llywelyn and all the hostages from Wales and the 
charters delivered to us as security for peace.
256
  
 
Therefore, the same legal rights and liberties enjoyed by Englishmen with respect to the 
dispossessions of the time were also granted to Welshmen.
257
 The jurisdiction and legal 
method under which cases would be tried was clarified. Perhaps more importantly, with the 
murders of 1212 in mind, the Welsh hostages were freed and the princes were released from 
promises given to John in the punitive settlement of 1211.
258
 It is indicative of his power that 
Llywelyn’s three clauses fall before the one relating to Alexander, king of Scotland, in any of 
the charters in which both these men feature.
259
 Welsh leaders were present at the discussions 
at Oxford in July 1215 which further debated the charter.
260
 The pope denounced and 
annulled Magna Carta, excommunicating all implicated with it, John refused to keep his word 
and the conflict between loyal and rebel English factions and their allies re-ignited.
261
 The 
French-Welsh alliance of 1215-16 supported one side and therefore played some part in the 
success of the movement which created this famous document and, as a consequence, their 
involvement in this important moment in European history deserves recognition.  Their 
attachment to that cause also briefly continued some form of connection to the great English 
magnates and Prince Louis, all of whom were later absolved, and also to Philip Augustus 
who interceded for the excommunicated.
262
 
                                                          
256 Holt, Magna Carta, 429-73, Appendix 5, 429-40, (‘The Articles of the Barons’, [429-32, discussion, 432-40, 
text], dated to mid June 1215 [prob. 18
th
, p 430], has 49 clauses and contains two Welsh clauses, nos. 44 
[pertaining to Welsh, English or March law use where relevant] and 45 [freeing Llywelyn’s son]), Appendix 6, 
441-73, (‘Magna Carta’, [441-6, discussion, 448-73, text], dated on the document as 15
th
 June has 63 clauses 
[three of which are related to Wales, 56, 57 and 58]), 466, 468 (Latin), 467, 469 (English). 
257 Rothwell, English Historical Documents, vol 3, 323, n. 1, ‘Articles 56-7 do for dispossessed Welshmen what 
clause 52 does for dispossessed Englishmen.’  
258
 Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 61. 
259
 Rothwell, English Historical Documents, vol 3, 315; Holt, Magna Carta, 468-9. Note: The hierarchical listing 
of leaders is common throughout the period, for another good example see: R. Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, 
(London: Allen Lane, 1975), 73.  
260 Hardy, Rotuli Litterarum Patentium, vol 1, 150a – Safe conduct to Oxford Council, 22nd July 1215 for 
‘Lewelin, Wennunuen, Maddoc, Mailgon, Res fil Griffin et omnes’; Smith, ‘Magna Carta and the Charters of the 
Welsh Princes’, 345-6, 350-1, 359-60; Holt, Magna Carta, 486-7.  
261
 Fœdera, vol 1, 202-5; Annales Monastici, vol. 1, Burton, 224, vol 2, Wintonia, 82, Stubbs, Walteri de 
Coventria, vol 2, 224-8; Luard, Matthæi Parisiensis, vol. 2, 616-20, 627-8, 642-5; Rothwell, English Historical 
Documents, vol 3, 324-6.  
262
 Luard, Matthæi Parisiensis, vol 3, 31; Annales Monastici, vol. 1, Burton, 224-5, vol 2, Wintonia, 83, Stubbs, 
Walteri de Coventria, vol 2, 239; Stevenson, Coggeshall, 186; Samaran et al, Recueil des Actes de Philippe 
Auguste, Roi de France, tome 4, 151-2 (entry 1524).  
 147 
 
 A little considered consequence of this alliance and the better-known charter with 
which it is associated, is the peace it brought to France. For years after, England played no 
hostile role in France, as it had in 1202 and 1206, and it constructed no coalitions to threaten 
Philip within France, as it had in 1214.
263
 The extent of English military ambition in France 
post-1216 can be seen in Henry’s limited mission of 1225 to maintain his influence in 
Gascony, rather than any attempt to retake former Angevin lands he still claimed.
264
 The 
baronial war, the death of John and the minority of Henry III, which saw years of ongoing 
warfare with English rebels and the Welsh, enabled Philip to consolidate his hold on former 
possessions of the English crown in France. He did so swiftly and intelligently, respecting 
local customs to minimise the impact of the change in ownership.
265
 This resulted in those 
lands being lost to the English crown forever, with the exception of the short-lived fifteenth-
century occupation of Normandy undertaken by Henry V.
266
 Since the Franco-Welsh alliance 
was part of the 1215-17 conflict, some of the fruit it bore can be seen in the expansion of 
Philip’s realm and the strengthening of his hold on those lands following the resolution of the 
war.  
 A further consequence of the treaty was that it helped illuminate the weakness and 
hypocrisy of the papacy of the day. The pope encouraged the Welsh and the English, and 
later the French, to unite and attack the king of England.
267
 Following John’s surrender, 
Innocent forbad the rebels and their allies from attacking John.
268
 This was not because John 
had changed his ways and become a fair or Christian ruler, but because he capitulated to 
Innocent, taken the cross, arguably with no intention of fulfilling his vow but to buy time, and 
most importantly he had also promised a sizeable financial tribute to the papacy.
269
 However, 
the pope had helped put into motion events which could not easily be stopped and his failure 
to punish John for his coalition with Otto and Flemish nobles in 1214 might have tarnished 
Innocent’s credibility as a fair and neutral arbiter. Also, Philip Augustus showed his fury at 
being ordered not to invade England because he had already outlaid large sums preparing the 
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attack requested of him by the pope.
270
 Innocent’s volte-face did not dissuade John’s enemies 
from continuing to plot action against him. The barons’ war and Louis’s invasion are 
irrefutable demonstrations of that.  In fact, it might be correct to regard Louis’s invasion as a 
counter-stroke to John’s 1214 campaign.271 Innocent carried out his threats to excommunicate 
those who attacked his vassal, John, but regardless of that, they continued their campaign 
until a natural military conclusion was reached, and this was then completed and bound by 
diplomatic means. The pope could not prevent or arrest the conflict, and his legates ultimately 
absolved those involved, and had only a minor influence on the settlement.
272
 This treaty, 
created in 1215 or 1216, is tangible evidence of the will of the secular leaders to defy 
Innocent and seek their own solutions to mutual problems. 
Although he represented himself as the fair arbiter of disputes among Christians, 
particularly leaders, there is no doubt that Innocent III had a political agenda and was 
strongly influenced by his personal desires.
273
 With regard to that minor part of his 
inheritance known as Wales, he had ignored written Welsh pleas in 1199-1201 concerning 
mistreatment by Canterbury and the plight of the Welsh church.
274
 However, he recalled their 
existence when he thought they could serve in his campaign against John.
275
 Just three years 
later, when they became a faction of the wider movement against John, by that time Rome’s 
subject ruler, he excommunicated them.
276
 After baronial success brought John to the 
negotiating table in 1215, discussions which included the Welsh there and in the resulting 
charter, John and clergymen sought to negotiate with them individually.
277
 At approximately 
the same time as their excommunication and the great meetings at Runnymede and Oxford, 
and almost certainly as an inducement aimed at depriving the baronial alliance of Welsh 
support, two Welshmen were elected bishops in Wales. It seems unlikely that the pope would 
reward Llywelyn for violence against his vassal, and Innocent must have had a hand in the 
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election of Iorwerth to St Davids and Cadwgan to Bangor during summer 1215.
278
 These 
appointments must be viewed with cautious scepticism due to their timing and lack of 
precedence. This was such an unusual circumstance in fact, that it requires consideration 
here. Their elevation could be seen as a placatory measure addressing apparent past injuries 
or as acquiescing to Welsh demands over their church. Some writers have even portrayed 
their appointment as a victory for Llywelyn.
279
 However, these candidates, although viewed 
as being universally acceptable, were ultimately approved by Innocent and John, and were 
also instruments of papal leverage inserted into the heart of Welsh territory and society, and 
at the top of the native church.
280
 Such direct contact with Welsh rulers and the population 
had been impossible when previous bishops were non-Welsh speaking Anglo-Norman 
absentees. Consequently, the appointments of Iorwerth and Cadwgan re-enforced Rome’s 
pre-eminence in ecclesiastical matters and offered the pope and his vassal a previously 
unknown opportunity to affect or perhaps control native affairs. They could work for 
obedience and loyalty to Rome’s vassal when Wales’s political leaders resolutely 
campaigned against that end. Far from being a reward or acknowledgment of Llywelyn’s 
ascendancy, these appointments had the potential to be used as a weapon to split Welsh 
obedience from their princes. When Rome had no or few native-speakers among their ranks, 
they had no leverage within that populace. In effect, their appointment could be seen as 
recognition of Llywelyn’s power and it constituted a move against him. The papal drive at 
this time, as demonstrated previously, focussed on establishing large, powerful, obedient 
kingdoms from which the pope could raise crusader armies. It went against that drive to allow 
the rise of a strong Wales which would forcefully strive for its own interests and recognition, 
and no doubt fight England in pursuit of those ends. Moreover, it would have been important 
to Rome to prevent France from acquiring Wales and Scotland as allies or vassals, and thus 
critically weakening England while in parallel greatly enlarging French power. The 
imposition of bishops who would be present and active in native affairs, a circumstance 
largely unheard of in Wales previously, could serve as a check to the burgeoning power of 
any Welsh leader.  
Consequently, the treaty between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn is a demonstration of 
contemporary leaders’ willingness to defy the papacy over such important matters, since 
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Rome was acting in its own interests above those of a number of Christian nations. Its utility 
therefore extends beyond being considered as part of French-Welsh affairs or the baronial 
wars that led to Magna Carta, but of being of much broader value in studies of alliances and 
medieval secular rulers defying the papacy.  
 
In practice, this French-Welsh alliance appears to have lasted for a short period, perhaps two 
years between late 1215 and late 1217. It seems most likely that the treaty was ratified and 
returned by Llywelyn sometime between November 1215 and May 1216, following the first 
arrivals in England of French troops and then Prince Louis.
281
 Philip showed notable caution 
in acquiring promises and hostages from the English barons before committing his heir to the 
campaign across the Channel.
282
 It seems likely that seeking other allies on the northern side 
of the Channel would be a desirable precaution. In the treaty, Llywelyn committed to 
supporting Philip and his heirs. This clearly encompassed Louis.
283
 While the Welsh had no 
long-standing connection to France, they had a long and a recent history of fighting against 
the English. They had also demonstrated that they were committed to this particular struggle 
by allying themselves with the English barons. That caused their hostages to be released and 
earned them clauses in the Articles of the Barons and Magna Carta, as well as representation 
at the Council of Oxford.
284
 Therefore, the line from the treaty agreeing to act as enemies to 
Philip’s enemies might well have been specifically included in reference to the context of 
shifting loyalties of the conflict, rather than simply being a diplomatic nicety.
285
 By February 
1217, Honorius III had ordered the allied factions to disavow their oaths to Louis. By 
coercing Scotland and Wales to ‘return their allegiance’ to the king of England, the pope 
demonstrated his position on politics in Britain and gave Rome’s ongoing vision for Europe – 
large states under one head.
286
 While this did not necessarily close the alliance, it indicated 
                                                          
281
 Fœdera, vol 1, 207; Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, vol 2, 228; Stevenson, Coggeshall, 176; Cheney, Innocent 
III, 391, Warren, King John, 250-1; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 317-24.  
282
 Luard, Matthæi Parisiensis, vol 2, 647-8; Cheney, Innocent III, 391; Warren, King John, 250-1. 
283
 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 3-4 (Latin), 57-8 (English); Rothwell, English Historical Documents, vol 3, 
306-7; Pryce, Acts of Welsh Rulers, (entry 235) 392. 
284
 Hardy, Rotuli Litterarum Patentium, vol 1, 143b, 150a; Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 89;  Holt, Magna Carta, 
429-73, Appendix 5, 429-40, (‘The Articles of the Barons’), Appendix 6, 441-73, (‘Magna Carta’),  486-7 
(Oxford). 
285
 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 3-4 (Latin), 57-8 (English); Rothwell, English Historical Documents, vol 3, 
306-7; Pryce, Acts of Welsh Rulers, (entry 235) 392. 
286
 Pressutti,  Regesta Honorii Papæ III,  vol. 1, 44; Bliss, Calendar of Papal Letters, 41, 43;  Potthast, Regesta 
Pontificum Romanorum de 1198 ab 1304, vol 1, 473 (5375, to ‘Princeps Angliæ’ the latter is probably used as a 
geographical rather than a political description, ie, ‘princes of the British Isles’), 473-4 (5378, barons), 477 
(5417, to all English, Scots and Welsh, and 5418, to Scots, rebels and ‘Nobilem Virum Lewelin’). 
 151 
 
that a possible end to the conflict was in sight. Certainly, when Louis and all of his supporters 
were absolved in September 1217, an opportunity for all parties to withdraw honourably and 
quietly from their prior agreements presented itself.
287
 Also, in spite of the politesse of the 
settlement at Lambeth, in buying off Louis’s claims and interests in England, Henry III’s 
government might also have effectively bought off French ties within Britain.
288
 Certainly, 
peace was easily made between Henry and the Scots although the settlement was decidedly to 
England’s advantage. Alexander later expressed regret over that.289 In the immediate 
aftermath of the peace, the French appear to have honoured their promises and not made 
trouble for Henry, within England at least. In contrast and despite the pursuit of an agreement 
between Henry, the legate and Llywelyn’s representatives at Worcester in 1218, the Welsh 
continued to fight until 1223 and then intermittently for another decade thereafter.
290
 It seems 
implausible that Llywelyn did this with the treaty with Philip in mind, unilaterally upholding 
its terms. It might well be that Llywelyn had tired of French perfidy; Louis and the barons 
had negotiated and concluded terms with the loyalists and the government without including 
– or even mentioning the matter to their Welsh and Scots allies.291 It seems clear that post-
1217, Llywelyn and the Welsh were forcibly pursuing their own aims. Also, had the French 
wished to support Llywelyn’s struggles with Henry’s government, they were given ample 
opportunity over those years. There is no indication in any source that they maintained 
contact with Llywelyn following the demise of Louis’s venture in 1217. The political 
landscape changed after Henry’s accession and the French prospered during his minority, 
particularly financially, and only had to contend with an inexperienced youth nominally 
leading a weakened, poorer adversary governed by a regent.
292
 Their dominance can be 
further explained by the internal conflicts of Henry’s minority during which control was 
fitfully wrested from Llywelyn and numerous English nobles who fought the Crown during 
this period. An imperfect settlement, bringing a limited, temporary peace, was eventually 
reached with Llywelyn in 1218. However, areas such as Carlisle and Cornwall returned to 
English control, while most English malcontents were eventually killed or returned to 
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obedience.
293
 The perfect demonstration of French dominance came on the occasion of Philip 
Augustus’ death in July 1223, when Henry’s government demanded the return of Normandy, 
according to the writ of an earlier treaty with Philip. While Henry’s messengers travelled to 
Louis, the government mustered an army at Portsmouth to effect an invasion. Louis’s 
position was firm: he refused the claim and threatened to re-invade England if it made hostile 
moves against his territories. The Crown immediately dismissed the army and shelved the 
claim to Normandy.
294
 England’s weakness and faltering control over its home territory 
perhaps removed the short-term French need for an alliance with anyone on the British 
mainland. Even a contemporary English source believed the French to be more powerful than 
England and lamented the loss of La Rochelle.
295
 However, as long as any goodwill 
generated by a successful union could be recalled, France retained the potential to again 
unsettle England from within.  
In terms of this project, this response from Llywelyn is a highly significant document. 
It is one of the rare examples of the Welsh, speaking with one voice through one leader, 
acting within an international environment. The context also demonstrated that the French, 
the Pope and both English factions viewed Llewelyn as an ally worth treating with; a level of 
recognition infrequently bestowed on Welsh leaders. The message gleaned from the text, 
discussed above, is important in evaluating how Llewelyn went about his diplomatic affairs 
and it clearly described his motivations and priorities. Therefore, Llewelyn’s treaty with 
Philip forms a vital milestone in the French-Welsh relationship which ebbed and flowed 
between 1163 and 1417. Although it has been established that an earlier, functional alliance 
existed between Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII between 1163 and 1168, Philip’s 
negotiations with Llywelyn appear to be of a different tenor.
296
 The insistence on this later 
alliance’s binding nature of the leaders and their heirs, marks a clear movement, not 
previously witnessed, towards permanent relations with British entities. This perhaps reveals 
that this treaty explicitly demonstrates a departure from Fryde’s otherwise apparently 
generically applicable notion that ‘foreign policy at this time was entirely opportunistic and 
without loyalty or sentiment.’297A lack of surviving contemporary agreements with the Scots 
hinders comparative analysis, although any corresponding alliance document is notable by its 
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absence. Even in the Acts of Parliament of Scotland listed by Duncan for 1282 and 1291 
there is no explicit description of a Franco-Scots treaty. These acts confirm correspondence 
between Louis and Alexander regarding his fealty for the northern English counties, but there 
is no mention of an alliance between them even though the union between the king of 
Scotland and the English barons is mentioned. This critical omission strongly suggests that 
there was no alliance between the French and the Scots at this time, but a confirmed mutual 
union with the English rebels.
298
 Therefore, since there is no earlier documentary evidence to 
promote the idea of a permanent connection between France and Scotland, this treaty 
between Philip and Llywelyn can clearly be held as an ‘Aulder Alliance.’ 
However, a long view of this period, and the consequences of this treaty, might well 
identify dark ramifications for any notion of a Wales ruled by native leaders. If the argument 
can be upheld that all Angevin princes were intended to be given experience in governance in 
the provinces of their ‘empire’, then John’s loss of Henry II’s territories in France was of 
enormous importance to Wales.
299
 It seems evident that the loss of these lands and successive 
failures to regain them would naturally refocus elsewhere this need for territories to govern. 
In that light, England’s efforts in the thirteenth century to subjugate Wales and create a 
principality for a royal heir to rule appear understandable, even inevitable. English expansion 
into Ireland and designs on Scotland might also be considered as attempts to replace Anjou, 
Normandy and Poitou with more northerly equivalents.  
The aftermath of the barons’ war specifically demonstrated the dangers of a Wales 
allied behind a capable leader. The contemporary evidence cited above shows that the 
French-Welsh alliance was well-known to the relevant powers, and the threat of a strong 
Wales connected to France must have caused concern. Since 1215, Llywelyn had improved 
his territorial position and had rights for Welshmen enshrined in binding charters.
300
 The 
weakness of England during Henry’s early reign was evident in the civil conflict to gain and 
maintain control of England, a struggle that lasted into the 1230s.
301
 Llywelyn’s actions while 
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in this position of strength were partly responsible for that sapping conflict in England, the 
Marches and Welsh lands. In Wales, he prosecuted a campaign that resulted in the peace of 
Worcester, although described as a great victory for the Welsh, it might more realistically be 
viewed as a truce rather than a conclusion to the war.
302
 The Worcester agreement was 
unsatisfactory; the letter of its terms favoured the king but their practical application, seen by 
all, favoured Llywelyn. The prince surrendered Welsh, Marcher and Crown lands won in the 
conflict to Guala, the papal legate, only to be immediately granted custody of them. He also 
did little to fulfil his promise to retake lands then held by the Deheubarth nobles, his allies, 
who had acquired those territories either directly from Llywelyn granting them or they had 
been captured with his assistance.
303
 Conflict continued with William (II) Marshal in 1219, 
with Llywelyn’s counter-attack pushing back Marshal’s forces to the coastal castle of 
Haverford. Marshal complained to the Crown who summoned Llywelyn to talks, but the 
prince was not punished when he twice failed to attend. The truce with Henry had worn thin 
by 1220 so further negotiations took place at Shrewsbury in May. Disputes over the 
interpretation of the resulting terms led Llywelyn to signal that he intended to resume military 
action and held the Crown responsible. War erupted between Llywelyn and Hugh Mortimer 
shortly after and that year’s action culminated in an effective invasion of Pembrokeshire by 
the Welsh.
304
 Warfare continued between Llywelyn, Marcher and Crown forces until the 
summer of 1223, when a joint campaign by William (II) Marshal, earl of Pembroke, Hubert 
de Burgh, the king’s justiciar and King Henry III caused Llywelyn and his allies to submit in 
the face of such might. This brought a temporary cessation of hostilities and the construction 
of a new castle in a strategically important location at Montgomery. During that campaign the 
prince of Gwynedd was excommunicated although he was absolved later that year.
305
  
Llywelyn also formed connections and alliances among the English nobles, such as 
Ranulf, earl of Chester, and John de Braose, and he exploited fractures within the nobility’s 
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allegiances and enmities to his own ends.
306
 Moreover, he sided with factions he had 
previously fought against, such as those of Falkes de Bréauté and Richard Marshal, earl of 
Pembroke, in 1224 and 1233 respectively, when each went into armed revolt against 
Henry.
307
 Whether Llywelyn genuinely thought these disputes with the Crown were just is 
immaterial. By supporting these rebels, Llywelyn was prolonging the Crown’s instability and 
England’s weakness. This no doubt suited him in the short-term; a weak king of England 
would not be able to express his power in Wales as John had in 1211. Alarmingly for native 
leaders intent on continuing independent rule, a connection to John’s advances surfaced later 
in Henry III’s reign, when negotiations sought to establish his gains as the norm and desired 
to re-impose them.
308
 The tale of conflicts between Henry, his son Edward, the Marchers and 
the Welsh leaders does not need to be recounted here; but the mention of Llywelyn’s role in 
destabilising England served to demonstrate the danger posed by a united, hostile Wales 
under a leader capable and desirable enough to be sought as an ally by the French. It is worth 
considering therefore that a treaty with France in the hands of a prince as powerful as 
Llywelyn was one factor that outlined a need to destroy native rule in Wales. Although not a 
defining justification for English aggression against Wales in the later thirteenth century, this 
French-Welsh alliance of 1215 or 1216 starkly illuminated how independent Welsh entities 
could be used by external powers, the papacy and France for example, to effect change in 
England. Therefore, removing that threat could be viewed by the crown as an important step 
to establishing and maintaining peace and security in England. It is probably no coincidence 
that it was Edward, Henry III’s son, who dedicated so much of England’s resources to wars in 
Wales and Scotland. 
This French-Welsh treaty could be judged a triumph of sorts; both parties had 
prospered and England had been weakened in respect of its territory, finances and ability to 
act militarily. This alliance, and the roles of its signatories and their adherents, is inseparable 
from that success.
309
 From a French perspective, although Louis was only the king of 
England to his supporters, this alliance contributed to bringing chaos to England, prolonging 
the civil war which weakened the country and saw the end of John’s reign, placing a minor 
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on the throne in his stead.
310
 Following the resolution of their invasion of England, the French 
were able to consolidate their hold on Philip’s acquisitions in France, to the lasting detriment 
of the kings of England. As an element of that result, the treaty with Llywelyn should be 
recalled with a measure of satisfaction by the French, Llywelyn’s ongoing campaigns 
certainly diverted English military resources to the threat in the west for years after Louis’s 
return to France. This alliance, in concert with contemporary agreements held with the 
barons, unequivocally constitutes a serious, determined effort to project French power onto 
Britain. 
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In contrast to Rees Davies’s assertion that fourteenth-century Wales was a peaceful place, the 
evidence shows it to be a hotbed of resentment and discontent, a place of riots, murders and 
risings, as well as the target for more than half a dozen foreign invasion plots.
1
 Two of those 
invasion attempts were conducted under the command of a Welshman fighting for the king of 
France. This chapter will examine those missions, after having highlighted certain of the key 
moments of the turbulent, violent environment that was Wales after Edward I’s invasion of 
1282. Following a review of the context and details of the expeditions apparently destined for 
Wales, this short chapter will conclude with an assessment of their rationale and impact. 
 
 
4.1  The Conquered? Turbulence in Wales after 1283. 
The extinction of independent governance in Welsh territories after 1283 does not appear to 
have deterred the French from including Wales within their strategic interests.
2
 Given their 
numerous efforts to propagate revolt there or to muster invasion forces apparently destined 
for Wales over the following century, it seems reasonable to argue that the fall of Gwynedd 
and the outbreak of conflict following Edward III’s claim to their throne in 1337, more 
starkly outlined Wales’s potential value to the French.   
Even in the years following Edward I’s successful invasion of 1282-3, native revolts 
found vent in Wales. Despite the brutally efficient extermination of the principal ruling 
families, the southern noble, Rhys ap Maredudd, raised the standard of revolt against Edward 
in 1287.
3
 Although crushed the following year, Rhys’s action highlighted deep dissatisfaction 
among the Welsh which was not only expressed by poetry but in military action, such as this 
first brief rising, as well as other acts of more localised violence.
4
 In 1294 another, more 
powerful rebellion took place, during which Edward himself was besieged in Conwy until 
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spring 1295. Madog ap Llywelyn, that revolt’s leader, was proclaimed ‘Prince of Wales’ 
drawing upon the legitimacy afforded him by his descent from a cadet branch of the 
acknowledged Welsh royal line. That conflict raged across most of Wales and saw the 
capture of several of Edward’s new, expensive and much-vaunted fortresses. Edward was 
forced to postpone his activities elsewhere, primarily his intended advance on Scotland, 
where the unexpected respite offered by the conflict in Wales has been identified as a 
possible reason, among others, for the Scots and French swiftly forming an alliance.
5
 While 
eventually victorious, Edward was humiliated by this revolt in a region he had presumed 
vanquished. Moreover, on top of the large sums dedicated to the ongoing castle-building 
programme, Edward had been obliged to raise an immense infantry force of over 35, 000 men 
in order to suppress the rebels, at the staggering cost of more than £55, 000.
6
  
The seeds of the ‘auld alliance’ between France and Scotland were sewn during 
Madog ap Llywelyn’s revolt. That union, the Treaty of Paris, was signed in October 1295, 
after France had firstly allied itself with Norway; John Baliol ratified the agreement with 
Philip IV in February 1296.
7
 Although both kingdoms had previously established diplomatic 
contact with one another, there had been no lasting tie. As France’s friendships and contacts 
are discussed elsewhere in this research, it is worth highlighting that prior to these final years 
of the thirteenth century, Scotland too had a history of making treaties with other states; 
Wales in 1258 and Norway in 1266 for example.
8
 Although this French-Scots pact is known 
as the ‘Auld Alliance’, this is obviously a back-projection; at its inception it was but one of a 
number of unions made between vying European states.
9
 However, since it endured, or more 
accurately, was revived on several occasions and bore fruit for the French cause in particular 
during the fifteenth-century, the Franco-Scots ‘Auld Alliance’ deserves brief analysis here.  
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Although there is a passing acknowledgement of a faint Scots connection to Louis VII 
dating to the 1160s, the 1295 Treaty of Paris is recognised as founding the French-Scots 
‘Auld Alliance’.10 Edward I was the reason Scotland and France sought stronger ties, but the 
Treaty of Paris, and all of its subsequent reincarnations heavily favoured the French.
11
 
Although it was sealed by marriage between nobles satellite to the respective crowns, and 
quelled existing Norwegian hostility to John Balliol, an overview reveals treaty terms that 
demanded little of France and much of Scotland. Although it offered the Scots the comfort of 
friendship with a significant power who was the king of England’s overlord, all of the 
principal clauses appear loaded to serve French interests. In times of war between France and 
England, the Scots were obliged to attack England and continue fighting, at their own 
expense. The treaty tied by oath the Scots’ king, earls, nobles and clergy as well as the 
communities and towns of Scotland to making war on England, and they were to notify the 
King of France of that in writing. Philip, on the other hand, was only to continue conflict if 
one had already started, in Gascony or Flanders, for example. The French king solely had to 
advise and assist his allies; there was no provision or requirement for direct intervention in 
Scotland.
12
 However, if given sufficient notice, he would respond to an attack on Scotland by 
moving against the English in other parts, with the aim of distracting English aggression. 
Although the formulaic convention not to agree peace unilaterally was also contained in the 
treaty, Philip’s role was clearly limited and conveniently vague. He had gained an ally who 
might serve to dampen English ambitions in Gascony and Flanders, and one that acted as the 
northern bracket of his alliances against England and its interests.
13
 This is not to present the 
Scots as dupes, they were not, rather it offers a taste of the realpolitik of the moment and 
recognition of the disparity in the allies’ powers.  
Irrespective of the promises of the treaty’s signatories, within perhaps six months the 
treaty was formally renounced after Edward’s crushing victory and humiliation of King John. 
The French had failed to assist their ally or distract Edward, and the Scots were too weak to 
confront him alone. After defeat by the Flemings at Courtrai in 1302, the French sued for 
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peace with Edward the following year and excluded the Scots from the agreement, as 
requested by Edward and in clear contravention of the Treaty of Paris. The alliance was truly 
lifeless just a short matter of years, perhaps even months after it had been agreed.
14
 
Nevertheless, it had established a precedent which was revived largely faithful to its original 
form during mutual, though mainly French, times of need. Examples of the treaty’s 
resurrection and joint-action occurred in 1326, 1346, 1359, 1371, 1391 and several more 
times during the fifteenth century.
15
 The early part of that century saw its most spectacular 
blossoming in the wars in France between 1412 and 1424, where thousands of Scottish 
soldiers fought with some notoriety for English, French and Burgundian paymasters.
16
 Most 
importantly though, the French and the Scots came to value the alliance formed in 1295 and 
discovered how to sustain a union through the ebb and flow of time, and against the 
machinations of their neighbours. Perhaps it is that achievement, rather than the unbalanced 
terms of the agreement that should be recalled. 
During the years 1315-18 in particular, trouble again flared in Wales, where an 
additional, serious threat was posed by the Scottish. Having effectively won their 
independence at Bannockburn in June 1314, Scottish forces invaded Ireland seeking to 
combine with native rebels to roll back England’s frontiers, opening other theatres to distract 
the English from Scotland.
17
 The Scots apparently attempted to extend this campaign into 
Wales, and attained the support of the leading Gwynedd magnate, Gruffudd Llwyd. The 
danger of external invasion was only alleviated by the failure of the Irish expedition in 1318 
and the death of its commander, Edward Bruce.
18
 Although royal authorities had calmed 
resentment in northern Wales, rebellion broke out in Glamorgan under Llywelyn Bren in 
1316. Although this had a limited but damaging effect, Bren’s broad support base 
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demonstrated the widespread and continuing resistance within Wales, north and south, to rule 
by the king of England and other, apparently oppressive aliens.
19
  
In the following decade, conflict within Wales involving Welsh soldiery continued 
but in an altered form. Following the 1282 invasion, new administrative procedures tied the 
Welsh more firmly to English practices and rule. Although paradoxical to a certain degree, 
the division of Welsh territories between twenty-five noble families after 1282 served to 
fragment English royal power in Wales. In terms of jurisdiction, administration and finance, 
each of these lordships constituted a largely independent territory, although each was held 
from the king. Throughout Wales, two legal systems ran in tandem. However, the 
proliferation of lordship boundaries where jurisdictions changed, encouraged lawlessness and 
disorder, bringing little semblance of domination by the king of England. Within this mosaic 
of quasi-independent entities there was no consistency, no common tax system, no parliament 
or other form of representation. In essence, Wales was divided into a mosaic of localities of 
variable sizes with changing ownership, rather than the larger territorial blocks that 
constituted the native kingdoms or the great lordships of previous centuries. This meant that 
the focus of native resentment was localised and more easily contained, but for this reason it 
made less impact on contemporary records.
20
 However, violence and resistance were still 
evident in the decades preceding the Black Death. During the 1320s, the obvious outlet for 
violence took the form of the private wars between the great English magnates that lasted 
between 1322-7. Many of their confrontations were played out on their Welsh lands and this 
period saw armies comprised of Welshmen pitched into the tumult of the political crises of 
the decade, not solely the tussle for supremacy between the Mortimers and the Despensers, 
but also the deposition and murder of Edward II.
21
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Rumours of another Scots plan to invade Wales circulated between 1325-7 and 
similarly in 1335. However, the threat of a hostile insertion by combined French-Scots forces 
was deemed credible enough to warrant the expenditure of Crown revenue. In 1338 and 1339, 
Anglesey and North Wales were fortified against the threat of a combined French-Scots 
invasion of the region.
22
 The dates are noteworthy; the attacks were probably connected to 
the commencement of hostilities between England and France.  
While there were peaceful periods in this time of administrative transition, from that 
of native governance to a more centralised administration based on English practice, 
fractured as it was between Marcher authorities, it is clear that tensions ran high between 
native and alien in Wales post-1282. Within the 1340s there were violent rejections of foreign 
rule in Wales; the sheriff of Merioneth was murdered while going about his duties, official 
records were seized, Rhuddlan came under attack and Henry Shaldeford, the Black Prince’s 
leading official in Wales, was murdered by a band led by a native nobleman.
23
 Although the 
great plagues that swept Europe at that time provided something of a lull in hostilities, fear of 
the vulnerability of the west to French-Castilian naval penetration was an ongoing feature of 
the period, and the direct threat of French invasion of Wales resurfaced in 1346 and 1359.
24
  
Such a consistent determination to resist easily played into the hands of external 
powers eager to throw into disarray the plans of the king of England. While there is evidence 
of collusion with the Bruces in 1315-17, the later connections to Scots ambitions in Wales 
during the years 1325-7, 1335 and 1339 demonstrate that the Welsh were clearly viewed by 
England’s enemies as strategically exploitable allies. Other European powers therefore 
recognised the Welsh were held by the king of England, but not under his command. Certain 
of these dates, 1326, 1346 and 1359, marked years when the French-Scots alliance was 
reissued and marked with combined military action. Therefore, these threats to invade Wales 
might have been perceived or made as an extension of those reformed bonds.
25
 It is 
noteworthy however, that in the range of publications consulted on medieval Scotland that 
there is negligible reference to any collaboration regarding projects in Wales, either in 
conjunction with the French or the Welsh.  
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In the 1330s, and probably in response to Edward’s deteriorating relations with the 
French, Wales once more became of interest to England’s continental adversaries. So, to 
further expand those conflict horizons, and to return to the focus of this research, the French 
and their Castilian allies also attempted to draw the Welsh into broader, European conflicts 
on their side, or at least they threatened to open another theatre of conflict on the British 
mainland. While 1338-9 brought the threat of a French-Scots invasion, the same spectre, but 
this time including Castilian support, reappeared in subsequent decades, notably in 1346 and 
1359.
26
  
However, as the peace made at Brétigny faded towards the end of the 1360s, and the 
French gained the initiative in the conflict with England, the prospect of attempted invasions 
of Wales was once again raised with missions in 1369 and 1372.
27
 These expeditions were 
placed under the captaincy of a Welshman, whose grand proclamation, naming himself as 
Prince of Wales and loyal ally of France, merit inclusion in this research.
28
 This third French-
Welsh alliance, this time between the French Crown and a Welsh mercenary captain fighting 
under their colours, saw its fullest fruition with the embarkation of two French invasion 
fleets, ostensibly bound for Wales, in 1369 and 1372. Although both missions were aborted 
or, in the case of 1372, redeployed to support other French operations, these efforts mark the 
first battlefield example of a combined French-Welsh force seeking to act in their mutual 
interests on the British mainland. This engagement of Welsh forces based in France to carry 
out an invasion of Wales, clearly demonstrates an active attempt to project French power 
onto Britain, engaging Welshmen within their strategy. This could readily be identified as 
part of a wider initiative by a France resurgent after Brétigny, to draw allies into the conflict 
with England. French machinations with Owain Lawgoch offer a microcosm of a broader 
strategy which also involved Portugal, Castile and Scotland.
29
 The alliance was between King 
Charles V and Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri, a soldier of Welsh royal lineage, more 
commonly called Owain ‘Lawgoch’.  
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4.2.   The Plans of Charles V and Owain Lawgoch 
Charles V, king of France 1364-80, reigned through a period which saw France recover the 
initiative in its long conflict with England. The broader details of his career need not be 
developed here, except to draw attention to an element of French strategy which became fully 
evident during his reign. While the policy of foreign engagement, diplomatic and military, is 
clear throughout the fourteenth-century, during Charles’s sovereignty a more defined 
overseas strategy is discernible. While the entire range of activities within that policy would 
be worthy of research, this chapter only includes those examples relevant to Wales and, to a 
lesser degree, Scotland and Castile. Of those cited, only two of the numerous real or imagined 
plots to invade Wales are dealt with in any detail because the evidence for them is richer and 
they correlate to the goals of this research. Charles V twice commissioned one of his 
numerous Welsh mercenary captains with the purpose of invading Wales.
30
 Although neither 
fleet arrived in Wales, these events are examples of a revived connection between the Welsh 
and the French, as well as demonstrable efforts to project French power onto Britain.  There 
is no reason to discuss the career of Owain Lawgoch here, save only the relevant years 
between 1369 and 1372.
31
 Although known as Yvain de Galles in France, and Owen 
Rotherick in England, Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri is more commonly called Owain 
‘Lawgoch’. This sobriquet, meaning ‘red hand’, appears to refer to a hand wound earned 
fighting the English on Guernsey in 1372. Owain is remembered as the last direct descendant 
of the house of Gwynedd, his great-uncle was Llewelyn ap Gruffydd and his great-great-
grandfather was Llewelyn ap Iorwerth.
32
  
 
The 1369.  
The build-up to this campaign is situated among the smaller conflicts played out between 
France and England and their allies, 1360-1369. Although these campaigns were largely 
conducted through the actions of free companies in Italy and southern France, English and 
French armies openly fought one another in Spain, Brittany and south-west France.
33
 By 
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1369, the French had recovered much that had been lost at Brétigny. The French-backed 
claimant, Henry de Trastamara, eventually won in Castile, and the victorious English 
candidate in Brittany, Jean de Montfort, paid homage to France.
34
 It is perhaps with these 
gains in mind that they sought to take the conflict to Wales, in order to oblige the English to 
focus on warfare there rather than in French territories or those of her continental allies. By 
probing areas the enemy was obliged to defend, the French demonstrated age-old military 
wisdom.
35
 However, it is also worth considering that having been victorious on the continent, 
the French might have perceived an opportunity to press their power onto the British Isles. 
Owain Lawgoch appears to have been a routier of some distinction and had declared himself 
for France some time in 1369. Other Welshmen came to serve with him in France, most of 
whom defected from service in English armies in France, occasionally turning over castles in 
their keeping to the French. At some point, Lawgoch revived his ancestral claim to the title of 
‘Prince of Wales’.36 
 By 1369, as the French became increasingly confident and successful in the conflict 
with England, they appear to have sought to broaden that action by engaging with the Welsh 
and Scots.
37
 They ordered Lawgoch and his lieutenant, Ieuan Wyn, to muster in Harfleur in 
December 1369 and embark with an army apparently intended for Wales. French records 
reveal that a small force of an indeterminable size but composed of French knights, 
Welshmen, men-at-arms, archers, crossbowmen and French criminals set sail for Wales 
shortly before the end of December that year.
38
 Unsurprisingly, the fleet was defeated by bad 
winter weather in the Channel and returned to port after almost two weeks at sea. Aside from 
the failure of the expedition, the English authorities had been made aware of the venture and 
immediately set about strengthening defences and garrisons to resist that and future 
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invasions. Also, Lawgoch’s supporters in Wales were hunted and one man was convicted of 
treason over the matter.
39
   
The 1369 mission was an extraordinary move on the part of Charles V. Viewed from 
a modern perspective, Wales had been part of England’s dominion since 1283 and therefore 
this appears to be an unprecedented effort to wrest it from England’s grasp. The closer 
examination of the relevant events of the fourteenth-century rendered above shows that 
England’s hold on Wales was not necessarily perceived as firm or legitimate by 
contemporaries. This mission also proves that the French were willing and able to muster and 
despatch forces for such operations with relative ease. This is not just a statement of logistical 
fact, but one of flexibility in their strategic thinking. Wales had probably not featured on their 
diplomatic agenda to any profound degree since the reign of Philip Augustus, so to move on 
an opportunity presented by Owain Lawgoch demonstrates the ability to adapt and exploit 
such occasions; such abilities are critical features of a successful military.
40
 Therefore, it 
might be reasonable to consider that under more favourable conditions, future initiatives 
might fare better. This expedition also demonstrates the faith that Charles V had in Lawgoch, 
that he would put forces under his command so readily. This must indicate therefore that 
Owain had earned the resources spent on this venture not only in the field but with his 
personal comportment among the nobles of the French court with whom he was familiar.
41
 
Had he not been regarded as worthy, it seems unlikely that this proposed invasion would have 
been entertained at the highest court circles necessary to enact it. This also demonstrated to 
the French that they had an asset in Lawgoch who was willing and able to be a thorn in 
England's side. Finally, this event illuminates the notion that the French were willing to 
explore and, potentially, build a relationship with native elements in Wales. This was no 
doubt because it might prove politically and strategically favourable for them to do so, rather 
than for the benefit of any Welsh yearning for independence; nonetheless this was a notable 
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military and psychological step. Although its failure to cross the channel was no doubt a 
setback, though hardly unexpected for a fleet sailing in late December, another expedition 
was prepared three years later. 
 
The 1372. 
Another fleet was mustered under Owain’s command in 1372, and this second of Lawgoch’s 
invasion attempts began with a bold, clear declaration of intent.
42
 The document is 
remarkable for the virulence of the language used and the originality of the claim. This 
appears to be the first occasion since the time of Gruffudd ap Cynan, that anyone had made a 
claim on Wales from exile. Perhaps exile is incorrect; there is no evidence that Owain 
Lawgoch had ever been to Wales.
43
 While Crown forces had fought to overcome native rule 
and then suppress revolts in Wales for perhaps three centuries, this presented a distinctly new 
challenge; preventing a Welsh revolt ignited by an overseas invasion.  
 
Evain de Gales, to all those whom these letters shall come, Greeting. The kings of 
England in past times having treacherously and covetously, tortuously and without cause 
and by deliberate treasons, slain or caused to be slain my ancestors, kings of Wales, and 
others of them have put out of their country, and that country have by force and power 
appropriated and have submitted its people to divers services, the which country is and 
should be mine by right of succession, by kindred, by heritage and by right of decent 
from my ancestors the kings of that country, and in order to obtain help and succour to 
recover that country which is my heritage, I have visited several Christian kings, princes 
and noble lords, and have clearly declared and shown unto them my rights therein and 
have requested and supplicated their aid, and have latterly come unto the most puissant 
and renowned sovereign Charles, by the grace of God king of France, dauphin of Vienne, 
and have shown unto him my right in the aforesaid country and have made unto him the 
aforenamed requests and supplications, and he having had compassion upon my state and 
understanding the great wrong that the kings of England have done unto my ancestors in 
former times, and that the present king of England has done unto me, and of his 
beneficent and accustomed clemency in which he is the singular mirror and example 
amongst Christians of justice, grace and mercy to all those that are oppressed and require 
comforting, has granted me his aid and the assistance of his men-at-arms and fleet in 
order to recover the said realm, which is my rightful heritage, as has been said; know all 
ye, therefore, that in return for the great love that my said lord the king of France has 
shown unto me, and is truly showing by his expenditure of three hundred thousand francs 
of gold, and more, as well in the pay of men-at-arms, archers and arbalesters as in [the 
provision of] ships and the pay and expenses of the sailors, in harness and other matters 
in various expenses, the which sum I am at the present time not able to furnish, I promise 
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loyally and by my faith and oath upon the holy evangelists, touched corporeally by  me, 
and for my heirs and successors for ever, and the aforesaid sum of three hundred 
thousand francs of gold I will return and wholly repay, or my heirs and successors or 
those who may claim through them (ou ceul qui auront cause d’eulx), or by their will or 
command, without any other terms; and I herewith have made and entered into, for me 
my heirs and successors and for all my country and subjects for ever, with my said lord 
the king of France for him and his successors and for all their country and subjects, a 
good and firm treaty, union and alliance, by which I will aid and assist them by my 
person, my subjects and my country, to the utmost power and loyalty against all persons 
alive or dead (contre toutes personnes qui povent vivre et mourir). In witness of which I 
have sealed these letters with mine own seal Given at Paris the 10
th
 day of May, the year 
of grace one thousand three hundred and seventy-two.
44
 
 
This declaration requires only brief analysis here; its stated intentions are clear. It seems 
reasonable to assert that this challenge for Wales was concocted under the aegis of the 
French. Owain could not have made such a statement without prior discussions with them 
and they must have agreed, and perhaps even dictated its clauses. Within it, Owain used the 
devices of nationality and oppression by the English to justify his claim. He also made a case 
for his lineage being legitimate, rather than that of the king of England, whose forebears he 
accused of unjust, treasonous killings of the true rulers of Wales. The fact that he opened with 
a discussion of legitimacy and lineage hints at French influences in the document’s 
composition. In establishing an issue over succession and legitimacy, there is an obvious 
parallel with the English claim to the French throne. Once Owain’s heritage was proclaimed, 
the French could more easily offer open support to a usurped, true, noble claimant rather than 
to a dubious pretender. As a consequence, England was obliged to make military preparations 
to repel this announced attack and also to later move against Owain in France, all of which 
diverted men, energy and resources from campaigns against the French.
45
 This declaration 
also allowed Charles to signal his intent to take the war to the English through a third party. 
According to Owain, this demonstrated that the French were showing the ‘compassion ... 
justice, grace and mercy to all those that are oppressed and requiring comfort’. He also 
alluded to wrongs ‘that the present king of England has done unto me’, referring to the 
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seizure of his lands in 1369. The possible reasons for Owain’s defection are discussed 
elsewhere.
46
  
Other key clauses concern Owain’s ornate flattery of Charles and statement that, 
having discussed the matter with a number of leaders, he intended to invade with French 
forces. Clearly, he had acquired French support for this venture and he swore fealty to France 
for himself, his heirs, his subjects and his country. The next clause appears problematic: he 
acknowledged that he owed the French 300, 000 gold francs and he would make good that 
debt once he had reclaimed Wales. It is worth speculating over potential reasons for including 
mention of this amount of money. For any Welsh audience, the knowledge that they would 
owe the French a large sum of money, that presumably they would have to pay, might prove 
counter-productive to Owain’s cause. It should be borne in mind that despite a few examples 
accusing cross-channel correspondence and a poem of unsure date that invited him to Wales, 
he had no power base or influence there, and there is no evidence of any noteworthy measure 
of support for him there at this time.
47
 At a glance, this might appear a large sum, however 
when the English became aware of this declaration they are likely to have first considered 
what size force this would have afforded Owain. Therefore, it is worth giving air to the idea 
that this declaration aimed to provoke a defensive reaction in Britain, perhaps little more. 
Moreover, it seems clear that this declaration was intended for a French and English 
audience, rather than a Welsh one. 
This second invasion force did not reach Wales either. Lawgoch’s fleet left Harfleur 
in June 1372 and attacked Guernsey, where Owain probably earned his nom de guerre.  
There, the event left notable traces in local sources and folklore.
48
 However, it appears that 
Owain received orders from Charles to go to Castile to procure the Castilian and Genoese 
fleet the French had apparently arranged to join the invasion of Wales. These additional 
components to this grand armada to Wales did not materialise in 1372. However, in July 
Owain and the Castilians made for La Rochelle, where the fleet alleged for Lawgoch was 
mustering. Here, they won a substantial naval victory over the English and also fought for the 
French in the land-campaign in the region that summer.
49
 The 1372 campaign was a great 
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success for the French and their allies, with Owain Lawgoch leading the assault on Soubise 
that finally captured the town, its castle and two illustrious prisoners; Jean de Grailly, the 
Captal de Buch, and the seneschal of Poitou, Sir Thomas Percy. The latter would meet death 
as a prisoner after the battle of Shrewsbury in 1403, a rebel against the king of England 
during the revolt of Glyn Dŵr.50 Owain Lawgoch had played an important role in the 
recapture of Soubise and La Rochelle, and he was feted as a hero in French chronicles.
51
 
However, the campaign drew to a close in late September, although the English captives were 
not handed over or dealt with by the crown until January 1373.
52
 The fighting season for that 
year had gone, and no further attempt was made to raise a fleet to invade Wales in 1372. It 
might be that the campaign in Aunis-Saintonge had always been the military plan for that 
year, and that letting slip news of an invasion of Wales would reach England, causing 
Edward to divert resources on the British mainland. While that position must be considered, 
so must the idea that the French made unexpectedly positive progress, then pressed and 
required support for their attacks under Bertrand du Guesclin around Niort and La Rochelle, 
reacting to the opportunities presented as the campaign unfolded. In brief, superficial 
analysis, the logistical difficulties of communicating campaign successes in mid-west France 
to Paris, then to a fleet at sea in order to radically divert it from its destination to a new 
theatre, appear to support the suggestion that the 1372 was an effective, elaborate deception. 
However, the sources offer conflicting but equally plausible versions of the events in 
question; either that the Spanish were delayed, and Owain assaulted Guernsey while awaiting 
them and then went to find them after plundering the island, or that having failed to finish off 
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resistance within Cornet castle, Lawgoch sought the Spanish force to ask them to return there 
with him to help complete the task.
53
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4.3.   Impact and Aftermath 
The launching of the 1369 fleet drew English resources to Wales to cover the invasion; the 
subsequent investigation revealed a certain level of collaboration within the native 
population. The redeployment of the army of 1372 in western France had an immediate 
impact securing substantial victories for the French king on sea and land; that impressive 
campaign was executed by French, Castilian and Welsh troops. However, the impact of its 
failure to reach Wales is perhaps impossible to assess; there are no French, English or Welsh 
references to the reactions of those involved, except for a Welsh lament.
54
 Also, to only 
attempt to assess the palpable results of these missions would be to miss their wider 
significance. 
 
The repeated threats to invade Wales clearly demonstrate that the idea that it could serve 
French strategic interests had survived Edward I’s invasion. The fleets of 1369 and 1372 
perhaps symbolise the zenith of this strategy prior to the revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr. 
Lawgoch’s fleets also appear to further demonstrate the extent to which the French were 
willing to display their power blatantly to provoke trouble in fourteenth-century Britain. 
While it is tempting to view the repeatedly aborted missions as feints, it is noteworthy that 
this area of exploitation was further threatened by invasion forces borne by joint French-
Castilian fleets in 1373 and 1377, despite an initial element of reluctance on the part of the 
Spanish.
55
 In light of the four proposed invasions of Wales between 1369 and 1377 it is little 
wonder that the English felt compelled to hire assassins to kill Lawgoch.
56
 A Scottish assault 
on Anglesey in 1381 was followed by alleged espionage activities by Castilian agents, 
reconnoitring the castles of south Wales in 1387-8. All these external threats were concurrent 
with a heightened state of tension and violence, including the murder of Crown officials in 
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Wales in the 1380s and the levying of small private forces to settle scores with bloodshed.
57
 
At the same time, a planned invasion of English territory also contained Welsh mercenaries 
raised in France.
58
 This multiplicity of attempts and threats to foment revolt in Wales, or to 
insert invasion forces into it, preferably with native support, demonstrate a clear strategy to 
project French power onto Britain, using Wales as a conduit and probably hoping to engage 
its people as active participants. Such a strategy is consistent with similar French ventures in 
Brittany, Castile, Scotland and Flanders; the Welsh examples offer another branch to that 
policy.
59
 
The Lawgoch expeditions demonstrate that when such a viable opportunity presented 
itself then the French were flexible enough to react and adapt such circumstances to their 
ends. Far from being a defensive or supine enemy, these missions offer an insight into the 
swift reactivity of the fourteenth-century French government that underpinned a strategy that 
explored all possible points of weakness in its English enemy, from the Iberian Peninsula to 
Scotland, and from Wales to Flanders.
60
 Fortune had provided the French with a Welsh noble 
of legitimate royal lineage, they appeared determined to use that connection to its fullest 
extent. This suggests that Owain Lawgoch and his growing corps of Welsh mercenaries was a 
credible force that France could deploy in its own interests and did so in more than one 
theatre. It is also reasonable to identify here the overt use of a ‘cultivate’ policy, with 
Lawgoch’s standing being enhanced to its greatest potential by the French. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that without French development of his claim, Owain ap Thomas ap 
Rhodri might have remained obscure.  
However, this is not to represent the Welsh solely as pawns, much of the 
contemporary Welsh poetry called for a saviour to liberate them.
61
 It is worth questioning the 
notion that Wales was therefore ‘conquered’ in Edward I’s time. This is not founded on any 
emotional or nostalgic attachment to an independently-ruled entity in Wales, but on the cold, 
hard reality of the military environment in Wales after 1283. It is indisputable that Edward I 
defeated Gwynedd and destroyed native rule throughout Wales. However, defeating an 
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enemy and conquering it are entirely different cases. The Welsh revolted repeatedly from 
1283 onwards, as illustrated above, and clearly did not accept that they were conquered. On 
the English side, the military environment of immense fortifications and permanent garrisons 
of varying sizes denotes one of occupation not conquest and settlement. The primary role of 
English castles in Wales was to suppress the natives by dominating the landscape and 
conducting operations from them.
62
 This is not a situation equivalent to a conquered territory, 
but one of occupation. The administrative, legal and economic regimes that were initially 
introduced into Wales by Edward I’s government were clearly not equitable to a transition to 
peace and settlement. Legally and economically privileged, the settlers brought in by the 
Crown remained armed and behind town walls on a war footing, protected and reinforced by 
castles and garrisons. Again, this reflects a state of occupation and suppression, rather than 
denoting the final conquest attributed to Edward that might be supposed without 
consideration.    
This also shows that not only did the French understand the value of the manpower 
they had in their armies, but that their potential to raise a serious revolt in Wales promised 
strategic benefits for France. As such, it was a venture worth pursuing, irrespective of the 
ultimate outcome. It is noteworthy therefore that the French repeatedly selected Wales for 
exploration rather than Ireland or any of the outlying troublesome English counties, for 
example. In addition, this demonstrates that the earlier French-Welsh relationships had 
evolved beyond diplomatic manoeuvring or a participating in a multi-factional alliance, but 
had grown to one of active military collaboration. It is perhaps striking also that implicit in 
the 1372 declaration is the statement that the Welsh were still considered a distinct people, 
despite ninety years of English rule.  Momentary consideration should also be given to the 
notion that this mission was solely a deception to unbalance the English that summer. 
Although unlikely, it would prove the French shrewd adversaries and worthy victors of the 
fighting that summer. It would be an unwise misuse of their power over small nations were it 
simply a ruse, and, were that revealed to have been truly their intention, they might have lost 
Yvain de Galles and his contingents from their service, as well as losing Wales as an area to 
exploit in the future. Other allies would surely have taken note had such mistreatment 
occurred. In addition, the French replayed their intentions to invade on several occasions 
throughout the fourteenth-century. A bluff, once called or covered, ceases to have the same 
value, yet the missions to Wales became more viable and more frequent as the French 
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regained power through the maturing century. On balance, it seems probable that the French 
hoped to develop their options to invade Wales, but in 1372 a closer, higher-value 
opportunity arose that summer that they could not ignore.
63
  
 
However, to pursue the above supposition of this being an elaborate French ruse to a 
fuller extent, this alliance might therefore have offered two main possibilities. Firstly, that it 
was a genuine plan to prise Wales from English clutches – and with perhaps four thousand 
troops as an initial impact force, with more troops being provided by the Welsh propelled into 
rebellion, it was a credible effort.
64
 There can be little doubt that the French would have liked 
to invade Wales and thereby deprived England of its resources, taxes and soldiery. Perhaps 
such an achievement might have permitted a French thrust into England’s western flank, 
visiting the French experience of the Hundred Years’ War on English soil; the destruction of 
fields and towns as well as the terror and disruption such conflict brought. This might have 
been desirable if, realistically, unlikely. 
However, the ongoing policy including Wales might have held other value to the 
French; as an element of a diplomatic ploy or a strategy of deception and reaction.
65
 With the 
former in mind, it would not be inconceivable to envisage the French using this latent threat 
as a bargaining point at a peace conference with the English, with the end-state of agreeing to 
leave Wales to the English Crown in return for concessions on the continent. A strong 
possibility though, is that this entire enterprise was an elaborate deception designed to divert 
and stretch English resources. For it to be a threat sufficient enough to divert English 
manpower, attention and resources, the ploy would have to be convincing. In Lawgoch’s 
case, a second fleet and army under a war captain with a legitimate and, perhaps not 
coincidentally, a recently revived and declared claim to the princely title certainly posed a 
plausible danger. The fact that the English reacted administratively and militarily in Wales to 
both of Lawgoch’s fleets demonstrates the success of the deception, were it so.66 It seems 
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credible to suggest that having been mustered and seen leaving port for England, attacking 
her interests en route and then sailing west down the Channel, that this fleet was intended to 
be reported to the English Crown, and never destined to turn north at Finisterre. Such 
suppositions cannot be proven however, and the overarching strategy to deprive England of 
possession of its closest neighbour appears compelling in the light of France’s repeated 
efforts in the west. 
These two unsuccessful missions to Wales were notable parts of Lawgoch’s story. His 
whole career was of notable interest in French-Welsh medieval relations, perhaps a high point 
from the French perspective. The fact that he was of noble lineage and through his actions he 
was given command and named as a ‘captain-general’ of Charles V’s armies elevates him 
beyond being a mere mercenary leader.
67
  Critically, Owain Lawgoch’s career in France and 
claims to the principality were of great value to Owain Glyn Dŵr. Lawgoch’s attempts to 
reclaim Wales, best exemplified by the stirring 1372 declaration and the two abortive 
invasions, created a precedent for French courtly involvement in ‘post-1283’ Wales. Without 
that, it would have been much more difficult for Glyn Dŵr to attract French support, 
examined in the following chapter. Although Glyn Dŵr’s rebellion proved more successful 
militarily; his claim to the title of ‘Prince of Wales’ was far leaner than that of Lawgoch.  It is 
notable that French chroniclers, particularly le religieux de Saint-Denys, recalled Yvain de 
Galles with fondness and felt that the French still owed him and the Welsh a debt. Owain 
Glyn Dŵr was able to draw on that sentiment to win French support.68 Without French 
involvement in Wales, the Glyn Dŵr revolt would have been markedly different. It would 
certainly be going too far to infer that without Lawgoch there would not have been Glyn 
Dŵr; however it is reasonable to say that the nature of Glyn Dŵr’s relationship with France 
would have been different, and might not have produced the documents or events discussed 
in the subsequent chapter.  
Finally, as referenced above, Owain Lawgoch’s military exploits in France brought 
him, Wales and the Welsh into some of the great French chronicles of the time: those of the 
French kings, Froissart, the Valois dukes, du Guesclin and other royal chronicles and sources 
such as the writings of Christine de Pisan, where they had never previously featured with 
such honour. He was clearly included among the French war-leaders of the time in a treatise 
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on chivalry.
69
 In terms of reviving medieval France’s interest in Wales, the relationship 
between Charles V and Owain Lawgoch was inestimable. Throughout this period, there 
remained a constant fear of native revolt in Wales and, in the closing decades of the century, 
the Welsh also seem to have been anticipating large-scale rebellion.
70
 This stands in contrast 
to Davies’s image of a relatively settled peace descending on Wales during the century, 
although he also identified gathering storm clouds as the fourteenth-century drew to a close.
71
 
In the early years of the fifteenth century, Owain Glyn Dŵr became the leader of a 
widespread revolt which touched all parts of Wales. During those years, the Welsh leader 
sought French aid. Once persuaded of the potential offered by Glyn Dŵr, the French again 
explored the possibilities offered by this latest Welsh rebellion, to the exceptional point of 
landing an expeditionary army in Wales in 1405.
72
 The diplomatic exchange between Owain 
Glyn Dŵr and the court of King Charles VI forms the focus of the next chapter. 
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5.1:     Introduction 
 
‘The diplomatic history of this period is as well-known as it is confused …’1  
 
The considerable series of contacts between Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr took place 
during the Hundred Years’ War and therefore its backdrop was painted by a number of wider 
influences. The three most important were the ongoing conflicts between the crowns of 
England, France and those within their influence or amity, the ecclesiastical schism that 
began in 1378, and the factional struggles within the French court during the debilitating 
illness of the incumbent, Charles VI.
2
  
Neither the course of the struggle between France and England, nor the story of the 
split within the western Church need detailed elaboration here, although elements of both are 
clearly embedded within this discussion. The rupture within the western Church created an 
additional dimension to the conflicts of the time. The existence of two continent-wide papal 
adherences largely deprived the Church of its role as European arbiter and peacemaker. To 
some degree, the schism encouraged competition between all sides which in turn fuelled 
several violent campaigns across Europe.
3
  There is no place here for the wider story of the 
schism and the ebb and flow of its related debates. At certain points however, the effects of 
those religious movements within Europe are fundamental to France’s connection to Wales in 
the early fifteenth century. These are developed where appropriate to this discussion. 
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In addition to the military and ecclesiastical dimensions, there is a strongly political 
element to this last contact studied between medieval France and Wales. The mental infirmity 
of Charles VI created opportunities for nobles seeking to promote their own positions.
4
 The 
government of France had, by the close of the fourteenth century, become a tug-of-war 
between factions led by the dukes of court, particularly those of Burgundy and Orleans.
5
 
Their vying was critical to the events that generated and sustained this Welsh alliance, and 
ultimately sought to revive it several years after its supposed demise.
6
  
 
 While the above establishes the broader backdrop, this chapter will examine a number 
of documents and events. In 1404, a treaty between Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr was 
negotiated, officially acknowledging that the two courts were openly communicating and 
allied. In addition, a military venture was launched that year, with the aim of invading 
Wales.
7
  The following year saw the arrival in Wales of a French-Breton expeditionary army, 
which joined and campaigned with Welsh forces.
8
 It appears that their joint venture also 
intended to encompass a simultaneous rising of English rebels.
9
 When the French-Breton 
army left Wales, perhaps as late as April 1406, it is possible that they carried with them a 
document from Owain, in which he stated his regime’s position on the schism.10 Neither that 
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well-known document nor its consequences have yet received adequate critical analysis.
11
 
Having attempted that, this chapter will challenge the notion that the Glyn Dŵr revolt simply 
withered on the vine. A good deal of evidence demonstrates that it did not. Its eventual 
demise was primarily due to circumstances on the continent which denied it the foreign 
support Glyn Dŵr’s forces came to need to make a sustained military impact against an 
enemy as powerful as England. However, a key factor in the asphyxiating of Glyn Dŵr’s 
Wales was a series of previously unappreciated English diplomatic missions to the continent 
from 1403 onwards.
12
 Those missions are examined below. Glyn Dŵr’s adherents proved 
remarkably resilient, however, and their cause evidently reignited in Wales in 1417, at the 
same moment that French ambassadors evoked the Welsh cause in debates at the Council of 
Constance.
13
  
This remarkable series of events, particularly those in 1404-6, gives flesh to arguably 
the most fertile of the four French-Welsh alliances studied. It seems evident that, given the 
depth of the French-Welsh alliance forged here, and the level of involvement of those two 
nations, their allies and their enemies, this final and most prolific alliance merits inclusion 
within the broader study of the Hundred Years’ War. 
 
The sharper focus of this study necessarily concentrates on the revolt in Wales which began 
in 1399, from which developed the alliance with France.
14
 While the violence in Wales arose 
during a period of truce between England and France, it is evident that other, similar, 
conflicts also started during similar periods of studied peace between the powers, yet those 
crowns, notionally observing a truce, contributed to the denouement and resolution of each 
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struggle. While campaigns in Brittany and Castile are recognised as additional theatres 
forming part of the broader conflict, this episode involving Wales, to date, is not.
15
 The 
revolution which transformed Henry Bolingbroke from duke of Hereford into King Henry IV 
of England requires only this passing reference.
16
 Perhaps the two main points of note 
connecting that event to this research are the effects Bolingbroke’s revolt had on English 
relations with the French and the Welsh. Regarding the former, it led to the gradual erosion of 
the twenty-eight year truce that Richard II had concluded with Charles VI in 1396, and 
eventually culminated with Henry V’s invasion of Normandy in 1415.17 In the immediate 
aftermath of Henry IV’s accession, Anglo-French relations took a severe downturn, 
nominally over the perceived mistreatment of Princess Isabella, Richard’s widow, however, 
other factors were also at play.
18
 It is perhaps little wonder that English nobles associated 
with Richard’s regime were to turn rebellious against their new king who had Richard killed 
and replaced them with his supporters and kinsmen.
19
 Henry’s actions however turned Louis, 
duke of Orleans, a former ally at the French court, into a sworn enemy who challenged Henry 
to a duel over the treatment of his niece.
20
  
French government policy was mediated by the chiaroscuro within the factional 
struggles of the French court; these have been simplistically portrayed globally as the dispute 
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between Burgundy and Orleans.
21 
The latter became better known as the Armagnacs during 
the ensuing civil war. The environment in which their well-known dispute grew was far more 
complex and replete with the subtle consideration and balancing of myriad concerns than a 
simple duel between the heads of two dominant factions. The more relevant factors of this are 
developed in the appropriate places below; however, the dynamics of the power relations of 
the time have largely been passed off as Burgundian or Orleanist which, at this early stage of 
the power struggle, is one-dimensional. It is worth briefly highlighting the profound depths of 
this matter here. The dominant movement of the time is therefore identified as the struggle 
between the dukes of Orleans and Burgundy, whereas in fact they were simply the most overt 
protagonists. The struggle was for power, and therefore all elements of the court and 
government were engaged. In the first place, while present and alert, the king, Charles VI, 
was the undisputed head of state from 1388. His position went unchallenged and his 
pronouncements were enacted.
22
 However, he was accessible to the influence and advice of 
those closest to him; the dukes of court. To define that group; his uncles, the dukes of Anjou, 
Berry and Burgundy, his maternal uncle, the duke of Bourbon, and his younger brother whom 
he made duke of Orleans in 1392 at the age of twenty-one.
23
 Within these groups there was a 
generally accepted, though little exposed, hierarchy. For example, Bourbon looked to Anjou 
as their suzerain below the king.
24
 The other great magnates; the duke of Brittany, the king of 
Navarre or the southern counts of Armagnac or Foix, along with other notable families, were 
less powerful or engaged in this struggle than the royal dukes named here. Although all were 
interconnected in a variety of ways, the lesser families escape further elaboration here. The 
governing dukes inevitably sought to secure the king’s commands in their favour, which 
naturally caused competition between them.
25
 However, the nature of Charles’s illness caused 
intermittent, unpredictable periods where the king slipped in and out of lucidity, each time for 
indeterminate periods. This created the innately unstable ground on which the rest of these 
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issues played out. During periods of the kings illness, euphemistically referred to as his 
‘absences’, the dukes directed affairs.26 Since none had a dominant claim to rule, they 
competed. Initially, the dukes of Burgundy and Berry ran affairs as they had done in the 
decade of Charles’s minority, with Louis, duke of Bourbon also playing a role in 
government.
27
 Of these, Philip the Bold, duke of Burgundy, was dominant despite being 
younger than John of Berry. Although this was perhaps primarily due to his force of 
character, it was certainly aided by the influence granted by the immense wealth earned from 
his territorial possessions in Flanders and Burgundy.
28
 In theory, Philip also governed 
Brittany for a period during the minority of Duke Jean V, which ended on 24 December 
1403.
29
  
The elevation of the king’s brother, Louis, to the duchy of Orleans in 1392, and regent 
designate from 1393, plainly posed a challenge to the contemporary established order.
30
 This 
royally-proclaimed ‘right’ to rule, as well as Louis’s ambitious personality, made inevitable a 
conflict for power with those who governed in the king’s stead.31 For the best part of two 
decades, Duke Philip was the major force in France’s government. He was able to overcome 
the ‘Marmousets’, the government of Charles V’s royal councillors summoned to rule by 
Charles VI in 1388, and for much of the next decade he was able to counter and contain the 
rising influence of the duke of Orleans.
32
 By 1398 perhaps, Louis had become a match for his 
aged uncle, and his attempts to wrest power from Philip form the basis of the power struggle 
described below which, at a certain point, saw the reach of French influence extend to Glyn 
Dŵr’s Wales.  
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However, as the maps below demonstrate, the landscape was not simply made up of 
two power blocks.
33
 This shows the jigsaw of territories held in eastern and northern France 
by the dukes of Orleans and Burgundy by 1407. The unmarked lands on this map were held 
by the French crown and other nobles, all of whom had their own interests and ambitions, and 
were not simply pawns of the two warring houses. Vaughan’s map reveals the proximity, 
even interconnectivity of the lands of Berry, Bourbon, Normandy and Milan, to these areas of 
focal interest to Burgundy and Orleans. The adherence of territories and nobles was still fluid, 
even those thought to belong to one faction or another. Certain of these acquisitions were 
either new, such as Louis’s purchase of Luxemburg in 1402, or were frequently rebellious 
and required military suppression, such as Burgundian Flanders.
34
 Such territories were at 
risk of being lost to native elements or prised away by an enemy in a conflict. Equally, since 
they had their own interests to preserve, allies could not always be counted on. With their 
own priorities and survival as paramount concerns, they were potentially susceptible to 
reducing the vigour of their factional support, becoming neutral or perhaps changing 
allegiance, when faced with seduction or destruction by a larger faction. These maps 
therefore show a snapshot of alliances and power relations at a given time, in a given region, 
and little more stable can be presumed.  
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Map 11: Territorial interests in north-eastern France. Sources: (Left) B. Schnerb, Les 
Armagnacs et Les Bourguignons, la Maudite Guerre, (Paris: Perrin, 2009), 18 ; (Right) 
Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, viii.  
 
This mosaic of territorial adherences and unstable amities could be redrawn across the 
whole of France, illuminating the difficulties faced by the contemporary protagonists and 
those who have later sought to describe these events. These shifting allegiances can be 
characterised by the actions of the other great ducal factions. To take the example of Bourbon 
and Berry, they can be seen to withdraw amity from the Burgundians for a time after 1407, 
but then as Philip’s heir, Jean sans Peur, seized and controlled the government, and normal 
governmental processes resumed, for a short period thereafter they can be seen engaging with 
the crown policies, guided by Jean.
35
 In addition, there were positive military connections 
between these princes of the blood. Jacques de Bourbon had accompanied Jean sans Peur on 
the disastrous crusade that was crushed at Nicopolis in 1396 and remained within his amity 
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his whole life.
36
 In 1405, to some degree, the forces of Bourbon and Berry interposed their 
own troops between those of Orleans and Burgundy to prevent further internecine 
bloodshed.
37
 In so doing, they held the gates of Paris against a feared attack by Orleanist 
armies, by consequence protecting the Burgundians inside.
38
 After Louis’s murder by 
Burgundian agents in 1407, most sided with the Orleanist faction.
39
 However, during the later 
government of Jean sans Peur, 1418-1419, elements of both ducal branches benefitted from 
his patronage, and both parties were also ‘rebels’ against his rule, as Burgundian records 
described them.
40
 When the civil war erupted anew with the murder of Jean, and his 
successor allied himself with England, the dukes can plainly be identified in opposition to 
Burgundian policy and evidently took the side of the loyalist forces led by the Armagnacs.
41
 
Therefore, identifying Berry and Bourbon as necessarily adhering to one faction or the other 
seems simplistic. It should be acknowledged that these families controlled states of their own 
within France; they held their own ducal courts, run by their own administrations.
42
 Their 
priorities were firstly to act in their own interests and in those which they perceived most 
benefitted the government of France. Where their interests conformed to those of the 
protagonists apparently intent on warring with one another, they are viewed as aligned with 
that faction. As the conflict played out, the larger part of both families can be identified 
within the Armagnac camp. However individual figures still made choices; Jacques de 
Bourbon certainly remained close to Burgundy.
43
 To blur the boundaries yet further, military 
commanders and clerics easily identifiable as adhering to one of the two main factions also 
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worked together on government projects. Good examples of this are given below in regards 
to the diplomatic agreements and military cooperation with Owain Glyn Dŵr. Therefore, the 
opposing factions still functioned together for much of the period studied here although the 
dramatic rupture in their relations in November 1407 held serious consequences for the 
Welsh as well as for the governance of France.
44
 
The interests of the other estates can also be seen within this spectrum of nobles vying 
for dominance. The French Church and universities actively debated a remedy to the 
ecclesiastical trauma of the time, the Great Schism, and advanced its preferred solution. 
Consensus proved difficult to achieve and maintain, and so that choice changed throughout 
the period as the Church factions also sought supremacy within the ecclesiastical sphere. At 
times, the opinions of the leading Church personalities concurred with those of the temporal 
princes, which has led to them being labelled as being of one faction or another. To a degree, 
this is accurate, but as with the dukes of Bourbon and Berry, the Church and the universities 
can also be seen to act in the interests of the French Church and government, as they 
perceived it at that time. Those who held administrative posts within the ducal governments 
can more safely be issued a firm factional adherence, but it seems reasonable to suggest that 
the majority of clergymen put the Church and the king before their other, lesser, temporal 
patrons. The ebb and flow of the ecclesiastical arguments at this time gave rise to 
Gallicanism, an ideology which privileged the needs of the French Church and state above 
papal demands.
45
 The merchant classes, particularly in Paris, also made their desires and 
feelings known, whether through parliamentary protest or violent urban revolt.
46
 
Other political currents also affected contemporary government, notably the 
‘Marmousets’ so despised by nobles such as Philip of Burgundy. The aegis of government by 
often low-born councillors was an anathema to Duke Philip.
47
 Nevertheless, this regime of 
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rational men directing affairs for the benefit of the state, especially its finances, won 
popularity in some quarters and represented a seismic event in the gradual evolution from 
whimsical, corrupt governance by the nobility toward the impersonal rule of a modern state 
run by professional administrators.
48
  
In addition, there were two extra-national elements to the factional interplay of the 
dukes of court. The first involved those matters in which the French actively sought and 
could clearly influence; the second was the movements of the time touching many nations. 
French ducal families married into the equivalent lines of neighbouring countries and so 
adopted the issues and alignments of their spouses. In some cases these issues were imported 
right to the heart of French government. Charles VI’s bride, Isabeau of Bavaria, was grateful 
to Philip of Burgundy for arranging their marriage. This is forwarded in places as the reason 
for their sharing certain political aims.
49
 Isabeau’s Bavarian family, the Wittelsbach, also held 
a firm connection to Bernabò Visconti, who was her grandfather and had been the ruler of 
Milan.
50
 Bernabò’s nephew, Giangaleazzo Visconti, tricked, seized and deposed Bernabò in 
1385 in a coup d’état. The new count of Milan, who was eventually made duke, had Bernabò 
imprisoned where he died shortly after; many of his supporters and sons soon followed him 
to the grave.
51
 In 1389, Louis of Orleans married Giangaleazzo’s daughter, Valentina, thereby 
creating a conflict at the highest level of French society, even though none of the French had 
been directly involved in the affair’s denouement.52 Further strata comprising a highly 
complex web of alliances, friendships and mutual interests also affected all of the factions 
and figures involved. Perhaps the simplest examples to advance here involve Burgundy. As 
the ruler of Flanders since 1384, the duke of Burgundy’s financial interests were inextricably 
linked to the region’s wool trade with England.53 War between France and England was 
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likely to be financially detrimental to the Burgundians therefore. By 1402, Louis of Orleans 
acquired Luxemburg and forged alliances with Guelders and Juliers, effectively imposing a 
territorial block between Burgundian estates in Flanders and Brabant to the north and 
Burgundy and Lorraine to the south. While this might well have been perceived by the 
Burgundians as aggressive, and relevant to their adversarial relationship within France, it also 
gave both factions a stake in Imperial matters. Each supported opposing imperial candidates, 
Wenceslas or Rupert, during the early years of the fifteenth century. Their choice of allies can 
in turn be seen to be mirrored in this struggle, where each faction created alliances with the 
higher nobility across Europe to their own benefit.
54
 These widespread alliances were also 
relevant to relations between Charles’s government and Glyn Dŵr.   
Of wider import, of course, were the great issues and events of their period. Power 
relations between nations and neighbours were naturally part of the ongoing challenges of the 
time. Therefore the usual issues of economics, security and alliances shaped the political 
decisions of all nations. The issue of the Great Schism further strained relations across 
Europe. As powerful magnates in their own right, as well as being involved in the direction of 
the French government, the dukes of court were touched by all of these affairs.  
Therefore, to represent this conflict as one between Orleans and Burgundy seems 
facile, but nevertheless convenient, bearing in mind this proviso. While those dukes headed 
the most aggressively engaged factions, they appear to have held sway when able to 
sufficiently influence the other parties mentioned here. It is the shifting pattern of dominance 
in the struggle between the leading French dukes, supported by a range of political, 
economic, ecclesiastical and continental concerns that formed French government policy 
during the years in question. Where relevant to this French-Welsh alliance, those relations are 
developed in the appropriate places below.  
 
Of course, these events in England and France helped propel to wider prominence Owain 
Glyn Dŵr who, prior to 1399, had led a relatively respectable, though largely unremarkable 
life.
55
 His early years can be characterised for the purposes of this study as having been raised 
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in north-east Wales, educated at the Inns of Court in London with other young noblemen, and 
loyally serving in English armies on at least three occasions before retiring from public life 
by 1388, while probably still in his late twenties.
56
 Although lauded in certain poems in the 
final decade of the fourteenth century for his lineage, wealth and courage in battle, at least 
one appears to criticise him for his lack of leadership in a time the poet Gruffudd Llwyd 
perceived as a one of dire Welsh need.
57
 When revolt in Wales erupted in the summer of 
1399 Glyn Dŵr does not appear to have been involved.58 In fact, his name does not appear in 
the records until the close of the following year, and even then, he is listed as one among 
many. Blanket terms litter the first records of the government reaction to investigate, suppress 
and pardon ‘treasons in North and South Wales’ committed by ‘divers evildoers in South 
Wales’ and ‘divers men in North Wales (who) have risen in insurrection’.59 It appears that as 
Crown intelligence on the violence grew, the names of the most evident culprits emerged 
before that of Owain Glyn Dŵr. Only one north Wales rebel, ‘Rhys Kiffyn’, was sought 
through the issue of a commission of arrest, even though he was named at the same time as 
Glyn Dŵr.60 Another arrest warrant was made for two rebels in the south, ‘John Filz Pieres 
and Maurice ap Meweryk’.61 The fact that none was issued for Owain Glyn Dŵr suggests that 
he was not initially the most prominent rebel, even in his home region. Owain first appeared 
in the records on 7 October 1400, and even then he is associated with ‘others of North 
Wales’.62 Although Glyn Dŵr, among others, was clearly implicated in the attack on Ruthin 
in September 1400, there is no connection between him and early acts of rebellion in south-
west Wales in 1399, north-west Wales in 1400 or south-east Wales in 1401.
63
 Even 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10816, [Accessed 6 Nov 2011]. 
56
 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 18-27; Davies, Revolt, 144-50; Ll. Smith, ‘Glyn Dŵr, Owain (c.1359–c.1416)’, ODNB. 
57
 R. Loomis, and D. Johnston, Medieval Welsh Poems, An Anthology (Binghampton: Center for Medieval and 
Early Renaissance Studies, 1992), 115-7; D. Johnston, trans., Iolo Goch: Poems (Llandysul: Gomer, 1993), 34-8. 
58
  J. Webb, ed. and trans., ‘Translation of a French metrical history of the deposition of King Richard the 
Second with a copy of the original’, by J. Creton’, Archaeologia, 20 (1824), 1-433, specifically 104- 6, 113; 
Williams, Chronicque de la Traïson et Mort de Richart Deux roy Dengleterre, 211-2; Clarke and Galbraith, ‘The 
Deposition of Richard II’, 125-81; Given-Wilson, Chronicles of the Revolution, 137-52, 155; Bennett, ‘Richard II 
and the Wider Realm’, in Goodman, and Gillespie, Richard II, The Art of Kingship, 199. 
59
 CPR 1399-1401, 357, 470, 518, 554, 555. 
60
 CPR 1399-1401, 555. 
61
 CPR 1399-1401, 520. 
62
 CPR 1399-1401, 555. 
63
 CPR, 1399- 1401, 518, 520; M. D. Legge, Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1941), no. 
228, 294-5; G. A. Sayles, ed., Coram Rege Roll, no. 560 (Easter 1401), m. 18 (crown)., Publications for the 
Selden Society, Vol 88, , ‘Select Cases in the Court of the King's Bench under Richard II, Henry IV and Henry V' 
(London: Selden Society, 1971), 114-7; Given-Wilson, Chronicles of the Revolution, 36 – 7, 155; Davies, Revolt, 
 193 
 
considering those rebels named in his home region for ‘treasons’, ‘insurrections’ or 
‘rebellion’ in north-east and central north Wales, Owain is but one name among dozens.64                
In light of that, it is worth momentarily pondering whether there were political 
motives behind the land forfeiture of the leading Welsh nobles, Glyn Dŵr and the Tudor 
brothers, for a new English monarch in need of gifts with which to reward those who 
supported his apparently unforeseen accession to the throne the previous year. That 
denunciation took place without recourse to appeal or a hearing for any of the accused. 
Moreover, the subsequent, rapid award of Glyn Dŵr’s territories to Henry IV’s recently 
legitimised half-brother, John Beaufort, then earl of Somerset, as early as 8 November 1400, 
suggests more a case of identifying a convenient scapegoat than one of recognition of 
Owain’s role as a leader of rebels.65 The gifting of territories to Beaufort was shrewd on 
Henry’s part; this made him the distributor of patronage to his father’s other family, and 
therefore the senior noble in that relationship. Henry’s legitimacy to accede to the throne was 
questioned within Britain and France; the grant of Glyn Dŵr’s estates to Beaufort neutralised 
one potential rival for the throne at the expense of a retired Welsh squire.
66
 The other Welsh 
leaders exempted from the pardons of November 1400, the Tudors, took firm military action 
against the crown. In April 1401, Gwilym ap Tudor led a force that took and held the fortress 
at Conwy from where he negotiated a pardon, while his brother Rhys appears to have joined 
Glyn Dŵr in the wilds. Henry Percy junior was commissioned to treat with both Tudors ‘and 
others’ in north Wales, but pardons were only issued to ‘Willym ap Tudor’ and thirty four 
others, presumably his force at Conwy.
67
 
Faced with the unappealing options of a hard and probably short life in hiding, 
surrendering and most likely being executed or mounting a seemingly impossible campaign 
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against the crown and government of England, Owain Glyn Dŵr chose the latter, to the 
eternal benefit of his reputation. His successes proved to be the most surprising and 
unforeseen element of the first years of fifteenth-century Britain. Nevertheless, French 
ambitions for the English throne coincided with and eventually abetted Owain’s campaign, 
and their joint aspirations led to the diplomatic and military contacts which culminate this 
thesis.   
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5.2:    Treaty of Alliance, 1404 
Any examination of this first overt documentary exchange must address the reasons behind 
the two sides seeking one another’s support. In the case of the 1404 alliance treaty between 
Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr, its origins are to be found in the currents within French 
elites; the Church, university and courtly factions. Although their historic manoeuvrings are 
interconnected with events that shaped their relations over decades, for this example it seems 
sufficient to isolate events related to the schism of 1378 and, bearing in mind the proviso 
raised earlier regarding the complexity of the courtly struggle, the adversarial relations which 
will be reluctantly characterised as those between the houses of Orleans and Burgundy.  
 The establishment and maintenance of the papacy in Avignon from 1305 onwards 
provided a root cause of the schism of 1378. Principally, the relocation of the Curia was 
forced by the threat to the papacy posed by violent instability within the Italian city states, 
along with intermittent conflicts which saw German armies overrun parts of northern Italy as 
well as further difficulties emanating from Naples.
68
 While in Avignon, the papacy enjoyed 
physical security for much of the rest of the fourteenth century. This stability enabled it to 
reform its governmental procedures and construct an efficient administration that transformed 
papal finances.
69
 Another factor was that during the second half of the thirteenth century, 
France and the papacy had developed increasingly close ties. This resulted in a rise in French 
influence in the Curia which, perhaps inevitably, led to a succession of Frenchmen ascending 
the papal throne. While it might be incorrect to claim that France controlled the papacy for 
three-quarters of the fourteenth century, its preponderant influence over it is undeniable. 
Naturally, given the papal role as arbiter, its bestowal of official appointments across Europe 
and its emergence as a growing financial entity, other powers came to resent France’s hold on 
the papacy.
70
 Although several popes based in Avignon attempted to return to Italy during the 
fourteenth century, endemic political instability and periodic warfare prevented the 
realisation of those desires. This came to a head in 1378 when the Pope Gregory XI died in 
the process of returning the papacy to Rome, under threat from the Italians that they would 
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elect a pope of their own if he did not restore the Holy See to Rome. In what might have been 
a temporary measure to appease the Roman mob, the subsequent conclave elected the 
archbishop of Bari, Bartolomeo Prignano – not even a cardinal – as Pope Urban VI. One 
faction of the Cardinalate returned to Avignon and duly elected Robert of Geneva, connected 
by blood to the French royal house, as Pope Clement VII. The schism was born, with a 
Roman and an Avignonese pontiff, and Europe’s states aligned themselves into the Urbanist 
or Clementist factions. Largely, this can be defined as France, her Spanish allies and Scotland 
falling into Clement’s obedience, while England, the Italian states north of Naples and much 
of the empire supported Urban.
71
 These powers encouraged others to support their candidate, 
and the issue of papal adherence became a factor cited when seeking allies or denouncing 
enemies. Many of the geo-political alliances and amities existed prior to 1378, so it would be 
an overstatement to suggest that these loose continent-wide alliances began to form because 
of the schism; nevertheless it became an evident factor in political considerations. While the 
issue of the papal candidates was overtly relevant to the Pennal Declaration of 1406, it can 
also be tied to other French expansions, such as into Flanders and Castile in the 1380s, but 
perhaps more particularly into Italy. The clearest examples of this were Savona in 1394 and 
Genoa in 1396, where a condition of French support was Genoese allegiance to the French 
papal candidate.
72
 Although this issue appeared to be an ecclesiastical matter, its use in 
France’s efforts to extend its power, into Genoa and Wales for example, demonstrate that the 
schism was undeniably linked to the politics of the day.  
 It was the personalities within the French courtly factions, their conflicts, drives and 
machinations which were of primary importance in the evolution of this Welsh alliance. 
Although the proclamations and debates within university and church circles supported or 
undercut the struggles of the noble factions, as well as influencing the crown’s position on the 
schism, the leading role in this Welsh alliance appears to fall to the temporal princes. Their 
                                                          
71
 Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 61-77; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 45; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The 
Avignon Papacy, 66-74; Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy, 164-6; Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 1-40; P. 
F. Ainsworth and G. T. Diller, eds., Jean Froissart, Chroniques: Livre I et Livre II (Paris: Librairie Générale 
Française, 2001),  737-43. 
72
 BNF J516. 29.; Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 106-8, 194-5; Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, xxxii-
iii, 42-54, 85-99; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 7; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 28, 45-6, 55; D. Lalande, 
ed., Le Livre Des Fais Du Bon Messire Jehan Le Maingre, Dit Boucicaut, Mareschal De France et Gouverneur De 
Jennes (Geneva: Droz, 1985), 181-4, 299-313; D. Lalande, Jean II le Meingre, Dit Boucicaut (1366-1421), Etude 
d’une Biographie Héroïque (Geneva : Droz, 1988), 97-101, 128-35.  
 197 
 
actions clearly comprise an expansionist military and diplomatic foreign policy.
73
 This drive 
saw French influence spread into Flanders, Scotland, and throughout Italy. It also enaged the 
forces of nations supporting rival popes and saw conflict brought to the heart of the French 
court, caused by the marriages of Charles VI and Louis of Orleans whose spouses brought 
their families’ rivalries to Paris.74 
The divisions between the French hierarchy ran deep on foreign policy matters and 
even on the issue of the church; the Orleanists favoured the via facti, the Burgundians the via 
cessionis, while the French Church and the influential University of Paris tended towards the 
via cessionis as a first step towards the via concilii, although the clergy oscillated between 
positions.
75
 These rivalries can be seen to be played out in the directions taken by the French 
government, notably in its stance over the schism and its relationship with England. When 
Duke Philip inherited Flanders in 1384 his attitude towards England was strongly mediated 
by his economic interests which were then firmly connected to the Anglo-Flemish wool 
trade.
76
 While France and England discussed peace, and Richard II in particular sought a 
rapprochement with Paris, the French nobles’ positions on England were less of a point of 
friction.
77
 Nevertheless, the disputes over the schism and the governance of the kingdom 
during the king’s illness were sufficient to accentuate the rift between Burgundy and Orleans. 
The course of these disputes can be mapped out in line with the preferences of the head of the 
government.  
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 The schism of 1378 provoked a wide range of problems, not the least of which were 
reactions against the orthodoxy dictated by the two papal factions. In England, John Wyclif’s 
works became increasingly popular and gave rise to the Lollard movement, and consequently 
encouraged the rise of the Hussites in Bohemia.
78
 In France, most of the French nobility, led 
by Louis of Anjou, king of Naples, Louis of Orleans and the French king, when lucid, 
demonstrated a firm adherence to Clement VII and, initially, to his successor Benedict XIII. 
In contrast, the French clergy appeared determined to show a measure of independence by 
debating the matter.
79
 Royal commands suppressing ecclesiastical debate were relaxed in 
time, and the notion of subtracting allegiance from the Avignon pope gained prominence.
80
 
Benedict was from Aragon and a seemingly abrasive character, and friction soon arose 
between him and the French, aiding the campaign to abandon him in the pursuit of healing 
the rift in the church.
81
 In tandem, Philip of Burgundy controlled the government; he 
envisaged a different path for France. In 1398 therefore the French withdrew their allegiance 
and sent troops to besiege Benedict at Avignon.
82
 The fact that the besieging army was 
commanded by Geoffrey de Boucicaut, the marshal’s brother, stands as another indication of 
the party directing the French court at that time. Perhaps to underline this Burgundian 
domination of court, rebellious vassals across the southern lands most often associated with 
Louis of Orleans’s hegemony were brought to heel by royal armies lead by Marshal 
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Boucicaut.
83
 However, by 1402 Louis had assumed lead of the government, during which 
time he and his ally, Waleran, comte de St Pol, issued personal challenges to Henry IV, and a 
more aggressive policy towards England was defined.
84
 Consequently, the crown’s position 
on the schism also changed; the siege of Avignon was eased and finally lifted in 1403 after 
Benedict’s escape into the hands of Robert de Braquemont, a Norman Orleanist, was effected 
in March of that year.
85
 French obedience to Benedict XIII resumed in May 1403 while court 
and government were directed by Louis. Although he never returned to Avignon, Benedict 
retained staunch Orleanist support, which benefitted his cause while they remained in control 
in Paris.
86
 Although Louis’s dominance only lasted a few short years, this provided the 
window of opportunity exploited by both sides in this French-Welsh alliance. The Orleanist 
ascendancy forms the critical backdrop to the connection with Owain Glyn Dŵr and they 
appear to have wasted no time in undertaking joint actions.  
 
However, this is not to represent Owain Glyn Dŵr as an Orleanist creation; he had come to 
wider prominence by virtue of his military successes and diplomatic efforts. By the end of 
1402, Owain had won small but notable military successes at Hyddgen and Radnor in June 
and August 1401, as well as at Ruthin in April the following year, where he defeated and 
took prisoner his local enemy, Lord Grey.
87
 Shortly after, Henry IV paid a substantial ransom 
to secure Grey’s release.88 On 22 June 1402, Owain’s forces defeated an English army in 
open battle at Bryn Glas. Its commander, Edmund Mortimer, acting earl of March, was 
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captured.
89
 Possibly due to the theoretically superior Mortimer claim to the English throne, 
Henry refused to pay the earl’s ransom, which offended certain nobles, such as Henry Percy 
junior, Edmund’s brother-in-law.90 Inevitably, this caused Mortimer to turn rebel, altering the 
value of Bryn Glas beyond simply a fine military victory – the largest English force between 
Bristol and Chester had been brutally massacred – and making it a success with a more 
profound potential. Mortimer’s ancestry entitled him to a more direct claim to the English 
throne than the incumbent Henry, although Edmund’s two nephews, who were minors, were 
senior to him in that respect. The adherence of a senior English noble, in genealogical terms 
at least, offered the possibility of recruiting those loyal to him and those opposed to Henry, 
but unwilling to side with any non-English power.  In time, it might also offer an opportunity 
to the French to acquire and advance a legitimate candidate to oppose Henry. A few months 
after capture, Mortimer appealed to his tenants and the border gentry to support his cause, 
which he couched in pro-Ricardian terms.
91
 Bryn Glas also proved to be one of the key 
triggers for the collapse of the English administration of Wales; tax revenues and judicial 
functions withered in its aftermath.
92
 Although the English hold over Wales was not entirely 
relinquished, it was reduced to near irrelevance at that time. Although not all coastal and 
border castles were taken or besieged, they no longer functioned in their designated purposes. 
Their military roles of controlling their locality or conducting punitive operations against the 
Welsh clearly ceased. A number of them were taken by assault or the towns in their lee were 
destroyed, demonstrating that even their basic protective function was compromised by Glyn 
Dŵr.93 Simultaneously, their administrative uses declined rapidly; legal and tax roles were no 
longer fulfilled. It might be fair to conclude that by 1404, the castles represented only a 
financially draining presence within Wales.     
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French sources identified revolts against Bolingbroke’s accession as being pro-Ricardian 
counter-revolutions.
94
 While that was the case with the Epiphany rising in 1400, and the 
Percy revolt of 1403 evoked Richard’s name, it would be incorrect to label the violence in 
Wales as such. The repeated revolts of senior nobles opposed to Henry demonstrated 
significant points of discontent among England’s elite.95  
 Before Glyn Dŵr had clearly established his noble credentials and openly 
demonstrated his military worth, initial contacts between him and Charles VI were 
understandably clandestine. No record of direct diplomatic initiatives between the two has 
come to light in any known source pre-dating 1404. Evidence describing their early military 
co-ordination emerges from English sources; it therefore seems possible that other related 
evidence lies undisturbed in French archives. Letters written by Owain prior to 1404 show 
that he was actively seeking overseas aid, as well as communicating with influential men in 
Wales.
96
 Although this evidence shows Owain sought Scots and Irish help as early as 1401, 
cross-Channel connections are more elusive, yet evident. Four good examples stand out from 
the years 1401–3. The first, from late 1401, details the capture of a Welsh crusader taken at 
sea, allegedly acting as an envoy sent by the French court to Scotland to press a case for 
supporting Owain. This appears to be corroborated by an entry in the Chancery Rolls.
97
  
Moreover, excellent first-hand evidence from 1401 describes a 500-strong force of 
Welshmen in the personal service of Louis of Orleans around Paris. 
 
‘One could already perceive the warning signs of the civil war. An undisciplined band of 
around five hundred Welshmen, without order or leader, who had abandoned the keep of 
several places in Guyenne under the pretext that they had not been paid their wages, had 
lived off pillage for a year and a half in the diocese of Paris without meeting any 
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opposition because these scoundrels claimed they were authorised by the duke of 
Orléans’.98  
 
Intriguingly, in 1403, Breton and French troops landed near Kidwelly and joined with 
Welsh rebels led by Henry Don assaulting the castle there.
99
 Glyn Dŵr had written to Henry 
Don inviting him to join his cause.
100
 This multi-national force cannot conceivably have been 
raised, joined and brought to the same battlefield in west Wales without prior agreement. This 
extension of the conflict to Britain’s coastline matched the martial success the French had 
enjoyed against English possessions in France, such as the capture of Mortagne and several 
places in the Limousin such as Corbefin.
101
 
Within a similar timeframe, throughout 1403 and early 1404, French, Breton and 
Castilian forces were particularly aggressive in the Channel region. During these ventures 
Dartmouth was taken and burned by the Bretons in early 1404, where one of their most 
renowned leaders, Guillaume du Châtel, fell in battle on English soil. Significantly, English 
sources recorded Welshmen among the captured Breton troops and crews.
102
 Concurrently, a 
France-based sea captain named Jean d’Espagne attacked Caernarfon and Harlech from the 
sea in late 1403 and early 1404, landing French troops to assist the Welsh who were laying 
sieges there.
103
 These highly significant events, although noted elsewhere, have passed 
largely without comment or contextualisation. As with the attack on Kidwelly, such co-
operation cannot have happened without prior discussion, agreement and possibly 
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reconnoitring, and most probably with guidance from men familiar with those waters and 
lands. Later evidence showed that seafarers from Wales had almost certainly acted as pilots 
and guides for the French fleets.
104
 In riposte, English fleets took reprisals on Brittany’s 
coastal villages.
105
 
 
Although they bore no official endorsement, it seems highly unlikely that they sailed without 
official awareness or covert sanction. Indeed, these missions, when viewed as an ensemble, 
suggest that a campaign to wrest Wales from Henry was already being implemented. Given 
the strength of the French and the Bretons it would obviously be beneficial for Glyn Dŵr to 
win their friendship. Teasingly suggestive traces of other men, probably Welshmen serving in 
Brittany, surface in the ducal financial accounts during this period.
106
 
Jean d’Espagne’s voyages would certainly have imparted to the French important 
logistical information on the scale of the tasks faced in Wales. They would then have been 
precisely aware of the distances and hazards between their home ports and possible target 
areas. In addition they had experienced the speed and size of the English naval response to 
threats in the west. It is notable that ships from Bristol had unsuccessfully hounded Jean 
d’Espagne; for his flotilla appears to have remained in the waters around north Wales for 
months after, possibly into 1405.
107
 It was probably these troops who jointly cleared 
Anglesey of English forces in perhaps just one bloody encounter.
108
 The substantial 
intelligence gained from these joint campaigns would have been of notable value for French 
fleet preparations in subsequent years.  
 
Therefore, the French, Bretons and Castilians were demonstrably engaged with the Welsh 
rebels after Louis of Orleans came to prominence at court and prior to signing the treaty in 
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summer 1404. It might be accurate to view the revolt led by Glyn Dŵr, by this point, as 
escalating beyond a peasant movement based in the Welsh uplands, and becoming part of a 
wider conflict involving several nations fighting at sea, as well as seeing combats on English, 
French, Breton and Welsh lands. So, even prior to making the treaty in 1404, these missions 
clearly demonstrate overt endeavours to project French power onto Britain, and they 
evidently sought to engage the Welsh as partners. In addition, it might be reasonable to view 
this example of France seeking a range of allies of varying power and location as being 
consistent with the policies of Louis VII, Philip Augustus and Charles V, as demonstrated in 
previous chapters. This therefore identifies an enduring, well-developed practice or, perhaps 
in other terms, a long-term strategy or ‘French method’. Also, on a point of analysis, the gifts 
of wine, weaponry and advice offered to Glyn Dŵr, combined with the enticement of a 
military alliance with France also suggest a further demonstration of the French wisely, 
seductively, deploying Nye’s ‘soft power’ in the first years of the fifteenth century.109 
Consequently, the French perceptibly invested resources into this refound connection. In 
order to give their union a conception of legitimacy, and to enable the French to consider 
overtly fuelling the revolt, this growing relationship required the mechanism of an alliance.  
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Treaty Documents. 
The three relevant, extant documents that comprise the 1404 ‘Treaty of Alliance’ between 
Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr are the commission to Owain’s ambassadors, Gruffydd 
Yonge and John Hanmer, dated 10 May (J392. 27.), the treaty document was completed in 
two stages on 14 June and 14 July (J623. 96 bis) and Owain’s ratification of the alliance on 
12 January 1405 (J623. 96.). Although the first document shows Owain’s ambassadors 
travelled to Paris, the text of the commission they bore strongly suggests that the French had 
begun proceedings, expressing affection for Owain and acting in a manner beneficial to him 
prior to May 1404.
110
  
Image 1: J392. 27. Owain’s commission to Gruffydd Yonge and John Hanmer.111 
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The first document of the 1404 treaty is a commission to Owain’s ambassadors to act 
in his place during these negotiations. The leaders of that embassy were named as Gruffydd 
Yonge, Owain’s Chancellor, Doctor of Canon Law and acting bishop of Bangor, and John 
Hanmer, Owain’s brother-in-law, a minor English noble, although ranked in the treaty as 
‘scutifer consanguinei’ (sic).112 However, it is clear that they led a larger party, since one 
clerk, a legally-trained notary, named himself in the document and indicated that others were 
also present.
113
 He was ‘Benedict Comme, clerk of the diocese of St Asaph, notary public by 
apostolic authority’, who also noted that he had delegated the document to be written by 
another since he was busy elsewhere.
114
  
These fragments concerning the embassy clearly demonstrate that the Welsh were 
able to constitute a party of envoys that conformed to the norms of the day.
115
 The more 
important ambassadorial missions of the period comprised a leading noble, preferably one of 
the royal blood, and a cleric of equivalent rank. Fowler identified the latter as ‘a bishop or 
archbishop, often the keeper of the king’s privy seal or chancellor’ who acted as the principal 
spokesman. In addition, late medieval embassies comprised a number of legal specialists to 
conduct and conclude the important diplomatic business at hand.
116
 It is therefore noteworthy 
that the Welsh, although apparently excluded from such high-ranking affairs since the fall of 
Gwynedd in 1282, clearly knew the requirements for diplomatic parties of the time. It is 
perhaps more striking that they were able to assemble a team capable of treating with and, by 
consequence, impressing the French sufficiently to conclude the alliance. It seems probable 
that by 1404 the French also wished this alliance to come into being. Nevertheless, this is one 
element of the Glyn Dŵr story that has not been previously considered and intimates that the 
Welsh were perhaps less isolated than has been be presumed. Gruffydd Yonge, it should be 
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noted, was valued enough by the French to serve not only at the Council of Constance, 1414-
1418, but also as an ambassador for the French and the Scots.
117
 Regarding the 1404 
embassy, the treaty text reveals that Yonge and Hanmer were empowered to discuss, agree 
and confirm a treaty with the French. They were also given leave to write any necessary 
documents required and to act in Owain’s stead in the case of any special circumstances 
arising during negotiations. Remarkably, the commission appears to reveal the French as the 
instigators of the alliance; it mentions the ongoing affection shown by the French towards 
Owain and the Welsh, before declaring Glyn Dŵr’s desire for union with Charles.118 This 
infers that there was already a positive relationship between the two rulers, or their 
representatives. Also noteworthy is that the connection between Owain Lawgoch, the well-
remembered Yvain de Galles to the French, and Owain Glyn Dŵr was evoked at this time.119 
The same chronicle that recalled that previous Welsh-French link also revealed that Glyn 
Dŵr’s ambassadors made two requests when given an audience. These were to purchase as 
many arms as the French were willing to sell and transport to Wales, as well as seeking 
military support for their cause.
120
 Although the chronicler dressed the embassy in terms that 
stressed the bravery of the French, he also included mention that Glyn Dŵr lacked troops; a 
point he first raised with the Scots and the Irish in 1401.
121
 The tenor of the commission and 
the resultant treaty appear in keeping with the expected form of the time. Considering Glyn 
Dŵr’s earlier approaches to Henry Don of Kidwelly, which can be read as a veiled threat, 
also the letters to unknown Irish lords and the hopeful missive sent to Robert III, king of 
Scots, the documents of 1404 represent a notable improvement in the diplomatic standards of 
Owain’s regime.122 This correct tenor is perhaps most easily postulated as an accumulation of 
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experience, the acquisition of higher-level clerics in 1404 and, probably, the result of guiding 
discussions with agents of the French Crown.
123
 Perhaps to emphasize his legitimacy and 
confidence, the 1404 exchange also marks the first overt record of Owain presenting himself 
as ‘Prince of Wales’.124 Simultaneously, Owain decried those claims of ‘Henry of 
Lancaster’.125 Although the case of legitimacy need not be investigated at any length here, it 
might suffice to recall that it was an issue at the heart of the dispute which began the Hundred 
Years’ War. Any claimant who might detract from the Plantagenet assertion of legitimacy 
might hope to meet a favourable hearing at the French court.
126
 
 
 
The French signatories present an intriguing picture of strained unity at the French court in 
summer 1404. However, close examination of the traceable personalities suggests Orleanist 
motivations played a hand in making this alliance and drove subsequent events.
127
 Assuming 
Fowler is correct in his assertion that it was recognised and accepted that French embassies 
were often without noble representation but were commonly led by a senior ecclesiastic, the 
rank and eminence of the French party conducting negotiations with Yonge and Hanmer 
either show that the French took Glyn Dŵr very seriously indeed or that they were intent on 
impressing that idea upon the Welsh with a substantial charm offensive.
128
    
 The first stage of the main treaty document was dated 14 June 1404 and confirmed the 
parameters of Glyn Dŵr’s ambassadors’ commission from the previous month and, more 
importantly, defined the terms of the alliance, discussed below. It also named Jacques de 
Bourbon, comte de la Marche, and Jean, bishop of Chartres as the principal negotiators on the 
French side.
129
 This agreement was copied and ratified in the French chancellor’s house in 
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Paris on 14 July.
130
 Present at this final concord were Arnaud de Corbie, chancellor, and three 
bishops, Jean of Arras, Philippe of Noyon and Pierre of Meaux, as well as Charles VI’s 
secretary and notary, ‘Johannes de Sanctis’, who completed the named ecclesiastical 
contingent. As Benedict Comme alluded, others were present but remained anonymous. 
Representing the nobility were Louis de Bourbon, comte de Vendôme, and lords Robert de 
Braquemont and Robert d’Amilly, both ‘knights of the chamber’.131 
 Two of the four bishops involved have been easily traced. They represented the two 
adversarial parties within the French court. Jean Montagu, bishop of Chartres, was an 
illegitimate son of Charles V, and therefore half-brother to the king and Louis of Orleans. He 
was an opponent of Jean sans Peur, who had him beheaded in 1409.
132
 Jean Canard, bishop of 
Arras, was the long-serving chancellor of Philip the Bold’s court and a lifelong 
Burgundian.
133
 The other clergymen are not easily traceable, so their allegiance cannot be 
verified. Despite the fact that they all sat in dioceses north-east of Paris, this does not 
guarantee they were necessarily Burgundians. To underline that point, Jean Gerson was 
sponsored and paid a pension by Duke Philip yet he opposed the duke’s ecclesiastical 
policy.
134
 Among the knights, Arnaud de Corbie and Robert de Braquemont are easily 
identifiable. The latter was the Orleanist lord who received Benedict XIII on his escape from 
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the siege of Avignon the previous year, and whose family long served the dukes of 
Orleans.
135
 While the chancellor can initially be placed loosely in royal obedience, since he 
served as the king’s chancellor, he later revealed himself as committed to the Burgundian 
cause, which was probably the case all along.
136
 However, the imposing presence of two 
counts of Bourbon is noteworthy. As princes of the blood, the Bourbons were connected to 
the crown itself, and the houses of Orleans and Burgundy alike.
137
 Duke Louis of Bourbon, 
these counts’ uncle, along with John, duke of Berry, openly acted as a counter to the 
ambitions of both houses, intervening militarily to block open conflict between them.
138
 
Therefore, the French ambassadorial party balanced the interests of the two ascendant ducal 
factions; Burgundy and Orleans, as well as the crown, represented through the officials and 
the counterweight of the Bourbon counts. This group might have presented a vision of a 
united court, or ensured that each faction had a stake in all ongoing negotiations. Although 
Jacques de Bourbon openly held Burgundian sympathies throughout his life, Louis de 
Bourbon’s principal territory, the comté de Vendôme, was an appanage held of the duke of 
Orleans.
139
 However, in view of its innate aggressive stance against Henry and England, this 
alliance must be considered Orleanist in founding and interest.
140
 As a further measure of this 
being an Orleanist drive, it is noteworthy that France made no such overtly hostile moves 
against England while Philip the Bold was alive. His death in April 1404 allowed Louis of 
Orleans to acquire more control over the government. The alliance with Glyn Dŵr was a 
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clear statement of his intent to make war on Henry IV. In addition, Louis demonstrated a 
personal connection to this mission by sending along men from his own household, paying 
for their equipment from his own accounts.
141
 
It is noteworthy that in spite of the disparity in the allies’ power and their apparently 
long absence from international diplomacy, the composition of Glyn Dŵr’s embassy mirrored 
the form, if not the size and eminence, of that of the French by containing men of the blood 
and the cloth, as well as legal specialists.
142
 Nevertheless, these documents paint a scene of 
several meetings between the envoys, to discuss the direction of the alliance, attended all the 
while by numerous scribes, whose identities are lost. In the treaty, the ambassadors 
exchanged promises, swearing for their masters on the holy gospels of God.
143
 The alliance 
was then born in principle; and its details defined its nature and limits. 
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1404 Treaty Clauses 
Following the usual politesses, in which the French generously addressed ‘the illustrious and 
most dreaded lord’ and ‘the magnificent and powerful Owen, Prince of the Cymry’, the treaty 
comprised eleven clauses to bind the rulers of France and Wales.
144
  Although all will be 
briefly touched upon, a few require slightly more in-depth examination because of their 
overall or later relevance. For example, the first gives the reason for this alliance:  
 
In the first place, that the said lords the king and the prince shall be mutually joined, 
confederated, united, and leagued by the bond of a true covenant and real friendship, and 
of a sure, good, and most powerful union against Henry of Lancaster, and (sic: ‘an’) 
adversary and enemy of both parties, and his adherents and supporters.
145 
 
This reveals the unambiguous motivation for the treaty; it specifically targeted Henry and his 
adherents. Although this is unsurprising, it is noteworthy for two reasons. Treaties of this 
period studied appear to be most frequently made for specific, immediate reasons, and not at 
times when there is no threat or need for mutual protection. This treaty, however, does not 
promise a permanent alliance as might be understood by other contemporary treaties which 
bound the signatories, their heirs and successors.
146
 The reason for Owain’s hostility towards 
Henry requires no expansion here, but it suggests that the French were intent on removing 
Henry from the throne. Clearly, this demonstrates an effort to assert their will over British 
politics and military affairs, using the Welsh as partners. One factor was French ire over 
Henry’s treatment of Charles’s daughter Isabella. His treatment of her, Richard II’s bride and 
still a teenager in 1404, had caused her uncle, Louis of Orleans, to challenge Henry to a 
duel.
147
 Louis’s ally, Waleran, comte de St Pol, also issued a similar defiance to Henry.148 
The second and probably main reason was perhaps a perception that the new king’s tenure on 
the crown was weak enough to challenge. It is significant that, in signing this treaty with 
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Owain, the French were preparing to openly breach the twenty-eight year truce with England 
signed in 1396. This shows a different policy direction within the French administration at 
that time and clearly underlines the Orleanist influence in government. It also suggests that 
they envisaged an opportunity to damage or remove Henry and that they recognised Owain as 
a suitable ally with whom to intrigue. Also of import is that the treaty does not mention 
England or its people anywhere. Henry and his adherents are identified as the enemy, and 
therefore this was not necessarily intended to start a war against the English in general, but 
rather an aspiration to decapitate the English regime. Nevertheless, this personal approach 
and aggressive new direction were indisputably Orleanist in flavour. 
 The next three articles of the treaty covered predictable promises that they would help 
one another against Henry, that they would act as ‘true and faithful friends’ toward one 
another, that they would warn the other if they became aware of Henry plotting against them 
and also act to hinder those plans.
149
 This perhaps reveals an intention to move against the 
Burgundians, rather than being of relevance to Owain. Next, the terms of the treaty made 
clear that each lord would ‘punish in such manner that shall give an example to the others’ 
any of their people who aided Henry in any way, even if either leader were brought to 
peace.
150
 Although the latter might appear at first glance to have been aimed more 
specifically at the Welsh, who had recently served in numbers in English armies, this notion 
should also be balanced against the knowledge that Frenchmen in English territories also 
served, and French princes of the blood, notably Louis, had recently sought Henry's 
friendship.
151
 Perhaps, then, this also reveals an Orleanist drive to the treaty and as an 
instrument to sever ties to England, whereas Burgundian financial interests were firmly 
connected to English trade with Flanders.
152
 
  The sixth clause determined that each party would discuss any peace moves and give 
the other one month to respond. Clearly, this insists that the French and the Welsh were to 
represent one another or include the other in any peace negotiation with the English. This 
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notion has precedence in a number of other alliances, perhaps most obviously that between 
France and Scotland.
153
 This apparently formulaic but bonding clause becomes significant at 
a critical point later and will be revisited below. 
 
Again, that one of the lords, the king and the prince aforesaid, shall not make or take 
truce nor make peace with the aforesaid Henry of Lancaster, but that the other might be 
included if he had wished in the same truce or peace, unless he is united or did not wish 
to be included in the same truce or peace, and he shall determine, concerning such refusal 
or rejection, who wished to treat for the said truce or peace, within a month after the one 
shall have signified the said truce or peace, by his letters patent, sealed by his seal.
154
  
 
 
Next, the French agreed to seize shipping in their ports which did not carry letters of 
testimony from either lord. Although this might have been motivated by a French desire to 
easily acquire mercantile goods and shipping, it was also of military importance and might 
give them the upper hand in the channel. Shipping was most probably used to spy on the 
other side’s ports, coasts and particularly on other shipping, such as the gathering of invasion 
fleets. This was evident in late 1404 when the English were able to send ample warning of the 
gathering fleet in Sluys and Harfleur intended to invade Wales that year.
155
 Therefore, 
controlling movements from ports was another way of controlling the flow of information 
and logistical necessities, as well as weakening the enemy’s commerce. Without such 
intelligence, England's coastal defence depended on ships from its own ports and shore-based 
watches giving news. A purely reactive defence such as this is less efficient and would put 
England at a disadvantage.  
The next two clauses appear formulaic; the first is a promise of redress, stating that 
should the two lords or their subjects fall out, then this should be resolved amicably and their 
quarrel ended peacefully, and next that this covenant was binding and sealed with promises, 
and both parties were reminded of that.
156
 The penultimate clause empowered the 
ambassadors to make promises and vows in their lord’s place and, having touched holy relics, 
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the union was final and binding.
157
 Then followed a clause which seemed to absolve all men, 
no matter of their ‘race or subjection’, of previous pledges to Henry.158  
This can be construed as touching both parties and those friendly to them; since the 
Welshmen, Frenchmen and others they hoped to then engage had served the English crown in 
a variety of roles. This clause served as a release from any oath and legitimised actions 
henceforth taken against Henry. There were two obvious benefactors of this. Louis, who had 
been Henry’s ally during his exile at the French court; this served as an official renunciation 
of that tie had the duel challenges not reached a wider audience. Also, the Bretons, many of 
whom had served the English crown prior to its withdrawal from Brittany in 1397.
159
 By this 
time, apart from supporting French, Castilian and Welsh attacks, the Bretons were clearly in 
conflict with England at sea and on land.
160
 England had finally relinquished its last 
stronghold in Brittany in 1397, leaving a bitter legacy.
161
 Although their candidate, Jean de 
Montfort, had triumphed over the French-supported duke, Charles de Blois, in 1364, English 
captains in situ had exacted a heavy financial toll from the Bretons since that victory.
162
 Jean 
de Montfort died in 1399 and his son Jean, the new duke, owed England less than his father. 
Henry machinated to prolong English influence in Brittany by marrying the Jean V’s mother 
in 1403.
163
 The Bretons showed active opposition to this and a maritime conflict began 
between them and the English. While largely a spectacle of coastal raids and counter-attacks, 
there were a few incidents of note, mentioned above.
164
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Since legality and legitimacy were highly important matters to establish prior to 
military action, this clause releasing them from oaths is significant. The allies were then free 
to engage others in this contest. In light of this, it is probably significant that Breton fleets 
and soldiers were involved in the conduct of attacks on English interests in Wales, England 
and at sea at this time. The Bretons comprised notable elements of the force assembled 
following the conclusion of this treaty, as well as being instrumental in the 1405 invasion, 
discussed below. It might also be that the previous clause pertaining to the seizure of shipping 
would also particularly appeal to the Bretons whose naval power might be augmented by the 
removal of English vessels from the Channel. However, even before the second signing of the 
alliance document in Paris on 14 July 1404, the French demonstrated their intentions to 
engage their allies in this venture by seeking Castilian support.
165
 On 7 July 1404, the senior 
Bourbon, Duke Louis, wrote to the king of Castile and Leon requesting ships for the mission 
to Wales while the French simultaneously gathered their own fleet in Channel ports. The 
letter began with a warm, friendly passage which showed that Louis de Bourbon knew the 
king and his relations well. He then asked for forty armed ships because ‘the king has ordered 
my very dear and well-beloved cousin, the Count of March, to proceed shortly to Wales with 
one thousand lances and five hundred crossbowmen; who will set out shortly to embark in 
Brittany, and from thence to Wales.’166 The French requested the Castilians to rendez-vous 
with the comte de la Marche in Brittany on 15 August that year and then to accompany him 
to Wales. There, Louis revealed the force ‘will find a good entry aided and assisted, in order 
to attack, harass, and injure the English, our enemies.’ Seemingly, Louis then threatened the 
Castilians, ‘And in this may you not fail us.’167 Louis then finished with an amicable flourish. 
Nevertheless, this letter demonstrates French diplomatic style in action; far from being a 
jumble of polite, inconclusive phrases, the expedition organisers expected Castilian support 
and showed no timidity in making that plain.  
 The contemporary Castilian account eulogising one of its noblemen, Pero Niño, 
records the arrival of a letter from France that largely replicates the intentions declared by 
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Louis de Bourbon.
168
 The account of the Castilian expedition renders a beautiful description 
of the journey, from the Spanish court to that of France, detailing their camaraderie, giving 
tales of battles, victories and repulsion by local forces during the mission which ravaged 
England’s southern coast.169 During one descent onto English soil they discovered that the 
land had been emptied of men by Henry IV who summoned them to go and fight Owain in 
Wales.
170
 In a noteworthy addition, Pero Niño’s tale recalled how the duke of Orleans was in 
charge of the government at that time and paid the Castilians to become his men and wear his 
livery. Moreover, Pero was recruited by Louis of Orleans to replace the fallen Guillaume du 
Châtel and stand with six of Louis’s men in a combat between them and seven Englishmen, 
in a reproduction of a previous fight between seven of Louis’s men and seven of Henry’s. At 
that point, the Castilian biographer recalled how Niño’s bloodline and heraldic devices were 
also those of the French royal house.
171
   
 
The final document directly connected to the 1404 treaty, Owain’s ratification, appears to add 
little to the thrust of the alliance established in the previous documents and contributes no 
discernibly new commentary for analysis. He signed it at Llanbadarn (Aberystwyth) on 12 
January 1405 and returned his assent to France.
172
  
However, the French did not wait for Owain’s accord; the alliance came to life in 
summer 1404 with the French mustering of an invasion force led by Jacques de Bourbon, 
who had also signed the treaty. Its resounding failure, blamed squarely on Jacques de 
Bourbon, comte de la Marche, found scathing criticism in France. The fleet gathered slowly, 
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so slowly that the English had the opportunity to attempt to burn those vessels idling in Brest 
harbour. The troops summoned were left waiting while Jacques de Bourbon vainly pursued 
some apparent love affair in Paris. When he finally arrived in port in mid-November, he 
proclaimed he could not go to Wales and so took to the sea in pursuit of merchant vessels. He 
made an ineffective landing near Dartmouth and swiftly withdrew.
173
 The affair wasted an 
opportunity; the weather had been fair, the troops assembled and prepared, and the Castilians 
had arrived. The shameful failure of Jacques de Bourbon was described venomously by the St 
Denis chronicler: 
 
I am ashamed to have recounted the crossing of the French to Wales; by the fault of the 
count of March, the course and end of the expedition, far from appearing as it did at the 
beginning, became dismal for them... this retreat covered the count with infamy and left 
an indelible stain on his name. The princes of the fleur de lys did not forgive him for 
having forgotten that he was the issue of royal blood, and of having sullied his honour by 
his culpable negligence.
174
  
 
Nevertheless, an alliance between Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr was given life and, 
according to the chronicler of St Denys, Owain received the gift of arms and armour 
subsequently sent by Charles thus: 
 
The king [Charles VI], in order to give pleasure to the Prince of Wales [Glyn Dŵr], gave 
to the ambassador, at the moment of his departure, an all gold royal helmet, a cuirass and 
a sword, and charged him with delivering them from him to his brother. I learned from 
the Frenchmen who found themselves there when these presents were given to him, that 
he humbly received them on his knees covering them with kisses, as if he had received 
the king in person.
175
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Image 2: A golden parade helmet from the reign of Charles VI.
176
 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cum tanta genuum flectione humili totque devotis osculis hoc gratum donum recepit, ac si regem personaliter 
recepisset’. 
176
 L. Deutsch, Metronome Illustré (Neuilly-sur-Seine: Michel Lafon, 2010), 6. This gives an idea of the level of 
skill and detail of French helmets contemporary to the one gifted to Glyn Dŵr.  
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5.3:     1405: An Orleanist coup? 
  
Item vii die Septembris, anno Domini ut supra receptum mandatum domini Thome, Dei 
gracia Cantuariensis archiepiscopi ad faciendum prossessionem singulis quartis et sextis 
feriis pro expedicione domini regis et exercitus sui contra ducem Aurelianum qui cum 
cxliiii navibus armatorum in portu de Milford applicuit in consolamen et refugium 
rebellium parcium Wallie.
177
 
 
This opinion, expressed by the bishop of Hereford at the time, clearly identified the French 
invasion of west Wales as the duke of Orleans’s enterprise. It is worth considering here 
whether this expedition formed one integral part of a broader strategy, with this element 
enacted in 1405. The government, under Louis’s direction as regent, undertook other external 
diplomatic and military endeavours before and during that year. Therefore this section will 
consider the other events which might connect to the French incursion into Wales in 1405, as 
well as considering certain elements of that mission.  
 It is worth exploring the modus operandi of one of the principal protagonists, Louis of 
Orleans. This research has revealed that he was a practiced exponent of a strategy prevalent 
in this period: the construction of alliances prior to military action and territorial acquisition. 
The French expedition might therefore be largely attributable to his development and 
deployment of this policy common in medieval France, illustrated in previous chapters, 
probably motivated by his personal hatred of Henry IV. Throughout his political career, 
Louis was a propagator of alliances with noteworthy noble leaders of all ranks. Early in his 
quest for territory he appears to have solely cast his eye southwards, to Italy, perhaps to 
emulate the deeds of his uncle, Louis of Anjou. He acquired a Milanese alliance when he 
married Valentina Visconti in 1389.
178
 With that came the formation of an axis of power 
between Louis and the duke of Milan which, after his ascension in 1394, also included 
Benedict XIII in Avignon. While he was not averse to coercing obedience, as witnessed in 
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the submission of Savona in 1394, he evidently enjoyed diplomacy and intrigue.
179
 The coup 
by Philip of Burgundy and Queen Isabeau that thwarted Louis’s Italian ambitions forced him 
to look elsewhere for territory. He chose to look northwards, taking action against those who 
had revealed their hands in the south.
180
 There, between 1398 and 1407, Louis invested his 
energies and fortune in forging alliances among the lords of north-eastern France and the 
adjacent regions of the empire. Strikingly, in 1398, he held a number of closed meetings with 
the emperor, Wenceslas, and agreed an alliance with him.
181
 During this period he also 
attained the homage of the princes of Baden, Cleves, Guelders, Hainault, Lorraine, Nassau, 
Pont-à-Moussons, Saar, Saarwerden, Salm, as well as buying Luxemburg and the great 
lordship of Coucy, from whom he also attained homage.
182
 During Henry Bolingbroke’s exile 
in France from 1398-9, Louis and he became allies too.
183
  
Louis showed he was an advocate of classic bracketing strategy, splitting and 
encompassing Philip of Burgundy’s estates in northern and eastern France. He also remained 
faithful to Wenceslas in Bohemia and his wife’s family in Milan, bracketing in three 
directions the new emperor, Rupert, who had ousted Wenceslas and was allied to Philip and 
Isabeau.
184
 Effectively, this second, eastern, axis of power offered Louis the possibility of 
moving against his imperial adversaries and gave him a stake in imperial affairs; there is 
evidence to suggest he harboured ambitions towards the imperial crown.
185
 These coalitions 
were no paper tigers. The partners acted in military concert during 1402-5, and thereafter, 
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pressing their joint interests from Italy to Luxemburg.
186
 Within this period, Louis also 
connected with the Scots and the Welsh, and it is tempting to view these, and possible links 
to Ricardian English rebels, as an effort to build another league of friendly powers linking 
Orleans with willing leaders in Britain.
187
 If Louis were following such a method outlined 
here, an alliance would be followed by an attack shortly afterwards. 
 
As has been previously related, the striking failure of the de Bourbon mission in 1404 
slighted the honour of France. Therefore, apart from fulfilling promises of assistance made to 
their new ally and consequently taking the war to the king of England, a mission in 1405 
would redress the self-inflicted insult to the considerable honour of France. This was 
certainly the mood of the moment among the lay chroniclers: 
 
Marshal de Rieux and the lord of Hugueville, considering the great dishonour there 
would be to the king if we did not go and help the Welsh, seeing as though the king had 
promised it, deliberated and decided to go there, and in fact they went there. In going 
they had a series of encounters at sea, as well as when they arrived in Wales, from where 
they returned with honour.
188
 
 
The religious commentators too appeared to be of the same mind: ‘My lords the dukes of 
France, who controlled the government, wished to keep the promise of aid made to the prince 
of Wales, and at the same time repair the shameful failure of the comte de la Marche by some 
notable feat of arms.’189 Therefore, with their pride wounded, the French determined to send 
an army to Wales during the 1405 campaigning season. However, there were other 
diplomatic stages which preceded the arrival of the French fleet. Firstly, in January, Glyn 
Dŵr ratified the alliance treaty of the previous year and returned it to France.190 In addition, 
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combined Welsh-French troops overran Anglesey and won at least one bloody victory over 
crown forces.
191
 The French were probably those still acting under the aegis of the freebooter, 
Jean d’Espagne.192 February 1405 witnessed the drafting of another alliance, probably by 
proxy, known as the ‘Tripartite Indenture’.193 This leagued Glyn Dŵr, Edmund Mortimer and 
Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland. The aim was to form a military alliance purposed to 
dethrone Henry and crown the Mortimer heir, giving Percy control of the northern English 
counties, Mortimer the south and overall rule, and an expanded realm of Wales. An 
additional point of interest emerges from the indenture, which bound all three to defend the 
kingdom against ‘all men’. Dispensation was made exempting Glyn Dŵr from fighting ‘lord 
Charles, by the Grace of God, King of the French, in the league and the covenant made and 
completed between them
.’194
 Glyn Dŵr was then publically, Charles’s ally in ‘Greater 
Britain’, as the indenture termed it. Some have questioned this document’s authenticity.195 
However, the lack of a convincing refutation, combined with subsequent events, make it 
appear valid. This treaty is the first indicator of an alliance between Glyn Dŵr and the Percys. 
No evidence other than tarnishing rumour has ever emerged regarding a union prior to 
Hotspur’s fateful revolt in July 1403.196 In fact, the contemporary evidence plainly 
demonstrates that Glyn Dŵr and his forces were campaigning in south-west Wales. The 
plethora of extant letters demonstrated the panic of local commanders at the size and 
destructive force of his army of June and early July 1403.
197
 From those letters it is clear that 
Glyn Dŵr was moving towards the south west, exactly the opposite direction from Percy at 
Shrewsbury and therefore it would have been impossible for their forces to have combined at 
that time. The letters from the garrison commanders to Henry and his council pre-date 
Hotspur’s revolt and passed through many pairs of hands en route to the king, making it 
perhaps inevitable that news of the Welsh attacks would spread before Hotspur announced 
his defiance.  
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 Constance, Lady Despencer, widow of the earl of Gloucester killed in the 1400 
Epiphany Rising and sister of the duke of York, attempted to kidnap the Mortimer heirs, 
Edmund’s nephews, from Windsor and deliver them into Glyn Dŵr’s hands in February 
1405.
198
 It seems unlikely that this was undertaken without conspiratorial premeditation. The 
attempt was thwarted at Cheltenham and the Mortimer minors were returned to the king for 
safe keeping. The Crown’s investigation into the matter revealed that Thomas Mowbray, Earl 
Marshal, had known about the plot but played no active part in it, and was therefore 
pardoned. The duke of York was sent to the Tower for his alleged but peripheral 
involvement, but was released after a few months and restored in 1406. Nevertheless, the plot 
is indicative of unseen connections between Glyn Dŵr and the very highest echelons of the 
English nobility. The movements of the earl of Northumberland are difficult to ascertain 
through these months.
199
 However, while the French were mustering and making preparations 
to set sail for Wales, Henry Percy was a major force behind an uprising centred on York 
which took place in early June 1405.  
 This large-scale, wide-spread northern revolt was nominally led by Richard Scrope, 
the archbishop of York, Thomas Mowbray, Earl Marshal and earl of Norfolk, Henry Percy, 
earl of Northumberland and Lord Bardolf. Scrope and Mowbray appear to have risen too 
early and were isolated from the alleged commanders of the movement and their additional 
troops. Duped into a parley with Ralph Neville, earl of Westmoreland, they were seized and 
executed a few days later.
200
 The extraordinary deed of executing an archbishop was roundly 
criticised, the Roman Pope, Innocent VII, vented his fury on the English ambassadors who 
related the event to him.
201
 The majority of rebels dispersed, returned home and were 
eventually pardoned, according to Adam of Usk, after removing their trousers, prostrating 
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themselves on the ground and humbly begging.
202
 Others resisted militarily and held towns 
such as Berwick against Henry, eventually meeting brutal execution as traitors.
203
 Percy and 
Bardolf retreated to Scotland.
204
 The following year they were tried for treason in their 
absence. The articles are damning, but also very helpful for this research.
205
 Although it is 
difficult to ascertain to what extent the treason charges contain general defamations and 
slanders against the accused, there are several articles of note.  They recounted the actions 
and movements of the York rebels in May and June 1405, justifying the execution of many of 
them for treason, and used the same evidence against Percy and Bardolf in absentia. Articles 
seven and eight categorically connect Percy to the Scots and French ambassadors in alliance, 
presenting hand-written evidence in Percy’s name and bearing his seal.206 Article nine is 
particularly compelling: a letter from Henry Percy to Louis of Orleans, whom Percy 
addressed as ‘tres haut & tres puissant Prince le Duc d’Orlions.’207 The letter tells how 
Percy’s ambassadors had approached the king of France’s envoys in Scotland to discuss an 
alliance between them. The letter announced Percy’s intention and will, along with his allies, 
to continue the fight for King Richard, if still alive, and to avenge him if dead. Percy also said 
that he intended to continue the ‘just quarrel’ of the queen of England, ‘v[ot]re niece’, and to 
make war on Henry of Lancaster. Percy then acknowledged that Louis had sustained this 
quarrel and others against Henry, so he requested aid in this conflict and offered his support 
to the king of France. The letter is not dated within its text and, being situated among other 
evidence from summer 1405, it is tempting to assume it was written at that point. However it 
seems perhaps axiomatic that such an approach would pre-date the moment when the rebels 
found themselves in the field and therefore too committed for Louis to assist in their 
enterprise. Irrespective of the unsure dating, this letter demonstrates that Percy’s connection 
to France was not solely and vicariously through the Welsh. In addition, treason trial articles 
twelve and thirteen explicitly connected Percy to the rebels in Wales, in adherence, counsel 
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and alliance.
208
 This therefore suggests that the Tripartite Indenture was more widely known 
than is currently conceived. It is not known whether any bond was formed at that point 
between Louis and Henry Percy. Northumberland’s apparently key role in the betrayal and 
capture of Richard II might have gravely damaged his chances of attaining instant or 
profound amity within the French court.
209
 Nevertheless, this letter showed that an alliance 
between Percy and Orleans was at least in the air at the time. 
The York revolt stands out for two reasons, the first being the unusual fact that the 
leaders issued a manifesto, which was read out by the archbishop to the assembled thousands 
on Shipton Moor.
210
 The second is the brutal fate suffered by the archbishop of York and the 
Earl Marshal.
211
 The intriguing factor is that several manifesto articles were connected to the 
Welsh rebels, despite there being no overt link between Scrope and Glyn Dŵr, but through 
Northumberland. Without that connection, there seems no reason to include mention of the 
Welsh within the interest of a northern rebellion seemingly centred on York and the Percy-
held border towns and fortresses, such as Berwick. As a document, the manifesto read by 
Scrope appears a fiery, rebel-rousing defiance.
212
 It made ten accusations against Henry. 
After each one he was thunderously excommunicated for his crimes. He and his adherents 
were charged with treason for which they suffered the archbishop’s excommunication. The 
articles described Henry’s proposed duel with the duke of Norfolk, the Earl Marshal’s late 
father, and subsequent exile in 1398.
213
 The consequence was his return under arms to 
reclaim his inheritance, having gained substantial support, he contravened his promises and 
seized the crown. He was also accused of robbing and killing nobles, clergy, merchants and 
members of virtually all other strata in the kingdom. His false seizure, deposition and murder 
of King Richard, son of the noble Edward, also earned him Scrope’s excommunication.214 
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The next treason charge elaborated Henry’s brutal treatment and slaughter of many 
clergymen, which proves a recurrent accusation throughout his reign. Then, he was 
condemned for his execution without trial of the earls of the Epiphany Revolt of 1400, and of 
the Percys, brother and son of the apparently approaching earl. He was also charged with 
crimes against the Church, Rome and the universities.
215
 Scrope then criticised the military 
expeditions and harm caused during Henry’s reign up to that point, which had damaged and 
impoverished the kingdom through intolerable exactions.
216
 The final article of the manifesto 
reassured the audience that the rebels did not seek to bring widespread changes, but had three 
specific aims.
217
 The first was to put the ‘rightful heir’ on the throne. Although no name is 
offered here, bearing in mind the context of the time and the Tripartite Indenture, the 
Mortimer heir is the only credible candidate. Secondly, the rebels wished to make peace with 
the Welsh, Irish and other enemies of the kingdom. The general pacific appeal might echo 
sentiments common towards the end of Richard’s reign.218 It is noteworthy that the Welsh 
were mentioned in first place, and the Scots and the French not named at all, but covered by a 
blanket term referring to other enemies of the kingdom. The final intention, perhaps inserted 
tactically here to guarantee a rousing cheer at the end of the reading, vowed to do away with 
exactions and promised the grant of an indulgence.  
 Although this revolt was swiftly crushed at York, and the remainder chased over the 
border or besieged within northern castles, the timing and connectivity with the Welsh in 
particular is noteworthy. It is unlikely that reports of its defeat and dispersal reached France 
before the fleet set sail for Wales. Preparations for the 1405 expedition would have been too 
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far advanced to halt for any reason save adverse weather or royal command; the French were 
about to invade Henry’s domain.219 
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The 1405 Expedition: Deeds 
 
‘And so the Bretons served and took the deeds of France’s war to all of the other nations’.220 
 
The deeds performed by the expeditionary force are difficult to ascertain categorically. 
English sources are all suspiciously quiet about the matter; only Thomas Walsingham 
mentioned it.
221
 This might suggest it was a minor event of little relevance and so failed to be 
included at length in the records. This is possible, though extremely unlikely for a number of 
simple reasons. The insertion of hostile land forces by the French adversary into a region of 
mainland Britain claimed by the English crown can only be an event of note. Added to this is 
the fact that the territory in question was held militarily by a large spread of garrisoned 
castles designated as the appanage of the heir to the throne. In addition, Henry’s reaction on 
learning of the French landing demonstrated the gravity the king attributed to the event. The 
1405 expedition seems to be an important event worthy of informed commentary. It seems 
reasonable to raise the idea that this news was deliberately downplayed or suppressed within 
English sources. Therefore, it is essential to turn to French sources to expand the story of this 
significant event. To modern writers, the landing in Pembrokeshire confirmed that the 
alliance had ‘borne full fruit’ and that Owain’s ‘dream had at last come true.’222  
 The two main sources, which appear to be the root of all other accounts, offer 
somewhat different tales of the mission. Both offer seemingly credible, detailed accounts, and 
both discernibly contain errors. The monk of Saint-Denys recorded a short campaign that 
demonstrated its superiority over a small number of castles and towns in south-west Wales.
223
 
The anonymous monks who wrote the chronicle identified that leadership of the expedition 
had been given to three men: Marshal Jehan de Rieux, along with Jean de Hangest, lord of 
Hugueville and Grand-Master of the Crossbows of France, and Robert de la Heuse, also 
known as ‘le Borgne’ or ‘Strabo’.224 These men figured consistently in contemporary 
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chronicles and documents; they clearly ranked among the highest echelons of French military 
leadership of their day, indicative of the importance the crown placed on this mission. It is 
also noteworthy that these leaders demonstrate a range of loyalties. Jehan de Hangest could 
rightly be considered, at that stage, a Burgundian.
225
 His presence was consistent with the 
statement of support for war efforts against England read out in parliament by Jean sans 
Peur’s spokesman in late summer 1405, who drew attention to England’s ‘redoubtable 
enemies, the Scots and the Welsh.’226 The Saint-Denys chronicle detailed the size of the 
army; eight hundred elite men, six hundred crossbowmen and twelve hundred lightly-
armoured troops in a fleet composed of two large warships and thirty medium-sized vessels. 
It added that these troops were raised in Brittany and Normandy which, at the time, were 
certainly lands under Orleanist influence.
227
 The army size is worthy of comment here; the 
better-known army sent to Scotland in 1385 under Jean de Vienne comprised one thousand 
three hundred men-at-arms and two hundred and fifty crossbows.
228
 Campbell described this 
force as ‘a major French army’, yet at perhaps only two-thirds the size of that sent to Wales, 
the relative obscurity of the Welsh expedition seems curious. The French waited for a 
favourable wind and set sail before the end of July, the timing of which might be relevant had 
a mid-summer rising been plotted with Northumberland. When they arrived at ‘Willeforde’, 
or Milford, they were allegedly greeted by a Welsh force of ten thousand sent by the ‘principi 
Wallie’, Glyn Dŵr.229 The chronicle then related how the French and Welsh devastated the 
country in their path, and marched on ‘Heleford’.230 Saint-Denys then described a battle in 
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front of Haverford, followed by a siege supported by artillery. Although the French and 
Welsh allegedly inflicted scores of casualties on the enemy, they failed to take the castle. The 
casualties caused, forty in the battle and seventy in the assault, seem perhaps realistically low. 
There, the French lost a famous knight, ‘Patroullart de Trya’.231 From there, French foragers 
took ‘Picot’ or Picton, in a swift first assault. They ravaged the countryside as far as 
‘Canneby’ or Tenby, once again putting all to fire and sword. Here, they prepared to assault 
the town, encircling it with crossbowmen and bringing up the artillery. The operation was 
disrupted when French scouts reported a thirty-strong fleet, packed with English soldiers, 
coming to relieve the town. This apparently caused an uncontrollable panic among the French 
who abandoned the siege and their artillery. Realising that their ships were stranded, they 
unloaded and torched them in order to deny the enemy. The French then fled in terror, despite 
the fact that there was no-one in pursuit and they were accompanied by two thousand Welsh 
horsemen.
232
 Almost twenty years after the event, Walsingham reported that ‘Lord Thomas 
Berkeley and Henry Pay burnt fifteen of their ships while they were in harbour.’233 However, 
Walsingham does not mention the allied army in flight, or offer any other information on the 
French fleet which, at well over a hundred strong, should have attracted further description or 
attack. Having recomposed themselves, and attacking villages in their path, the allies 
prepared to attack ‘Sancti Clari’ or Saint-Clears, whose residents promised to surrender if the 
French took ‘Callemardin’ or Carmarthen.234 When the allied force arrived there, Glyn Dŵr, 
described as ‘princeps (Walensibus)’, swore not to leave until he was master of the place. The 
chronicle then described a four-day siege of the well-garrisoned, strongly-walled town. The 
French sapped the walls, forming a breach that would allow them to fight hand-to-hand.
235
 
The first assault inflicted numerous casualties on the defenders and, as the French prepared a 
second assault, the inhabitants sought parley. They offered terms that the French could enter 
the town unopposed and remove all the booty that they could carry, as long as they allowed 
the inhabitants to live and to remain in the town.
236
 The Welsh also agreed to these terms, 
ransacking the town of all portable booty. However, they also set fire to the streets and 
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suburbs, and destroyed most of the town walls. From there the allied army marched to 
‘Cardinguan’ or Cardigan which, fearing the same fate, capitulated.237 According to the 
Saint-Denys chronicle, the expedition then appears to have wound down its military activities 
after having covered an estimated sixty leagues.
238
 The French asked the Welsh prince to 
station them in three different areas, in order not to suffer privation until they could return to 
France. Glyn Dŵr did this, and the French remained in Wales until All Saints, when six 
vessels arrived and returned the knights and squires to France. Saint-Denys tells us that they 
left the twelve hundred troops and five hundred crossbowmen under the command of a Picard 
squire named ‘Blesum de Belay’ or ‘le Bègue de Bellay’ in French, until further ships could 
be sent to them.
239
 The chronicle commented, in its frequently scathing tone: ‘We strongly 
criticised those who came back to France having so abandoned the men who had fought for 
their glory, who had always been first in the assaults and who had saved them from more than 
one danger.’240 However, it reassured the reader that the nobles remained true to their word 
though, and brought them back to France towards Lent.
241
 
 The contingent commander has proved difficult to track, and, from a list of the 
knights and squires of the realm from 1400 emerge two clear candidates: Monseigneur le 
Besgue de Villaines and Monseigneur de Bellauges.
242
 Surprisingly, there is a third candidate 
who, despite seeming to have the correct name, only comes to prominence after 1415 and 
does not appear to have the same martial pedigree or Orleanist connections as the two 
mentioned previously. Therefore, Jean de Bellay, while still a possibility, is probably ruled 
out.
243
 As for the other two, both had campaigned together in the royal army sent against 
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Guelders in 1388.
244
 Although ‘Monseigneur de Bellauges’, and variations of that name, 
remained active around court during the relevant period, he also seems less likely than the 
final possibility.
245
 The only candidate bearing the nickname ‘le Bègue’, or ‘the stammerer’, 
is Pierre de Villaines, commonly referred to in a variety of sources as ‘le Bègue de Villaines.’ 
Due to the rarity of that nickname, this man was probably more memorable than most. In 
addition, there were two Pierre de Villaines, father and son, who, like the lord of Bellenges, 
fought for the Orleanist cause throughout this period.
246
 The father was connected to the 
Marmouset government favoured by Charles and Louis, and escaped the worst persecution of 
Philip of Burgundy when he regained power, suffering imprisonment rather than 
execution.
247
 He had campaigned with Bertrand du Guesclin, losing an eye fighting the 
English, and perhaps notably is mentioned within the same frame of reference as ‘messire 
Yvain de Gales.’248 He was also associated with known Orleanists such as Jean Montagu and 
he served in the government of Touraine, Louis’s first duchy. Moreover, ‘le Bègue’ can be 
found in Brittany and La Rochelle during the relevant period, in the company of Robert de la 
Heuse, and so appears to be in the right place and with the right people to have partaken in 
the expedition to Wales.
249
 Perhaps the final point to make concerning ‘le Bègue’ is that, if 
marooned in Wales, he returned and can be traced in records after the expedition’s return. He 
appeared near Malicorne along the Breton border in 1406, later served as governor of La 
Rochelle in the Orleanist west and was militarily active until 1410.
250
 The cautious 
conclusion is, therefore that the mysterious leader left behind with the troops in Saint-
Denys’s account, was this man or his namesake son. As a staunch Orleanist, he might be 
exactly the sort of dependable servant to charge with such a commission.  
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 There is another possible reason for an Orleanist-inspired mission to attack south-west 
Wales; that of personal vendetta. These lands had been given to ‘Isabel, the king’s consort’ as 
part of her dower in 1396.
251
 Shortly after his coronation, Henry distributed these lands 
among his supporters and rewarded others with the profits therefrom.
252
 A French mission 
there could well have been intended to deny Henry lands they possibly perceived as part of 
Isabelle’s right. It is possible that they considered settlement there, as certain intelligence 
suggested, or that they were assessing the locality for support against Henry. The personal 
element to relations between Henry and Louis makes this notion worthy of consideration.
253
 
 
The second main contemporary account appeared in the usually less-well regarded chronicle 
of the Burgundian nobleman, Enguerrand de Monstrelet which, although it ends in 1444, 
appears to have been begun as early as 1413, and the first book, from which this evidence 
comes, probably dates to 1422, the same year the Saint-Denys chronicle ends.
254
 There are 
several different editions of this manuscript which have surfaced over the centuries, although 
none is recorded as diverging noticeably from another.
255
 Perhaps surprisingly, this account, 
which makes far grander claims, has found favour among modern British writers such as 
Lloyd, Kirby and Davies, despite a paucity of conclusive evidence to substantiate its 
expansive claims.
256
  
The Monstrelet account differs from that of Saint-Denys in a few critical details, 
although in places the two accounts largely tally. The first difference is the date. Monstrelet 
wrongly assigns this to 1403. The second is the named leaders of the mission. Although both 
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chronicles agree on the master of crossbows, Monstrelet identified the marshal of France as 
the other commander. The figure of twelve hundred soldiers is agreed in both, but no number 
of knights or crossbowmen is offered here, this therefore constitutes Monstrelet’s entire force. 
The fleet size is radically different, at six score sailed vessels, as opposed to the thirty or so 
suggested by Saint-Denys.
257
 The bishop of Hereford’s evidence strongly favours 
Monstrelet’s figure.258 Both agree that the fleet was delayed by the wind, whether by force, 
lack or direction is unclear. The fleet is credited as leaving from Brest and arriving in 
‘Harfort’ where the French slew the inhabitants and made for the castle. Monstrelet 
incorrectly claimed that the earl of Arundel was inside the castle, but made no mention of 
taking it, only of the burning of the suburbs and putting all around to fire and sword. Next, 
Monstrelet also said that the French went to ‘Tenebi’, cited as eighteen leagues from 
‘Harfort’.259 This was where the French found the ‘prince de Gales’ and ten thousand of his 
fighters waiting for them. That high number of Welsh is consistent in both accounts. There is 
no tale of the fear and flight related by Saint-Denys; instead the two armies headed directly 
for the regional capital, ‘Calemarchin’ or Carmarthen, given as twelve leagues from Tenby. 
No account of an attack here is given, and instead the armies then entered ‘pays de Morgnie’ 
or Glamorgan, and went to ‘l’abbaye noble’ associated with ‘la Table ronde’, which has been 
presumed as being Caerleon, although Monstrelet gave no names or details.
260
 From there, 
they are said to have taken the road to ‘Vincestre’, a clear confusion with Worcester. In order 
to approach Worcester from this direction, they would necessarily have had to approach 
Hereford, which might go some way to explaining the confusion between ‘Heleford’ and 
‘Hereford’ in the Saint-Denys chronicle, ‘Harford’ in Monstrelet and the modern 
interpretation of Haverford.
261
 Here they burned the suburbs and the surrounding countryside 
before meeting, three leagues from the town of Worcester, the king of England.
262
 Here, 
Monstrelet recounted how the two armies adopted battle formations, each on a hillside with a 
large valley between them. This stand-off was said to have lasted eight days, during which 
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there were many skirmishes between the two sides. These were said to have resulted in over 
two hundred dead, among them ‘Patroullart de Troies’, along with ‘monsieur de Mathelonne’ 
and ‘monsieur de La Ville’, and many wounded.263 ‘Patroullart’ is identified as the brother of 
the marshal leading this expedition. This would make ‘the marshal’ Renauld de Tries who 
was in fact admiral of France until he retired sometime in 1405 or early 1406, in the wake of 
this expedition.
264
 Ducal records show that their family were servants of the dukes of Orleans 
throughout this period.
265
 It is possible that an admiral would lead such an expedition, just as 
the mission to Scotland in 1385 had been commanded by an admiral, Jean de Vienne.
266
 This 
alleged stalemate outside Worcester was ended when the king of England withdrew behind 
the town’s walls one evening when he perceived that the French and the Welsh, hard pressed 
by hunger, would not attack. As he retired, some French and Welsh are said to have taken 
eighteen carts laden with food. The loss of baggage from Henry’s army is vaguely 
corroborated by Lloyd, although the number is higher at forty, and swollen rivers were the 
supposed cause.
267
 They then returned to Wales and the French embarked on the ships that, 
according to Monstrelet, had been at sea during this time, guarded by men at arms, and went 
to a port where they had been directed. This last point correlates with evidence from the 
Saint-Denis chronicle that Glyn Dŵr had provided the French with a map of Wales’s 
accessible ports.
268
 The French returned to Saint-Pol de Léon without incident and the two 
leaders went to Paris where they were feted by the king and the princes of the blood.
269
 
Other French sources on the matter depend on these two accounts. For example, Jean 
Juvenal des Ursins rehashed that of Saint-Denys.
270
 Pierre Cochon’s chronicle added nothing 
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new, repeating that they returned at ‘Toussains’, but the implication is that none were left 
behind, which therefore slightly favours Monstrelet’s account.271 This is unsurprising, as des 
Ursins wrote his work in Paris and apparently copied large tracts directly from Saint-Denys, 
whereas Monstrelet’s and Cochon’s chronicles were both composed in Burgundy.272 Both the 
French chronicle accounts contain errors and, no doubt, truths; distinguishing these from one 
another appears impossible at this time. As shown above, both versions of this event were 
probably completed in or around 1422, as was that of Thomas Walsingham.
273
 The proximity 
of Saint-Denys to the court in Paris is no guarantee of accuracy, particularly considering that 
the chronicler frequently and blatantly had an axe to grind against the behaviour of the 
nobility. The fact that one of the commanders, Jehan de Hangest, was perhaps of Burgundian 
adherence, as was Monstrelet, could have given him access to details unavailable to the 
perhaps more isolated monks of Saint-Denys. Therefore, while clear proof for either limiting 
the expedition to Pembrokeshire or placing it at the gates of Worcester has yet to be 
discovered, even without a more profound examination of the sources, there are indicators 
favouring the Worcester theory.   
 
The passage of armies almost always leaves traces; primarily physical and sometimes 
cultural. Although the French-Welsh army of 1405 appears to have left an imprint on 
vernacular folk-tales and places names of western Worcestershire, due to its inherent 
unreliability and susceptibility to manipulation over time, this aspect will not be investigated 
further here.
274
 Any army of the estimated size of the allied force, or even a forward 
contingent, might leave traces on the landscape and historical record of the area as it foraged 
for food and suppressed opposition. This appears to be the case with the southern and 
northern approaches to Hereford and Worcester; this theory is founded on the taxation 
records for the border, as well as other supporting evidence.
275
 The tax records give snapshots 
of the economic state of the Welsh border shires during the revolt, detailing how much 
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money was raised and which places were granted exemptions from paying. Of primary 
importance to this research is that the records detail the situation in 1404 and again in late 
1406 and 1407.
276
 The first observation is that, supported by contemporary letters, the 
marches had sustained considerable destruction and impoverishment by warfare up to the first 
measuring point in December 1404.
277
 The extent of this damage has yet to be sufficiently 
expressed in any extant publication, although Helen Watt’s study is an excellent start-point. 
The evidence presented by the appeals for exemption and tax collection demonstrates a 
noteworthy surge in claims between 1404 and the next tally in 1407, strongly suggesting that 
the area experienced an event to cause this rise.
278
 Allowing for natural occurrences of 
poverty, a declining economy perhaps and other unrecorded rebel attacks on the area, the 
level of successful claims still rose more steeply than the prior rate of attrition caused by 
Welsh troops.
279
 Although this number is noticeably higher than previously, as Watt clarifies, 
these figures probably mask a more extensive record of damage since people had returned to 
the area by 1407 and some areas were not deemed to have sustained sufficient damage to 
warrant exemption.
280
 Therefore, at some point between 1404 and the next occasion 
exemptions are permitted, 1407, the border region of Herefordshire and southern and western 
Shropshire endured an event that caused destruction and depopulation. The only candidate for 
this activity, outside the other possible economic and unrecorded military factors, is the 
passage of the allied army of 1405. The presence of the French in the area was specifically 
mentioned by a letter from the inhabitants of Shropshire to the king. The letter clearly reveals 
a fear that the ‘rebels and the French’ were aware that there were fewer troops defending the 
county than elsewhere along the Welsh border. It is also evident that the plaintiffs expected 
them to overrun and waste the county unless the king sent military aid.
281
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Elsewhere, the letter also claimed that a third of the county had been destroyed by the 
rebels and that the inhabitants had fled ‘to gain their meat and sustenance elsewhere’. It bears 
the date of 21 April but no year is given, although the Proceedings editors placed it 
‘probably’ in 1403. It seems exceedingly unlikely that a third of the county had been 
destroyed by the close of the campaigning season 1402 and that the inhabitants feared a 
French invasion of the western Shropshire border at that point, notably prior to the Welsh-
French alliance. Damage to that extent only appears to have been recorded by 1404 at the 
earliest and the only occasion of a possible French presence near the Shropshire border is late 
summer 1405. August and September would be good months for incursions into the border 
regions; the harvests would be ripening and would help feed a foraging army. Therefore, this 
letter should be considered for 1406 at the earliest; particularly if the Saint-Denys chronicle 
were correct about the French staying the winter. Ongoing rumours concerning them might 
well have been in the air in spring the following year. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
consulted were absolutely split equally between it meaning ‘hors de nouvelles’ (without news of) or ‘or, de 
nouvel’ (or/so, once again). In essence, it makes little difference to the argument put forward here, which 
solely seekes to establish that the French and the rebels were present. It does, and the only candidate year for 
that is 1405.  
 240 
 
 
Map 12: Tax exemptions in the borders.
282
 
 
The allies appear to have left the border before October; a letter from the countess of 
Hereford revealed that although they were expected to appear at Worcester, there were only 
rumours of them in the area by 28 October.
283
 Information furnished by Bishop Mascall’s 
register, plotted onto a map, further corroborates this theory.
284
 The places there named form 
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two clear streams, one on a southerly approach from Gwent to Hereford, the other heading 
north-west through southern Shropshire and into Wales. This is worthy of mention in that it 
might demonstrate the army’s ingress and egress; it would probably not return the same way 
it came if it needed to forage; Monstrelet suggested this army needed food, and this would be 
common among contemporary campaigns.
285
 On this evidence then, although uncertain, 
Monstrelet’s account seems more credible.  
So, crown and local sources demonstrate that there was a notable volume of 
destruction wrought upon the area at the right time, the French were clearly identified by 
local inhabitants and there are no noticeably large-scale attacks recorded anywhere in this 
region afterwards. In fact, opinion currently holds that things began to sour for Glyn Dŵr 
from 1405 and, if this analysis is correct, this again isolates 1405 as the only candidate year 
for the destruction that befell the March between 1404 and 1407.
286
 Although the theory of 
decline seems incorrect for reasons discussed below, the physical evidence demonstrating the 
presence of a hostile force in the region appears compelling. 
However, there is a further suggestive source; the movements of King Henry. The 
king had suppressed the York revolt and was demonstrably present at Pontefract between 6 
and 12 August 1405.
287
 On 7 August, still at Pontefract, Henry learned of the French landing, 
writing orders to the sheriffs of sixteen counties, indicative of a large threat, to the following 
effect: 
 
To the sheriff of Hereforde. Order, as he loves the king and his honour and desires the 
safety and defence of the realm and the marches thereof, upon sight etc. to cause 
proclamation to be made that all knights, esquires, yeomen and other fencible men of the 
sheriff’s bailiwick upon their allegiance and under pain of forfeiture shall make ready, 
array and furnish themselves with arms, every man as his estate requires, and hasten to 
draw to the city of Hereforde, to march with the king and manfully resist the malice of 
his enemies; as now newly it has come to the king’s ears that the seigneur de Hugevyle 
and great number of other his enemies of France with a fleet of ships have landed in 
Milforde haven to reinforce the Welsh rebels, and with them are purposing to invade the 
realm and the marches of Wales, and to do what mischief they may to the king and his 
lieges; and his will is to resist their malice, and take order for defence of the realm and 
marches and of the said lieges.
288
 
 
The surprise and fear at this bold French move seem palpable within this and subsequent 
messages that season. Henry’s surprise seems out of line with the intelligence at his disposal. 
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In July, commissions were issued to raise troops to counter the French who were going to 
attack English interests in Picardy and then ‘to go to Wales to strengthen the rebels there.’ In 
the same month, Thomas de Berkeley was commissioned to raise troops in Gloucester, 
Bristol and Somerset because it was said that the Welsh were going to invade that area ‘with 
a great force.’289 
Henry can then be tracked with reasonable certainty across the country, moving through 
Nottingham to Leicester, arriving there by 16 August at the latest.
290
 Records place him at 
Leicester until 19 August.
291
 Henry then proceeded to Worcester by 23 August, from where 
he ordered the sheriffs of seven counties ‘under pain of the king’s wrath’ to meet him at 
Worcester the following Monday. These messages exude tones of fear and threat – highly 
suggestive of an urgent and sizeable danger.
292
 Henry can be shown to be present at 
Worcester until 31 August. Although Enguerrand de Monstrelet gave no precise dates, this 
evidence places Henry in the area and within the timeframe declared by Monstrelet, and for 
precisely the right amount of time, eight days, during which the supposed stand-off between 
the armies was alleged to have occurred.
293
 While there, Henry summoned more troops, 
binding named individuals as well as reissuing the orders of array to seven surrounding 
counties to meet with him at Hereford, because ‘his enemies of France have landed in Wales with 
no small power to reinforce the Welsh rebels.’294 
The French and Welsh allies are plainly identified by Henry and the threat seems 
credible and large enough to warrant this further, urgent call for more troops. By 4 September 
Henry had advanced to Hereford where he tried to raise a loan and recorded his intent to 
march against the French in Wales.
295
 Here, Bishop Mascall celebrated the expedition the 
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king was about to launch against the duke of Orleans in Milford.
296
 His trail of orders shows 
that the king remained at Hereford at least until 10 September after which point, though it is 
unclear when, he seems to have retired east, resurfacing at Worcester on 28 September.
297
 
This offers another window of opportunity for the alleged stand-off to have occurred. It is 
possible that Henry made some effort to advance west but, failing to find the enemy or being 
prevented from doing so by adverse weather conditions, not mentioned by the French or any 
other English source, he returned to Worcester.
298
 Both of these seem extremely unlikely; 
thousands of men and horses are easy to track and there is a lack of evidence berating the 
weather conditions. It is also possible of course, that he did not attempt to attack, track or 
harass the allies. Records reveal he remained at Worcester for the first week of October, from 
where he returned to Westminster, arriving there by 14 October at the latest.
299
 It must also be 
concluded that Henry was clearly in the place indicated by Monstrelet at the appropriate time 
and, most compellingly, for the amount of time claimed. Apart from accepting that there is a 
good deal of truth in Monstrelet’s account, there seems no other means of explaining his 
strikingly accurate claims on this matter. Therefore, despite Rees Davies’s belief that in its 
unsupported form it savoured of ‘a flight of chivalric literary fancy’, Monstrelet’s chronicle 
appears to reflect what the physical evidence independently suggests; the presence of two 
opposing armies in the same region at the same time.
300
  
 
According to the Saint-Denys evidence, the major noble leaders did not return to France until 
All Saints, and so were available for battle until November, and the rest of their sizeable army 
which was left to overwinter in Wales was, equally, present and therefore theoretically 
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occupying part of the domain claimed by Henry until Lent 1406.
301
 If this account is correct, 
then having been divided into three sections around Cardigan, roughly twenty miles over easy 
terrain from the damaged English position at Carmarthen, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
they would have been easier for Henry to engage and destroy, had he the will.  
This poses a problem. Henry clearly knew that the French were in Wales, yet he 
appears to have done nothing to confront them at the time, nor journeyed there the following 
year to reassert his power.  The conclusion that Henry shied away from battle is troubling; 
one of the signal features of Henry’s reign is that he readily and hastily rushed to battle, as 
the suppression of the Percy revolts of 1403 and 1405 clearly demonstrated. Not only this, 
but Henry appears to have deliberately projected an image of being a king who would deal 
with dissent resolutely, either in face-to-face dispute or in mobilising troops and hastening to 
a confrontation.
302
 It is feasible that in this case he decided not to risk himself in combat, 
although this runs against the record of his reign and fails to explain why he did not send an 
army under a subordinate. There is also the curious story of the English of Pembrokeshire 
paying off the Welsh with the significant sum of £200 of silver around November 1405. This 
is suggestively but not explicitly supported by Privy Council records, and might indicate the 
extent to which the Welsh were dominant in the west at that time.
303
 It might also have 
secured a truce in that area. Henry’s lack of activity in Wales might be indicative of either an 
acceptance of a loss of control there, or reflect that the French army had returned to France in 
the uneventful manner described by Monstrelet, leaving only the Welsh to attack, although 
this explanation seems unsatisfactory and incomplete. Henry’s refusal to pursue in September 
or to show the flag in the west the following year supports a conclusion that he accepted that 
he no longer controlled the region. After the Welsh sacked Carmarthen in 1403, Henry 
journeyed there in person and reasserted his authority around west Wales. However, he did 
not do so in 1405 or the following year.
304
 In addition, there is a notable flurry of evidence 
concerning hostage exchanges, exemplified by a curious paper trail regarding Thomas Roche, 
constable of Pembroke castle. He was captured by the Welsh sometime during the latter half 
of 1405 and was eventually exchanged for four Welsh prisoners.
305
 It is also noteworthy that 
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Roche was rewarded with legal protection by Henry in regard to his custody of Carmarthen, 
which possibly identifies why and when he was taken by the Welsh.
306
 However, Roche’s 
liberty does not appear to have been easily arranged. Henry issued a firm command to 
Reginald, Lord Grey, to see to it that a number of rebels were released so that Roche could be 
freed.
307
 The negotiations for Roche’s release dragged on until the following summer.308 The 
process of negotiation with the rebels might be dismissible as a locally-worked solution had 
the king not been consistently involved. His personal hand in the matter could be taken as a 
legitimisation of the rebels’ territorial claims, just as the English would exchange prisoners 
with the French, for example, during times of truce. Perhaps herein lies the key. It should be 
borne in mind that, according to the English spy at Glyn Dŵr’s parliament in July 1405, Glyn 
Dŵr intended to present himself before Henry with the French behind him and discuss 
peace.
309
 No-one has yet suggested that this might be what happened, yet truces between the 
Welsh and the border communities were relatively frequent.
310
 From the Welsh side, 
following profound research on Owain Glyn Dŵr, it seems probable that he would do what 
he promised. To examine this suggestion from the crown’s perspective, a truce would explain 
several ambiguities. If Henry made such an agreement, no matter how insincerely, that would 
explain why the sizeable army he frantically gathered at Hereford in September made no 
clear move into Wales, that season or the following year, suggesting the agreement of a year-
long truce, for example. Evidence from March the following year implies that the king had 
not managed to resupply Coity castle in the Vale of Glamorgan, when he ‘was last in 
Wales.’311 This clearly implies that Henry was thought to have entered Wales in 1405, but did 
not even go the short distance from Hereford to Coity in the gentle coastal landscape of 
Glamorgan. The military activities arranged shortly before Henry’s departure for London 
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were not indicative of mounting a campaign westwards. In that first week of October 1405, 
he ordered ‘Richard, Lord of Grey’, to hold a commission of ‘oyer and terminer’ in the king’s 
own lordship of Brecon, and Henry appointed Thomas, earl of Arundel, keeper of 
Shrewsbury, and empowered him to do whatever was required to secure the county of 
Shropshire.
312
 These two measures are clearly security measures designed to stabilise and 
secure the border. This not only implies a threat to penetrate the border, but also supports the 
re-dating to 1406 of the letter from the tenants of Shropshire who feared that the French 
would return.
313
 On 7 October, local officials were appointed to raise a force of 200 men-at-
arms and 600 archers to muster in November – so in no apparent hurry.314 Their task was to 
accompany Lord Grey ‘for the safe-keeping of the castles and fortresses of those parts (South 
Wales) and the counties of Gloucester and Hereford adjoining.’ A comparable force was to 
be raised to assist Arundel also. While this intends an advance into ‘South Wales’, judging by 
the letter of the orders, this force was raised to secure and stabilise the English side of the 
border and bolster nearby castles on the Welsh side. It is questionable whether they would 
have ventured too deeply into Wales if there were no truce in force, since this army is smaller 
than either the Welsh or French force individually and would logically be at great risk of 
destruction. Later that month, Lord Grey was appointed as the king’s lieutenant in Brecon 
and Hereford for a period of forty-nine days.
315
 Again, this seems unhurried and short-term; 
hardly indicative of a counter-strike by crown forces. Finally, the force ordered to be raised in 
October was, on 24 November 1405, commissioned to serve Lord Grey until 1 February.
316
 
At the same time, Henry ordered another session of ‘oyer and terminer’ to be held in 
Gloucester and Hereford as people there had been supplying the rebels with ‘victuals, armour 
and other harness.’317 The sum of these actions appears to be a re-imposition of law, order 
and the king’s authority over Hereford, Gloucester, Shropshire and Brecon. These are clearly 
defensive security measures, carried out at will, rather than under the threat of an immediate 
attack. They stand stark in comparison with Henry’s hurried summoning of troops from so 
many counties during the late summer and early autumn. Once more, these later measures 
imply the existence of a truce, rather than a state of war and invasion. 
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The following year, parliament debated a strategy for the Welsh war and demanded 
action; it voted funds for Prince Henry to raise a sizeable army of five thousand men that 
year; yet they did not enter Wales at all.
318
 The fighting that occurred in 1406 was peripheral; 
indeed it might be just to limit the count of military operations that year to the English 
landing on Anglesey.
319
 It is difficult to dismiss Henry’s passivity otherwise, given his 
martial career up to that point and the extraordinary challenge posed to any king of England 
of a French army, combined with rebel forces, on lands he claimed and were held in the name 
of the royal heir. The notion of a truce would also perhaps explain hostage negotiations such 
as those mentioned above, such arrangements being common following truces. It should be 
remembered that by summer 1405 Henry held Glyn Dŵr’s heir, Gruffydd, and others close to 
the Welsh leader, and therefore this might have proven a good time to conduct peace 
negotiations probably aimed at securing their release.
320
  
The notion of a truce is not far-fetched. Quite the contrary, it is precisely what Glyn 
Dŵr said he would do; the decline in military activity after the 1405 campaign and 
subsequent prisoner exchange are suggestive of this end. This might also explain French 
actions following the campaign in Wales. Assuming the Saint-Denys chronicler was correct, 
the return of the French nobles was legitimate, and possibly a term of the truce. The army left 
behind would have been safe from attack from the English, or acted as a powerful guarantee 
of opposition should Henry return too soon. Assuming Monstrelet was right, the unmolested 
departure of all of the French was entirely feasible and in keeping with a truce being in force. 
If either scenario were true, then the French had recovered their honour, tarnished by the 
comte de la Marche in 1404. They had either invaded and ravaged one corner of their 
enemy’s domain, or they had confronted him and shown him their colours on his own soil, 
possibly assisting in negotiating a truce for their ally. Their shame erased, they were free to 
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return home to be feted. Glyn Dŵr’s actions in seeking a truce seem merited for several 
reasons. Firstly, this would seem to be a normal human reaction of a father whose son and 
several close friends had been captured that summer. Next, as recorded by a good 
independent contemporary source, that was exactly what Glyn Dŵr said he would do when 
the French arrived. Also, the manner in which this appears to have been done seems to fit 
with the normal contemporary native cultural and diplomatic practices in terms of conflict 
resolution.
321
 Meetings at border points to settle disputes and to seek redress are documented 
throughout the medieval period. The form and typical clauses used in such ‘agreement 
meetings’ appear consistently in examples from 1354 to 1498.322 These meetings were often 
followed by a period of truce during which the different sides sought to fulfil the obligations 
to which they had committed themselves. Such an agreement might explain why Henry IV 
became personally involved in pursuing the release of seemingly unknown Welsh hostages 
detailed above. These ‘agreement meetings’ were not solely native practices, but were 
adopted by the Normans and the English in their dealings with the Welsh. Recognising the 
protagonists acting within the cultural customs of their day appears to ground their actions in 
a more realistic way. Finally, had the French assisted in winning peace for Glyn Dŵr, it 
might help explain the clauses of the Pennal Declaration of March 1406. It has been viewed 
as a document detailing the blue-print of a future state; such a proclamation would be an 
illogical thing to produce during a war, which some believe was in decline for the Welsh after 
1405. It clearly makes more sense to plan ahead during a truce and appears to give an idea of 
Glyn Dŵr’s peacetime intentions. The extent of the campaign’s reach and the reasons why 
Henry declined to face the allied army in combat remain, for now, uncertain. However, the 
above offers a plausible, even probable, solution, if people’s actions reveal the true course of 
events. 
 
The expedition to Wales should be considered within the context of other French activities 
beyond its borders that year. In a similar time frame, Charles de Savoisy commanded a force 
that launched from Saint-Mathieu in Brittany in late August and conducted an apparently 
successful, bloody attack between Portland and the Isle of Wight in the company of Bretons 
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and Castilians.
323
 In addition, from spring to mid-summer 1405, there was a plan to forcibly 
install Benedict XIII into Rome.
324
 Although this is discussed in more detail below, its 
existence and because so many of the great French magnates contributed towards it merits 
reference here. Although it ultimately foundered before completion, the fact that France was 
able to articulate its external power so forcefully in 1405 demonstrates not only its perhaps 
unexpected military capability, but also its less frequently discussed political and strategic 
will to do so. 
Robert Mascall, bishop of Hereford, had little doubt that the French expedition was sent 
by the duke of Orleans, as the opening quotation reveals.
325
 This appears accurate in the 
context of Louis’s domination of the French court from 1402 onwards, but notably from 1404 
to early 1406 when he ran affairs. Considering the previous year’s alliance, the failed mission 
of 1404 and Louis’s military strategy of alliance and action, Mascall’s assertion is entirely 
credible. In addition, the project that same year to insert Benedict XIII into Rome under arms 
was plainly supported, perhaps even driven, by Orleans. The following quote from King 
Charles’s letter of 1406, following the earl of Northumberland’s visit to Paris, also associated 
the English rebels with the French invasion of Wales. This establishes some grounds to tie the 
York rebellion and the allied campaign in Wales to part of an attempted coup, fuelled by 
Louis of Orleans, all of which aimed at dethroning Henry IV. While this appears to read as a 
rebuke, the letter undeniably offered aid to those English rebels who sought to overthrow 
Henry. In light of this and Louis’s other efforts against Henry, it seems plausible to forward 
the notion that 1405 saw an unsuccessful attempted Orleanist coup. 
 
They should know that, if recently, when we sent an army to Wales, we had been sure 
that the partisans of the just cause and the friends of the legitimate heirs to the throne 
would welcome our people favourably and would hasten to join them, we would have 
had at our disposal far greater forces, but we are still ready to help them in the 
aforementioned cases.
326
  
                                                          
323
 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 316-23. (It is noteworthy that de Savoisy is said to have spared the Genoese 
they found in England on the grounds that they were subjects of the French king, 320-1); Evans, The 
Unconquered Knight, 107-32; Carriazo, El Victorial, 186-215.  
324
 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 262-7, 290-7; Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 337-41; Creighton, 
History of the Papacy, vol 1, 188-95; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 47; Pillement, 
Pedro de Luna, 124-6, 131-6 (Pillement says Benedict withdrew in August, Creighton says October, 195, the 
latter seems the more reliable); Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 68; Lalande, Jean II le Meingre, 130-9. 
325
 Parry, The Register of Robert Mascall, 6.  
326
 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 428, 430 (Latin), 429, 431 (French); Williams, Chronicque de la Traïson et Mort, 
299-302, My translation of: ‘indubitanter scientes quod, cum ad Walliam novissime armatum transmisimus, si 
securi duissemus gentem nostram ab amicis veritatis et heredum Anglie sequacibus recipi debere gratulanter, 
et cum effectu, ut decebat, cosiari, majorem multo potenciam misissemus, mitterque semper parati sumus, 
 250 
 
5.4:    The Pennal Declaration, 1406 
 
The ‘Pennal Declaration’, was a letter sent by Owain Glyn Dŵr to Charles VI concerning 
Wales’s position on papal allegiance during the Schism. It comprised two documents; a short 
preamble on a separate parchment and the main document which discussed two principal 
subjects on one large parchment.
327
 The latter acknowledged receipt of a French letter 
received on 8 March 1406, while the preamble and the declaration were both dated as 
complete in the same year but on the last day of March.
328
 The original letter from France 
was brought to Owain by ‘Hugh Eddowyer, of the Order of Predicants, and Maurice Kery, 
our friends and envoys.’329 The existence of a member of the Dominican Order is noteworthy 
due to their influential role in Pope Benedict XIII’s personal council, including the position 
of the pope’s confessor.330 Little has been revealed of these two envoys except through the 
incarceration of a Dominican friar named Hywel Edwere in north Wales in 1410. The 
evidence for this also illuminates the probability of Scots’ involvement in transporting 
messengers and provision of victuals to the rebels. Additionally, the fluid nature of loyalties 
of castle commanders is unveiled; some retained Percy sympathies, some changed stance 
according to the local strength of the protagonists or as immediate financial opportunities 
arose.
331
 There is no record of the French original letter to Owain, although its contents are 
clearly rewritten within this reply. Frustratingly, no precise composition date for the French 
document is included, although the text leaves clues, discussed below. This is relevant in 
terms of establishing the identity of the French hand guiding this policy. The documents 
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plainly show that it came from Charles VI’s court; however this appears to fall during a 
period of regency under the queen and Orleans during one of the king’s absences, but one 
denoted by Louis’s weakening grip.332  
 
It is telling that the Welsh were invited to declare their allegiance for the pope commonly, 
though not entirely accurately, regarded as the French candidate. This demonstrates that the 
element that dominated the French court at that point regarded them as a legitimate power 
and a desirable ally. This could be more simply characterised; before 1406 the Welsh had 
sufficiently demonstrated their liberty from England to conduct their own political, military 
and diplomatic affairs, and were therefore legitimate to induce into French influence. The 
1404 alliance transferred Wales’s temporal allegiance to France.333 One of the stated aims of 
the French initiative that arrived in Wales in March 1406 was to secure Wales’s spiritual 
allegiance to the French king also.
334
 This overt acquisition of the allegiance one of 
England’s British dominions was a significant and aggressive measure by the French. It 
clearly proves an effort to expand their power and influence into Britain. 
According to the Saint-Denys chronicle, the bulk of the French-Breton expeditionary 
force overwintered in Wales and returned to France around Lent 1406.
335
 If correct, then it is 
possible that the Pennal documents were taken to France with that returning army.   
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The Documents 
The Preamble 
This relatively brief note, in diplomatic terms, gave a précis of the longer document it 
accompanied.
336
 It is valuable for a number of reasons, perhaps most notably for the use of 
the first person which strongly suggests that Owain Glyn Dŵr dictated this part of the 
declaration. It seems unlikely that Owain wrote it.
337
 The document gives an example of 
Owain Glyn Dŵr’s voice; an apparently angry one that used repetition and colourful, violent 
phraseology. To illustrate that point, he referred to English barbarism three times in this short 
note: ‘fury of the barbarous Saxons’, ‘barbarous fury of those reigning in this country’ and 
‘barbarians’338 The description of an enemy as barbarian is far from unique. However, it 
appears to recount the unwarranted destruction of something innocent, perhaps holy. Italian 
writers of the period refer to descending German armies in the same manner.
339
 The Pennal 
voice speaks of the violence and oppression suffered by the Church in Wales as well as by 
‘my nation’, ‘whence because they had government over us, and indeed, on account of that 
fact itself, it seemed reasonable with them to trample on us’, ‘the metropolitan church of St. 
David’s was, as it appears, violently compelled, by the barbarous fury of those reigning in 
this country, to obey the church of Canterbury, and de facto still remains in this subjection’ 
and ‘similarly you will wish to extirpate and remove violence and oppression from the church 
and my subjects.’340 These denunciations of Henry and his violent methods were not simply 
Glyn Dŵr venting against injustice. The original French approach, contained within Owain’s 
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longer reply, regaled him with the pro-Avignon account of the Schism, using certain phrases 
to list the efforts Clement and Benedict had made to heal the rift, and sought Owain’s 
declaration of support for the preferred French-backed pontiff.
341
 The language of the French 
letter described in detail the mob violence that had forced the election of Urban VI on the 
grounds that he was Italian, and how the Roman pontiffs had usurped the Holy See. Owain 
appropriated the same terms and, by mirroring that language, appears to have been attempting 
not only to relate to the issue in hand and demonstrate his fervour in this important matter, 
but also to reflect the similarities between Henry’s and Urban’s conduct. Moreover, his 
condemnation of Henry and his allegedly unjust, unchristian and barbarous ways would 
likely have been music to the ears of those French nobles who bore Henry ill will. It should 
be recalled here that Louis of Orleans detested Henry personally for his treatment of his 
niece, Isabella, and his subsequent refusal to engage in a duel with the duke. In addition, it 
should be remembered that Louis was Benedict’s most fervent advocate at court.342 In writing 
this, perhaps, Owain was speaking directly to Louis. In a period where personal relations 
played a major role in high-level politics, Owain appears to have been addressing his 
audience wisely.  
In this short letter, Owain appears humble and addressed the French king with the 
correct words of esteem. Perhaps most importantly to the French faction whose support he 
hoped to elicit, he made plain his answer regarding Benedict: ‘confident indeed in his right, 
and intending for me to agree with you as far as is possible for me, I recognize him as the true 
Vicar of Christ, on my own behalf and on behalf of my subjects by these letters patent, 
foreseeing them by the bearer of their communications in your majesty’s presence.’343 For the 
Welsh rebels, his expressed wish to retain French support and to seek their aid in 
simultaneously resurrecting and liberating the Welsh Church from Canterbury’s yoke were 
paramount. He closed by requesting the French to present the letter to Benedict XIII and to 
support their cause. However, within this document, which differs from the other more 
ecclesiastically-flavoured or diplomatically formulaic letters, Owain also showed a more 
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subtle, emotive side to his language, ‘as you deemed us worthy to raise us out of darkness 
into light’, and from this short letter his intelligence seems perceptible.344  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 3: The Great Seal of Owynus, Dei Gratia Princeps Wallie attached to J 516. 29, the 
main section of the ‘Pennal Declaration’ (an identical seal is also attached to the ratification 
of the 1404 treaty, J 623. 96).  
 
The Declaration 
The main document comprises two sections.345 By far the greater part discussed the Schism 
and justified Benedict as the true pope, while a short final section presented a number of 
points and requests Owain wished to make in order to revive the Welsh church.346  
To date, the greater part of the document has been largely passed over in preference to 
discussions of the Welsh issues. Rees Davies, the only writer to comment on this first section, 
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brushed past it in two sentences.347 However, a more thorough treatment of it reveals more 
noteworthy points.  The main theme of the message is valuable; that of Wales’s desire to 
strengthen ties to France and offering its spiritual allegiance to French guidance. However, 
there are other points of substance and style that demand exposure.  
In the first instance, the document reveals the names of the two envoys, ‘Hugh 
Eddowyer’ and ‘Morris Kery’, who returned from France with the French letter.348 In 
addition, this document firmly dates Owain’s 1406 parliament, which must have been held 
between the arrival of the French request, 8 March 1406, and the completion of the reply, 31 
March 1406.349 Within the body of this main document, Owain explicitly says as much.350 
Although the date of this third assembly has proved elusive, most writers have 
assumed it was convened at the place named on the document, Pennal.
351
 On reflection, while 
possible, this seems unlikely. Owain held his 1404 parliament at Machynlleth, and that of the 
following year at Harlech.
352
 Given that Pennal is just outside Machynlleth, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that Owain was varying his councils between southern and northern 
strongholds. Within the clauses of most interest to Welsh writers, Owain recognised the need 
to establish northern and southern colleges in Wales.
353
 Equally, the following year, when 
Prince Henry’s army advanced to Aberystwyth, Owain was in the north, which might support 
a notion that he alternated his council venue on a yearly basis.
354
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 That short passage also reveals the composition of Owain’s parliament; clergy, nobles 
and the most prominent men of each commote.
355
 In contrast to Lloyd’s assessment therefore 
that Owain held ‘a house of lords rather than a house of commons’, it seems unequivocal that 
Owain’s parliament contained the appropriate leaders of the three estates – entirely in 
keeping with the notions and norms of his time.
356
 
The main thrust of the French letter described the events which, ‘violently and 
through an infamous riot’ raised ‘Bartholomew de Prinhano’ to the highest Christian 
office.
357
 The description of the election, the aggression of the Roman mob and the 
withdrawal of the cardinals from Rome is unremarkable fare.
358
 It does, however, neatly 
exemplify Italian opposition to the French dominance, even possession, of the papacy during 
much of the fourteenth century. The Pennal text then renders a largely routine justification of 
the deliberation over the rightful election of Clement VII and subsequently that of Benedict 
XIII. Within this part of the letter there is also a defence of the efforts made by Clement and 
Benedict to heal the schism, and contrasting revelations are made of the actions of the intrusi, 
the intruder or anti-pope, to deepen the crisis.
359
 This section also contains a notable tactic of 
French persuasion; the listing of all those temporal princes who freely supported Benedict.
360
 
They were all lords of French territories, or rulers connected to the French crown by blood, 
marriage or alliance. Superficially, this resembles a weak list of pro-French puppets and 
relations. It is worth considering however, that this might have been proposed as a subtle, 
seductive invitation to join that club. The lure of accepting would be to stand in liberty in a 
similar manner to Scotland, Cyprus and Genoa, whose political independence against larger, 
aggressively acquisitive neighbours was powerfully upheld by France. Viewed in that light, 
the French approach to Owain should be perceived in a different manner, one which is 
substantially underpinned by the previous examples of intelligent French diplomatic 
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seduction seen previously in this thesis. That point can be directly underlined by the 
paragraph preceding Owain’s demands, in which the French offer many of the requests Glyn 
Dŵr subsequently made.  
 
It seems to our said lord the king that this shall be to the safety of his soul, of his 
subjects, and the safe-keeping of his realm. Concerning this, the same lord the king, who 
sincerely zealous, prays heartily for his safety, the prosperity and conservation of his 
honour, his state and himself, under the bond and treaty of friendship, and of a singular 
love which he has for him. He requests that he indicate this himself, because if he puts 
the aforesaid into action, he will give the same lord, the king, great satisfaction, and he 
will consider himself very well pleased and to his greater obligation. If, by chance the 
said lord prince, the prelates the other ecclesiastics of his land, and his subjects dread, 
because from this kind of restoration, that certain prelates and other beneficed clergy, 
appointed by the anti-pope and his predecessors, and other favours of whatsoever nature 
granted on behalf of future occasions to his subjects may be unsettled, or that the lord 
Benedict may wish to change anything. On that account, our lord the king offers that he 
will, procure from the said lord Benedict that all the prelates and beneficed clergy shall 
be confirmed, and all favours, dispensations, etc., shall be ratified and conceded to them 
in secure and proper form. Also the lord Benedict shall provide, that when prelacies and 
other benefices are vacant, or shall be vacant, those persons only who are sufficiently in 
the faith and good will of the said lord the prince shall be appointed, and not rivals or 
suspects.
361
 
 
 
This manifestly promised that that Charles would have a greater obligation towards Glyn 
Dŵr and detailed those things that he would initially secure from Benedict on Owain’s 
behalf. The fact that these offers originally came from the French has only been partially 
alluded to by Rees Davies, but appears in no other secondary work consulted. Although 
Davies recognised many of the Welsh demands as ‘utterly unexceptional’ he appears to 
diminish the French role in this key part of the document, instead highlighting the ‘amplitude 
of his (Owain’s) vision and the bravado of his approach.’362 Lloyd also saw the brilliance and 
originality of the Pennal demands; ‘one cannot doubt, upon a review of this long list of 
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demands, that the Welsh leader was an excellent hand at driving a bargain and fully 
understood how much might be extracted from Avignon in return for the promise of his 
support.’363 However, in pressing the originality and breadth of his vision, these two 
respected historians seem to have utterly missed the point; the strength and intelligence of the 
Pennal Declaration lies in the fact that there is nothing entirely new or visionary in it, but that 
all can be related to other events either in Wales or contemporary Europe, and therefore all of 
the Welsh articles were theoretically grantable on the grounds of precedence.  
 Although Lloyd, Davies and Williams have offered good descriptions of the Welsh-
interest clauses of the Pennal Declaration, they are worth discussing here.
364
 In the final 
section, that of primary interest to Welsh writers, the same aggressive voice identified in the 
preamble again becomes apparent. There is the curious reference to the English as 
‘barbarorum Saxonum’, yet the letter discusses ‘monasteriis et collegiis anglicorum’, and the 
‘regni Anglie’.  This suggests that a specific point was being made about the English being 
‘Saxons’, yet Owain’s intended point now seems lost. Intriguingly, a similar term to describe 
the English as ‘Sesnes’, temptingly close to the Welsh term for English, ‘Saesneg’, appears in 
contemporary French treatises which also included friendly reference to the Welsh. They 
were written between 1406 and 1409, and described as ‘traité’; notably one titled “A Toute 
La Chevalerie” which was connected to the longer, multi-part ‘Traité Contre Les Anglais.’365 
On the grounds of the use of those uncommon phrases, it is tempting to imagine collusion 
between the writers of the ‘traités’ and the Pennal Declaration. In addition, as the French 
letter to Owain identified the Roman pope as intrusi, so, in a repetition of the preamble’s 
appropriation of French terms, Owain’s declaration refers to ‘Henricum Lencastrie 
                                                          
363
 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 121. 
364
 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 118-21; Williams, Welsh Church from Conquest to Reformation, 222-5; Davies, 
Revolt, 169-73. 
365
 Grèvy-Pons et al,  Jean de Montreuil, Opera, vol 2, 12 (dating), 89-149 (one version of the traité ‘A Toute La 
Chevalerie’, plus notes), 96, lines 150-6 (three mentions of the ‘Sesnes’), 105, (‘Qui de glaive [usera] de glaive 
[morra]’, the murderous behaviour of the English towards their neighbours, ‘facent [continuelment] guerre 
mortelle … ou ilz n’ayent esté cause d’espandre, et espandu plus de sang humain, bouté feux, violé femmes, 
destruit eglises, hospitaulx et autres lieux sains que (toutes aultres nations crestiennes), tesmoing France, 
Espaingne, Escoce, Gales et Yrlande …’), 113, lines 703-5 (honourable mention to ‘Yvain de Gales’ for leading a 
French army against the English and killing more than 500 ‘Angloiz’ in one place), also in the Traité Contre Les 
Anglais (étape I), 159-218, particularly 201-2, lines 1267-1273, dealing with a point over who asserted their 
sovereignty overbearingly towards their subjects and neighbours, ‘se poeut evidanment jugier le contraire, et 
se les Escoz et lez Galois, les Espaignos et cheux d’Irlande en estoient interrogiéz, voire tous les aultres voisins 
desdiz Angloiz, ilz tesmoigneroient lesdiz Angloiz ester gens intollerables, rigoreux et hays de leurs voisins.’ 
 259 
 
intrusorem’.366 It appears that Owain was trying to communicate with his interlocutors with 
the same terms they used, applying them to his circumstances and embellishing them 
emotively.  
 Demands made by Glyn Dŵr in the Pennal Declaration have been identified as 
political as well as ecclesiastical, and likened to a civil programme for an independent church 
within an independent state.
367
 The Welsh clauses then, are the following: 
 
First, that all ecclesiastical censures against us, our subjects, or our land, by the aforesaid 
lord Benedict or Clement his predecessor, at present existing, the same shall by the said 
Benedict be removed.
368
 
 
The simple request for the lifting of any censures made by the Avignon pope against Owain, 
his subjects and lands would be simple to achieve. The French promised that they could 
procure this as well as many of the other subsequent requests.  
 
 ‘Again, that whatsoever vows and of whatsoever nature given by us or whomsoever of 
our principality, to those who called themselves Urban or Boniface, lately deceased, or to 
their adherents, shall be absolved.’369  
 
This second clause acts in tandem with the first, annulling the obedience to Benedict’s papal 
adversary. This too, would have been simple to grant. 
 
Again, that he shall confirm and ratify the orders, collations, titles of prelates, 
dispensations, notorial documents, and all things whatsoever,  from the time of Gregory 
XI., from which, any danger to the souls, or prejudice to us, or our subjects, may occur, 
or may be engendered.
370
 
 
The next clause appears as a cautious next step, following the removal of censures by 
Avignon and the annulment of vows to the Roman pope, returning to the established state of 
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affairs immediately prior to the schism. This also would be simple enough to decree in 
writing or in a public audience.  
 
Again, that the Church of St David, archbishop and confessor, was a metropolitan 
church, and after his death, twenty-four archbishops succeeded him in the same place, as 
their names are contained in the chronicles and ancient books of the church of Menevia, 
and we cause these to be stated as the chief evidence, namely, Eliud, Ceneu, Morfael, 
Mynyw, Haerwnen, Elwaed, Gwrnwen, Llewdwyd, Gwrwyst, Gwgawn, Clydâwg, 
Aman, Elias, Maelswyd, Sadwrnwen, Cadell, Alaethwy, Novis, Sadwrnwen, Drochwel, 
Asser, Arthwael, David II., and Samson; and that as a metropolitan church it had and 
ought to have the undermentioned suffragan churches, namely, Exeter, Bath, Hereford, 
Worcester, Leicester, which is now translated to the churches of Coventry and Lichfield, 
St Asaph, Bangor, and Llandaff. For being crushed by the fury of the barbarous Saxons, 
who usurped to themselves the land of Wales, they trampled upon the aforesaid church of 
St. David’s, and made her a handmaid to the church of Canterbury.371  
 
This is perhaps the first clause of any local significance. The reason for presenting these 
twenty-four names, established through the proper consultation of chronicles and books, 
proves a precedent for native control of the church and a long Christian heritage. The broader 
claims to ecclesiastical sovereignty over those English dioceses named was also founded on 
established precedent and a belief, supported by manuscript and myth, that St David’s had 
once counted those parts of England within its influence.
372
 This clause also allows for that 
angry voice, railing against the ‘barbarous Saxons’ to once again be heard. However, it 
should also be borne in mind that the terms of the Tripartite Indenture had also laid a Welsh 
claim to areas of England, and that this 1406 declaration might be viewed as a continuation of 
that assertion. If there were still plans afoot to invade England and combine with English 
rebels to dethrone Henry, as King Charles’s letter of the same year blatantly stated, then this 
statement by Owain appears to connect with desires expressed in England and France.
373
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Again that the same lord Benedict shall provide for the metropolitan church of St 
David’s, and the other cathedral churches of our principality, prelates, dignitaries and 
beneficed clergy and curates, who know our language.
374
  
 
The next clause has drawn particular interest from writers whose mother-tongues were 
Welsh, Lloyd and Davies.
375
 However, as shown above, the notion of selecting clergy 
favoured by Owain was proposed by the French. Equally, the call for priests able to freely 
commune with their flocks was neither new, since Gerald of Wales raised the same issue in a 
letter to the pope in 1201 and again by others on several occasions thereafter, nor was it a 
uniquely Welsh issue, as other peoples such as the Bretons and the Flemish had raised similar 
complaints.
376
 This should also have been simple enough to agree, although anointing an 
entire national clergy, however small, would have required considerable effort.  
 
Again, that the same lord Benedict shall revoke and annul all incorporations, unions, 
annexions, appropriations of parochial churches of our principality made so far, by any 
authority whatsoever with English monasteries and colleges. That the true patrons of 
these churches shall have the power to present to the ordinaries of those places suitable 
persons to the same or appoint others.
377
 
 
Equally, the transfer of the oaths of allegiance away from English institutions in lands under 
Owain’s influence would have been easily announced, but harder to enforce. The second part 
of this, regarding locally-appointed candidates, would also have been an easy clause with 
which to concur, and would have granted Owain’s church a measure of control over its 
personnel. In theory, the pope might not have wished this, since pontiffs traditionally played 
a role in candidate selection; to lose this would be to lose a measure of power. However, this 
and the following clause mirrored movements within the French church in particular at that 
moment; the appropriation of control over the national church by the secular authorities. This 
‘Gallican’ attitude appears entirely appropriate considering the recent conflict between the 
French government and Benedict over appointments and taxes. In making this and the 
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following point, it seems that Owain was shrewdly relating his state of affairs to those of his 
audience; this was after all, a letter to the French king, or those acting in his stead, not one to 
the pope. 
 
Again, that the lord Benedict shall concede to us and our heirs, the princes of Wales, that 
our chapels, etc., shall be free, and shall rejoice in the privileges, exemptions, and 
immunities in which they rejoiced in the times in the times of our forefathers the princes 
of Wales.
378
 
 
As described above, this request over the control over the garnering of ecclesiastical taxes in 
Wales would have been resonant to the French court. It made a claim to rights similar to 
those then in the air in France and, once again, it was loosely attributed to historical 
precedence. This would certainly benefit Owain and clergy loyal to him. As with all of the 
preceding clauses, this would have been easily, though theoretically, granted by papal decree, 
with the harder task, the practical application, being left to those in situ.  
 
Again, that we shall have two universities or places of general study, namely, one in 
North Wales and the other in South Wales, in cities, towns, or places to be hereafter 
decided and determined by our ambassadors and nuncios for that purpose.
379
 
 
This ‘well-known request’, as Lloyd described it, does demonstrate vision, as Davies said, 
but hardly seems to qualify as ‘bravado’.380 As Davies also pointed out, many places were 
petitioning for and acquiring universities; so, this is only original in the Welsh context, but 
not so in a contemporary British or continental one.
381
 It does however signal Glyn Dŵr’s 
intentions to train an independent administration for which universities played a key role in 
producing the essential personnel. So, this is a sensible and constructive measure, but 
considering the number of other such institutions inaugurated around the same time, it is 
hardly a revolutionary proposal. It is perhaps noteworthy that this is aired as a future 
intention, their locations seemingly undecided. In addition, the fact that there were to be two 
might indicate that divisions between north and south forced Owain’s hand on this matter, 
rather than there being a wealth of candidates in both regions. 
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Again, that the lord Benedict shall brand as heretics and cause to be tortured in the usual 
manner, Henry of Lancaster, the intruder of the kingdom of England, and the usurper of 
the crown of the same kingdom, and his adherents, in that of their own free will they 
have burnt or have caused to be burnt so many cathedrals, convents and parish churches; 
that they have savagely hung, beheaded, and quartered archbishops, bishops, prelates, 
priests, religious men, as madmen or beggars, or caused the same to be done.
382
 
 
This penultimate clause and that which followed were certainly connected. The above 
demanded, in perhaps the rich colourful language attributable to the document’s originator, 
how the enemy should be declared heretics and be tortured, in riposte to their many violent 
crimes against clergymen. Indeed, this call would certainly have been presentable as valid at 
the time; up to 1406, Henry IV’s reign had produced a staggering body-count of society’s 
upper echelons. Among the nobility, these included a king, the earls of Gloucester, 
Huntingdon, Kent, Salisbury, Wiltshire, Worcester, the Earl Marshal who was also earl of 
Norfolk, along with dozens of knights and an unknown number of lower-born men.383 His 
large-scale killing of clergymen has been described as a ‘peculiar characteristic of Henry IV’s 
retributive policies’, only surpassed by Henry VIII.384 Although a precise figure has proven 
impossible to calculate, Henry’s regime presided over the often brutal despatch of 
considerable numbers of all ranks of cleric, from friars through to the archbishop of York.385 
So, to return to the declaration, in the same fashion that the first Welsh clauses acted as 
stepping stones for those that followed, so the penultimate article prepared the ground for the 
subsequent demand for a crusade against Henry. 
 
That the same Lord Benedict shall grant to us, our heirs, subjects, and adherents, of 
whatsoever nation they may be, who wage war against the aforesaid invader and intruder, 
as long as they hold the orthodox faith, full remission of our sins, and that the remission 
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should continue as long as the war between us, our heirs, and our subjects, and the 
aforesaid Henry, his heirs and subjects shall endure.
386
 
 
This evocative call for a crusade against Henry has also been identified elsewhere.387 There 
seems no doubt that these last two clauses establish the justifiable grounds and make a call 
for holy war against Henry, his heirs and his supporters – not against England, it should be 
noted. This undisguised call to arms seems to repeat Owain’s request for foreign troops made 
during 1401, perhaps revealing his true weakness, having insufficient men to effectively and 
universally oppose crown forces.388 This promised a long war, an unending war perhaps, 
against the common enemy. Given Orleanist control of court at the time of the approach to 
Owain, and powerful presence even when not directly at the helm, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that these last two articles might appear to be a counter-seduction on Owain’s part. In 
so doing, using the same terms written originally by the French throughout his text, and by 
using a similar ploy, Glyn Dŵr emerges as engaging and intelligent. However, apart from 
being appealing to the faction controlling the French government, this call too was based on 
recent precedent. Gregory XI had called for a crusade against Milan in 1372, Urban VI had 
declared crusades against the French Clementists in 1373 and 1384; the former induced the 
attack by English forces under the bishop of Norwich in 1373, while the latter caused conflict 
with Louis of Anjou.389 All of these targets were connected to the duke of Orleans. Therefore, 
in this time of personality politics, a crusade call might not only have been personally 
appealing but also based on just, retributive precedent. There might be another, more elusive, 
example of a holy war being called at this time; allegedly by Archbishop Arundel against the 
Welsh from 1404.390  
This clause in Owain’s reply might be in response to that, as well as engaging with 
the intense personality politics of the moment between Louis and Henry. In addressing an 
appeal for a holy war to the Avignon papacy, Owain was not issuing a desperate call for help 
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or attaching a seemingly over-blown religious appeal to an otherwise regional feud between 
temporal princes; he was displaying his knowledge of his interlocutor. Norman Housley’s 
key study clearly relates how aggressive the papacy had been since its translation to 
Avignon.391 As he revealed, ‘Crusades against Christian lay rulers were thus an important 
feature of the crusading movement in the Avignonese period.’392 In seeking such a campaign 
against Henry, Glyn Dŵr again appeared therefore to be using the correct language to the 
correct audience. The Avignonese papacy had sought to flex its muscles at the beginning of 
the fourteenth century, by supporting campaigns throughout the eastern Mediterranean, aimed 
at those Christian princes requiring correction in the region, as well as the faith’s Muslim 
enemies.393 Many of the proposed crusades were to support embattled Christian allies, 
particularly Armenia, as well as to reclaim or expand the territories of nobles favoured by the 
Curia, and the French ranked highly among them.394 However, crusades were not solely sent 
east. Grand campaigns in Spain not only supported the Reconquista of the peninsula from the 
Moors of Granada, but the papacy also lent its weight to the political and dynastic struggles 
between Castile and Aragon, allies of England and France.395 Although the papacy also 
encouraged often large-scale campaigns against pagans in Eastern Europe during this period, 
it also conducted a notable number of smaller, political actions too, particularly in Italy.396 
Certain of the crusades called against Christian rulers appeared to contain a strong element of 
personality politics between the pope and the noble or region in question. Perhaps the most 
convenient example of that was Bernabò Visconti’s designation as a heretic by Urban V in 
1363, followed by a military campaign against Milan.397 Despite the enduring Anglo-French 
conflict and the terrifying mortality caused by the century’s plagues, it seems that most of the 
calls for crusades were made during the second half of the fourteenth century, and therefore 
during the lifetimes of Glyn Dŵr, his friends and allies.398 As Housley’s work shows, the 
Avignon popes were practiced exponents of crusades against European lay rulers, deemed 
heretics beforehand, whether on a grand or small scale; by recruiting troops or mercenaries 
locally or from nations uninvolved or adjacent to the conflict area.399 This is easily 
                                                          
391
 N. Housley, The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305-1378, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 9-81. 
392
 Housley, The Avignon Papacy, 80. 
393
 Housley, The Avignon Papacy, 9-49. 
394
 Housley, The Avignon Papacy, 12, 23, 45-7. 
395
 Housley, The Avignon Papacy, 50-65. 
396
 Housley, The Avignon Papacy, 65-74. 
397
 Housley, The Avignon Papacy, 77-8. 
398
 Housley, The Avignon Papacy, 41-81. 
399
 Housley, The Avignon Papacy, 74, 80. 
 266 
 
demonstrated by campaigns against the Serbian king, Italian territories and in the numerous 
Spanish conflicts.400 The fear of drawing papal sanction is exemplified by the thoughts of 
Jean Gerson, who was aware of an increased possibility of English attack should the French 
be branded as heretics: ‘since they might attack us all the more freely [considering us] to be 
on a par with schismatics, heretics and Saracens’.401  This suggests therefore that the Welsh 
authors of these clauses were well aware of the political form and uses of crusades, as well as 
the willingness of the Avignon popes to use them as a mechanism to attain their goals. So, 
these two, final, more aggressive requests in the Pennal Declaration had demonstrable 
foundation on recent events and were justified, if required, as counter-strikes to the 
belligerence of the Roman adversary and his heretical adherents. In that light, they seem far 
from being unlikely or extreme, but entirely within the known actions of the Avignon popes, 
and therefore an astute request.  
Perhaps the last pieces of information revealed by the Pennal Declaration, relevant to 
this study at least, concern the timing of the drafting of the original French letter to Owain 
which arrived in the hands of Kery and Eddouwyer. The text gives clues, clearly identifying 
that Benedict had been to Italy and that he was still in Genoa at the time it was written.402 
This correlates with the campaign that had been openly building since April that year which 
aimed to advance on Rome. Once the Holy See had been seized, Benedict would be installed, 
where he would name one of the French dukes, either Orleans or Anjou, as Emperor.403 
Although statements supporting the campaign were issued in the king’s name, the plan 
clearly favoured Benedict’s cause, which, for some time, had also been that of the duke of 
Orleans. The idea was for French troops under Louis of Bourbon and Louis II of Anjou, 
claimant to the kingdom of Naples, to advance through the French-allied states of the 
Ligurian coast to Pisa and from there to strike for Rome. The rival pope, Innocent VII fled 
the chaotic revolt in Rome that summer. The moment had arrived, Rome was to be taken, and 
the court despatched Louis of Anjou for Genoa with significant forces. With the court 
focussed on the south, Jean sans Peur chose that moment to attempt a coup d’état of sorts, or 
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at least to gain control of the government by verbally attacking the policies of the government 
under the regent, Louis of Orleans. In light of the deepening dispute between the ducal 
factions, Louis of Anjou was recalled before he reached Genoa, and the duke of Bourbon was 
not permitted to leave Paris for the Italian campaign, his influence being required at court. 
The two adversarial dukes issued a series of condemnations of one another and, with their 
respective allies, gathered thousands of troops around Paris from August onwards. Amid the 
spiralling tension and manoeuvring forces, the government effectively ground to a halt. After 
a time, Burgundy was obliged to withdraw his appeals to parliament, in the knowledge that 
his actions had pushed the Queen and the duke of Berry into the Orleanist camp, making a 
tripartite alliance in December that year.404 Perhaps in shock, most of the other great 
magnates appeared to retain positions of indecisive neutrality. Benedict had arrived in Genoa 
in May, but in July his army was ravaged by plague which erupted throughout the region, 
even as Marshal Boucicaut was attempting to negotiate alliances and secure routes for an 
advance. This bold initiative to take Rome withered as the toll of plague victims rose. 
Benedict had retired from Italy to Nice by October, where he heard that Innocent VII had 
died; France’s decisive opportunity had been lost through squabbling in Paris and failure to 
advance when the chance to do so arose.405 However, the possible dates for the composition 
of the French letter to Owain therefore fall between May and October 1405, with some 
leeway allowing for the failure of news of Benedict’s withdrawal to reach the author and their 
masters. The drive behind the letter to Owain clearly influenced its composition. A strategy to 
take Rome and end the schism was in favour and forces to achieve that were being 
assembled. Simultaneously unbalancing England by causing trouble in Wales might gain 
additional time to press the main offensive or end the even longer conflict with England by 
inserting a weaker or French-supported king on the English throne. Mid-late summer 1405 
was no doubt an exciting time at court in Paris; with the desirable prospect that a victory in 
either theatre would hugely favour French interests.  
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In summary, therefore, nothing found in the Pennal Declaration is radical in any sense, saving 
perhaps its application to a Welsh context. All points had precedence, often very recent, or 
were simple administrative requests easily permitted by decree. Davies described the 
programme announced in this document as ‘visionary’, ‘extraordinary’ and ‘breath-taking’.406 
It would be incorrect and ungenerous to deny this, it is such a document, but not for the 
reasons assumed by Davies. It seems obvious, though entirely original, to conclude that the 
Pennal Declaration does not stand out as unusual in the time in which it was written. All of its 
requests were possible to achieve, it was a balanced and arguably realistic document, entirely 
in keeping with the mores of its time; this is its true visionary aspect, that it was created not 
with a wistful eye on history, but on the cold, hard present in which it was created. In its time, 
in its context, it was a realistic, achievable project. It is extraordinary perhaps because despite 
having no obvious connections to the apparatus of state construction and the channels of 
international diplomacy, Glyn Dŵr and his council were able to create such a credible 
programme. Perhaps further, the fact that it has survived to this day and, perhaps, that it has 
escaped being analysed and contextualised for so long also seems remarkable. It could also 
be considered extraordinary in the way in which the document appears to reveal the mind and 
voice of Owain Glyn Dŵr. It is a rare example of such a document, its complexity, the 
development of ideas and compelling linguistic manoeuvres overshadow the articles it 
presents. It would also be fair to give it a negative connotation; perhaps this would constitute 
its most breath-taking point. The very act of growing the Avignon allegiance widened the 
schism by one degree. In so doing, and also by seeking to expand the conflict further through 
continuous warfare or new crusades, the universally lamented state of continent-wide conflict 
would be further increased. While the duke of Orleans consistently demonstrated his 
enthusiasm to attack Henry of England by all means, such a goal would likely lack wider 
popularity.  
 
The broader significance and impact of the Pennal declaration are difficult to measure. This 
is partly because of the paucity of surviving documentation on connected matters; it was 
clearly important, for funding, mustering, inserting and extracting a sizeable royal army 
overseas is no irrelevant undertaking. However, the matter is further confused by hindsight 
of the civil war which was about to erupt in France, which obscures or corrupts as complicit 
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all which happened before it. There is no incontrovertible proof that Benedict ever saw the 
letter, although he certainly knew of its contents and of Welsh allegiance to him. This is 
evidenced by his provision of Welshmen from June 1406 including Gruffydd Yonge, bishop 
of Bangor, Adam Usk, Benedictine bishop of Llandaff and a grant to Maredudd, Glyn Dŵr’s 
son.
407
 In the church records there is one key mention that proves Benedict’s awareness of at 
least part of its message, for he appears to have designated St David’s as a metropolitan 
church.
408
 Without the Pennal Declaration, it seems unlikely that he would have been aware 
of that desire at that time. Which other requests made in the document Benedict also allowed 
are lost at this time. 
However, perhaps the primary significance of the exchange has so far been missed. 
Superficially, it declares Owain’s desire to support one of the papal candidates. Within the 
text, it is plainly stated that the French king wished to be bound closer to Owain, and in 
riposte the Welsh leader expressed a reciprocal sentiment.
409
 However, this is an Orleanist 
initiative, though one with shifting degrees of royal and ducal backing. Therefore, this is an 
alliance document further binding Glyn Dŵr to France, but more specifically to the Orleanist 
cause which backed Benedict XIII. However, by the time Owain’s letter reached Paris, the 
mood at court was shifting again. King Charles recovered his senses in December 1405 and 
reviewed the alarming escalation of hostile posturing between Orleans and Burgundy of that 
autumn. On 27 January 1406, Charles decreed that the government was to be a council of the 
princes, and not one commanded by a regent alone. By July, 1406, a new council was 
formed, albeit dominated by Orleanists for the moment, but no longer with Louis at the 
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helm.
410
 Thus, Louis, who had held power firmly up to mid-summer and retained it but 
slowly, decreasingly by degrees thereafter, lost clear, personal control of the government at 
that point. Although he remained a powerful, instrumental member of the council, his 
decline in power would also affect his allies and their causes.
411
  
Therefore, by the time Glyn Dŵr’s reply reached Paris, perhaps at the end of April 
1406 at the earliest, it arrived in an altered environment to that in which the question was 
first posed. This of course would have been impossible for him to gauge or affect. However, 
military preparations were under way for offensives in the south-west and the north-east. 
Burgundy was to reduce Picardy, while Orleans was to take key areas of Aquitaine.
412
 En 
route south, Louis, consistent with his policy of alliances, made a treaty with Jean V, duke 
of Brittany.
413
 While the two rivals were blatantly sent to the opposite ends of France, a 
calmer environment was restored to the capital. With that, came renewed debate on the most 
effective means of ending the schism, which favoured another withdrawal of obedience and 
proposed a plan for the mutual cession of both popes. The court referred the debates to 
parliament which discussed the matter through the summer and autumn of 1406 and 
proposed to once again withdraw obedience.
414
  
Louis’s efforts before Bourg were wholly ineffective, earning him the acidic 
criticism of chroniclers.
415
 Likewise, John appears to have achieved less in Picardy, and may 
not have even moved his troops out of their quarters.
416
 Henry Percy, earl of 
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Northumberland, appeared in Paris during the year looking for support in the fight against 
King Henry.
417
 King Charles replied by letter, giving an answer which could be viewed as a 
response of sorts to the Pennal Declaration.
418
 While calling on the English to overthrow 
Henry and giving an ongoing assurance of French support to that end, this letter also appears 
to rebuke them for not turning up to support their army when it arrived in Wales. Percy left 
with no army, and went to raise one in Scotland, with no material, but probably verbal, 
French and Welsh support.
419
 By the time Louis of Orleans returned to Paris in early 1407 
his star appeared to have waned.
420
 While this was unlikely to remain the case for long, this 
moment perhaps offered his enemies a transient window of opportunity in which to move 
against him.  
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5.5:     The Men Who ‘Killed’ Owain Glyn Dŵr. 
 
‘Very many said that he died; the seers maintain he did not’.421 
 
Clearly, while the Welsh and the French government were conducting business in their own 
interests, their opponents were not inactive. While it is well-known that Owain was not 
ultimately triumphant, to date there is no comprehensive or even compelling explanation for 
this. Lloyd described a scene where Glyn Dŵr’s principate had reached its zenith by 1405, 
adding ‘during 1406 it was brought to a standstill; no further successes were won’.422 No 
proven defeats were suffered that year either; in fact there was negligible military activity in 
Wales bar on Anglesey, which was reinvested gradually by English forces from Chester and 
Ireland, without apparently engaging in battle. This clear lack of aggression on both sides 
supports the notion of a truce, proposed above. However, Lloyd then wrote of ‘the inevitable 
collapse’, which appears somewhat tainted by hindsight, and then constructed a story where 
all relevant factors contributed to this conclusion.
423
 Rees Davies recognised this issue, 
commenting on the dangers of hindsight, but then claimed that the revolt was ‘an 
unconscionably long time a-dying.’424 Perhaps creating an image of a revolt as being 
something which can die is incorrect in the first place. Since it was the violent expression of a 
cause founded on ideas and opinions, it could end and at any time be revived by people 
adhering to similar beliefs. Once the idea of it ‘dying’ is settled upon, however, it can only 
die – since all living things die, and therefore Davies’s view is also tainted by this imagery 
and hindsight. Davies delivered a tale of painful, slow, unavoidable decline.
425
 Both these 
conclusions are unsatisfactory since they both select the factors that align with the eventual 
outcome, rather than exposing and developing balancing points that underpinned Welsh 
successes or furthered the French alliance in the years after 1405. During the period that 
appears to be marked by the slide to defeat, Welsh ambassadors were in the courts of France 
and Scotland, the French raised further forces for Wales which fought English captains who 
blocked their path at sea, while magnates and communities in the English border counties 
were reprimanded for making truces with the Welsh for some time after the fall of Harlech in 
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1409.
426
 Had the revolt been doomed at that point or had the Welsh been a spent force, then 
none of these actions would have taken place. In light of these factors, this research offers a 
broader, more profound explanation, but principally focuses on events outside Wales.  
There is no suggestion or evidence that anyone physically killed Owain, but his 
regime decreased in power and his reign came to an end. Therefore his fall is attributable to 
the actions of men, whether engaged in politics often seemingly unrelated to Wales or in 
military operations against Owain or his allies. This section discusses those men and their 
actions. It does so by scrutinising the relevant diplomatic missions and contemporary 
ecclesiastical and political movements, as well as the sharper, more violent means of 
achieving victory.  
 English military efforts in the first five years of the fifteenth century had largely 
proved unimpressive across a number of theatres. Successive, serious internal revolts such as 
those of 1400, 1403 and 1405 describe an environment in which the king’s enemies dared to 
tread. Although Henry’s brutality against his opponents increased throughout his reign, this 
was clearly insufficiently fearsome or effective enough to regain control of the kingdom.
427
 
As shown above, from the advent of Louis’s more aggressive position towards England from 
1402, the French had enjoyed successes against English possessions in France, such as the 
capture of Mortagne, Corbefin and several places in the Limousin.
428
 In addition, Breton, 
French and Castilian fleets had carried the war directly onto English soil and appeared to 
narrowly hold the balance of power in the Channel during these years. Although the Scots 
had been comprehensively beaten in September 1402 at Homildon, near Durham, and 
therefore in England, they continued to harass English interests on sea and land, and appear 
to have provided logistical support in the form of sea-going transport for the Welsh and 
French.
429
 More embarrassingly, Henry IV had personally derided the Welsh as a people ‘de 
petit reputacion’ and parliament scorned them as ‘bare-footed idiots’, yet in the long years of 
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their damaging, costly and to some degree humiliating revolt, Henry and his forces met with 
successive defeats.
430
 Whether on the battlefield, as at Hyddgen, Ruthin or Bryn Glas, or in 
the storming of great fortresses such as Carmarthen, Harlech and Aberystwyth, crown forces 
were consistently inferior to those of Glyn Dŵr.431 Although the English won a victory at Usk 
near the border in May 1405, notable for the quality of the casualties rather than their 
number, this was negligible return for the scale of their military efforts and financial outlay to 
that point.
432
 Wales had been lost to the natives. In addition, the revolt exposed the feebleness 
of those castles that remained nominally under crown control. Their assault and seizure does 
not appear to have been part of the rebel strategy and there is no evidence of a concerted 
effort to seize any but a key few. This is understandable since the rebels would need to 
commit men to garrison them, losing all mobility advantages.  In addition, decades of 
experience in France meant that crown forces were well-able to conduct a series of sieges; 
however, they were demonstrably less effective in the wilderness of fifteenth-century Wales.  
Those crown commanders who retained keep of castles in Wales conducted few operations 
against the rebels during the revolt, and their allegiance appears to have moved towards a 
position of neutrality, or perhaps self-interest, in certain cases.
433
  Although crown control of 
a number of locations in Glyn Dŵr’s Wales was still extant, in some cases it appears to have 
been largely notional. The parlous state of English fortunes in Wales at that time provides 
perhaps the best example of a seemingly dire general situation for English power. However, 
‘military conquest was a traditional means of acquiring new territory, although it was seldom 
used on its own.’434 So, while England’s military efforts lacked success, diplomatic ventures 
proved more fruitful, in time.  
It has been possible to chart many of the English diplomatic missions to the continent 
during this part of Henry IV’s reign. The actions and skills of these largely unsung servants 
of the crown improved England’s fortunes where armies had proven inadequate. While many 
of the ambassadors’ letters are of limited value individually, as a whole they help construct a 
useful corpus showing the form and style of the time. From these letters, two additional 
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points emerge; the grindingly slow pace of medieval diplomatic processes and also the 
frequency and extent to which the ambassadors denigrated their counterparts in letters to the 
Privy Council or the king, then greeted them in person with blustering pleasantry.
435
 From the 
mass of these discussions the intriguing and critical evidence emerges of a diplomatic 
strategy that assisted, perhaps even saved, England's cause. The names of England's 
ambassadors are largely unfamiliar, but appear to follow the seemingly typical composition 
for ambassadorial parties of the time, with nobles, clergy and clerks.
436
 The nobility was 
represented throughout by these knights; Richard Aston, John Croft, William Hoo, Hugh 
Lutrell, William Lyle, Thomas Swynford and Thomas Swynborne, of whom the latter is most 
easily traced in other military activities.
437
 The only clergyman who featured in the critical 
meetings was Nicholas de Ryssheton, Doctor of Laws. John Urban seemed to be a permanent 
member of these embassies, although his designation is unclear. At times he had no defined 
title, at others he was described as an ambassador or the ‘Lieutenant du Maire de l’Estaple [a 
Calais]’.438  
 Lutrell, Croft, Ryssheton and Urban made representation to Philip of Burgundy in 
December 1403, addressing complaints to him and France’s Great Council against the 
aggressive actions of the duke of Orleans and Waleran of St. Pol.
439
 These were no doubt 
legitimately felt, and referred to the various probing attacks which England had suffered 
along the entirety of its south coast and, as noted above, had reached as far west as Kidwelly. 
This approach might have had a wider purpose, as subsequent discussions would reinforce. 
The English were no doubt conscious of the divisions and struggles within the French court 
during the king’s illness. Philip of Burgundy was therefore the right choice for them; as 
demonstrated previously, he had consistently been the senior noble at court since the death of 
Charles V in 1380, he enjoyed a commercial relationship with England, and Orleans was his 
adversary. Shortly after, the same ambassadorial team opened discussions with the Flemish 
deputies as well as with Duke Philip regarding Anglo-Flemish trade.
440
 The stratagem seems 
to have borne fruit immediately; the comte de St. Pol was summoned to Paris to account for 
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his actions.
441
 A number of letters passed between Henry, his ambassadors at Calais and the 
Privy Council.
442
 These dispatches reported on progress, but also showed Henry’s will to 
support and encourage the ambassadors in their tasks. The English made an intelligent 
concession during winter 1403-4. The previous summer was remarkable for the level of 
maritime violence witnessed, as well as coastal attacks. Repaying such violence in kind 
would have seemed justified and perhaps expected. In contrast, the English offered to extend 
the previously agreed safeguard to French and Flemish fishermen.
443
 This was a significant 
gesture, not just of goodwill but one which few, if any, of their opponents could attack. 
Gesture, goodwill, adherence to notions of good conduct and apparent good faith appear to 
have been essential to the art of successful diplomacy at the time. From this point, early 1404, 
Henry’s ambassadors can be seen raising and addressing grievances regarding the seizures of 
goods and vessels, commercial advantages and talks on peace. These were undertaken with 
the Flemings, therefore the house of Burgundy also, along with separate missions to the 
Hanseatic League.
444
 There is no need to further develop the undulating course of all such 
commercial negotiations, but solely to acknowledge the strategy of Henry’s diplomats; 
engaging partners and adversaries alike in discussions encompassing hostility and redress, 
peace and trade, with a view to achieving mutually beneficial commerce, which strongly 
advanced England’s interests at that time. 
 Aston and Ryssheton delivered a strong complaint to Philip of Burgundy in March 
1404.
445
 Their French ambassadorial counterparts included the bishop of Chartres and Jehan 
de Sanctis, who would be so closely involved with the Welsh alliance negotiations in May of 
the same year, as well as with the Pennal Declaration. The noble envoy was the lord of 
‘Hengueville’, Jehan de Hangest, one of the 1405 expedition leaders.446 The letter is an 
excellent example of the English strategy towards the French court. Aston and Ryssheton 
recognised, but disputed the degree to which outrages and reprisals had been committed by 
the English side, noting that they were contrary to the extant truce.
447
 They countered de 
Hangest’s accusations regarding English actions in Picardy and Boulogne citing murders and 
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robberies committed on Alderney. They furthered this with an attack on de Hangest for 
profiting from these activities and inferred French meddling in Anglo-Scots’ affairs.448 
Henry’s ambassadors also recalled the actions of the Bretons who they identified as subjects 
of the French crown in the obedience of the Admiral of France who had landed in England, 
burned and plundered Plymouth, where they robbed, murdered and carried off the people of 
the area. All of this had been done contrary to the oaths they had sworn and the responsibility 
for adherence to these promises lay with the French court. Not only that, the Bretons had also 
attacked Jersey and Guernsey where they committed similar atrocities.
449
 Henry’s 
representatives then complained that the comte de St. Pol had maintained fleets on a war 
footing in Flanders. While this ran contrary to the spirit of the truce and oaths sworn by him 
and others of the royal blood, they went on to point out that these fleets had been used to 
attack all kinds of vessels, during which the cowardly practice of hurling projectiles at those 
trying to save themselves by swimming away had been witnessed. Not only that, these ships 
had been involved in landings on the Isle of Wight where they had molested poor fishermen 
and overrun sheep pens.
450
 While clearly a slight against the nobility and behaviour of those 
involved, the English repetition of the importance of the sworn oaths, the truce and the 
responsibility of the French court to control its subjects, reinforced their position. In short, 
they expected better from the French. They went on to make that very point, with recognition 
that the correction and punishment of the ‘Duc d’Orliens’ who was making war in 
contravention of the oaths made by his king, fell to the French court. They did not ask for 
reparations, and cited the formulaic but relevant phrase about avoiding the spilling of 
Christian blood, but asked that the court obliged Louis to remain faithful to the oaths of peace 
all the French nobles had sworn.
451
 In a parting shot, Henry’s men added that they were 
unaccustomed to such behaviour from the French, and could not recall previous reigns where 
the king had such disobedient subjects.
452
 The letter is an excellent example of shrewd 
diplomacy; it made clear England’s complaint in black and white, but at the same time sought 
to isolate the activities of Orleans and St. Pol from those of the rest of the French nobles. In 
asking the French court to set its house in order, it showed that Henry did not blame Charles’s 
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court as a whole – and the implication here regarding war is clear – but identified the 
unfaithful, disobedient Louis as the malefactor by whose actions France’s collective honour 
was tarnished. Asking the French to settle the matter was a masterstroke, since it helped set 
the factions further against one another, and by deploying the arguments of precedent, norm, 
honour and standards, Aston and Ryssheton had appealed to factors consistent with the time 
and familiar to the target audience. This letter probably also assisted Louis’s opponents at 
court, the Burgundians, in pointing out the abnormality of his behaviour, and the advantages 
of removing him from power in order to pursue a course of peace and commerce.  
 The death of Philip of Burgundy the following month weakened Henry’s cause in the 
French court. With Louis in control, hostility to England increased rapidly. The ambassadors 
at Calais continued to play vital roles however, maintaining a level of discourse with all 
elements and monitoring enemy activity in France. In the first case, they continued 
negotiations with Margaret, duchess of Burgundy, who continued to run many of the duchy’s 
commercial affairs in the months following her husband’s death. She in turn influenced the 
Flemings to maintain peace with the English and, over the summer months, it appeared as if a 
new treaty between England and Flanders would be signed.
453
 As Louis of Orleans took up 
the reins of government, peace negotiations with the French ambassadors, usually led by 
Jehan de Hangest, visibly stalled.
454
 English relations with the Burgundians and Flemings 
also soured and then turned hostile, probably in adherence to the leaning of the court’s 
dominant faction, and their previously hopeful discussions ground to a halt.
455
 The English 
diplomatic style of the time did not simply rely on the fine intellects of the king’s envoys. 
They sought to quicken the prospects of a truce by conducting an attack on Sluys that year.
456
 
On this occasion, underpinning the truce offer with the threat and use of force utterly failed.  
Henry’s diplomats were crucial in passing on intelligence of the build up of the 1404 
fleet. In September they wrote that the French were stalling due to the likelihood of a 
diversionary attack to assist the Welsh rebels, and next they learned that the forces were 
instead intending to invade Wales.
457
 They also identified Louis and Waleran as active 
obstacles to the peace process.
458
 By 6 October, Ryssheton wrote that the fleet for Wales had 
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mustered but still not moved.
459
 Five days later he and Croft wrote to Henry confirming that 
troops from France, Flanders and elsewhere were assembled in Sluys in order to make the 
journey to Wales.
460
 Then, on 14 October, Ryssheton wrote to the mayor of London, William 
Askham, informing him that Wales, Sandwich and Calais were threatened. The attack fleet 
then appeared to be at Harfleur, and Ryssheton included troop numbers and the opinion that 
this force intended to occupy Wales, rebuild the castles and do as much harm there as 
possible.
461
 As Anglo-French relations appeared to be sliding to war, Henry’s ambassadors 
tried a new tack; threatening to withdraw from discussions.
462
 This appeared to provoke a 
reaction from the French who immediately dispatched a full ambassadorial party composed 
of Jehan, bishop of Chartres, Jehan de Hangest, Guillaume Boisratier and Jean de Sains, who 
proposed a venue for discussions with the English.
463
 As the mission under Jacques de 
Bourbon, comte de la Marche, launched, faltered and slunk back to port, the French returned 
to the idea of negotiations with Calais, allowing Swynford and Ryssheton their opportunity to 
stall in turn. The French threat in 1404 had evaporated, and discussions on where or whether 
to meet went on throughout the winter.
464
 Others joined Henry’s men in Calais, adding their 
names to the documents describing their exchanges with the French. Their meetings were to 
no avail and the diplomatic stalemate between the royal courts remained throughout 1405.
465
 
This lean period in relations coincided with Louis’s brief domination of government. Within 
that time, the missions led by Jean d’Espagne took place. Operations in Wales in 1405 began 
in early winter, resulting in the allied capture of Anglesey after killing the sheriff and all of 
his men in one fight, and culminated in the expedition to Wales detailed above.
466
 Henry’s 
diplomatic service was still active during this time, however, demonstrating how when one 
source of opportunity ran dry, others were devoted more time and occasionally bore fruit, 
such as relations with the Hanseatic cities, the Prussians and Portugal.
467
 Anglo-Scots’ 
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correspondence also suggested the latter was a nation split between factions, similarly to 
France. While the powerful duke of Albany maintained publically cordial relations with 
Henry, James of Douglas clearly did not, and troops under the earl of Orkney accompanied 
Lord Bardolf into Berwick as the York rebellion flared in June.
468
 
 Diplomatic contacts with the French were not entirely abandoned during 1405 
however, and connections with Flanders and the Burgundians in particular, can be followed 
from May onwards.
469
 News of the comte de St. Pol’s ineffective attack on Marck was passed 
on, and his failure was recorded with scorn in French records.
470
 Then, Henry’s ambassadors 
reported the breakthrough that had appeared long in coming. News from Calais brought by 
John Urban revealed that the knights Richard Aston and William Hoo, and squires Perin 
Lorraine and Richard Oldington, had brokered a trade treaty with the duke of Burgundy on 6 
March 1406.
471
 While this was good news from a financial perspective, it also demonstrates 
the successful exploitation of a factional fissure in the French court. Jean sans Peur, the new 
duke of Burgundy, was rising in power and clearly engaged in mounting a challenge to Louis 
of Orleans. Strengthening the Burgundian cause would assist England, and simultaneously 
weaken Louis, in turn harming Glyn Dŵr. That a major court party had established links to 
England demonstrates that control of the direction of the French government had partly 
slipped from Louis’s grasp at that point. While this change in position might have been 
temporary, with Jean’s friendship and Louis’s weakness transient, the English took advantage 
of this opportunity. The records demonstrate highly lucrative trade between England and 
Flanders during the rest of 1406.
472
 Louis and his allies were far from beaten though; the 
Bretons put two thousand troops onto Alderney in July that year. However, the English now 
had a supporting role within one of the courtly factions and therefore a role in the French 
power struggle.
473
 This subtle but significant victory had been won by Henry’s ambassadors 
alone.  
 Another arena where English diplomacy eventually fared well, perhaps unexpectedly, 
was in Brittany. English successes here can be identified as openly bearing fruit during and 
after 1406. In 1402, Philip of Burgundy gained the tenure of the duchy during the last year of 
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Jean V’s minority, and entered into alliance with him.474 With Philip’s aid, Henry IV married 
Jean de Montfort’s wife, Jeanne, in 1403; a move which provoked resentment among much 
of the duchy’s nobility.475 That anger was vented in the attacks on English interests detailed 
previously. Openly, Anglo-Breton relations from 1406 onwards witnessed a remarkable 
transition from hostility to truce in little over a year. Breton involvement in the aggressions 
against England was undeniable; from its greatest lords, such as the du Châtel, to the 
common soldiery and mariners. In the wake of these years of attacks, Henry IV acted against 
them. While there were military efforts, such as the previously noted attack on Saint Mathieu, 
his main effort appears to have been economic and diplomatic. Jean V’s records reveal 
notable diplomatic traffic between the duke and his mother, ‘la reyne d’Angleterre’, between 
December 1405 and March 1406.
476
 The contents of these letters are not revealed; however it 
seems reasonable to believe that Henry would engage his new queen in assisting discussions; 
peace and commerce worked in their mutual interests, while war between her husband and 
her son only benefitted their adversaries. These letters appear to coincide with a slight thaw in 
relations; the duke assented to the collection and payment of ransoms for notable Bretons 
held by the English.
477
 The fine balancing act played by the Breton dukes was never a simple 
task, and equally, Jean V was obliged to engage with both crowns without rousing either. The 
young duke maintained excellent relations with the French court, sending embassies to 
discuss marriage with Charles VI’s daughter, Jeanne, although other matters of import were 
no doubt debated on these occasions.
478
 England’s treaty with Flanders had been brokered by 
March 1406 and commercial intercourse followed swiftly after. In May that year, Henry 
ordered the expulsion of the Bretons and the French from London, and the seizure of their 
ships and merchandise soon after.
479
 In riposte, the Bretons initially maintained their hostile 
stance, attacking Alderney for example, and the duke also entered into a personal alliance 
with Duke Louis as well as sending a fleet and troops south to Bordeaux to aid the king of 
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France.
480
 The latter act, of November 1406, was most likely related to the treaty between 
Jean and Louis of September that year, and intended to support the attack on Bourg ordered 
by Paris. Nevertheless, during 1406 Anglo-Breton relations had shifted from a position close 
to open warfare to one of reduced, though ongoing, hostility, but now with dialogue.  
 The early months of 1407 saw Louis return discredited from campaigning in the 
south-west. Perhaps in consequence to his loss of prestige, the Anglo-Breton rapprochement 
gained pace. The ducal records reveal significant numbers of cross-channel prisoner 
exchanges from March to May 1407.
481
 These ransoms and exchanges involved sizeable 
numbers of men on each side, the largest being the trade of 120 English prisoners for 
‘Hugues de Kaerenmanach’ who was held by ‘sieur de Becquelay ‘, probably Thomas, Lord 
Berkeley.
482
 It is impossible to distinguish whether these men were seized on land, at sea or 
in port, and therefore claims such as those made by Walsingham about the English disrupting 
military convoys to Wales are impossible to prove or refute.
483
 However, these exchanges 
and a general decline in fighting appear to be indicative of a truce being held. English records 
mention truce talks at the end of May.
484
 Jean V declared a guarantee of safety for English 
merchants in June 1407.
485
 It is noteworthy, but perhaps coincidental, that ducal military 
officials were ordered to ascertain the obligations of Jean, son of Jean d’Espagne, around that 
time.
486
 Peace appeared to be in the air. This careful process appearing to lead towards one 
conclusion cannot have been accidental or undertaken without mutual contact. These 
documents appear to have been lost, were they ever written, but seem to begin with Queen 
Jeanne’s letters to Jean V. The final result of this unseen discourse was achieved on 11 July 
1407, when Jean V signed a full year-long truce with England.
487
 The terms of the agreement 
probably betray the instigation alluded to above. Within it, Jean named his mother first, the 
queen or ‘royne d’angleterre’, disclosing that he accepted a year-long truce and in so doing 
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ordered his officers and all others to respect the agreement.
488
 The Bretons, therefore, were 
lost to the Welsh cause until at least mid-summer 1408, but had probably been disentangling 
themselves for some time prior to the truce. Without the use of Breton ports, ships and 
manpower, an expedition to Wales suddenly became a far less realistic proposition, and 
presented the English with a smaller front on which to concentrate. The diplomatic prising of 
Brittany from hostilities effectively cut off French-Welsh connections while the terms of that 
truce were honoured. This provided Henry and his government an opportunity to press their 
cause in Wales.  
A further good example of Henry’s envoys causing division between the French 
factions was seen in 1407. By June, Aston and his colleagues had concluded with the duke of 
Burgundy a ‘general security’ on sea and land which was to last three years.489 The peace 
agreement’s publication throughout Burgundy was confirmed in another letter to Henry.490 A 
major court faction had therefore made peace with England, and concluded a treaty ensuring 
a degree of co-operation. As a classic element of a ‘cultivate and eradicate’ strategy, the 
English exploited this further still over those months, giving favourable trading conditions to 
the Flemings alone, while insisting on excluding the French from any measure of benefit in 
any form from their peace and trade.
491
 This ploy of favouring one partner to the detriment of 
other less friendly parties was used elsewhere by England during the middle ages.
492
 In 
bolstering their ally, they not only strengthened him, but this strategy outlined the attraction 
of amicable relations with England, and discredited the policies of hostile parties. As such, 
this is a deployment of Nye’s ‘soft power’ by Henry’s government.493 With the Burgundians 
apparently positively disposed to England, and the Bretons assuming a neutral posture, the 
English position was much improved. To some degree, it could be suggested that with 
France’s eastern and western Channel regions neutralised, an attack on the centre of the 
enemy’s coast, Normandy, became a considerable possibility. 
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While this diplomatic intercourse was ongoing, the University of Paris returned to the 
question of healing the schism in the church towards the end of 1405. With Benedict’s 
strongest ally, Louis, weakened following the events of late 1405 and the king’s insistence on 
rule by council from January 1406 onwards, the matter of another withdrawal of obedience 
resurfaced.
494
 The debates quickly led to an abandonment of the via facti and moved in 
favour of the via cessionis.
495
 These sessions took place throughout the year and by 
November 1406 it was generally, though not unanimously, agreed that action was required. 
Although mutual cession was preferable, action against Benedict was deemed necessary by 
those loud voices opposed to him in council. While unilateral cession might prove potentially 
harmful to France, its appeal was improved by the plan to seize ecclesiastical taxes, tithes and 
benefices for the French state. Perhaps with that lucrative incentive in mind, a partial 
withdrawal of obedience was projected to follow.
496
 When Innocent VII died on 6 November 
1406, one proposal by Gerson was for the Roman cardinals to recognise Benedict and thus 
heal the schism, giving hope to the cause of the Orleanists and their allies.
497
 However, the 
idea was overborne by turbulent arguments in council and, in March 1407, the French sent 
ecclesiastical ambassadors to Rome where they realised that, despite his encouraging words, 
another recently elected Roman pope, Gregory XII, had no intention of resigning the papal 
crown unilaterally or mutually, thereby bringing union to western Christianity.
498
 Although 
the University of Paris dominated the discussions in the capital, Benedict XIII was able to 
outmanoeuvre those ambassadors sent to hold talks with him. The University had required 
them to pronounce France’s intention to declare neutrality, should Benedict fail to publish 
Bulls on the steps he would take to resolve the division in the church. He did not do so, but 
apparently conducted himself with such skill and diplomacy that, at the end of discussions in 
May 1407, he was able to stall the declaration of neutrality.
499
 An agreement for both popes 
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to meet at Savona was agreed by both parties, with differing levels of enthusiasm.
500
 Roman 
politics once again disrupted the already troubled course of events. Ladislas of Durazzo chose 
that moment, June 1407, to attempt to seize Rome.
501
 Although ambassadors and other 
churchmen continued with the projected meeting at Savona, and Benedict duly obliged and 
presented himself there in good time, Gregory proved most reluctant and concocted a series 
of excuses and stalling tactics, and ultimately failed to attend.
502
 The focus and energies of 
France’s ruling elements were therefore engaged and, from a Welsh perspective, distracted 
from all but the most critical matters of the Schism, internal squabbles and trade relations. 
While inadvertent, the French church’s overriding interest in its own affairs over the needs 
and desires of the temporal government and its allies also harmed Glyn Dŵr’s regime.  
 
Henry’s diplomats had, to a certain degree therefore, secured England’s finances and 
overseas trade. This not only calmed and then improved relations with England’s partners, 
raising its standing, but more importantly assured a flow of finance critical to any 
government. Linked with these agreements was the liberty for its fishing fleets to ply their 
trade which, in their unofficial capacity as coastal sentinels, bolstered England’s actual and 
imagined security.
503
 This equally benefitted the continental fleets. However, the potential 
threat posed by a recovering England overshadowed that of all of its neighbours except 
France. As the country’s strength returned, it would enable Henry’s government to 
investigate other opportunities to improve England’s position by interfering with its 
neighbours’ politics; the treaty with Burgundy in March 1406 and the truce with Brittany the 
following year were crucial to this. A further significant step in England's drive to disrupt its 
hostile neighbours came later that month, when a stroke of luck brought the heir to the Scots’ 
throne, James, into English hands. His ship had been captured by English seamen en route to 
France. His capture and the death of King Robert III the following month obliged the Scots to 
appoint a regent. The duke of Albany took that role and maintained a passive stance towards 
England. This guaranteed that the ongoing hospitality to James and Albany’s son, Murdach, 
taken at Homildon in 1402, would be sufficient to keep them alive. However, this also 
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effectively made Albany king in James’s absence.504 A truce between England and Scotland 
was remade, and subsequently renewed over the following years of relevance.
505
 
 This period of recovery and largely peaceful relations with Flanders and the Hanseatic 
League continued into 1407 and assisted England to make a move against its enemies in 
Wales. There is a lack of compelling evidence that the crown made any advances into Wales 
during 1406. The source that made such a claim – that certain border areas submitted to the 
crown during the year – can only be dated to 1556 at the earliest, and therefore must be 
treated with extreme caution.
506
 While it is therefore manifestly unreliable evidence, the 
submissions, if correct, were still non-aggressive means of advancing Henry’s cause in 
Wales. This further suggests the existence of an unpublicised truce. This sort of nibbling 
around the fringes of an area under a truce appears consistent with behaviour typical of the 
period. The move against Anglesey, notably not part of mainland Wales, was conducted 
throughout 1406 and only early the next year was the crown able to install a military 
commander there with a personal guard of a hundred men.
507
 While there was apparently no 
English-Welsh combat during 1406, a truce would have benefitted Henry’s efforts to improve 
his position with continental partners and rebuild his strength at home. Crown strategists had 
determined that a strike against Llanbadarn (Aberystwyth) would be the most productive way 
of ending the revolt.
508
 The attack was led by Prince Henry, then nearly twenty, at the head of 
an army of 600 men-at-arms and 1, 800 archers, equipped with numerous siege engines and 
even cannon.
509
 They began the siege of Llanbadarn in May, where at least one of the siege 
                                                          
504
 Rymer, Fœdera, vol 8, 368-9, 371-2; Riley, Ypodigma Neustriæ, 413; CPR 1405-8, 168, (30 April 1406); Bean, 
‘Henry IV and The Percies’, 212-27; Macdonald, ‘Crossing the Border’, 149-55; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 323-4, 
341, 341;  Laidlaw, The Auld Alliance, 49; Macdougall, An Antidote to the English, 58; Brown, The Black 
Douglases, 105-9. 
505
 Rymer, Fœdera, vol 8, 418, 430; Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 162-5, 232-5. 
506
 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 152; Henken, National Redeemer, 13, 64-5; Note, Lloyd, 149-50, dates these 
sources to Hiraethog’s version from 1556 to 1564 and another to 1776. Henken favoured the notion that 
Hiraethog’s text of 1553 was based on a text from 1422. No original exists, therefore it cannot be conclusively 
shown that this is correct or even that Hiraethog’s was a faithful copy. Even if it were, it is still solely the 
opinion of a chronicler which is uncorroborated by any other document. The opinion of Cardiff University’s 
expert on this material, Dr. Dylan Foster-Evans, is that the text could date from either period, since the styles 
were similar, or have been written in a style attempting to emulate early fifteenth-century Welsh language 
texts. However there is nothing that conclusively dates it to 1422. An instruction in, Fœdera, vol 8, 436, allows 
for rebels to be admitted into the king’s grace on the payment of fines and certain other conditions. However, 
this obviously does not denote the submission of an area.  
507
 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 99, 129-30; Davies, Revolt, 122-3, 188-9. 
508
 CPR, 1405-8, 361-2; Davies, Revolt, 293. 
509
 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 131; Griffiths, ‘Prince Henry, Wales, and the Royal Exchequer, 1400-1413, ’ 211; 
Davies, Revolt, 124, 252-3. 
 287 
 
guns exploded, and the prince’s troops gave a poor account of their martial prowess.510 As the 
siege progressed, and evidently proved more difficult to prosecute than expected, Prince 
Henry issued orders to Thomas, lord Berkeley, to attain timber for siege engines, much of it 
to be acquired from the lands of former English rebels.
511
 A truce was negotiated for the 
crown by Richard Courtney, the chancellor of Oxford University, and came into effect on 24 
September 1407.
512
 Owain refused to recognise or honour it, however, and fighting 
recommenced shortly after.
513
 The siege of Aberystwyth would continue for another year but 
other events, propitious to England’s causes, occurred in Paris in November that year.514  
 
The conflict between the dukes of Burgundy and Orleans had largely been a bloodless 
political feud over government control, finance and territory. As noted above, the house of 
Anjou, Berry and Bourbon also manoeuvred and machinated to improve their respective 
positions, and this often required them to ally or to neglect to support one faction or another. 
Their allegiances were not fixed, making the political picture a complex, multi-factional one 
of shifting positions. However, Philip of Burgundy had largely, but not entirely, dominated 
the government since the death of Charles V, his brother.
515
 During the 1390s his nephew 
Louis, brother of Charles VI, had risen to prominence, as duke of Touraine and then Orleans, 
and challenged Philip’s supremacy.516 During the king’s illness, the two leading dukes had 
enriched themselves on the wealth of the kingdom and it seems that their conflict grew over 
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the size of their claim to that resource.
517
 With that as its origin, their conflict took on 
political and territorial dimensions, incorporating allies and other factions into their 
competition for control of France’s wealth. The best example of their alliances comes in the 
form of the Visconti; Philip supported that branch that included Bernabò, and by consequence 
Queen Isabeau and the Wittelsbach dynasty, while Louis married into Giangaleazzo’s side of 
the Visconti, and naturally leaned towards the other German factions.
518
 Their political 
manoeuvring had resulted in Philip and Isabeau investing their candidate in Genoa when the 
king required Louis to sell his stake in the territory.
519
 It was their obstruction of his Italian 
ambitions that obliged Louis to look elsewhere for expansion. Therefore he began acquiring 
territory and allies in north-eastern France from 1398 onwards, but with impetus from 
1401.
520
 It seems probable that this drive was personally motivated by Philip’s thwarting of 
his ambitions to the south. The clearest sign of this was his alliance with Philip’s local 
enemy, the duke of Guelders, and Louis’s acquisition of Luxemburg in 1402.521 Philip’s 
death in April 1404 appeared to aid Louis’s cause.522 From September that year, Louis and 
the league of German princelings he had recently cultivated, moved against Lorraine, Metz 
and the surrounding regions. The city recognised Rupert as Emperor, obliging him to defend 
it.
523
 In the late summer of 1405, the forces of Louis and Jean sans Peur gathered around 
Paris causing great fear, although no fighting actually took place.
524
 Although both sides were 
pacified at conference by the other dukes and the queen, a notable secret alliance was formed 
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thereafter, between Louis, the Queen and John of Berry.
525
 The conflict in the north-eastern 
border region was indecisive during 1405 and gave way to negotiation and posturing 
throughout the following year.
526
 By May 1407, Louis’s allies had reformed their league and 
again threatened Metz and Lorraine. In July they were decisively crushed at Champigneul, 
with most of the German nobles and Louis’s general, Guillaume de Braquemont, being 
captured.
527
 The duke of Lorraine and the Messines went to Paris to submit to arbitration; 
however, nothing was satisfactorily resolved and Louis prepared a new solution the following 
month in alliance with the marquis of Pont-à-Moussons.
528
 The fear of a wider conflagration 
engulfing the region, dragging with it the German Imperial parties and the French ducal 
factions, was palpable during the late summer and early autumn.
529
 The conflict between 
Burgundy and Orleans had finally been brought to the battlefield at Champigneul. The defeat 
of Louis’s allies there handed the initiative to his enemies. The use of their otherwise 
temporary advantage was swift and surprising.   
 Louis, duke of Orleans, was assassinated on 23 November 1407 by a gang led by 
Raoul d’Anquetonville acting under the orders of Jean sans Peur.530 This murder should 
primarily be viewed as a significant event within the struggles of the French courtly factions. 
It also acted as the trigger event for France’s slide into civil war. While there is no evidence 
directly connecting Henry’s government to the orders to kill Louis, this news would have 
undoubtedly been welcomed at Westminster. Although Louis’s aggressive opposition to 
Henry has been noted elsewhere, Glyn Dŵr’s close connection to the duke has not.531 Given 
that Owain had allied himself to France under Louis’s leadership, effectively to Louis’s 
faction, and agreed to adhere to his papal ally, the duke’s assassination would evidently 
damage Glyn Dŵr’s power and standing in France. This dramatic step by the duke of 
Burgundy offered England an opportunity to press its interests in the ensuing turmoil. This is 
proved by the orders issued at the Privy Council in December 1407 to Henry’s latest team of 
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ambassadors; Thomas, bishop of Durham, Sir Thomas Erpingham, Hugh Mortimer, squire, 
and legal expert John Cateryk.
532
 These men were empowered to treat with France regarding 
a truce and a royal marriage between the two crowns. Within these orders were critical 
clauses. While the usual formula regarding the inclusion of allies was mentioned, the 
instructions explicitly required that the French agreed that Owain was not an ally and the 
truce should be made specifically excluding Owain.
533
 The ambassadors’ line threateningly 
maintained that Owain must be subject to the Crown.
534
  The treaty documents contain no 
mention of these machinations, of course, but spoke airily of France being entitled to include 
their ‘allies, friends, confederates, kingdoms, subjects, lands and lordships or their people’ 
within the terms of a perpetual peace.
535
 The resultant treaty terms appear to allow France to 
represent the Welsh, in keeping with the clauses of the 1404 alliance. The Franco-English 
treaty of late 1407 explicitly stated that the French could declare and discuss for its allies on 
all questions, quarrels and wars, irrespective of their circumstances and dependency.
536
 
Theoretically, Owain stood close to inclusion in a treaty of perpetual peace – how long 
that would have lasted in reality is another matter. However, the fact that the subject of Wales 
was not even permitted to be discussed demonstrated two critical points. The Crown was 
determined to defeat Owain and retain Wales as a territory; and therefore, the conflict with 
Wales would continue until one side had been defeated.  
During the same negotiations, peace was also agreed for Aquitaine and other areas of 
France through negotiation with the duke of Berry.
537
 The only named French negotiators 
participated in the negotiations concerning Aquitaine and cannot be linked with certainty to 
the discussions relevant to Wales. However, there is no mention anywhere that the French 
negotiators argued for Glyn Dŵr’s inclusion in peace negotiations with the English. It is quite 
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conceivable that by the end of 1407 Charles’s negotiators were sympathetic to Burgundy or 
were even his adherents. Even if they were non-aligned, the probable goal of the French 
ambassadors was to swiftly and simply remove any threat England could pose to a France in 
disarray. If they were those who concluded the additional treaty for Aquitaine, then they 
appear to have been under the aegis of the aged duke of Berry. It seems just to suggest that 
the concession over Owain might not have sat comfortably with the French, but 
circumstances dictated that their security considerations were paramount. The French 
abandonment of their ally, though an entirely disreputable act, is perhaps understandable 
within its context. By being able to record terms which, under scrutiny, put the French in a 
wholly disreputable light, it appears that England was momentarily ascendant. Nevertheless, 
this stood in plain, direct breach of their treaty of alliance with Glyn Dŵr. 
 
Again, that one of the lords, the king and the prince aforesaid, shall not make or take 
truce nor make peace with the aforesaid Henry of Lancaster, but that the other might be 
included if he had wished in the same truce or peace, unless he is united or did not wish 
to be included in the same truce or peace, and he shall determine, concerning such refusal 
or rejection, who wished to treat for the said truce or peace, within a month after the one 
shall have signified the said truce or peace, by his letters patent, sealed by his seal.
538
  
 
Considering the grand, binding terms of the 1404 treaty, and the barely noticed discarding of 
Glyn Dŵr during these negotiations, it seems difficult to conceive other that Owain was 
bargained away as a point to safeguard France.  
Duke Louis’s murder caused grave problems in France, not only among the nobles, 
but also the clergy. When Jean Petit delivered a speech defending the act, he justified it by 
portraying Louis as a tyrant and therefore, the killing of a tyrant was beneficial to France.
539
 
This caused revulsion in many, notably in Jean Gerson who, although a Burgundian-
sponsored cleric for so long, fully transferred his allegiance to the house of Orleans and 
harangued Petit for the few remaining years of his life.
540
 While apparently abhorred by 
political assassination out of principle, Petit’s discourse was also political and marked a 
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proximity between Burgundy and Queen Isabeau. Giangaleazzo Visconti deposed Isabeau’s 
grandfather, Bernabò, in order to take possession of Milan. At the time it was justified by the 
claim that Bernabò was a tyrant, and removing him was legal, legitimate and even a duty.
541
 
In addition, his fragmentation of Milan – among his sons – weakened it and benefitted her 
enemies; therefore his downfall was essential to maintain Milan’s power. The closeness 
between the defences of both overthrows, considering the family connections, is unlikely to 
be coincidental. The embroiling of the French clergy in political assassination by cousins who 
had often sworn themselves to peace and with Italian and Imperial feuds and machinations 
was a significant concern. 
 
While the projected papal conference at Savona had failed, the issue of the schism dragged 
exhaustingly on. Benedict had increased in credibility from his presence at Savona and Genoa 
during 1407, and by April 1408 he had regained a modicum of French support. It had become 
evident that the Roman papacy had lost credibility the previous year and therefore it might be 
ripe for invasion. Benedict plotted with Marshal Boucicaut for Genoese galleys to assault the 
papal seat, and had some degree of amity with Paolo Orsini, leader of the papal guard in 
Rome.
542
 They moved to muster in late April 1408, but Rome’s vulnerability had been 
noticed by Ladislas in Naples, who attacked and took the city just as Boucicaut’s fleet was 
putting to sea.
543
 Just as in 1405, Benedict’s military plans for Rome had been thwarted by 
circumstances beyond his control. However, Gregory’s papacy was in chaos, largely due to 
disaffection spawned by his failure to live up to his promises regarding the schism, and most 
of his cardinals abandoned him, fleeing to Pisa.
544
 Although this presented an opportunity to 
win those cardinals to Benedict’s cause or to advance on chaotic Rome, the murder of Louis 
had robbed Benedict of his most powerful support in the French court. Since then, his 
opponents in Paris had worked assiduously to promote their solution to the schism; a 
pronouncement of France’s intention to declare neutrality by Ascension Day in May.545 
Although Charles VI wrote to Benedict on 12 January 1408, he did not receive the letter until 
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mid-April.
546
 At the same time, truces were signed between England and other regional 
powers such as the Breton and Burgundian dukes, as well as the Scots. Events appeared to be 
turning towards a restoration of peace in the north.
547
 However, Benedict countered the 
French court’s letter by sending a Bull written in May 1407. The papal order would 
excommunicate any who threatened withdrawal from the pope, challenged papal decisions or 
hampered the healing of the schism.
548
 This policy had possibly been concocted with the 
connivance or at least knowledge of those ambassadors sent to Benedict in 1407, though they 
now risked falling foul of it; excommunication was to be followed by interdict.
549
 With 
hindsight, this appears a rash course of action. However, Benedict’s previous contests of 
brinkmanship with the French court had ultimately proved successful, and the prior 
subtraction of obedience had been fully reversed.
550
 Benedict still had friends at court, and 
although Louis was no longer alive, he had been the strongest individual there since at least 
1404, and the possibility of his friends and faction regaining control remained. With those 
salient points in mind, there seems little reason to suppose that Benedict’s methods and 
obstinacy would fail to return France to his cause once again. However, the University of 
Paris was leading the debates at court, Benedict’s letter was denounced and his supporters 
jailed or hounded out of France.
551
 Marshal Boucicaut was commissioned to seize Benedict, 
who fled to Perpignan, where he held council, and thereafter he retired to safety in Aragon.
552
 
France declared neutrality in May 1408.
553
 The articles of the Pennal Declaration thereby 
became not only irrelevant, but a threat to Welsh-French relations. It might be appropriate to 
ponder whether the Pennal Declaration finally resulted in a bitter-sweet moment; some of the 
requests appear to have been agreed by Benedict, such as making St David’s a metropolitan, 
but following that pope’s path would tear Owain from the French, which he could not 
afford.
554
 It is unknown which actions were taken in Wales concerning France’s withdrawal 
of obedience. However, to retain French support Glyn Dŵr would have to jettison Benedict 
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and adhere to the crown. Militarily, the cause does not appear lost in France; Jean V of 
Brittany formed an alliance with the Orleanists in May 1408, and theoretically therefore, the 
western sea lanes were open again.
555
 Also, the French do not seem to have entirely 
abandoned the Welsh, despite their moment of weakness during the negotiations in December 
1407. Monstrelet detailed the raising of a force to go to Wales to assist, in the same year 
Walsingham described combat at sea during which English fleets defeated troop ships bound 
for Wales. This evidence, though cautiously discounted by Lloyd may therefore have been 
fact.
556
 Glyn Dŵr’s ambassadors, probably Yonge and Trevor initially, were certainly in Paris 
in 1408, and Yonge repeatedly appears in records for a decade thereafter, and during this time 
some aid was forthcoming.
557
 Charles VI certainly said that he would send more military aid 
to Wales and to English rebels, and there is no overriding reason to dismiss this promise.
558
 
However, on the continent, both popes lost their obedience; the European powers hoped that 
the conference soon to be held in Pisa would finally end the schism.
559
  
 
The diplomatic victory ensuring a truce with France enabled the English to press their sudden 
ascendancy in Wales, placing another siege under Gilbert, Lord Talbot, before Harlech, 
Owain’s northern capital in early 1408.560 The winter of 1407-8 was noted across Europe as a 
hard one; ‘the worst for five hundred years’ according to the chronicler at Saint-Denys, 
causing many animals to die and water sources to freeze solid for months.
561
 Shortly after 
Louis’s murder, in February 1408 the Percy threat was finally extinguished when 
Northumberland and Bardolf were slain attempting to regain their northern estates. Lewis 
Byford, one of Glyn Dŵr’s bishops, was captured in their company in this brief fight at 
Bramham Moor.
562
 In little over six months the landscape of the revolt had dramatically 
changed from a picture of apparently settled native rule under a popular, skilled leader with a 
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progressive plan for a stable state, with notable foreign allies, to the nightmarish vista of 
complete isolation, articulated by two seemingly decisive strangleholds firmly placed around 
Glyn Dŵr’s urban centres. Without these, Glyn Dŵr might lack legitimacy internationally, 
and be more easily cast as one of a number of rebels or pretenders that plagued Europe’s 
thrones throughout the period. In addition, parliaments held in the woods perhaps lacked the 
required majesty or appeal for envoys of foreign crowns, whereas safely held ports and 
castles told those powers that they would be able to extract their forces when required. 
Without them, Glyn Dŵr lacked a measure of the grandeur and credibility required by 
successful leaders, as well as a basic requirement of any ruler; an identified capital. The 
sieges continued however, with Aberystwyth falling towards the end of 1408, perhaps in 
September.
563
  
Another winter was enough for the trapped garrison at Harlech, which capitulated in 
February 1409.
564
 Edmund Mortimer died in the siege, while his wife and children, Owain’s 
daughter and grandchildren, as well as Owain’s wife, were captured at its fall. They were 
taken to London and eventually starved to death along with his heir, Gruffudd.
565
 However, 
shortly after the capitulation of Harlech, two French carracks, the ‘Sancta Maria’ and the 
‘Sancta Brigida’ were seized off Milford. Other than being connected to the revolt, there is no 
credible explanation why these two, probably with support vessels, were at the 1405 
expedition’s point of entry into Wales. It is tempting therefore to link their presence to 
continued French efforts to engage with Glyn Dŵr’s revolt.566 Moreover, the Welsh were still 
a notable military force within Wales; in 1409, English border communities were still making 
truces with them, and they were well able to mount attacks east of the border.
567
 Although 
such operations were less frequent or damaging during these years, were the Welsh an 
insignificant force, then such actions and agreements would not have occurred. Letters 
recently re-dated to the summer of 1412 suggest a new Welsh leader was in command.
568
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It seems noteworthy that Glyn Dŵr’s family were kept alive for so many years, 
Gruffudd is thought to have died in 1411 and the other captives in 1413. Yet had they not 
been required by Henry for some purpose, such as for bargaining with Owain, then there 
seems no reason for the king to sustain them. Henry had, after all, shown no timidity in 
despatching a large number of people, whether on the scaffold or in prison. Therefore their 
continued existence raised a question, that being whether they were held as a check on 
Owain, being allowed to die when his power had sufficiently dwindled. Despite the seeming 
completeness of the defeat assumed by the loss of Harlech, the Welsh did not give up. 
However, events far away would pull victory further from them and closer to the English 
crown.  
A general council was agreed across Europe, and convened at Pisa in 1409. Although 
the Roman and Avignon popes were declared deposed and an alternative candidate elected, it 
proved a disaster.
569
 Neither of the two schismatic popes – or indeed their supporters – in 
reality accepted their depositions, so there were now three popes rather than two. The schism 
went on, in some respects worse than before. 
 
In France, conflict began between the ducal parties in the years following Louis’s murder and 
Jean sans Peur’s subsequent seizure of control of the government in 1409.570 Jean actively 
sought to keep the agreement with England, personally intervening in restoration disputes in 
Normandy and Picardy in summer 1408, as well as dealing with a serious revolt against him 
in the Low Countries that year.
571
 His consolidation of power in Paris was a bloody affair; he 
set about persecuting his opponents, many being killed while others fled.
572
 Jehan Montagu, 
the bishop of Chartres, a notable Orleanist and former Marmouset so hated by the duke’s 
father, was publicly beheaded.
573
 Such was Jean’s grip on power that some adherents of his 
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enemies sought his amity. The perfect example of this is his treaty of alliance with the duke 
of Brittany in July 1410, who had made a series of alliances with those princes of the 
Orleanist cause shortly prior to the Burgundian coup.
574
 The duke of Berry, the count of 
Alençon and others who had been unengaged if not neutral, appalled by John of Burgundy’s 
excesses, declared themselves Orleanists, making a larger conflict inevitable.
575
 By mid-
1410, France’s slide to civil war was inexorable.   
 
Meanwhile, Henry’s ambassadors in Calais announced that the peace with the Burgundians 
was still holding in May 1410, and that negotiations for its prorogation were due.
576
 
Elsewhere that summer, mutual safe conducts were agreed for Castilian and English ships.
577
 
In November that year, Henry IV approached Albany, the regent of Scotland, with a view to 
negotiating a final peace or a long truce between the kingdoms.
578
 While all of these 
agreements and understandings could be reversed by one act or declaration, they are 
indicative of a trend supporting England’s diplomatic ascendency at that time.  
 In 1411, circumstances dealt the English another fortuitous hand, which they played 
well. In the north, two armies of Scots fought each other, distracting them for the rest of the 
year.
579
 More importantly, probably as a consequence of French factional warfare that year, 
the duke of Burgundy approached the English at Calais and requested military aid. Henry 
responded swiftly, despatching a force of three hundred lances and a thousand archers under 
the command of the earl of Arundel.
580
 While a coup for Jean, who could show he had the 
powerful military support of England at his back, this was clearly a more significant 
development for the English. The friendship with Burgundy had worked a fissure in the 
edifice of the French court. This new, military alliance had turned into a breach through 
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which they could push troops into France. The Burgundians and their allies closed on Paris in 
September, fighting an action at the bridge of Saint-Cloud on Paris’s western boundary in 
early October.
581
 The Orleanists were forced to give up the bridge; they fell back on Paris and 
fled south. The Burgundians and their allies took the capital shortly after. Jean sans Peur and 
the earl of Arundel dined with Charles VI at the Louvre.
582
 Perhaps in reaction to this 
development, the duke of Brittany agreed to a ten-year continuation of his truce with England 
at the end of October, again closing the door on possible French exploits in Wales.
583
 The 
Burgundian leader took control of the king and his children at that point, and in the last action 
of the season, led them to the siege of Etampes, which his impressive array of troops took 
before returning to their quarters for winter. With the fighting season over, his English 
contingent retired to Calais.
584
 With the passage of English troops through Paris and their 
alliance to the de facto leader of France, cemented in agreement and on campaign, Glyn 
Dŵr’s cause was no longer of interest to those then leading France. Internationally at least, 
Owain Glyn Dŵr died as a figure of significance at the fall of Saint-Cloud. 
In Wales, however, Owain Glyn Dŵr was still a force to be considered. He 
demonstrated as much by capturing and ransoming Henry’s main stalwart in Wales, Dafydd 
Gam, in April 1412.
585
 Although Owain seems to have faded after that final public act of 
defiance, it appears likely that he passed on the mantle of leadership to his son Maredudd, so 
the struggle could go on.
586
  
                                                          
581
 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 4, 509-13; Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 2, 30; d’Avout, La Querelle des 
Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 146-51; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 92-3;Courteault, Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le 
Héraut Berry, 46-7; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 152-6.  
582
 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 4, 523-9 (includes a noteworthy anti-English rant by the chronicler); d’Avout, La 
Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 152. 
583
 Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 5, 155, 166-7. 
584
 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 4, 569-79; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 139-41; Courteault, Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit 
Le Héraut Berry,48-9. It is noteworthy that the Welsh adherence to the Orleanist cause survived the death of 
Duke Louis. Welsh troops still appear in the ducal accounts from 1410-2, the most notable example of which 
follows: Lannette-Claverie, Collection Joursanvault, 209 (1410-2), ‘Mandement de Pierre Renier, trésorier 
général du duc d’Orléans [then Charles, son of Louis], au receveur du domaine du duc dans le comté de 
Dunois, d’accomplir les instructions du duc en payant régulièrement ses 30 l. t. de gages annuels à Madoc Hoel 
(alias Houel), établi par le duc d’Orléans à la garde de son château de châteaudun sous le commandememt du 
capitaine de château.’ 
585
 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 142; Davies, Revolt, 227, 302; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 383. 
586
 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 154, citing Gruffydd Hiraethog from 1556-1564. Note, ‘1415 - Owain went into 
hiding on St Matthew’s Day in Harvest (21 September), and thereafter his hiding place was unknown. Very 
many said that he (Owain Glyn Dŵr) died; the seers maintain he did not.’ If this entry from the annals has any 
credibility it might denote that the ‘seers’ knew Owain was still alive, and might have lived for another fifteen 
years. See I. Bowen, The Statutes of Wales (London: Unwin, 1908), 41.  
 299 
 
The actions of 1412 saw the final defeat of French ambitions in Britain for decades to 
come. During the winter, the Orleanists approached the English and tried to persuade Henry 
to support them militarily rather than the Burgundians.
587
 This request marks the complete 
opening of France to the English. When both warring factions solicited England’s aid it 
handed the balance of power to Henry. This demonstrated that England had recovered to the 
extent that it was strong enough to influence the outcome of the French civil war. It also 
allowed the English the opportunity to play both factions, thereby understanding their 
weaknesses before prosecuting an invasion of their territory. The Orleanists offered Henry all 
that England had ceded at Brétigny in 1360, as well as Poitou on the death of the duke of 
Berry, and also Périgord and Angoulême on the death of the young duke of Orleans, in return 
for a thousand men-at-arms and three thousand archers.
588
 In contrast, the Burgundians 
discussed a marriage alliance between Prince Henry and one of Jean sans Peur’s daughters.589 
Having helped the Burgundians drive their opponents from the north the previous year, in 
1412 England supported the Orleanists. In June, Thomas, duke of Clarence, and Sir John 
Cornwall landed in Normandy with an army of at least four thousand and pressed inland, 
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prospecting to advance towards the conflict near Bourges.
590
 While this may well be viewed 
as a cynical move to confuse and weaken the French factions, in reality it was a political 
trump card. Meanwhile, the French warring parties held talks and agreed peaceful terms, and 
renounced all foreign alliances.
591
 Peace was brokered, largely at the intercession of Louis, 
duke of Guyenne, Charles VI’s heir, as the king slipped back into illness.592 After being 
bribed 150, 000 crowns, the English departed, having played a role in cleaving the loyalties 
of France’s magnates. In November, a treaty was made at Buzançais, which obliged all of the 
dukes to write to Henry and renounce all and any agreements with him.
593
 The fact that this 
was a necessity carried out by royal command demonstrates the depth of the fractures within 
the French court and how far the English had been able to invest them. So, the dukes duly 
sent their honourable renunciations to Henry. It is noteworthy, though, that Clarence rejected 
them, and secretly Charles of Orleans made another agreement with the English in 
contravention of his king’s orders.594 The close of 1412 did not bring an end to the conflict, 
therefore, but just the conclusion of that particular phase. However, England had held the 
balance of power between the warring French factions and received ambassadors from both 
parties. Neither French faction would then have been able or probably willing to support a 
conflict in Wales in any form. Although the Welsh cause experienced one final swansong at 
Constance in 1417, Owain had therefore finally been abandoned by the French.
595
 As a 
figurehead or representative of Wales in Europe, Owain Glyn Dŵr’s moment appears to have 
disappeared at that point, for reasons entirely beyond his control.  
 
Therefore in summary, many men had a hand in Owain Glyn Dŵr’s ‘death’, advertently or 
otherwise. Those troops who besieged Aberystwyth and Harlech certainly played a role, 
although their involvement had been facilitated by the steady work of Henry’s ambassadors 
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on the continent. The other men of violence, the armies that fought in eastern France and 
those which faced one another before Paris, deepened the crisis at the French court, allowing 
Louis’s position to be challenged. This sparked the reorganisation of power that cost Louis 
his hold on government, weakening Owain’s chief supporter in France, and also made the 
duke vulnerable to assassins’ hands. The debates of the French clergy and the wise men of 
the University of Paris resulted in the implosion of Benedict XIII’s relevance and 
consequently his power. They, too, unknowingly contributed to Owain’s demise. Benedict’s 
confrontational behaviour and unyielding obstinacy aided his political isolation which 
eventually ended in physical seclusion in Aragon.  All of these men played significant, but as 
yet unrecognised, roles in Owain’s downfall, and perhaps the ambassadors at Calais should 
be attributed the largest share of the credit for that. Their skill in maintaining relations, then 
working and exploiting the few opportunities that presented themselves were critical in 
weakening England’s adversaries, broadening the extant fractures in the French court to an 
extent that would eventually facilitate the invasion of the next king of England.   
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6:   Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated French diplomatic initiatives and military campaigns which 
attempted to extend their power into Britain during the medieval period. This study examined 
four instances of association with the Welsh. Each chapter illustrated appropriate 
contemporary examples delineating elements of medieval France’s foreign policy and 
practice. Their development of a network of allies of differing strength across the continent 
emerges as a notable central feature of this ultimately successful strategy. The careful close 
reading of the treaty documents enabled an evaluation of the form and style of the time and, 
where an abundance of sources allowed, an investigation of the minutiae of these hard-nosed 
negotiations. Moreover, this research reveals that these examples of French-Welsh interaction 
are plainly too numerous and too well-structured to be the result of opportunism.  
Among the numerous conclusions and considerations this research has generated, one 
of the most unanticipated yet evident is the continuity of France’s strategic appreciation of 
Wales throughout the period studied. This recognises Wales’s relevance to England’s power 
and war effort during the medieval period. Although it was in France’s interests to move the 
conflict to Britain, one strategy to achieve this was by denying the enemy Welsh troops, taxes 
or a peaceful western flank by nurturing amities there. The evolution of this ploy evidently 
brought the Welsh and French into common conflict against the English, as evidenced during 
the reigns of Philip Augustus and Charles VI. England therefore was not only denuded of 
Wales’s resources of men, money and the stability offered by peace, but it was required to 
deploy its own finite assets in attempts to defend its west. This obviously reduced its ability 
to act as forcefully or in a prolonged manner elsewhere; this plainly benefitted France and to 
some extent Scotland. When Owain Lawgoch appeared to offer the chance of launching a 
Welsh-French force against Wales, the French acted positively at that moment, or at least, 
convinced the English government of that intention. Whether those years saw the French play 
two sophisticated, successful ruses, or whether they were simply unable to execute their 
apparent campaign plan, remains in the realms of opinion and the preference of the reader. To 
some extent, this demonstrates the skill of the plan; that even now both possibilities seem 
equally compelling. The benefits were plain to see, England’s resources were expended by 
rushing troops to Wales, investigating possible Lawgoch sympathisers and rebuilding castles 
there. The final development of this relationship saw the insertion of an expeditionary force 
into Wales, no small feat for the time. This happened once the Welsh had effectively defeated 
crown forces on the ground and begun to re-establish their government as a recognisable 
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entity once more, rather than simply appearing as a permanently restive province. The 
alliance of 1404 and the mission of 1405 were possible due to the strength of both parties; 
Glyn Dŵr was a competent commander with popular support, while Louis of Orleans was 
resolute in his antipathy towards Henry IV and actively courted allies in his foreign ventures. 
Their intriguing and the opportunities presented by the political-military circumstances of the 
moment saw the arrival of a French army on lands Henry claimed, but which he had lost to 
Owain. Depending on which chronicler most accurately described the 1405 expedition, that 
force stayed in Britain for either a three- or a nine-month campaign, and did so without being 
harassed or confronted by the hastily amassed thousands under the command of a warlike 
king. Although that fact alone supports the notion of an unpublicised truce, the story of the 
1405 invasion represents an extraordinary episode in British and French history. It is perhaps 
all the more surprising that it has still not attracted broader scholarly attention. In addition, 
and in contrast to France’s alliance with the Scots, two of these unions offered the prospect of 
campaigning against the king of England in person, on English battlefields. While Scotland 
might have represented a relatively friendly, stable redoubt at one end of Britain, these joint 
ventures with the Welsh offered direct opportunities to decapitate the English monarchy. 
While those openings were slim in reality, they were clearly alluring and feasible enough to 
the French to generate treaties, expenditure and troop deployments.  
The cases examined within this research describe the potent articulation of French 
power across the Channel which has not been previously explored to any significant extent. 
In that way, this work challenges any notion of English dominance during much of the 
medieval period. While such a perception is increasingly under review, presenting a counter 
case for French power evidently offers a new viewpoint. The range of examples offered 
within the background of an ongoing but developing strategy designed to extend the reach of 
French influence beyond its borders visibly shows the remarkable intelligence, flexibility and 
reactivity of medieval French doctrine; traits essential to a successful military. It is 
noteworthy that they repeatedly sought to attract and maintain a range of allies as a policy 
over the span of numerous generations. Given that France was victorious in the medieval 
phase of the enduring struggle with England, French methods and practices demand more 
profound consideration than they have previously received. It is therefore instructive that the 
French placed such significance on the Welsh; their recurrent efforts to ally themselves with 
the natives are unmistakeable and undeniable.    
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It seems important to illuminate the lack of continuity in their relations and to dispute 
modern efforts to imply that similar alliances were permanent, when the facts demonstrate the 
contrary. Medieval alliances commonly appear to lack permanence; relations were played out 
in an interrupted fashion through the movements of changing military, economic, 
governmental and religious pressures.
1
 Also, the fact that official French-Welsh connections 
pre-date those of the Franco-Scots ‘Auld Alliance’ has not yet attracted the attention it is 
perhaps due. The two examples of union from the later Middle Ages reaffirm the renewed 
connection between Welsh and French leaders, and consequently acknowledge French 
recognition of Wales’s ongoing usefulness a century after ‘conquest’, but there appear to be 
no permanent connections between any of the contemporary partners. Their repetition and 
renewal suggest that they have a broader significance within the context of the long-lived 
dispute between France, England and their respective allies. In that regard, French-Welsh 
relations merit further and wider consideration, in the first instance, inclusion of the Glyn 
Dŵr conflict within broader studies of the Hundred Years’ War would seem to be perhaps 
appropriate recognition of that.  
Throughout these events, it is clear that the Welsh were not simply pawns. In fact, 
neither party appears beholden to the other in any of these studies, despite the florid language 
employed by both sides. The continuous appeal of the Welsh to a major power, combined 
with their role in some of the notable events of their continental region, elevates them beyond 
the fringe to which many general studies relegate them. This study also shows that the Welsh 
were able to communicate appropriately within the means and norms of their time, and to 
organise themselves along similar lines to their contemporaries. Although this seems a basic, 
even axiomatic, observation, it does not appear to have been noted anywhere else.  
It is worth briefly considering whether, in each case, the Welsh were hostages to the 
whims of French political desire. Certainly, Owain Gwynedd could not be described as a 
French proxy. He successfully courted the attention and support of Louis VII after twice 
defeating Henry II on the battlefield. The course and the evolution of Owain’s diplomatic 
efforts mark an impressive first in Welsh history; however, his defiance of Henry preceded 
contact with Louis. The description of the conference at La Ferté-Bernard and the 
                                                          
1
 Brown, The Black Douglases, 211-2; Autrand, ‘Aux origines de l’Europe moderne: l’alliance Franco-Ecosse au 
XIVe siècle’, 33; D. J. Kagay, ‘Disposable Alliances: Aragon and Castile during the War of the Two Pedros and 
Beyond,’ Albany State University Papers, 2010, Consulted online at: 
http://www.medievalists.net/2011/08/11/disposable-alliances-aragon-and-castille-during-the-war-of-the-two-
pedros-and-beyond/ [Accessed: 10/04/2012], 1-69. 
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denouement of part of the feudal conflict between Louis and Henry offer an entirely new 
vista on their well-known relations.  That realignment appears to resolve a number of long-
standing problems concerning the interrelations of all those represented at the meeting in July 
1168. Although it is not suggested that Louis specifically articulated French power within 
Britain, he did exercise his authority over Henry and the plaintiffs at La Ferté-Bernard. In that 
way, the French king clearly projected himself over his vassal, Henry II.  
 When Philip Augustus proposed an alliance with Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, the prince of 
Gwynedd accepted and reacted to benefit his interests, without jeopardising his position. He 
formed one part of a multi-factional alliance forged to support and protect Prince Louis’s 
attempt to claim the throne of England. It is remarkable that, from the perspective of several 
centuries, the measure of Llywelyn’s power has been largely forgotten. However, he stood as 
an equal among others in the coalition; the French heir, the rebel English barons and the 
Scots. The recognition of his issues before those of Malcolm of Scotland within the first 
drafts of Magna Carta denotes his high standing. This chapter illustrated a powerful 
diplomatic campaign by the French, creating an excellent opportunity to utterly defeat their 
enemy and take the throne of England. Military stalemate, growing baronial unease and the 
shifting sands of the political and religious affairs of the moment thwarted that attempt and 
subsequently definitively severed the union between Philip and Llywelyn. Nevertheless, each 
entered the agreement as relative equals; Philip was globally stronger, but in Britain, where 
he was about to send his heir, Llywelyn was clearly the more potent.  Both benefitted from 
that period of association. Llywelyn campaigned successfully against the kings of England 
before and after his alliance with Philip during his five decade reign, showing that he did not 
enter the alliance or the conflict on another’s command.  
Owain Lawgoch could be depicted as an agent of French polity; although that is 
perhaps unfair. The 1372 declaration makes intriguing reading; teasingly posing the question 
whether the venture was a well-developed ruse. This chapter provides a new picture of Wales 
post-1282, challenging the notion of ‘conquest’ while demonstrating that, in reality, Wales 
was far from being a peaceful province. Whether a deception or a genuine effort to probe 
Wales with a view to conquering it, the Lawgoch invasion projects illustrate the 
sophistication and success of France’s foreign policy at that time. Although the result does 
not determine the intent, it is noteworthy that England reacted to cover Wales, while 
Lawgoch and du Guesclin retook La Rochelle and much of western France.  
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In 1404, the French court formally approached Owain Glyn Dŵr in a bid to promote 
the growing conflict with Henry IV. This chapter mapped the complexities and undulations of 
the factional warfare within France at the time. The degree to which the French were able to 
exert themselves across their borders into Italy, Spain, Brittany, the Empire and Britain 
during this short period is remarkable. This clearly reveals the extent to which they had 
recovered or even advanced their former might by the beginning of the fifteenth century. This 
too is not remarked upon in any publication consulted, perhaps because of the gravity of their 
rapid decline in the first quarter of that century. However, the diplomatic exchanges also 
appear to allow a glimpse into the mind of Glyn Dŵr; angry but highly intelligent, replete 
with linguistic ploys to engage and persuade his new ally. This alliance saw a French army 
enter Henry’s domain and campaign there for several months, not simply land for a hasty 
coastal skirmish. The work of the French, Welsh and English diplomats was investigated and 
presented. Through those difficult moments, perhaps the English envoys emerged as the most 
worthy, though unsung, heroes of that phase of the conflict. This chapter also showed how 
French factional warfare caused both major courtly parties to turn to their enemy for aid. This 
rarely exposed fact gave England a supporting role in the struggle for the governance of 
France, which evidently allowed them to influence the outcome of that conflict. This sudden 
rise enabled England to encourage splits in the French court, and weaken its factions, 
facilitating the invasions which followed less than five years later. Once again, the French-
Welsh alliance waned, largely through external factors. However, the abundant details 
available for this area of research enabled a thorough investigation, producing another fresh 
vision of an otherwise frequently described period. It cannot be said that Glyn Dŵr was a 
French pawn; the rebellion he came to lead was unconnected to the French, although their 
distraction through civil war assisted his fall. Even without French encouragement or material 
support, resistance in Wales continued in some form for years after. 
 
This work is intended as a contribution to the field of international relations and studies of 
power and diplomacy. In these discussions of medieval diplomacy in practice, the leaders and 
their interpersonal dynamics have been examined or re-investigated, revealing a number of 
fresh perspectives. This work proposes a broader view, demonstrating the continent-wide 
connectivity of medieval Europe’s factions and movements. Therefore, not only is the 
subject-matter new, but so are the methods used and conclusions drawn. It also goes some 
way to credibly portraying and discussing this barely-researched area of medieval history 
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and, in so doing, shows a number of research and publication opportunities. These, the author 
wishes to investigate in the coming years, hopefully engaging in collaborations with others 
interested in these matters, from prosopographies and warfare, to works on broader subject 
areas such as foreign policy.
2
 These observations demonstrate the existence of several ample 
research niches to fill. In addition, studies on smaller, now disappeared, entities such as 
Wales are few and far between, and perhaps this should change. The application of theories 
and writers uncommonly associated with medieval history, such as soft power and Sun Tzu, 
is intended to demonstrate their broader conceptual potential as well as the contemporary 
relevance of the medieval world. 
Finally, although the French-Welsh connection was intermittent due to the undulating 
financial, military, political and religious pressures of the periods in which they occurred, 
their recurrence is incontrovertible. In establishing that as the case, this represents an 
evolution in current thinking on French policy and ability during the period, as well as the 
role and the skill of the Welsh with whom they sought these alliances. These studies are 
therefore original and contribute to a number of academic fields.  
 
                                                          
2
 There are few works on foreign policy; the most frequently consulted was Mirot, La Politique Française en 
Italie de 1380 à 1422 in 1934, while work on Louis and the Armagnacs was last done in English in Darwin’s 
Louis d'Orléans in 1936. 
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Appendix A 1.1:   Owain Gwynedd’s first letter to the court of Louis VII, between October 
1163 and July 1165 (Latin). 
L. gloriosissimo Francor(um) regi Owin(us) rex Walie salute et devotissimum obsequium. Ex 
quo vestre virtutis magnificentiam et amplissimam vestre dignitatis ac nobiliatatis 
excellentiam fama nuntiante et veridical multorum relatione accepi, in vestre celsitudinis 
notitiam venire, et dulcissimam vestram amicitiam habere, summon desiderio a multis 
temporibus desideravi. Sed quod hactenus, commeantium raritate impediente et locorum 
distantia, obtinere non potui, decetero ut obtineam tam scripto quam nuntio diligenter 
laborabo. Me igitur et mea, si qua vobis placent, vestre voluntati ad nuntum exponens, 
summa precum instantia deposco quatinus me, hucusque multimode discretion vestre 
incognitum, inter vestros fideles et devotos amicos amodo habere dignemini. Quid autem 
carissime vestre dilectioni super petitone proposita placuerit, per presidentium latorem michi 
significare non differatis. Valeant qui vos feliciter et diu regnare desiderant. Valete.
1
 
 
Appendix A 1.2:   Its English Translation. 
To Louis, very glorious king of the French, Owain, king of Wales, greeting and very devoted 
service. Since I have heard of the magnificence of your virtue and the very eminent 
excellence of your dignity and nobility from the announcement of rumour and the truthful 
report of many, I have for a long time desired with the greatest desire to come to the notice of 
your highness and have your very delightful friendship. But that which up to now I have not 
obtained, having been prevented by the rarity of travellers coming and going and the 
distances of places [between us], from now on I shall endeavour diligently to obtain by both 
writing and messenger. Placing myself and my possessions, if by any chance they are 
pleasing to you, at the command of your will, I ask with the greatest perseverance of prayers 
that you may now deign from now to consider me, largely unknown up to now to your 
discretion, amongst your faithful and devoted friends. Do not delay to inform me through the 
bearer of the present letter what it shall please your dearest amiability concerning the 
proposed petition. May they fare well who desire that you reign happily and long. Farewell.
2
  
 
                                                          
1
 Pryce, The Acts of Welsh Rulers, (no. 193) 324. 
2
 Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’, 4, 26 (letter 1, English, Latin). 
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Appendix A 2.1:   Owain Gwynedd’s second letter to the court of Louis VII, between 
November 1163 and July 1165 (Latin). 
Ow’ rex Walie, suus amicus devotissimus H. Suessionensi episcopo et regis Francie 
cancellario, suo patri in Cristo et amico dilectissimo, debitam ac voluntariam cum salute 
amicitiam. Deo patri, mi venerande, et vestre discretion gratias refero, de hoc quod mihiper 
nuntium meum Moysen litteris vestries mandastis, ut scilicet si meum nuntium iterum 
mitterem domino regi Francie, per vos divertere facerem, ut vestro suffragio efficacius suum 
propositum effectui mancipare valeret. Unde et nunc istum M’. nunteum meum vobis 
mittimus consulendum de suo negotio, vos obnixe deprecando quatinus eum versus regem 
foveatis, et partem nostrum pro Dei amore et nostro iuvetis. Valete.
3
 
 
 
Appendix A 2.2:    Its English Translation. 
Owain, king of Wales, his very devoted friend, [sends] due and voluntary friendship with 
[his] greeting to his very beloved friend and father in Christ, Hugh, bishop of Soissons and 
chancellor to the king of France. I give thanks to God the Father, my venerable one, and to 
your discretion concerning that which you committed to writing in your letter to me through 
my messenger Moses, namely that if I should again send my messenger to the lord king of 
France, I should make him come through you, so that with your help his purpose might be 
accomplished more effectively. Whence we are now sending this Moses as my messenger to 
consult with you concerning his business, and vigorously entreat you to support him vis-à-vis 
the king and to assist our side for the love of God and us. Farewell.
4
  
 
                                                          
3
 Pryce, The Acts of Welsh Rulers, (no. 194), 324-5. 
4
 Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’, 6, 27-8 (letter 2, English, Latin).  
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Appendix A 3.1:   Owain Gwynedd’s third letter to the court of Louis VII, between 
September 1165 and 24 April 1166 (Latin). 
Excellentissimo dei gratia L. Francor(um) regi Owin(us) Waliarum princeps, suus homo et 
amicus fidelis, devotissimum cum salute servitum. Cum universersorum relation, serenissime 
rex, te conspicuum predicet, in quo omnes possunt et debent confidere, clementia tamen mihi 
experiment nota et mansuetudo erga subiectos et in te confidentes, fecit me eligere te solum 
consultorem, ad quem in angustiis meam conqueror necessitate. Quamtotiens enim de meo 
esse et mea sollicitudine litterarum inscription vobis nuntiavi, non tam litteras quam earum 
latores benevole recepisti et eos clementer tractasti. Mihi etiam per illos, Dei gratias et vobis, 
consuluisti prout pius rex confidenti in eo debuit. Cum itaque angustie ad presens mihi 
undique sint, nolo te clementem consultorem latere. Werra quam rex Anglie per multos dies, 
ut vobis notum est, severitate sue tyrannidis mihi excogitavit, in preterita estate, nullis malis 
meis precedentibus, contra me surrexit. Sed cum in conflict quinque partis nostri exercitus 
convenirent, Deo gratias et vobis, ex suis plures ceciderunt quam ex meis. Sed, quia non 
hominis propositi sed nutu Dei omnia disponuntur, movit exercitum versus Anglia(m), non 
nostris fortasse meritis sed humilium oration ad sanctos et sanctorum intercession ad Deum, 
usque adeo tamen me dubium reliquens, quod nec pacem nec indutias nobiscum composuit. 
Iratus itaque pro eventu non prospero, alienigenis et omnibus quos ad nostrum detrimentum 
congregaverat, in dicessu mandavit ut post futuram Pascha contra nos iterum cum eo 
venirent. Proinde vestram clementiam obnixe deprecor quatinus per presentium latorem mihi 
nuntietis si animum werrandi contra eum habetis, ut in illa werra et vobis serviam nocendo ei 
secundum consilium vestrum et illata mihi ab eo vindicem. Quod si hoc proponis, quid 
consulas, quod auditorium mihi largiri vis, per hunc latorem mihi nuntietis. Nullam enim 
viam evadendi eius insidias habeo, nisi te largiente mihi consilium et adiutorium. Privatum 
etiam et familiarem clericum meum Guiardum et consanguineum vobis commendo, quatinus 
pro Dei amore et nostro ei necessaria provideatis. Misi enim eum ante in vestram presentiam 
cum litteris meis, quibus non credidistis, ut nobis dictum est, quod essent mee. Sed sunt he, 
Deum testum induco, qui per illas eum intimo corde vobis commendavi. De hoc etiam 
vestram clementiam obnixe deprecor, ut sicut incepistis prelates ecclesie, videlicet 
apostolicum et archiepiscopum Cantuariensem, michi pacificos redder, sic et adhucreddatis. 
Valete.
5
 
                                                          
5
 Pryce, The Acts of Welsh Rulers, (no. 196), 327-9. 
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Appendix A 3.2:   Its English Translation. 
To the very excellent Louis, by the grace of God king of the French, Owain, prince of Wales, 
his very faithful man and friend, [sends] very devoted service with [his] greeting. Although 
the report of all, most serene king, proclaims you to be conspicuous as one in whom all can 
and should have complete trust, the clemency known to me by experience, and the kindness 
towards subjects and those having complete trust in you, make me choose you as the sole 
adviser to whom in difficulties I may complain loudly of my necessity. For as often as I have 
informed you about myself and my cares by the writing of letters, you have received not only 
the letters but their bearers benevolently and treated them kindly. Through the latter you have 
counselled me, thanks be to God and you, as a pious king should counsel someone having 
complete trust in him. Now that, therefore, difficulties are all around me at present, I do not 
wish my kind adviser to be ignorant of the situation. Preceded by no evil deeds of mine, in 
the past summer the king of England has waged against me the war which, as is known to 
you, he has planned for many days with the harshness of his tyranny. But when in the conflict 
the five armies of our side came together, thanks be to God and you, more of his men fell 
than mine. Having seen this, he wrongfully and harmfully mutilated my hostages, although he 
had not presented them previously for the keeping of peace. But, because all things are 
disposed of not by the wishes of man but by the will of God, he moved the army towards 
England, not through our merits, perhaps, but through the prayers of the humble to the saints, 
and by the saints’ intercession to God; however, he left me uncertain of the outcome to the 
end, because he arranged neither a peace nor a truce with us. Angered therefore because the 
result had not turned out as he had hoped, on his departure he ordered the foreigners and all 
whom he gathered together to defeat us to come with him against us again after next Easter. 
On that account I vigorously entreat your clemency that you will inform me through the 
bearer of this present letter whether you are resolved to wage war against him, so that in that 
war I may both serve you by harming him according to your advice and take vengeance for 
the war he waged against me. But if you do not propose this, inform me by this bearer what 
you advise, what help you wish to bestow on me. I have no way of evading his snares unless 
you grant me advice and help. I commend to you moreover my private and familiar cleric and 
kinsman, Guiardus, that you may provide him with necessities for the love of God and us. I 
sent him before into your presence with my letters, which you did not believe were mine, so 
we were told. But they were mine, I bring in God as my witness, and through them I 
commended him to you from the depths of my heart. I vigorously entreat your clemency 
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concerning this as well, that just as you have begun to render peaceful towards me the 
prelates of the Church, namely the pope and the archbishop of Canterbury, so you will 
continue to do so. Farewell.
6
  
 
 
                                                          
6
 Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’, 7-8, 27-8 (letter 3, English, Latin). 
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Appendix B 1.1:   Llywelyn ap Iorwerth’s reply to Philip Augustus, c. 1215-1216 (Latin). 
Excellentissimo domino suo Ph(ilippo) Dei gracia illustri Francorum regi Loelin(us) princeps 
Norwallie fidelis suus salute et tam devotum quam debitum fidelitatis et reverentie 
famulatum. Quid retribuam excellentie nobilitatis vestre pro singulari honore et dono 
inpreciabili quo vos rex Francor(um), imo princeps regum terre, me fidelum vestrum non tam 
munifice quam magnifice prevenientes, litteras vestras sigillo aureo impressas in testimonium 
federis regni Francor(um) et Norwallie principatus michi militi vestro delegastis, quas ego in 
armariis ecclesiasticis tanquam sacrosanctas relliquias conservari facio, ut sint memoriale 
perpetuum et testimonium inviolabile quod ego et heredes mei, vobis vestrisque heredibus 
inseparabiliter adherentes, vestris amicis amici erimus et inimici inimicis, idipsum a vestra 
regia dignitate erga me et meos amicos regaliter observari modis omnibus expecto postulans 
et expecto ? Quod ut inviolabiliter observetur, congregato procerum meorum concilio et 
communi cunctorum Wallie principum assensu, quos omnes vobiscum in huius federis 
amicicia colligavi, sigilli mei testimonio me vobis fidelem inperpetuum promitto, et sicut 
fideliter promitto fidelius promissum adimplebo. Preterea, ex quo vestre sullimitatis litteras 
suscepi, nec treugas nec pacem nec etiam colloquium aliquod cum Anglicis feci, set per Dei 
gratiam ego et omnes Wallie principes unanimiter confederati, inimicis nostris imo 
munitissima, que ipsi per fraudes et dolos occupaverant, per auxilium domini in manu forti 
recuperavimus, recuperata in domino Deo potenter possidemus. Unde postulantes expectimus 
universi Wallie principes quod sine nobis nec treugas nec pacem cum Anglicis faciatis, scituri 
quod nos nullo pacto vel precio, nisi precognita voluntatis vestre benivolencia, eis aliquo 
pacis seu federis vinculo copulabimur.
7
  
                                                          
7
 Pryce,  Acts of Welsh Rulers, (entry 235) 392-3. In contrast to Pryce, Treharne, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of 
Alliance in 1212’, 74-5, has the following textual differences (not including those bracketed additions in either 
publications, Treharne’s capitalisation after commas or use of ‘Vallie’ and ‘anglicis’) in form, spelling and lack 
of capitalisation after commas: (Line 1) ‘dei Gracia’,  (2) ‘norVallie’, (6-7) ‘francorum et norVallie’, (8), comma 
after ‘ecclesiasticis’,  (18)  ‘per dei gratiam’, (22) ‘domino deo’.  
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Appendix B 1.2:   Thomas Matthews’ English translation of J655 14 AEiii 66. 
To our most excellent lord Philip, by the grace of God, the illustrious King of the French, 
Llywelyn, Prince of North Wales, his friend, sends greeting and such devotion as the debt of 
fealty and respectful service, which I will repay the excellency of your nobility, on account of 
the singular and priceless gifts, which you, King of the French, even prince of that country of 
kings, outstripping me, your friend, not more munificently than magnificently, have sent me 
by your knight, your letters, impressed by your golden seal in witness of the alliance of the 
kingdom of the French and the principality of North Wales, which I, before an assembly of 
clergy, even on the sacrosanct relics swear to observe as they will be a perpetual memorial 
and an inviolable testimony, that I and my heirs, cleaving inseparably to you and your heirs, 
shall be your friends’ friends, to your enemies’ enemies. This itself therefore stipulating, I 
expect and ask from your kingly dignity to be royally observed in every manner towards me 
and towards my friends, and in order that it may be inviolably observed, having called 
together a council of my chieftains, and with the common consent of all the princes of Wales 
all of whom I have joined with you in the friendship of this treaty promise you, under witness 
of my seal, fidelity in perpetuity, and as I thus faithfully promise I will carry out my promise 
more faithfully. Moreover, since I received letters of your excellency, I have made neither 
truce, nor peace, nor any negotiation whatever with the English.  But, by the grace of God, I 
and all the princes of Wales, unitedly confederated, will manfully resist our enemies, even 
yours, and by the help of God and with a strong hand, we will recover from the yoke of the 
tyrants themselves the great part of the land and the strongly fortified castles, which they by 
fraud and guile have occupied. And being recovered, we will powerfully hold [them] in the 
Lord God, whence stipulating, we, the princes of all Wales, desire that without us, neither 
truce nor peace will ye make with the English, [for] let it be decreed, that by no pact or 
reward, unless by the foreknown kindness of your wish, will we be joined to them in any 
peace or treaty. 
  
Endorsement – The Covenant of Llywelyn, Prince of North Wales, with the Lord King of 
France.
8
 
                                                          
8
 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 3-4 (Latin), 57-8 (English). 
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Appendix B 1.3:   The Translation from English Historical Documents. 
To his most excellent lord, Philip, by God’s grace the illustrious king of the French, Llywelyn 
prince of North Wales his faithful subject greeting and devoted and due service of fealty and 
reverence. How am  I to repay the excellence of your nobility for the singular honour and 
priceless gift with which you the king of the French, nay foremost of kings on earth, 
anticipated me, not so much munificently as magnificently, in sending me, your knight,  your 
letter sealed with the seal of gold in testimony of the treaty between the kingdom of the 
French and the principality of North Wales – which letter I will have kept in the aumbreys of 
the church as if it were a sacred relic, to be a perpetual memorial and an inviolable witness 
that I and my heirs, adhering inseparably to you and your heirs, will be friends to your friends 
and enemies to your enemies and I confidently ask and request that the very same be 
observed in all respects by your royal dignity in royal fashion towards me and my friends. 
That it may be inviolably observed, by the testimony of my seal, having summoned the 
council of my chief men and having obtained the common assent of all the princes of Wales, 
all of whom I have bound to you in the friendship of this treaty, I promise that I will be 
faithful to you for ever and just as I faithfully promise I will most faithfully fulfil my 
promise. Furthermore, from the time I received your highness’s letter, I have made neither 
truce nor peace, nor even parley, with the English, but, by God’s grace, I and all the princes 
of Wales, unanimously leagued together have manfully resisted our – and your – enemies, 
and with God’s help we have by force of arms recovered from the yoke of their tyranny a 
large part of the land and the strongly defended castles which they by fraud and deceit had 
occupied and having recovered them we hold them strongly in the might of the Lord. Hence 
we, all the princes of Wales, ask and request that you make no truce with the English without 
us, knowing that we will not for any terms or price bind ourselves to them by any peace or 
treaty unless we know in advance we have your approval.
9
  
                                                          
9
 Rothwell, ed., English Historical Documents, vol 3, 1189-1327 (1975), 306-7.  
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Appendix B 1.4:    Huw Pryce’s summary of Huw Pryce’s 2005 summary of J 655, no. 14 
from Acts of Welsh Rulers. 
Letter, thanking Philip, king of the French, prince of the kings of the earth, for sending 
Llywelyn, Philip’s faithful man, his letter sealed with his gold seal in testimony of the treaty 
between the kingdom of the French and the principality of North Wales, which Llywelyn will 
have kept in the aumbreys of the church as if it were a sacred relic, so that it may be a 
perpetual memorial and an inviolable testimony that he and his heirs, adhering inseparably to 
Philip and his heirs, will be friends to Philip’s friends and enemies of his enemies; Llywelyn 
asks that the same will be observed by Philip towards Llywelyn and his friends.  In order that 
this be kept inviolably, having summoned the council of his leading men and with the consent 
of all the princes of Wales, all of whom he has bound together in the friendship of this treaty, 
Llywelyn promises by the testimony of his seal to be faithful to Philip for ever, and just as he 
promises so he will more faithfully fulfil his promise. From the time he has received Philip's 
letter Llywelyn has not made truce, peace or even parley with the English, but by the grace of 
God he and all the princes of Wales in unanimous confederation have manfully resisted their 
– and Philip’s – enemies, and with the Lord’s help have recovered from the yoke of their 
tyranny a great part of the land and the strongest castles which they have occupied by deceit, 
and hold mightily in God that which has been recovered. Therefore all the princes of Wales 
request that Philip make neither truce nor peace with the English without them, knowing that 
the princes will not bind themselves by any agreement or price to the English in any peace or 
treaty, unless they have advanced knowledge of his approval.
10
 
 
                                                          
10
 Pryce,  Acts of Welsh Rulers, (entry 235) 392. 
 319 
 
Appendix B 1.5:    Notes on differences between these translations 
The differences between the translations produce some points of contention. Structurally, the 
principal difference is that Treharne’s text uses longer sentences than that of Matthews. This 
gives the translation a different flow to the Latin original and thus, it reads slightly differently 
overall. In remaining faithful to the original, Matthews’ work is more difficult to piece 
together as one coherent message, and some of the variations between the two versions arise 
from these different redactions of the sentence form, structure and implication. Treharne 
appears to have isolated two notable translation errors in Matthews’s work. The first centres 
on the word ‘militi’, knight, in line seven of the Latin original.  Matthews understood that 
Philip had ‘sent me by your knight, your letters’, suggesting that one of Philip’s nobles had 
carried the treaty to Gwynedd. In contrast, Treharne phrased it thus, ‘sending me, your 
knight, your letter’ implying that Llywelyn was describing himself as Philip’s knight. The 
second translational issue focuses on the ‘armariis ecclesiasticis’, as Treharne and Pryce have 
it and consequently as it appears on line seven of their transcriptions. Matthews believed it to 
be ‘armatiis ecclesiasticis’, so this issue is one of transcription firstly, then translation. The 
difference in meaning is stark however, Matthews’ version described a meeting of the clergy 
and Treharne’s a cupboard in a church. Treharne appears to have accurately argued that this 
difference arose from a palaeographical error by Matthews.  The two versions induce 
different visions of Philip’s diplomatic mission to the Welsh; Matthews’s grander military 
mission to Wales being ratified by a clergy council contrasts with Treharne’s anonymous 
messenger who bears Llywelyn’s response promising to guard the letter safely and swearing 
fealty as Philip’s knight. Although Treharne appears correct on these two textual differences, 
the treaty clearly shows that Llywelyn summoned councils and debated the matter before he 
replied. Llywelyn attained agreement from those in his affinity, although his letter does not 
say whether this encompassed the nobles and the clergy. However, this letter was written 
with the connivance of Llywelyn’s clergy; it was to be kept in a church and, in keeping with 
common practice of the time, the author of the reply was almost certainly a cleric.  This 
would have been more difficult to promise in 1212 when the papal interdict was in force 
throughout England and Wales. Although the interdict was relaxed in Wales during that year, 
as is discussed below, it is unclear precisely when that happened. Prior to that event, 
Llywelyn’s confident assumption of church cooperation is unlikely. In addition, the mention 
of Llywelyn summoning councils is noteworthy; Brut y Tywysogion refers to gatherings of 
Welsh clergy in 1215 and 1216, but no source mentions a meeting of the Welsh clergy in 
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1212.  This evidence places both Welsh groups necessary to enact the alliance in council with 
Llywelyn after 1215, but not in 1212. 
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Appendix B 1.6:    Constructing a primary case for 1212  
In an attempt to construct a case for 1212, apart from the inconclusive entry in the Brut which 
makes no reference to any French-Welsh alliance, the contemporary evidence which might 
aid that theory can only be viewed as circumstantial, at best. Although the following sources 
were not presented by Treharne, they seem to be the only references upon which such a case 
can be built. Amid entries for 1213, one French chronicler, Guillaume le Breton, referred to 
Philip’s desire to intervene in England. The editor’s footnote backdated this project to 1209, 
combining ‘Jean de Lascy’, Roger the constable of Chester who was loyal to John, and the 
king of France.
11
 This referred to Philip’s pledge made between March 1209 and April 1210 
to accept ‘J. de Latiaco’ or John de Lacy, into his service if he made good his promise to 
make war on King John in England and Ireland.
12
 The de Lacy family held lands in 
Herefordshire, Ireland and Normandy, and therefore could form an indirect connection 
between Wales and France through the March. However, more recent scholarship on the 
matter assists in establishing that this was a minimal threat, if any, and resulted in no attempt 
to overthrow John.
13
 This might, perhaps, be combined with John’s brutal treatment of 
another noble family who, like the de Lacys, were landowners in the Welsh Marches, but also 
had firm connections with Ireland, Scotland and France. In 1210, the king hounded William 
de Braose out of Wales and Ireland, capturing and killing his wife and heir.
14
 De Braose fled 
to France and might have machinated with the authorities, although there is no obvious proof 
of that. Several sources linked the de Braose and de Lacy families in these times, one of 
which identified ‘Walterus de Lacy’ agitating in exile in France in 1211.15 However, the fact 
that Guillaume le Breton wrote of Philip’s project in 1213 most probably connects it to the 
plan to attack England formulated in the same year following the receipt of Innocent III’s 
letters to the French king.  
                                                          
11 Delaborde, Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, vol 1, 245-6. 
12
 Samaran et al, Recueil des Actes de Philippe Auguste, tome 3 (1966), 161-2 (entry 1079). Note: A. A. M. 
Duncan believes that this is not ‘John’ de Lacy, who was a minor at the time, but another member of the 
family, probably ‘Walter’, Duncan, ‘John King of England and the Kings of Scots’, 258-9, this view is shared by 
Professor D. Power (Swansea University), revealed in conversation in 2010. 
13
 Duncan, ‘John King of England and the Kings of Scots’, 258-9. 
14
 Giles, Wendover, 247-8, 254-7; Annales Monastici, vol. 1, Margan, 30, Theokesberia, 59, vol 2, Wintonia, 81, 
Waverleia, 265, vol 3, Dunstaplia, 32, vol 4, Oseneia, 54-5, Wigornia, 399; Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, vol 2, 
201-4; Norgate, John Lackland, 287-8, Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History, 387; Warren, King John, 184-
8; S. Duffy, ‘John and Ireland: The Origins of England’s Irish Problem,’ 239-44. 
15
 Giles, Wendover, 254-5; Annales Monastici, vol. 1, Theokesberia, 59, vol 2, Wintonia, 8, vol 3, Dunstaplia, 32, 
vol 4, Oseneia, 54-5; Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, vol 2, 201-4; Norgate, John Lackland, 287-8; Warren, King 
John, 83, 193-6.  
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 Therefore, the strongest primary source connecting Philip to discontented English 
nobles, with no mention of the Welsh, comes from Wendover.
16
 This source has some 
notable detractors however; Cheney dismissed it, while Bradbury described it as an 
exaggeration.
17
 It is impossible to discount Wendover’s chronicle however, due to the fact 
that seemingly every secondary source consulted includes it. Although Wendover’s evidence 
falls among entries for 1212, it appears to refer to events more commonly and reliably 
ascribed to 1213 and perhaps 1215.
18
 Such dating inconsistencies are quite common in 
medieval sources.  
The treatment of William de Braose and his family might have been another factor 
that provoked baronial discontent with John which resulted in the alleged 1212 plot to kill 
him in Wales or to hand him over to the Welsh. More concrete reasons for English disloyalty 
include John’s intentions to impose higher taxes, to demand more service from his nobles and 
his heavy-handed, sometimes murderous methods of control.
19
 Any friendship between the 
French king and the de Lacy family appears short-lived; records show Philip Augustus 
redistributing the Norman estates of ‘Jean’ and ‘Gilbert de Lacy’ shortly after ‘Walter de 
Lacey’ was absolved and returned to the obedience of the king of England.20 Taken as a 
whole, contemporary evidence linking France and Wales in 1212 is tenuous, particularly 
when compared to the weight of clear, reliable, independently corroborating sources for 
1215-16. It appears therefore that no sound case for 1212 can be constructed using primary 
sources.  
                                                          
16
 Giles, Wendover, 259-60. 
17
 Cheney, Innocent III, 338-9, ‘unsupported ... circumstantial ... and mostly unacceptable’; Bradbury, Philip 
Augustus, 318. 
18
 Luard, Matthæi Parisiensis, vol 2, 647-8; Norgate, John Lackland, 169, 232-9, 253-5; Cheney, Innocent III, 
326, 367-86,  391; Turner, King John, 175-257; Warren, King John, 224-40, 246-52; Sayers, Innocent III, 184; 
Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 190-3; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ 345; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 56-7.  
19 Giles, Wendover, 254-5; Annales Monastici, vol. 1, Margan, 32, vol 4,Wigornia, 400; Stubbs, Walteri de 
Coventria, vol 2, 206-7; Norgate, John Lackland, 167-71; J. C. Holt, The Northerners (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood, 1981), 79-81; Warren, King John, 181-99. 
20
 Fœdera, vol 1, 216; Samaran et al, Recueil des Actes de Philippe Auguste, tome 4, 191-2 (entry 1556 and 
n.1).  
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 Appendix C 1.1:   Owain Lawgoch’s declaration of alliance with King Charles V of France, 
10 May, 1372 (French). 
A tous ceulx qui ces lectres verront Evain de Gales, salut. Comme les roys d’Angleterre, qui 
ont esté ès temps passez, meuz de mauvais courage et de convoitise dampnée, à tort et sanz 
cause et par traisons appensees, aient occis ou fait occire aucuns de mes prédecesseurs roys 
de Gales et yceulx mis hors et deboutez du dit royaume, et ycellui royaume par force et 
puissance appliquie a eulx et detenu et ycellui soubzmiz avec les subgiez du pais à plusieurs 
servitutes, lequel est et doit estre appartenir à moi par la succession et comme plus prochain 
de sanc et de lignage et en droict ligne descendant d’iceulx mes prédécesseurs roys d’icellui 
royaume, et pour avoir secours et aide à recouvrir le dit royaume, qui est mon héritage, me 
soye transportez devers pluseurs roys, princes et seigneurs chrestiens, et leur aye declairié et 
monstré clerement le droit que je y ay, en leur requerant et suppliant humblement que a ce me 
voulsissent aydier, et derrainement me soies traiz devers mon très puissant et très redoubté 
seigneur Charles, par la grace de Dieu roy de France, dauphin de Viennoys, et lui ay monstré 
mon droit que j’ay ou dit royaume et fait les requestes et supplicacions dessus dictes, et 
ycellui seigneur ayant compassion de mon estat, actendu le grant tort que les diz roys 
d’Angleterre ont eu en leur temps envers mes diz prédécesseurs et encores a le roy 
d’Angleterre qui est à present envers moy, et consideré toute la matière de mon fait de sa 
benign et accoustumée clémence, qui est le mirouer singulier et exemple entire les chrestiens 
de toute justice et de toute grace et miséricorde pour touz opprimez relever et conforter, 
m’ayt octroyé son ayde et confort de gens d’armes er de navire pour recouvrer le dit 
royaume, qui est mon droit héritage, comme dit est; sachent tuit que je, en recongnoissant la 
grant amour que mon dit seigneur le roy de France m’a monstrée et monstre par vray effect 
en ce fait, ou quel et pour le quel mectre sus a mis et exposé du sien trois cens mil francs d’or 
et plus, tant en gaiges de gens d’armes, d’archiers et d’arbalestriers comme en navire et en 
gaiges et despens de marigniers, en hernoiz et en autres fraiz, missions et despens pluseurs, la 
quele somme je ne lui puis pas présentement rendre, promet loyaument et par la foy de mon 
corps et jure aux sains Euvangiles de Dieu, touchées corporelement pour moy et pour mes 
hoirs et successeurs à tousjoursmaiz, que la dicte somme de troiz cens mil francs d’or je lui 
rendray et payeray entièrement ou à ses diz hoirs et successeurs ou ceulx qui auront cause 
d’eulx, ou à leur commandement à leur voulenté, sanz autre terme, et dès maintenant ay fait 
et accordé pour moy, pour mes hoirs et successeurs et pour tout mon pais et subgiez 
perpetuelement avec mon dit seigneur le roy de France, pour lui, pour ses hoirs et successeurs 
roys, pour tout son pais et ses subgiez bonnes et fermes amities, confédéracions et aliances, si 
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que je les ayderay et conforteray de ma personne, de mes subgiez et pays, de tout mon povoir, 
loyaument, contre toutes personnes qui pevent vivre et mourir. En tesmoing de ce, j’ay seellé 
ces lectres de mon seel. Donne à Paris, le X
e
 jour de May, l’an de grace mil CCC soixante 
douze.
21
  
 
 
                                                          
21
 The original is A. N. JJc 27, f. 55, (which is held in the Archives Nationales in Paris, a request to view it was 
denied). This transcription appears in A. Thierry, Histoire de la Conquête de l’Angleterre par les Normands 
(Paris: Panthéon, 1851), vol 4, Appendix no. 7, 299-300. 
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Appendix C 1.2:   Its English Translation. 
Evain de Gales, to all those whom these letters shall come, Greeting. The kings of England in 
past times having treacherously and covetously, tortuously and without cause and by 
deliberate treasons, slain or caused to be slain my ancestors, kings of Wales, and others of 
them have put out of their country, and that country have by force and power appropriated 
and have submitted its people to divers services, the which country is and should be mine by 
right of succession, by kindred, by heritage and by right of decent from my ancestors the 
kings of that country, and in order to obtain help and succour to recover that country which is 
my heritage, I have visited several Christian kings, princes and noble lords, and have clearly 
declared and shown unto them my rights therein and have requested and supplicated their aid, 
and have latterly come unto the most puissant and renowned sovereign Charles, by the grace 
of God king of France, dauphin of Vienne, and have shown unto him my right in the 
aforesaid country and have made unto him the aforenamed requests and supplications, and he 
having had compassion upon my state and understanding the great wrong that the kings of 
England have done unto my ancestors in former times, and that the present king of England 
has done unto me, and of his beneficent and accustomed clemency in which he is the singular 
mirror and example amongst Christians of justice, grace and mercy to all those that are 
oppressed and require comforting, has granted me his aid and the assistance of his men-at-
arms and fleet in order to recover the said realm, which is my rightful heritage, as has been 
said; know all ye, therefore, that in return for the great love that my said lord the king of 
France has shown unto me, and is truly showing by his expenditure of three hundred 
thousand francs of gold, and more, as well in the pay of men-at-arms, archers and arbalesters 
as in [the provision of] ships and the pay and expenses of the sailors, in harness and other 
matters in various expenses, the which sum I am at the present time not able to furnish, I 
promise loyally and by my faith and oath upon the holy evangelists, touched corporeally by  
me, and for my heirs and successors for ever, and the aforesaid sum of three hundred 
thousand francs of gold I will return and wholly repay, or my heirs and successors or those 
who may claim through them (ou ceul qui auront cause d’eulx), or by their will or command, 
without any other terms; and I herewith have made and entered into, for me my heirs an 
successors and for all my country and subjects for ever, with my said lord the king of France 
for him and his successors and for all their country and subjects, a good and firm treaty, 
union and alliance, by which I will aid and assist them by my person, my subjects and my 
country, to the utmost power and loyalty against all persons alive or dead (contre toutes 
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personnes qui povent vivre et mourir). In witness of which I have sealed these letters with 
mine own seal Given at Paris the 10
th
 day of may, the year of grace one thousand three 
hundred and seventy-two.
22
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Owen, ‘Owain Lawgoch – Yeuain de Galles: Some facts and suggestions’, 61-2. 
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Appendix C 2:   A map of Paris circa 1383, familiar to Owain Lawgoch and the envoys of 
Owain Glyn Dŵr. 
 
23 
  
                                                          
23
 Image: A Map showing Paris in 1383 under Charles VI, including the city boundary under Charles V in 1367 
and Philip Augustus in 1180.   Deutsch, Metronome Illustré, 152. 
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Appendix D 1:   The relevant section of the Pennal Declaration, 1406, Latin.
24
  
‘Et videtur dicto domino nostro regi quod hoc erit ad salute anime sue, subditorum suorum, 
conservacionem status sui; et de hoc idem dominus rex qui sincere zelatur salutem suam, 
prosperitatem et conservacionem honoris et status sui ipsum visceraliter et sub vinculo ac 
federe amicicie et dilectionis singularis, quam ad eum habet, rogat et requirit significando sibi 
quod si premissa deducat ad executionem, faciet eidem domino regi maximam 
complacenciam et se repputabit ad sua beneplacita perampluis obligatum; et si forte dictus 
dominus princeps, prelati et alii viri ecclesiastici terrarium sibi subditarum formidarent quod 
ex hujusmodi reductione possent certa prelaturas et alia beneficia ab intruso et suis 
predecessoribus obtenta et alias gracias cujuscumque condicionis subditis suis concessis pro 
tempore futuro turbari vel quod dominus Benedictus vellet aliquid innovare, dominus noster 
rex offert se procuraturum erga dictum dominum Benedictum quod omnes prelati et 
beneficiati confirmabuntur, omnesque gracias, dispensaciones et alie etc, ratificabuntur et 
concedentur in forma eis grata et secura ; quodque dictus dominus Benedictus providebit de 
prelaturis et aliis beneficiis ibidem vacantibus et vacaturis personis sufficientibus dicto 
domino principi fidis et gratis et non sibi emulis aut suspectis. Et subsequentur ex 
deliberacione consilii nostri convocari fecimus proceres de prosapia nostra et prelatus 
principatus nostri ac alios in hac parte evacandos et tandem post diligentem examinacionem 
et disputacionem articulorum premissorum et materie eurumdem per prelatos et clerum 
sufficienter factas, concordatum et conclusum existit quod nos, confidentes in jure domini 
Benedicti, sacrosancte Romane et universalis ecclesie summi pontifices, presertim eo quod 
pro pace et unione ecclesie prosequtus est et in dies, ut intelleximus, prosequitur, 
considerantesque duram servitiem, adversarii ejusdem Benedicti tunicam Christi 
inconsutilem dillacerantis ac ob sinceram dilectionem quam erga vestram excellenciam 
gerimus specialem, predictum dominum Benedictum ut verum Christi vicarium in terris a 
nobis et subditis nostris recognoscendum fore duximus et recognoscimus per presentes. Et 
quia, illustrissime princeps, infrascripti articuli statum nostram et ecclesie Wallie 
refformacionem et ultimitatem notorie concernunt, vestram regiam magestatem humilime 
rogamus quatinus expedicionem eorumdem graciose penes prefatum dominum Benedictum 
summum pontificem promovere dignemini. Et primo si censure ecclesiastice contra nos et 
subditos nostros seu terram nostram per prefatum dominum Benedictum aut Clementem 
predecessorum suum late existant, quod ipse Benedictus relaxet. Item quod quecumque et 
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 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 51-4. 
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qualiacumque juramenta per nos seu quoscumque alios principatus nostri illis qui se 
dominaverunt Vrbanum et Bonifacium nuper deffunctos seu eisdem adherentibus 
qualitercumque prestita relaxat. Item quod confirmet et ratificet ordines collatos, titulos 
prelatorum, dispensacionesque et officia tabellionum ac alia quecumque in quibus periculum 
animarum aut prejudicium nobis et subditis nostris in ea parte evinire seu generari possent e 
tempore Gregorii xi. Item quod ecclesia Menevensis que a tempore sancti David 
archiepiscopi et confessoris fuit metropolitana et post obitum ejusdem successerunt eidem 
archiepiscopi ibidem xxiiii, prout in cronicis et antiquis libris ecclesie Menevensis nomina 
eorumdem continentur et hic pro majori evidencia eadem exprimi fecimus, videlicet, Eliud, 
Heneu, Morwal, Menevie, Haerunen, Elwayd, Gvrnuen, Llevdiwyt, Gvrgwst, Gvgavn, 
Cledavc, Ainan, Elave, Maelyswyd, Sadernuen, Catullus, Alathvy, Nouis, Sadernuen, 
Diochwael, Asser, Arthuel, David secundus, et Sampson, pristina satui restituatur ; 
quequidem ecclesia metropolitana infrascriptas habuit et habere debet ecclesias suffraganeas, 
videlicet, Exoniensem, Battoniensem, Herefordensem, Wygorniensem, Legicestrensem, cujus 
sedes jam translata est ad ecclesias Coventrensem et Lichfeldensem, Assavensem, 
Bangorensem, et Landavensem ; nam ingruente rabie barbarorum Saxonum qui terram Wallie 
eisdem usurparunt, ecclesiam Menevensem predictam suppeditarunt et eam ancillam ecclesie 
Cantuariensis de facto ordinarunt. Item quod idem dominus Benedictus provideat de 
metropolitano Menevensi ecclesie et aliis ecclesiis cathedralibus principatus nostri, prelaturis, 
dignitatibus et beneficiis ecclesiasticis, curatis scientibus linguam nostram dumtaxat. Item 
quod dominus Benedictus in corporaciones, uniones, annexiones et appropriaciones 
ecclesiarum parriochialium principatus nostri, monasteriis et collegiis anglicorum 
quorumcumque auctoritate hactenus factas revocet et annullet et quod veri patroni earumdem 
ecclesiarum locorum ordinariis ydoneas personas presentare valeant ad easdem seu alias seu 
alias conferre. Item quod dominus Benedictus concedat nobis et heredibus nostris principibus 
Wallie quod capella nostra et cetero sit libera et gaudeat privilegiis, exempcionibus et 
immunitatibus quibus gaudebat temporibus progenitorum nostrorum principum Wallie. Item 
quod habeamus duas universitates sive studia generalia, videlicet unum in Northwallie et 
aliud in Swthwallie, in civitatibus, villis seu locis per ambaxiatores et nuncios nostros in hac 
parte specifiendis et declarandis. Item quod dominus Benedictus contra Henricum Lencastrie 
intrusorum regni Anglie et usurpatorem corone ejusdem regni et sibi adherentes, eo quod 
ecclesias tam cathedrales quam conventuales et parochiales voluntarie combusit et comburi 
procuravit, archiepiscopos, episcopos, prelatos, presbyteros, religiosos tam possessionatos 
quam mendicantes inhumaniter suspendi, decaitari et quartirizari fecit et fieri mandavit et 
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quod scismaticus existit, cruciatam conceder dignetur in forma consuenta. Item quod idem 
dominus Benedictus concedat nobis et heredibus nostris, subditis et adherentibus nobis 
cujuscumque nacionis fuerint dumtamen fidem teneant ortodoxam, qui guerram contra 
prefatum intrusorem sustenimus plenam remissionem omnium peccatorum et quod remissio 
hujusmodi duret guerra inter nos, heredes, et subditos nostros et prefatum Henricum, heredes 
et subditos suos durante.  
 In cujus rei testimonium, has litteras nostras fieri fecimus patentes. Data apud Pennal 
ultimo die macii anno a Navitate Domini millesimo quadringentesimo sexto et principatus 
nostri sexto.  
 
In dorso. – Littera per quam Owynus, princeps Wallie reduxit se et terras et domina sua ad 
obedienciam domini mostri pape xxiii
mi
. 
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Appendix D 2:   The English translation of the relevant section of the 1406 ‘Pennal 
Declaration’:25 
‘It seems to our said lord the king that this shall be to the safety of his soul, of his subjects 
and of the safe-keeping of his realm. Concerning this, the same lord the king, who sincerely 
zealous, prays heartily for his safety, the prosperity and conservation of his honour, his state 
and himself, under the bond and treaty of friendship, and of a singular love which he has for 
him. He requests that he indicate this himself, because if he puts the aforesaid into action, he 
will the same lord, the king, great satisfaction, and he will consider himself very well pleased 
and to his greater obligation. If, by chance the said lord prince, the prelates, the other 
ecclesiastics of his land, and his subjects dread, because from this kind of restoration, that 
certain prelates and beneficed clergy, appointed by the anti-pope and his predecessors, and 
other favours of whatsoever nature granted on behalf of future occasions to his subjects may 
be unsettled, or that the lord Benedict may wish to change anything. On that account, our lord 
the king offers that he will, procure from the said lord Benedict that all the prelates and 
beneficed clergy shall be confirmed, and all favours, dispensations, &c, shall be ratified and 
conceded to them in secure and proper form. Also, the said lord Benedict shall provide, that 
when prelacies and other benefices are vacant, or shall be vacant, those persons only who are 
sufficiently in the faith and good will of the said lord the prince shall be appointed, and not 
rivals or suspects.  
 Following the advice of our council, we have called together the nobles of our race, 
the prelates of our Principality and others called for this purpose, and, at length, after diligent 
examination and discussion of the foregoing articles and their contents being thoroughly 
made by the prelates and the clergy, it is agreed and determined that we, trusting in the rights 
of the lord Benedict, the holy Roman and supreme pontiff of the universal church, especially 
because he sought the peace and unity of the church, and as we understood daily seeks it, 
considering the hard service of the adversary of the same Benedict, tearing the seamless coat 
of Christ, and on account of the sincere love we specially bear towards your excellency, we 
have determined that the said lord Benedict shall be recognized as the true Vicar of Christ in 
our lands, by us and our subjects, and we recognize him by these presents.  
 Whereas, most illustrious prince, the underwritten articles especially concern our state 
and the reformation and usefulness of the Church of Wales, we humbly pray your royal 
                                                          
25
 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 95-9. 
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majesty that you will graciously consider it worthy to advance their object, even in the court 
of the said lord Benedict: 
 First, that all ecclesiastical censures against us, our subjects, or our land, by the 
aforesaid Benedict or Clement his predecessor, at present existing, the same by the said 
Benedict be removed.  
 Again, that whatsoever vows and of whatsoever nature given by us or whomsoever of 
our principality, to those who called themselves Urban or Boniface, lately deceased, or to 
their adherents, shall be absolved.  
 Again, that he shall confirm and ratify the orders, collations, titles of prelates, 
dispensations, notorial documents, and all things whatsoever, from the time of Gregory XI., 
from which, any danger to the souls, or prejudice to us, or our subjects, may occur, or may be 
engendered.  
 Again, that the Church of St. David’s shall be restored to its original dignity, from 
which time of St. David, archbishop and confessor, was a metropolitan church, and after his 
death, twenty-four archbishops succeeded him in the same place, as their names are contained 
in the chronicles and ancient books of the church of Menevia, and we cause these to be stated 
as the chief evidence, namely, Eliud, Ceneu, Morfael, Mynyw, Haerwnen, Elwaed, 
Gwrnwen, Llewdwyd, Gwrwyst, Gwgawn, Clydâwg, Aman, Elias, Maelyswyd, Sadwrnwen, 
Cadell, Alaethwy, Novis, Sadwrnwen, Drochwel, Asser, Arthwael, David II., and Samson; 
and that as a metropolitan church it had and ought to have the undermentioned suffragan 
churches, namely, Exeter, Bath, Hereford, Worcester, Leicester, which is now translated to 
the churches of Coventry and Lichfield, St. Asaph, Bangor, and Llandaf. For being crushed 
by the fury of the barbarous Saxons, who usurped to themselves the land of Wales, they 
trampled upon the aforesaid church of St. David’s, and made her a handmaiden to the church 
of Canterbury. 
 Again, that the same lord Benedict shall provide for the metropolitan church of St. 
David’s, and the other cathedral churches of our principality, prelates, dignitaries, and 
beneficed clergy and curates who know our language.  
 Again, that the lord Benedict shall revoke and annul all incorporations, unions, 
annexations, appropriations of parochial churches of our principality made so far, by any 
authority whatsoever with English monasteries and colleges. That the true patrons of these 
churches shall have the power to present to the ordinaries of those places suitable persons to 
the same or appoint others. 
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 Again, that the said lord Benedict shall concede to us and to our heirs, the princes of 
Wales, that our chapels, &c., shall be free, and shall rejoice in the privileges, exemptions, and 
immunities in which they rejoiced in the times of our forefathers the princes of Wales.  
 Again, that we shall have two universities or places of general study, namely one in 
North Wales and the other in South Wales, in cities, towns, or places to be hereafter decided 
and determined by our ambassadors and nuncios for that purpose. 
 Again, that the lord Benedict shall brand as heretics and cause to be tortured in the 
usual manner, Henry of Lancaster, the intruder of the kingdom of England, and the usurper of 
the crown of the same kingdom, and his adherents, in that of their own free will they have 
burnt or have caused to be burnt so many cathedrals, convents, and parish churches; that they 
have savagely hung, beheaded, and quartered archbishops, bishops, prelates, priests, religious 
men, as madmen or beggars, or caused the same to be done. 
 Again, that the same lord Benedict shall grant to us, our heirs, subjects, and adherents, 
of whatsoever nation they may be, who wage war against the aforesaid intruder and usurper, 
as long as they hold the orthodox faith, full remission of all our sins, and that the remission 
shall continue as long as the war between us, our heirs, and our subjects, and the aforesaid 
Henry, his heirs, and subjects shall endure. 
 In testimony whereof we make these our letters patent. Given at Pennal on the thirty-
first day of March, A.D. 1406, and in the sixth year of our rule. 
 
Endorsement. – The letter by which Owen, Prince of Wales, reduces himself, his lands, and 
his dominions to the obedience of our lord the Pope Benedict XIII.  
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Appendix D 3:    Translations from El Victorial. 
The fifteenth-century chronicle, El Victorial, Crónica de Don Pero Niño, Conde de Buelna, 
Por Su Alférez, Gutierre Díez de Games, which is a contemporary record of the life and deeds 
of a Castilian nobleman, was compiled and reproduced in Spain in 1940 by Juan de Mata 
Carriazo.
26
 There are several extracts within it that are directly relevant to the case of Owain 
Glyn Dŵr.  Although a compilation of El Victorial was translated into English prior to 
Carriazo’s publication, it missed all but one reference to Wales.27 To my knowledge, apart 
from the Evans entry below, this work has never been translated into English anywhere, nor 
has it been reproduced anywhere in any secondary source consulted.
28
 The relevant entries 
and attendant difficulties have been included here: 
 
Capítulo LXI 
E Bruto pasó en Yrlanda, e en Frisia, e en Escotelanda. E avn heran pobladas, fizo grandes 
villas e fortalezas, e puso en ellas reyes que fizo él de grandes honbres de su naçión. E dióles 
leyes por donde se governasen, e tornó en Anglia. E él e Dorotea fuéronse al grand puerto, 
donde estaua el estor, e fizo allí vna muy grand çivdad que agora llaman Longis, e 
ennobleçiola mucho. E fizo en los reynos duques, prínçipes  condes de las provinçias. E el 
cabuallero de vos dixe que veniera con él de Galizia, fízolo príncipe de vna grand provinçia, e 
púsole nonbre de las Galias, e que agora llaman Galiçia; e es la que agora llaman Gales, en 
Anglia.
29
  
 
Chapter 61 
And Brutus crossed to Ireland, and Frisia, and Scotland. And even though
30
 they were 
populated, he made large towns and fortresses, and he put in them kings and he made them 
great men of their nations. And he gave them laws with which they governed themselves, and 
he returned to England. And he and Dorotea took themselves to the large port where the fleet 
was, and there made a very large town that they now call Longis,
31
 and he honoured it 
                                                          
26
 Carriazo, El Victorial. 
27
 Evans, The Unconquered Knight.  
28
 I acknowledge Valerie Brown and Edgar Miranda who gave helpful advice on the original text of chapter 74, 
below. 
29
 Carriazo, El Victorial, 176. Also, this is an early example of the use of ‘England’ to refer to the British Isles. 
30
 I have translated ‘avn’ (‘even’ or ‘yet’) as ‘aunque’ (even though). 
31
 This could either mean London or be a confusion with ‘Logres’, Brutus’ eldest son, according to the myth, as 
well as being the British – Celtic word for ‘England’, ‘Lloegr’ in modern Welsh. The Brutus myth was in common 
circulation during this period. Henry IV used it to justify his claim to homage from the Scots in 1400, see 
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greatly.
32
 And he made in the kingdoms dukes, princes and earls of the provinces. And the 
knight that you say that came with him from Galicia, he made him prince of a great province, 
and he gave it the name of the Gauls and that they now call Galicia, and this is the one they 
now call Wales, in England.
33
  
   
Capítulo LXXIII  
Allí supo el capitán cómo el rey de Yngalaterra avía juntado grand hueste, e avía llevado 
mucha gente de aquella tierra, e hera ydo contra Jván, prínçipe de Gales, que estaua alzado 
contra él.
34 
   
 
 
Evans included this portion of El Victorial, in her translation, which falls at the very end of 
the chapter. This is the only mention of Owain and the Welsh revolt to be found in the 
English version. The two English renditions presented here are Evans’ firstly, followed by 
my independent translation.  
 
Chapter 73 
The captain there learnt that the King of England had brought together a great army, and had 
taken many folk from that part to march against Owen, Prince of Wales, who had rebelled 
against him.
35
  
 
There the captain learned how the king of England had assembled a great host, and had taken 
many people from that land and had gone against Owain, Prince of Wales, who had risen 
against him. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Fœdera, Vol 8,  155-8; for a Spanish account of the Brutus story, see Juan de Mata Carriazo, El Victorial, 142-
77. 
32
 There is an issue with the word 'ennobleçiola'; a strict translation would render it as ‘ennobled’, which 
means little in this case, so I have used ‘honoured’.  
33
 The relevance of repeating the Brutus myth in a Spanish chronicle seems unclear, however, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that this passage not only establishes the noble ancestry of the British, it quite clearly 
forms a connection between the British, i.e. Welsh, of that period with the Spanish in Galicia. Noble lineage 
and ancient connections were often used to confirm a precedent and give good grounds to legitimise Spanish, 
in this case Castilian, involvement in wars in Wales against England.  
34
 Carriazo, El Victorial, 211. 
35
 Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 128. I readily concede Evans’ superior Spanish and translation 
accomplishments. However, I have attempted to remain more faithful to the original text in an effort to better 
recreate the style and sentiment of Games’ work without necessarily rewriting it in modern English.   
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Capítulo LXXIV  
Cómo Jván, prínçipe de Gales, estaua alzado e non quiso ouedeçer al conde Arvi, que los 
yngleses fiçieron rey.
36
  
 
 Segúnd que suso vos he contado que los yngleses despuesieron al rey Richarte de 
Angliaterra, Jván, prínçipe de Gales, hera su pariente vien çercano. Este non quiso ovedeçer 
por rey al conde Arvi como los otros del reyno; ante, con el gran pesar que ovo de su mal, 
hazía grand guerra al rey e a Londres, donde él hera comarcano.  
            Gales es vna tierra apartada
37
, al cavo del reyno, ver al Norte. Es muy fuerte tierra, e 
montañosa; es bien poplada e de buenas fortalezas. Están a las entradas unos puertos que 
llaman las Marcas
38
; non ay otra entrada si non aquélla. El prínçipe vió que tenía luenga 
guerra con el rey: derrocó todas las fortalezas de su tierra, e non dexó sinó çinco castillos, que 
están en lo mas fuerte de la tierra, unos çerca de otros, e fizo yr todos morar la gente de su 
tierra al derredor de aquellos castillos.  
            Diçen que es vna tierra muy sana e frutífera, e fermosa gente. E tenía allí consigo 
muchos cavalleros de los del rey Richarte, e otras muchas gentes, e pelean todos a cavallo. E 
traya cada vno su bozina ; e tan vsado lo an, que quando les faze menester, tan bien se 
entienden vnos a otras en la tocar, como por voz de honbre o palabra. E quando el rey venía a 
su tierra, dexávale entrar las Marcas, e poníase en otros lugares donde non le podía enpeçer, e 
defendíale otros pasos. E quando se derramavan por su tierra, aquella hera su ganancia; que el 
prínçipe e los suyos heran tan guerreros, que de noche prendían e matauan muchas de las 
gentes del rey. E después, quando el rey se volvía para se yr, el duque ývale todavía a las 
espaldas, façiéndoles gran daño. Si el rey se arredraua de Londres, salía él pasava las Marcas 
al llano, e rovava la tierra: e volvíase, e pasava las Marcas. E ya el rey auía ydo tres o quatro 
vezes al pays de Gales.
 
 
                                                          
36
 Carriazo, El Victorial, 211-2. Literally ‘non quiso ouedeçer’ could translate as ‘did not want to obey the earl of 
Derby as king’, but this feels weak and clumsy. Therefore, in this case, ‘refused to recognise’ seems more 
appropriate. 
37
 I acknowledge that this can be taken as ‘faraway’ as well as ‘separate’; however, after deliberation and 
viewed in context, the former seems more appropriate. 
38
 This appears to be problematic; there is no port called ‘las Marcas’, or anything even resembling it in any 
language. It seems reasonable to assume that Games was referring to the overland point of entry into Wales, 
‘the Marches’. In this instance, ‘puertos’ therefore must mean something similar to ‘(mountain) passes’ or 
‘valley entrances’.  Even a brief survey of a modern map of the Pyrenees reveals the word ‘puerto’ and ‘porto’ 
in use in the mountains where there is no coastal connection. For example, Puerto Otxondo, Puerto Ibañeta, 
and cognates Portillo Eraice, Port de Lers, Port d’Envalira and Port de Puymorens were simply found consulting 
this page, and no doubt others exist: http://www.veloloco.com/map/pyreneen-cols.php [Accessed 25 / 08 / 
2012]. 
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            El rey envióle sus enbajadores, diçiendo que mantenía grand loqura, e que no le 
podría durar; e que se dexase de aquella opinión, e que le faría muchas merçedes. E 
respondióle, que fiçiese como mejor pudiese, que de tres nobles que se labrasen en Londres, 
que suyo hera el vno. Enviábale sienpre ayuda el rey de Franzia de ballesteros, e armas, e 
vino que lo non ay en Yngalaterra.   
            E si el capitán de las naoes de castilla vieniera a Yngalaterra en conserva
39
 de Pero 
Niño, segúnd aquella costa estaua menguada de gente aquella sazón, ellos ganaran lugares, e 
fizieran muchos rescates, e otras muchas buenas cosas; e vinieran de allá honrrados, e asaz 
cavdalosos. E por el capitán Pero Niño non aver más gentes de su naçión, le es e deve ser mas 
loado e mejor contado quantas buenas cosas él fizo; ca él non auia más de tres galeras e dos 
valleneres que le aconpañauan. E si él llevara veynte galeras, como los otros llevaran ante e 
después, es de creer que fiçiera maravillosas cosas.  
 
 
                                                          
39
 This could mean ‘sail in the convoy or fleet of’ (‘navegar en la conserva de’) or come from ‘conservar’ to 
imply support, keep, preserve or retain, so it could be ‘in support of Pero Niño’. In the absence of expert 
opinion I currently lean towards my translation above.  
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Chapter 74 
How Owain, prince of Wales, rose and refused to recognise the earl of Derby, who the 
English had made king. 
 
As I have recounted above, that the English had deposed King Richard of England, Owain, 
Prince of Wales, was his close relative.
40
 He refused to recognise the earl of Derby as king 
like the rest of the kingdom; before, although it grieved him, he declared a great war against 
the king and London, where he was residing.  
Wales is a faraway land, on the fringe of the kingdom, to the north. It is a very strong 
land, and mountainous, it is well-populated and has good fortresses. There are at the borders 
some passes they call the Marches; there is no other way to enter than that. The prince saw 
that there would be a long war with the king: he threw down all of the fortresses of his land, 
and left only five castles, that are in the strongest part of the land, near each other, and he 
made all of the people of his land live around those castles.   
They say it is a very healthy and fertile land, of beautiful people. And he had there 
many of King Richard’s knights, and many other people, and they all fought on horseback.41 
And each one had his horn; and so they used that, when it became necessary, they understood 
one another so well upon using it, it was like a man’s voice or word. And when the king came 
to his land, he allowed him to enter the Marches, and he put himself in other places where he 
could not be found, and he defended other passes. And when they overran his land, that was 
his advantage; that the prince and his men were such warriors, that at night they captured and 
killed many of the king’s people. And afterwards, when the king turned to leave, the duke42  
still went at him with swords, causing him great harm. If the king retreated to London, he 
would leave and pass the Marches to the plain, and robbed the land: and returned, and passed 
the Marches. And the king had already gone to the country of Wales three or four times. 
The king sent his ambassadors, saying that it was great madness, and that it could not 
last; and that he desist from that opinion, and that he would grant him mercy. And he 
responded, that he would do the best he could, that of three noblemen that would be 
                                                          
40
 This is incorrect, Owain and Richard were not related. However, this borrows from a contemporary idea that 
the Welsh rose in support of Richard. For further contemporary evidence on this notion, see Jean Creton’s 
metrical account of the deposition in J. Webb, ‘A Translation of a French Metrical History of the deposition of 
King Richard the Second by Jehan Creton’, 1-433; Given-Wilson, Chronicles of the Revolution, 137-52. 
41
 The probable implication here is that the Welsh are all knights, or horsemen at least, therefore chivalrous 
and worthy of assistance. Connecting events to Richard might also serve to render actions against Henry 
legitimate in the eyes of the French and Spanish.  
42
 This should read ‘prince’ since no duke is mentioned and contextually it can only refer to Owain.  
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appointed in London, one of them would be his. The king of France always sent him help in 
the form of crossbowmen, weapons, and wine of which there is none in England.
43
 
And if the captain of the Castilian ships had come to England in the fleet of Pero Niño, 
because that coast had very few people at that time, they would have captured places, and 
made many rescues, and many other good things; and come back from those places with 
honour, and also with much booty. And because captain Pero Niño did not have more of his 
countrymen, he should be lauded even more and all the good things he did be more widely 
recounted; since there were no more than three galleys and two ballingers in his company. 
And if he took twenty galleys, as others had taken before and since, it can be believed that he 
would have done remarkable things.
44
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43
 At first glance this appears unclear. However, this must refer to the French-supported Tripartite Indenture 
between Owain, Edmund Mortimer and Henry Percy senior, which sought to remove Henry and divide England 
and Wales into three parts; northern and southern England and an enlarged Wales. Whoever took the throne 
would be Owain’s ally. It is well-known that Charles VI sent Owain an army which included Jean de Hangest, 
Grand Master of Crossbows, and his troops, as well as wine on at least one occasion, see Lloyd, OG, 78, 93-5, 
102 and Davies, Revolt, 166-9, 193. Games’ account tallies with the known facts, probably due to Games’ and 
Pero Niño’s involvement in the aborted 1404 mission for which the French requested Spanish shipping and 
brought Pero Niño’s ships to the English coast. 
44
 Pero Niño’s compatriot and adversary, Martin Ruiz, was given twenty galleys for this mission in1404. He 
combined forces with James, duke of Bourbon and accomplished very little, despite the size and power of the 
French-Spanish fleet. In 1405 the French sent an army on campaign with Owain, most probably to enact the 
Tripartite Indenture, which could explain ‘before and since’ reference in the text. See Davies, Revolt, 115-21, 
193-5 and Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 100-1, 105, 131. 
 340 
 
Appendix D 4:    Letter from John de Stanley to Henry IV, 30
th
 July, 1405.
45
 
 
Most excellent, most mighty, and most dread liege Lord,  
 
I commend myself to your royal Majesty as far as I know how or dare, thanking you as 
humbly, and as far as I am capable, for your honourable letters, to me now recently sent by 
your said Majesty; by the news contained in which all your lieges in these parts and myself 
are greatly comforted, and your rebels in these Marches surprised, that is to say, as well on 
account of your honourable and speedy coming towards these said Marches, as for your 
gracious doing in the parts of the North, as in your said letters appears more fully. The which 
letters reached me last week, as I was lying ill of the ague at my house in Lathom.  
And on the same day, as fortune would have it, one David Whitmore and Yevan ap 
Meredith, two of the more influential persons in the county of Flint, were come thither to talk 
to me concerning their governance, their estate, and the news from Wales, that is to say, how 
the said county is still in good peace, looking for and awaiting always the gracious succour, 
comfort, and arrival at the said Marches of you, most dread Lord; and willing to be at all 
times your humble and faithful lieges and subjects, as soon as they shall be able to be 
succoured and safely guarded from the malice of your other Welsh rebels in those parts 
surrounding them, by the same gracious and speedy arrival in the Marches above mentioned. 
And also they have also told me how that Owen Glyndwr has summoned a Parliament 
at the present time, being held at Harlech, where there will be four of the more influential 
persons of each commote throughout all Wales, being in his obedience.  
And also, most dread Lord, the said David and Yevan have informed me that, as far as they 
have been able to learn up to this time, the said Owen, provided that he can be assured at his 
said Parliament of having a very great force and considerable aid out of France, doth propose 
to send to you, most mighty Lord, after this his Parliament above mentioned, for a treaty; and 
the same David and Yevan are gone to the said Parliament for to know therein all the 
purposes and results thereof, and to meet me again at the County Court to be held on Tuesday 
next in Chester, to certify me as to all the truth thereon, and the purpose of the said 
Parliament. 
                                                          
45 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 76-9 
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Concerning which most dread Lord, may it please your aforesaid Majesty to send me 
back your gracious pleasure, by your honourable letters, by the bearer of this; whether I shall 
send your Highness the purport of the said treaty, if anything of the kind shall reach me, 
together with the other news of the said Parliament, if it be your pleasure that I should do, as 
well as touching the said County of Flint, and all your other Marches surrounding it, as for 
the accomplishment of all your other pleasures in these parts up to this present, together with 
the comfortable news that has come for you from these parts, so if it be a pleasure to your 
above-mentioned Highness, until your coming to these said Marches, which He Who is 
Almighty send speedily, to your own high honour. And may He grant you gracious life and 
very long to endure in all honours, joy and prosperity; together with the sovereign victory 
over all your enemies, and gracious accomplishment of all your desires. 
 
Written at the Abbey of Valleroial, the 30
th
 day of July. 
 
Your simple Bachelor, if it please you, 
 
John de Stanley 
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Appendix D 5.1:   Charles VI’s Letter to the English Nation, 1406 (Latin).46 
 
Quas ob res, incolas omnes Anglie et subditos qualescunque deprecamur, in quantum suum 
honorem caripendunt, veritatemque sequi volunt et suam fidelitatem demonstrare, quatinus 
ponentes ante suarum consideracionum oculos as eorum memorie reducentes mortes 
principum, prelatorumque et aliorum virorum sancte mentis, nec non procerum Anglie tam 
multorum, crudelitatesque et offensas eorum impensas domino naturali atque regi et juri 
corone, ut prefertur, manus imponant ad forcia, et illum sepefati Anglie regni magnanimiter 
expellant invasorem. Nec dedecorantem evidenter ac pervertentem notorie regni Angli 
successiones hereditarias consuetas a cetero paciantur, aut dissimulent ulterius fideles 
antedicti, quod tantum ac tale regnum, in quo tot vigent animi et supersunt viri fortes, tante 
subiciatur tyrannidi et impressioni insolite, et que decet pusillanimes, non viriles. Quin pocius 
faciant et procurent ac alias possetenus, operentur, ut strenui ac fideles, quod corona Anglie 
antedicta, quo debet reponatur loco ac veris reddatur heredibus et eis restituatur, ut est 
justum. Et nos, dummodo de firmo stabilique proposito nobis constet, offerimus libenti ac 
volenti animo, quandocunque idem Anglie habitantes volent se in libertatem vindicare, et ad 
justum verumque dominum redire, nosque debite duxerint requirendum et in auxilium 
advocare, si efficaciter et potenter juavaturos, ut tenemur, quod eis cedet ad gaudium et nos 
nostrum fecisse debitum magnopere fatebuntur ; indubitanter scientes quod, cum ad Walliam 
novissime armatum transmisimus, si securi duissemus gentem nostram ab amicis veritatis et 
heredum Anglie sequacibus recipi debere gratulanter, et cum effectu, ut decebat, cosiari, 
majorem multo potenciam misissemus, mitterque semper parati sumus, casibus antedictis.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
46 The Latin text (Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 428, 430, also in Williams, Chronicque de la Traïson et Mort, 
299-302, as well as N. Grèvy(-Pons), E. Ornato and G. Ouy, Jean de Montreuil, Opera, vol 1, Epistolario, 280-2, 
the first of which was translated into French (Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 429, 431), from which comes the 
English translation. The passage break-up into the paragraphs in the English version below is my creation, 
where as the Latin and the French are reproduced as they appear in the printed sources.  
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Appendix D 5.2:   Charles VI’s Letter to the English Nation, 1406 (French). 
 
A ces causes, nous conjurons tous les habitants et sujets du royaume d’Angleterre, quels 
qu’ils soient, en tant qu’ils ont quelque souci de leur honneur et qu’ils tiennent à suivre la 
bonne cause et à faire éclater leur fidélité, de rappeler en leur mémoire et de remettre sous les 
yeux les morts tragiques de tant de princes, de prélats, d’hommes vertueux et de nobles 
personnages d’Angleterre, les cruautés commises envers leur seigneur naturel et roi, enfin les 
atteintes portées, comme il a été dit, aux droits de la couronne ; nous les supplions de s’armer 
d’une généreuse résolution et de travailler à chasser l’usurpateur dudit trône d’Angleterre. Il 
est de leur fidélité de ne pas souffrir plus long-temps un tyran qui  bouleverse insolemment 
tous les droits de succession, et de ne point laisser gémir sous le joug d’une honteuse 
oppression ce beau royaume, si fécond en hommes courageux et intrépides.  Un tel 
abaissement conviendrait à des lâches, et non à des gens de cœur. Ils doivent au contraire 
faire tous leurs efforts et mettre tout en œuvre, comme de braves et loyaux Anglais, pour 
rendre ladite couronne à qui de droit et la replacer sur la tête des véritables et légitimes 
héritiers. Quant à nous, pourvu que nous soyons assuré de leur ferme et immuable résolution, 
nous offrons volontiers et de bon cœur d’aider les Anglais, quand ils le voudront, à recouvrer 
leur liberté et à revenir à leur véritable et légitime souverain, de les seconder puissamment et 
efficacement, comme nous y sommes tenu, dès qu’ils croiront devoir requérir dûment notre 
assistance et nous appeler à leur secours; nous ferons en sorte qu’ils n’aient qu’à se louer de 
nous, et qu’ils et qu’ils avouent hautement que nous avons fait notre devoir. Qu’ils sachent 
que, si naguère, en envoyant une armée dans le pays de Galles, nous avions eu la certitude 
que les partisans de la bonne cause et les amis des légitimes héritiers du trône accueilleraient 
nos gens avec faveur et s’empresseraient de se joindre à eux, nous aurions disposé de forces 
beaucoup plus considérables ; mais nous sommes toujours prêts à les assister dans les cas 
susdits. 
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Appendix D 5.3:   Charles VI’s Letter to the English Nation, 1406 (English).47 
  
To these causes, we entreat all the inhabitants and subjects of the kingdom of England, 
whoever they might be, as they have some concern about their honour and that they aim to 
follow the just cause and let their loyalty shine forth, to recall to their memory and to put 
before their eyes the tragic deaths of so many princes, prelates, virtuous men and noble 
people of England, the cruelties committed towards their natural lord and king, in short, the 
attacks carried out, as has been said, against the rights of the crown. 
We beseech them to arm themselves with strong resolve and to strive to drive out the 
usurper of the said throne of England. It is upon their loyalty to no longer suffer a tyrant who 
brazenly upturns the rights of succession, and not to leave groaning beneath the yoke of this 
shameful oppression, this beautiful kingdom, so bountiful in courageous and intrepid men. 
Such an abasement would suit cowards, but not men of stout heart. On the contrary, they 
must make every effort and do all in their power as brave and loyal Englishmen, to give the 
said crown to whom it belongs and place it on the head of the true and legitimate heirs. As for 
us, provided that we are assured of their firm and unstinting resolution, we voluntarily and in 
good heart offer to help the English, when they desire it, to recover their freedom and to 
return to their true and rightful king, to powerfully and effectively support them, as we are 
bound. As soon as they believe it necessary to ask duly for our help and call us to their aid, 
we will act in such a way that they shall have nothing but praise for us, and they will openly 
acknowledge that we have done our duty. 
They should know that, if recently, when we sent an army to Wales, we had been sure 
that the partisans of the just cause and the friends of the legitimate heirs to the throne would 
welcome our people favourably and would hasten to join them, we would have had at our 
disposal far greater forces, but we are still ready to help them in the aforementioned cases.  
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Appendix D 6:   Genealogical Tables of the French Royal Princes.
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Valois: 
 
 
Burgundy  
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Appendix D 6.1:     French Expansion Activities, 1382-1396. 
 
A survey of French activities beyond their borders during this period reveals the wide extent 
of their territorial ambitions, which encompassed Flanders, Italy, Scotland among others 
which brought the French into conflict with temporal as well as spiritual powers. Flanders 
was ambiguously connected to both France and England through trade and marriage. Flemish 
ambassadors had recognised Richard as their overlord, evidently with their economic and 
physical security in mind, then France occupied it under the pretext of suppressing a rebellion 
there in 1382.
49
 The Roman pope Urban VI’s papal bull of 1383 legitimised the bishop of 
Norwich’s vain Flanders crusade against the Clementists. Perhaps in riposte, the Avignon 
pope, Clement VII, proclaimed Duke Louis of Anjou king of Naples and, in a counterstroke 
relevant to Glyn Dŵr’s later Pennal Declaration, Urban VI declared the new French king in 
Italy a schismatic and a heretic and proclaimed a crusade against him in January 1384.
50
 
These actions should be viewed as an articulation of the regional struggle between France and 
England, expressed through the pretext of papal legitimacy.  
Simultaneously, and for the rest of the 1380s, France pressed its interests in Naples 
through Louis of Anjou, and then his namesake son, which resulted in open warfare with 
Charles of Durazzo, Ladislas his son, and Urban VI’s forces and allies. The central and 
southern Italian states were consumed with this conflict for the rest of the decade and for 
some time into the next, although ultimately French ambitions in the south were thwarted.
51
 It 
is also significant that while this struggle was ongoing, the French were also able to invest a 
sizeable expeditionary force into Scotland during 1384-5, as well as assembling a vast fleet in 
preparation to invade England the following year.
52
 Despite the Crown’s other 
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preoccupations, such as the schism and rule by noble council during the king’s minority and 
later due to his illness, the dukes were still able to implement an expansive foreign policy. 
However, it is worth considering that these two major distractions and the subsequent 
devolution of power constituted a series of events that permitted the ducal factions to sponsor 
such expeditions in an effort to extend overseas their, and their king’s, power. 
Although the French had a historic involvement in southern Italy, Scotland and 
Castile, a post-schism policy with ambitions in northern Italy is identifiable and its impetus to 
some extent can be attributed to Louis, duke of Orleans.
53
 He has been clearly identified as a 
proponent of the via facti, seeking a forceful, military solution to the schism and appears to 
be the driving force behind France’s entente with Glyn Dŵr; the diplomatic and military 
contacts took place while his party was ascendant in government. Louis’s Italian ambitions 
stemmed from the ongoing French interests in Sicily, Naples and Provence. These had been 
further advanced by his marriage to Valentina, daughter of Giangaleazzo Visconti, the 
powerful duke of Milan.
54
 The French drive to gain territories in Italy has also been identified 
as an extension of the factional struggle between Orleans and Burgundy, although this should 
be considered alongside the better-established claims in the peninsula of the house of Anjou. 
The see-sawing of France’s Italian policy, if it can justifiably be identified as such a 
consistent enterprise, demonstrates the rapidity with which power changed hands in Paris and 
the uncertainty that this struggle created.
55
 The duke of Milan courted French support and 
involvement in the region in 1392; this resulted in Genoa being designated to the duke’s son-
in-law, Louis of Orleans, in November 1394. Louis also made an alliance with neighbouring 
Montferrat that year. Giangaleazzo, too, appeared content to see his son-in-law settle in 
Genoa or possibly carve out another kingdom for himself within northern Italy. It has been 
described as a disappointment to Milan when Louis sold his rights to the territory early the 
following year. Genoa was then held by the French government, over which the queen was 
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beginning to exert an increasing influence. Louis had no option but to obey the king’s 
command to sell.
56
 As the queen and Burgundy exercised their power over the direction of 
the government, a French alliance was formed with Milan’s enemies and a number of 
indecisive conflicts broke out with Florence, Mantua and other states nominally supported by 
the French from 1395 onwards.
57
 Burgundy was frequently politically connected to Isabeau 
of Bavaria, Charles VI’s queen, whose family bore an enmity towards Valentina’s branch of 
the Visconti. The queen therefore had contrasting transalpine interests to Louis of Orleans, 
despite the rumours or truth of amorous liaisons between them. Before the end of 1396, the 
queen had Valentina banished on false charges and continued to assist Florence against its 
enemy, Milan.
58
 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Nicopolis, the French sought 
Giangaleazzo’s aid in securing the return of the French hostages held by the Turks.59 In the 
remaining years of the century, a vista of squabbling at the French court can be presented; 
with the anti-Milanese schemes of Burgundy and the queen being thwarted by Louis and his 
allies.
60
 Nevertheless, the appointment of Marshal Boucicaut as governor of Genoa in 1401 
can be viewed as a coup for Burgundy over Orleans, since the marshal’s allegiance was 
firmly tied to Jean sans Peur, who as count of Nevers, had saved him from execution after 
Nicopolis. This act demonstrates that Philip, duke of Burgundy, headed the French 
government at that time.
61
 The peace with England described above in chapter 5, and 
acquisition of Genoa demonstrated the success of the court’s diplomatic talents. Due to the 
fact that Genoa was drawn into the orbit of French power without threat or war, it might also 
be possible to identify this as another use of Nye’s ‘soft power’ by medieval France, similarly 
to Louis VII’s relationship with the French nobles and Henry II, discussed in chapter two.62 
                                                          
56
 Darwin, Louis d'Orléans, 23-4; Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 155-8, 203-4, 324; Chamberlin, 
Count of Virtue, 152-5. 
57
 d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 32-43; Darwin, Louis d'Orléans, 19-24; Bueno de 
Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 206-23, 322-5; Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 180-8. 
58
 d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 12, 19-21, 28;Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo 
Visconti, 203, 267; Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 175-9; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 44, 55-6, 109; Morrall, Gerson 
and the Great Schism, 6-11; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 30-1.   
59
 Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 212. 
60
 Mirot, La Politique Française en Italie de 1380 à 1422, 23-41; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des 
Bourguignons, 23-4, 30-1; Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 215, 267. 
61
 Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 203-4, 267; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 44, 55-6, 109; Morrall, 
Gerson and the Great Schism, 6-11; Lalande, Le Livre Des Fais, 116; Lalande, Jean II le Meingre, 68, 97 n.3, 98-
101; B Schnerb, ‘le contingent franco-bourguinon à la croisade de Nicopolis’ in J. Paviot and M. Chauney-
Bouillot, eds., Nicopolis, 1396-1996, Actes du Colloque International, (Dijon: Société des Annales de Bourgogne, 
1997), 67; Ainsworth and Diller, Chroniques, 994-5 ; J. Black, Absolutism in Renaissance Milan: Plenitude of 
Power under the Visconti and the Sforza 1329-1535 (Oxford : OUP, 2009), 2.  
62
 Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, 94-5. 
 350 
 
Doubtless, pragmatic security considerations underpinned Genoa’s decision; nevertheless 
France was their prime choice over any other regional or continental power, spiritual or 
temporal. Although the Marmouset-controlled government sponsored a crusade to North 
Africa under the Bourbons in 1390, by the middle of the decade another such mission was 
raised by the French, but driven by the house of Burgundy.
63
 In 1396, it demonstrated its 
power and religious zeal by raising, sponsoring and, with the blessing of the Roman pope, 
sending the crusade that ended in disaster at Nicopolis in 1396.
64
 At that point no other noble 
faction could execute such a bold initiative. It is little wonder therefore that Duke Philip 
dominated the government and the solutions favoured by those clerics he patronised, such as 
Jean Gerson, came to prominence during these years.
65
 
 
The Fading of Scotland’s star:  
At the same moment, it is worth considering the plight of contemporary Scotland. Within this 
period of foreign exertion, the French-Scots alliance stalled in 1385 following the disastrous 
expedition led by Jean de Vienne.
66
 By 1400, it had not fully recovered to being an 
operational military alliance in the manner it had been prior to de Vienne’s mission. In an 
attempt to rectify this, French troops campaigned with the Scots at sea in 1401-2, and on land 
in 1402.
67
 In September 1402 the Scots were crushed by the English at the battle of Homildon 
Hill, where notable numbers of Scottish nobles and some French knights were captured or 
killed. Louis of Orleans has been connected to this initiative in Scotland.
68
 The enormity of 
this English victory, masterminded and prosecuted by the Percys, effectively removed the 
Scots as land-fighting force of any external military worth for approximately a decade. King 
Robert III was declining physically and his rule was weak. Also, he appears to have been 
pursuing peace with England in this period. A definitive end to any prospect of Scots 
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involvement with this Franco-Welsh alliance came with the capture at sea of Robert III’s 
heir, James, in 1406. He remained a captive of the English crown until 1424.
69
 Although 
considerably weakened by the Homildon defeat and loss of men of the calibre of those 
captured there, the Scots were still able to mount occasional harassing attacks around the 
border area, as well as establishing a visible presence on the sea, and conducting some more 
ambitious ground operations under the direction of certain nobles.
70
 However, due to 
Scotland’s weakness, it appears that any hope of forming an axis of power involving France, 
Wales and Scotland was not possible at the moment of the inception of the French-Welsh 
alliance.  
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Appendix D 6.2:    Possible Composition of Owain Glyn Dŵr’s Court in 1404. 
A further point on the Welsh group is that no effort has been made to determine who might 
have comprised Owain’s council. Since there is proof that Owain’s policy over decisions 
concerning relations with France and England were debated in parliaments convened by 
Owain, it seems likely that, in keeping with his contemporaries, he also maintained a 
council.
71
 Such a council need not contain a large number of advisors; studies of 
contemporary Burgundy provide a significant perspective on the size and functions of such 
an organisation. During the period in question Burgundy rose to become a power that figured 
among some of the most important events of the fifteenth century. It has been characterised 
as powerful beyond its size and having a well-structured government.
72
 Although the duchy 
of Burgundy was far wealthier than Wales and was composed of a number of different 
administrative bodies, the number of members sitting at the ducal council and parliaments 
summoned can be shown to be relatively compact. The duke’s ‘grand conseil’ was made up 
of just ten members in 1426. The council of Charles the Bold in 1469, when Burgundy was 
approaching its zenith in terms of its wealth, size and power, only contained a bishop as 
chancellor, another suitable to stand in his absence, four leading knights, eight ‘maîtres des 
requêtes’ and fifteen secretaries and other aides; effectively the duke, fourteen council 
members and administrative staff. The ‘maîtres des requêtes’ were legal specialists 
empowered to deputise for the chancellor, determine the ruler’s rights and powers on issues, 
as well as to clarify and execute legal matters. Such highly skilled administrators were 
essential to the legal and governmental machinery of any medieval parliament. Charles’s 
1473 parliament at Malines, founded on the French parliamentary model, was attended by a 
total of forty-five people, among whom were two presidents, four knights of the grand 
council, six ‘maîtres des requêtes’ and twenty other councillors.73 There was no connection 
between Glyn Dŵr and Burgundy, and little possibility of either directly influencing the 
other. Small states did not require the relatively heavily-populated parliaments of England or 
France, for example, and the ambition of Glyn Dŵr’s diplomatic efforts strongly implies the 
existence of such a government council, and Owain even wrote of such an institution’s 
existence.
74
 Yonge and Hanmer, as chancellor and blood-relation, can be safely included as 
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part of Owain’s equivalent to Burgundy’s grand council, although the other members could 
only be tentatively suggested. That will only be attempted in part here, but this appears to 
show that Glyn Dŵr was conducting his affairs in the appropriate manner for his time and in 
keeping with other contemporary leaders. Other known ecclesiastical adherents to Owain’s 
cause were two bishops, John Trefor and Lewis Byford, also Hywel Kyffin, dean of St 
Asaph, Hugh Eddouyer of the Order of Predicants, as well as his court bard or ‘prophet’, 
Crach Ffinant.
75
 The identities of the lower orders of administrative staff remain elusive, 
although the names of the clerk, Benedict Comme, and Glyn Dŵr’s secretary, Owain ap 
Gruffydd ap Rhisiart are known.
76
  There are also several prominent candidates to stand as 
military representatives within Glyn Dŵr’s council. Rhys ap Tudor, Henry Don, Rhys Gethin, 
Hywel Coetmor and Rhys ap Gruffudd were the most obvious soldiers to consistently figure 
throughout the revolt.
77
 Since this was an age where promotion of blood connections and 
nepotism were the normal order, it seems likely that Owain's sons Gruffudd and Maredudd, 
his brother Tudor, as well as members of the Hanmer and the Pulesdon families also had 
roles, not forgetting Edmund Mortimer, acting earl of March.
78
 However, as the evidence 
provided by David Whitmore’s deception showed, an unknown number of local leaders from 
across Wales also attended Owain’s parliaments rendering impossible a complete assessment 
of those responsible for governance in Wales under Glyn Dŵr.79 Nevertheless, this provides a 
fuller picture than has been presented previously.  
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Appendix D 7.1:  The Chronicle of Saint-Denys account of the 1405 Expedition (Latin).
80
 
 
De hiis que marescalos de Ryeux in Wallia gessit. 
 
Ut quod principi Wallie (promiserat) domini duces Francie, in regni regimine principales, de 
subsidio mittendo adimplerent, et ut quodam notabili facto comitis Marchie, quem antea 
miserant, ignominia tegeretur, inclitos milites dominum marescallum de Rieux, dominum de 
Hugevilla, magistrum ballistariorium Francie, et dominum Strabonem de Laheuse capitanos 
elegerunt pugnatorum mittendorum. Ex Britania igitur et Normania, mandatis obtemperantes, 
cum sexcentis balistariis, mille ducentis servientibus levis armature, octingentos electos 
pugiles collegerunt, qui cum classe duarum magnarum et rostratarum navium ac tringinta 
mediocrium in Walliam transmearent. Et hii omnes, circa finem jullii navigium ascendentes, 
cum per mensem mare placidum ex aspero factum expectassent, tandem portum de 
Willeforde, situm in comitatu de Pennebroc, attingentes, mox decem mille Wallenses missos 
a principe repererunt, quorum ope libere principatum intrarent, et si impedimentum 
occurreret, eos potenter juvarent.  
Et tunc Gallici cum ipsis Walensibus campestrem patriam ceperunt destruere, et 
flamma voraci consumere, recte tendentes ad villam de Heleford, que castro munitissimo 
subjacebat, unde protinus exierunt cum multis sagittariis fere trecenti homines ad unguem 
omnes loricati et ad resistendum prompti; cum quibus inito prelio, mox victi sunt, et ex eis 
sexdecim captis et quadraginta interfectis, ceteros fugere compulerunt. Inde ad villam 
tendentes, insultus multos fecerunt ; sed ex castrensibus septuaginta interfectis, cum propter 
fortitudinem loci illam capere nequirent et obsidionalia instrumenta per mare ducere ad loca 
alia ordinassent, mox obsidionenem relinquerunt. In hiis tamen assultibus quamvis perpauci 
ex Francis ceciderint, ibi tamen quidam miles famosus, nomine Patroullart de Trya, occubuit, 
cujus interitum graviter omnes Gallici tulerunt.  
 Eadem eciam die ad castrum nomine Picot ad custodiam pabulatorum deputati 
perrexerunt, quod primo assultu ad dedicionem venire coegerunt. Loco igitur, onusti preda, 
cedentes, et per adjacentem patriam, nulla incolumni relicta re, cui ferro aut igni noceri 
posset, ad villam maritimam et muratam nomine Canneby pervientes, ipsam de communi 
consilio omnium et assensu obsidione cingere et capere viribus decreverunt, per circuitum 
balistarios et obsidionalia instrumenta commode collocantes. Cum autem ad id diligentissime 
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instarent, nundum primo assultu inchoato, a longe classem triginta navium appropinquare 
viderunt, armatis viris et victualibus munitam, que ad succurrendum incolis mittebatur.   
Quod cum per exploratores veraciter didicissent, subito tantus pavor et formido super 
eos irruit, ac si omnes interitum sentirent imminere, et quia majorem partem navigii habebant 
super arenam, quam et nequibant ad mare impellere, cum non (possent) navigio se salvare, 
mox evacuates vasis, illa igne combusserunt, ne ad manus hostium devenirent. Moxque 
adhuc nemine persequente, sic contabuerunt eorum corda pre timoris angustia, et fugere sic 
inordinate et cum tanta celeritate decreverunt, ut obsidionalia instrumenta et maximam 
missilium partem cum sarcinis hostibus distrahenda relinquerent, quamvis tunc secum 
haberent duo mille equestres Walenses.  
Post hanc ignominiosam fugam, cum more suo villagia comburendo ad castrum 
Sancti Clari fortissimum pervenissent, illud obsidione cingere statuerunt. Sed tandem ad 
dedicionem venire promiserunt, si bona villa propinqua vocata Callemardin ad eorum 
odedienciam veniret. Ex hac villa populosa, quam et muri fortissimi ambiebant, rex Anglie 
multa percipiebat commoda, et ex ea sagitarii cum cohortibus armatis sepius erumpentes 
Walensibus multa dampna inferebant. Quapropter princeps jurejurando firmavit se inde non 
discessurum, donec viribus caperetur. Ibi in una parte Francigenis et altera Walensibus 
locatis, cum dies quatuor in obsidione exegissent, Gallici cum fossoriis et celtibus ferreis 
muros ilico suffoderunt, ut sic plane possent et manutentim pugnare. Ibique multis ex 
hostibus sauciatis et occisis, secundo reiterato assultu, cum jam Franci murorum altitudinem 
occupare conarentur, oppidani pro tractu pacifico componendo mutuo consuluerunt. 
Obtulerunt siquidem ut, salvis armis et quantum quisque posset de mobilibus secum ferre, in 
urbe manerent salva vita, ut sic juramentum principis compleretur, et sibi atque Gallicis liber 
daretur ingressus. Quam oblacionem princeps et Walenses, qui nundum pedum murorum 
attingerent, acceptantes, et Gallicorum laudantes strenuitatem, sicut condictum fuerat, villam 
princeps cum suis libere est ingressus. Ex tunc villa predalis Walensibus effecta, cum se 
spoliis uberrimis onerassent, muros per circuitum in parte maxima destruxerunt, in cunctis 
compitis ville et in suburbiis flammam voracem ponentes. Inde ambo exercitus ad 
Cardinguan castrum vallidum tendentes, ex eventu vicinorum infausto territi oppidani 
dedicionem mox acceptaverunt imperatam.  
Et tandem Gallici, cum fere per sexaginta leucas per regionem grassati fuissent 
hostiliter, principi requisierunt ut ab invicem divisi ob sterilitatem patrie loca eis 
assignarentur ad habitandum opportuna, donec classe conquisita repatriare valerent. In tribus 
igitur locis usque ad festum omnium Sanctorum remanserunt; et tunc sex parvis navibus 
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milites et armigeri disposuerunt redire, in Wallia mille ducentos levis armature servientes et 
quingentos balistaros relinquentes, quemdam armigerum nomine Blesum de Belay Picardum 
statuentes, cui omnes obedirent, donec navigium ad redeundum transmisissent.   
Hoc in dedecus redeuncium versum fuit, cum sic relinquissent qui propter eorum 
gloriam dimicantes in assultibus fuerant semper primi, eos ex multis periculis sepius eruentes. 
Quibus tamen recommendati fuerant nobiles cum eisdem remanserunt fideliter, et 
necessitatibus eorum benigne succurrerunt, et eos undecunque collectis navibus circa 
carnisprivium reduxerunt.   
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Appendix D 7.2:  The Chronicle of Saint-Denys account of the 1405 Expedition (French).
81
 
 
Expédition du maréchal de Rieux dans le pays de Galles. 
 
Messeigneurs les ducs de France, qui avaient la direction des affaires, voulant accomplir la 
promesse de secours faite au prince de Galles, et réparer en même temps par quelque notable 
fait d’armes le honteux échec du comte de la Marche, qui avaient jadis chargé de cette 
mission, résolurent d’envoyer dans ce pays des troupes auxiliaires sous la conduite d’illustres 
chevaliers, du maréchal de Rieux, de messire de Hugueville, grand-maître des arbalétriers de 
France, et de messire le Borgne de la Heuse. Ces trois capitaines, conformément aux ordres 
qu’ils avaient reçus, levèrent en Bretagne et en Normandie huit cents hommes d’élite, six 
cents arbalétriers et douze cents hommes de troupes légères, et se disposèrent à passer dans le 
pays de Galles avec une flotte composée de deux grands vaisseaux de guerre et de trente 
petits navires. Ils s’embarquèrent tous vers la fin de juillet. Après avoir attendu pendant un 
mois un vent favorable, ils arrivèrent enfin au port de Milford, dans le comté de Pembroke. 
Ils y trouvèrent dix mille Gallois que le prince de Galles avait envoyés pour leur faciliter 
l’entrée de ses terres et leur prêter appui, s’ils rencontraient quelque obstacle.  
Dès lors les Français et les Gallois mirent le pays à feu et à sang, et marchèrent droit 
sur la ville de Hereford, dominée par un château fort, d’où sortirent tout à coup près de trois 
cents hommes armés de pied en cap, suivis d’une multitude d’archers et déterminés à 
combattre. On en vint aux mains. Les Français eurent l’avantage, leur tuèrent quarante 
hommes, firent seize prisonniers, et mirent les autres en fuite. Puis ils s’approchèrent de la 
ville et livrèrent plusieurs assauts. Mais la place était trop forte pour qu’ils pussent s’en 
rendre maîtres, et ils avaient fait transporter ailleurs par mer toute leur artillerie. Ils levèrent 
donc le siège,
82
 après avoir tué soixante-dix des assiégés et n’avoir perdu eux-mêmes que très 
peu de monde. Parmi les morts se trouva un fameux chevalier, nommé Patrouillart de Trye, 
qui fut vivement regretté par tous ses compagnons. 
Le même jour, ceux qui avaient été détachés pour protéger les fourrageurs poussèrent 
jusqu’au château de Picot, et le forcèrent à se rendre dès le premier assaut. Les Français 
partirent de là chargés de butin pour ravager le pays d’alentour, y mirent tout à feu et à sang, 
et arrivèrent devant un port fortifié, appelé Kenneby. Ayant résolu d’un commun accord 
d’assiéger et de prendre cette ville, ils placèrent tout à l’entour leurs arbalétriers et dressèrent 
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leurs machines de siège.
83
 Ils poussaient leurs préparatifs avec activité, et étaient sur le point 
de livrer le premier assaut, lorsqu’ils aperçurent de loin une flotte de trente vaisseaux bien 
approvisionnés et munis de gens de guerre, qui venaient au secours des habitants. Les 
rapports de leurs éclaireurs ne leur laissant aucun doute sur les intentions de l’ennemi, ils 
furent tous saisis de frayeur et d’épouvante et se crurent perdus sans ressource. Comme la 
plupart de leurs vaisseaux se trouvaient sur la grève, et qu’ils ne pouvaient le remettre à flot, 
ni par conséquent se sauver par mer, ils en retirèrent leurs bagages et y mirent le feu, afin de 
les soustraire à l’ennemi. Bientôt la terreur s’accrut encore parmi eux, et leur effroi devint tel, 
que même sans être poursuivis ils s’enfuirent en toute hâte dans le plus grand désordre, et 
abandonnèrent  leurs machines de siège
84
 ainsi que la plus grande partie de leur artillerie et de 
leurs bagages, quoiqu’ils eussent avec eux deux mille cavaliers gallois. 
Après cette fuite honteuse, ils arrivèrent, tout en brûlant suivant leur coutume les 
villages qu’ils rencontraient sur leur route, devant le château fort de Saint-Clair et se 
disposèrent à l’assiéger. Les habitants promirent de se rendre, si la ville de Caërmarthen, 
située dans le voisinage, se soumettait à eux. Cette ville, qui était bien peuplée et garnie de 
bonnes murailles, offrait de grands avantages au roi d’Angleterre. Les archers et les hommes 
d’armes, qui en formaient la garnison, faisaient de fréquentes sorties et incommodaient fort 
les Gallois. Aussi le prince de Galles jura-t-il de ne point s’éloigner sans s’être rendu maître 
de la place. Les Français se postèrent d’un côté, les Gallois de l’autre. Après quatre jours de 
siège,
85
 les Français sapèrent si bien les murs avec des pioches et des hoyaux, qu’ils firent 
une brèche
86
 et purent combattre corps à corps. Les ennemis eurent beaucoup de blessés et de 
morts au premier assaut. Quand ils virent que les Français se préparaient à en donner un 
second et à escalader les murs, ils se décidèrent à entrer en pourparler, et offrirent, pour 
dégager le prince de son serment, de le recevoir lui et les Français et de leur abandonner leurs 
armes et tout ce que chacun d’eux pourrait emporter du pillage, à condition qu’ils auraient la 
vie sauve et resteraient dans la ville. Le prince et les Gallois, qui n’avaient pas encore atteint 
le pied des murs, acceptèrent cette offre, louèrent les Français de leur vaillance, et entrèrent 
librement dans la ville, ainsi qu’il avait été convenu. Les Gallois la livrèrent aussitôt au 
pillage ; après s’être gorgés de butin, ils rasèrent la plus grande partie des murs, et mirent le 
feu dans toutes les rues et les faubourgs. De là les deux armées marchèrent vers un château 
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fort nommé Cardigan, dont les habitants, effrayés par le sort de leurs voisins, s’empressèrent 
de capituler.  
Les Français, après avoir couru le pays l’espace de soixante lieues environ, craignant 
d’avoir à souffrir de la disette à cause de la stérilité, prièrent le prince de Galles de les 
cantonner dans des lieux différents, jusqu’à ce qu’ils pussent avoir une flotte pour retourner 
dans leur patrie. On leur assigna trois quartiers séparés, où ils restèrent jusqu’la fête de la 
Toussaint. Alors chevaliers et écuyers s’embarquèrent sur six petits vaisseaux, laissant dans 
le pays de Galles douze cents hommes de troupes légères et cinq cents arbalétriers sous les 
ordres d’un écuyer picard, nommé le Bègue de Belay, jusqu’à ce qu’ils leur eussent envoyé 
des vaisseaux pour leur retour.   
On blâma fort ceux qui revinrent en France d’avoir ainsi abandonné des gens qui 
avaient combattu pour leur gloire, qui avaient toujours été les premiers dans les assauts et qui 
les avaient sauvés de plus d’un danger. Cependant les nobles, sous la conduite desquels ces 
hommes d’armes avaient été placés, restèrent fidèlement avec eux ; ils pourvurent 
généreusement à leurs besoins, rassemblèrent des vaisseaux de toutes parts et les ramenèrent 
en France vers le carême.   
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Appendix D 7.3:  The Chronicle of Saint-Denys account of the 1405 Expedition (English).
87
 
 
The Deeds of Marshal de Rieux in Wales.
88
  
 
My lords the dukes of France, who were the principal governors of the kingdom, wished to 
fulfil the  promise of aid made to the prince of Wales and, at the same time, to repair the 
shameful failure of the comte de la Marche, who had previously been commissioned with this 
operation, by some notable feat of arms. They resolved to send to that country soldiers under 
the renowned knights, Marshal de Rieux, lord de Hugueville, the Grand-Master of the 
Crossbows of France, and the lord Borgne de la Heuse.
89
 Consequently, following their 
orders, from Brittany and Normandy, they mustered with six hundred crossbowmen, one 
thousand two hundred lightly armoured sergeants and eight hundred chosen fighting men, 
who were to be transported to Wales in two large warships and thirty medium-sized vessels.
90
  
And, after a month waiting for the sea to turn calm, they all embarked around the end of July 
and finally arrived in the port of ‘Willeforde’ (Milford), in the county of ‘Pennebroc’ 
(Pembroke).
91
 There, ten thousand Welshmen sent by the prince carefully emerged, to help 
the army freely enter the principality, and if any obstacle were met, they could help them. 
Then, the French with the Welsh captured and destroyed the fields of the country, and 
the fire voraciously consumed them, and went straight to the town of ‘Heleford’ (Haverford), 
from whose heavily fortified castle, immediately sallied many archers closely followed by 
three hundred men armoured from head to toe, resolved to make a stand and began fighting. 
Soon, many were vanquished, and they captured sixteen, killed forty and compelled the rest 
to flee.
92
 Thereafter, they reached the town and made many assaults;
93
 and indeed seventy of 
the garrison were killed, but because of the strength of that place they were unable to take it 
and having ordered their siege engines to be transported by sea to another place, they 
                                                          
87
 My Translation. 
88
 I have attempted to translate this as faithfully as possible to the Latin original. I note that there appear to be 
gaps in the original text and a number of shortcomings in Bellaguet’s French translation. Therefore it is 
inevitably imperfect and I accept that other interpretations are possible. I am grateful to Professor Peter Coss 
for his thoughts on this text.  
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 The original Latin text describes the soldiers as ‘pugnatorum’ – I find no reference or inference to them 
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 The original says ‘tringinta mediocrium (navium)’ not ‘trente petits navires’. I find the description of the 
warships being ‘rostratarum’ (literally ‘long-beaked birds’) evocative. 
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 ‘cum per mensem mare placidum ex aspero factum expectassent’ has not been translated in the French 
version.  
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 I find no mention of Bellaguet’s claim that ‘Les Français eurent l’avantage’ in the Latin.  
93
 The line ‘insultus multos fecerunt’ should be read as ‘assaults’. 
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abandoned the siege. However, although ever so few of the French fell in these assaults, 
nevertheless a famous knight called ‘Patrouillart de Tries’ went to his grave, whose loss was 
solemnly suffered by all of the French. 
The same day, the selected scouts hastened to the castle called ‘Picot’ (Picton), which 
was in the custody of the foragers, who acted together to surrender at the first assault.
94
 
Consequently from this place, laden with plunder, they withdrew, and through the 
surrounding countryside, leaving none unhurt by this event, with fire and sword harmed all 
that they could, and arrived at a walled coastal town called ‘Canneby’ (Tenby), the army, by 
common agreement assented to besiege, encircle and manfully take it by surrounding it with 
archers and the assembled siege engines. However, although they industriously pressed, they 
had not yet started the first assault, when in the distance they saw a fleet of thirty ships 
approaching, with armed men and well-provisioned, that had been launched to come to the 
aid of the inhabitants.   
When they learned the truth from their scouts, so much fear and terror rushed over 
them, and death seemed imminent, and because most of the boats they had were on the sand, 
and they were not able to push them to the sea, having no means of saving themselves in their 
boats, soon they had evacuated the beaches and consumed the ships with fire, so they did not 
fall into the enemy’s hands. Next, with no-one as yet in pursuit, they completely lost heart, 
choked by fear and fled in such confusion and with such speed that they abandoned their 
siege engines and most of their ammunition, and scattered their baggage,
95
 although at that 
time, they had with them two thousand Welsh horsemen.  
After this shameful flight, they burned villages, as was their way, until they reached 
the very strong castle of ‘Sancti Clari’ (Saint-Clears), where they established a siege. But at 
last they promised to come to terms if the inhabitants of the good town of ‘Callemardin’ 
(Carmarthen), nearby, came to their obedience. From this well-populated town, surrounded 
by a strong wall, the king of England perceived many opportunities and from here archers 
with armed forces often made sorties causing the Welsh much harm.  
Wherefore, the prince firmly swore not to depart from there, until his men had 
captured it. There, the French positioned themselves in one place and the Welsh in another, 
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 This is a difficult passage, the ‘pabulatores’ (foragers) appears to refer to the garrison.  
95
 ‘sarcinis hostibus distrahenda relinquerent’ – ‘scattered their baggage’ or ‘their packs divided among their 
enemies’? 
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after spending four days besieging it, with spades and picks
96
 made of iron they undermined 
the walls in that place, so that they could fight hand-to-hand in the open. There, many of the 
enemy were wounded and killed, a second assault was repeated, when the French attempted 
to take possession of the tops of the walls, the townsfolk requested a mutual peace treaty to 
be arranged. 
There they entreated that, save weapons
97
 and allowing as much as each could carry 
by himself, that they could remain safely alive in the town, thus releasing the prince of his 
oath, and that they and the French should have free entry. Then the prince and the Welsh, 
who had not yet reached the foot of the walls, accepted this offer, and praised the vigour of 
the French and, as was agreed, the prince and his men freely entered the town. From that 
town the Welsh brought out plunder, with a bountiful burden of loot, the surrounding walls 
having been for the most part destroyed, and set fire to every street in the town and the 
suburbs.  Thereafter both armies reached the ramparts of the fort of ‘Cardinguan’ (Cardigan), 
and due to the inauspicious outcome for their neighbours, the terrified townsfolk swiftly 
surrendered.  
And finally, the French, who had advanced sixty leagues across hostile territory, 
requested of the prince to divide them on account of the sterility of the surrounding 
countryside, and to allocate them to suitable places to inhabit, while a fleet was sought to 
repatriate them. And therefore in three
98
 places they remained until the feast of All Saints, 
and then the knights and squires arranged to return in six small ships, leaving behind one 
thousand two hundred lightly armoured sergeants and five hundred archers in Wales, over 
whom a Picard squire named ‘Blesum de Belay’ was put in charge (lit, was established or 
elevated), who all obeyed, until ships to return them would be sent.  
They returned in dishonour, on account of how they thus abandoned those who had 
fought for their glory and were always first in the assaults, and who had frequently pulled 
them out of many dangers.
99
 However, those nobles were praised who faithfully remained 
with them, kindly helped them and saw to their needs, and gathered ships from wheresoever 
at their own costs and brought them back around Lent.  
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Appendix D 8:     The 1405 Expedition: Fleet, Army and Costs. 
This mission inaugurated a new stage in French-Welsh relations; the landing of a royal army 
in Wales to support a Welsh leader against the king of England. Although French forces had 
already effected short-lived landings around Kidwelly and Caernarvon in the prelude, this 
larger mission was discussed and sanctioned at court as well as being legitimised by the 
previous year’s treaty. Although the deeds of the mission are discussed in Chapter 5, and 
have been partly analysed elsewhere, no known research considers the composition and costs 
involved in this expedition.
100
 Due to a severe paucity of relevant record evidence, it has 
proven impossible to produce perfect results in the analysis of possible costs. Nevertheless, 
the following research should give an impression of the scale of the task and commitment 
undertaken by the French in mounting this expedition. No detailed analysis of the chronicles 
describing the expedition appears elsewhere, nor has any thought been given to this French 
fleet; these two crucial subjects are therefore dealt with here.  
    
 
The Fleet
101
 
There have been significant difficulties in attempting to calculate the composition, speed and 
size of the 1405 fleet. In the first instance there was no formal, regular navy and no record 
detailing ships, their size, complement, tonnage or the costs incurred in hiring and equipping 
ships for specific voyages or paying for the ships’ crews. This appears, from the records 
consulted, to portray a state of non-standardised even irregular construction, and whimsical 
record-keeping. Nevertheless, it seems a worthwhile exercise to construct a picture of the 
fleet using the available evidence, supplementing the lacunae with the more abundant yet still 
incomplete information on contemporary English fleets. This should help to give a more 
complete, if still imperfect assessment.  Although battles and campaigns between the French 
and the English could be won by better led, motivated and positioned forces, these victories 
ebbed and flowed from one side to another with neither side establishing lasting 
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dominance.
102
 This suggests that England and France were relatively equal in naval strength 
during the last quarter of the fourteenth, and the first decade of the fifteenth centuries. With 
that in mind, an assessment of a French-Breton fleet, borrowing information from English 
records is still credible, worthwhile and realistic. 
It should firstly be stated that French records are few and almost entirely inadequate 
for this task and therefore borrowing similar information from elsewhere has been essential. 
There is no list stating the final number of ships that formed this fleet, no suggestion of the 
size, speed or carrying capacity of any French warship of this period, nor any similarly 
detailed account of a contemporary French fleet from which to glean details to aid 
calculations for the 1405 mission. While it is possible to establish the cost of constructing a 
French warship of this period, there appears to be no full account showing contemporary 
French recruitment costs, nor how many troops the different ship types commonly carried. 
Undeterred by these ultimately insurmountable problems in gaining absolutely accurate 
figures for the fleet, evidence from English sources has been useful in progressing this study. 
Information concerning the details of English shipping is more plentiful and thus can be used 
to approximate the size and cost of such a fleet had it been English, using English costs and 
sizes.  
Determining the size of ships should give an indication of the number of crew and 
soldiers they could carry. However, estimating the size of late fourteenth- and early fifteenth-
century ships poses a problem. Ships are understood in terms of being a certain number of 
‘tons’. Modern ships are measured by the volume of water they displace, but this was not the 
case in the medieval period.  The unit of measurement, ‘ton’, refers to the medieval wine 
container which held 252 gallons or 554.4 litres.
103
 Therefore ships were measured in terms 
of the burden they were capable of carrying. However, there was no standardisation and thus, 
no common means of calculating ship burdens.  Also, the amount of water, food and other 
equipment such as weapons, spares or material for repairs carried was not included in the 
overall tonnage of the vessel although, clearly, room had to be found for such essential items.  
In 1405 there were no permanent navies in the modern sense. There were a small 
number of ‘royal ships’ but in times of military need, merchant ships were ‘impressed’ or 
forced into crown service, sometimes requiring conversion to be fit for military purpose.  
This was particularly the case in England, but less often practiced in France.
104
 During the 
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fourteenth century, recompense for impressment was made by the English government to the 
ship’s owners at a rate of 3s 4d per ton, although this rate was reduced to 2s per ton in 1385.  
Therefore, the authorities estimated the ship’s carrying capacity as low in order to limit the 
amount paid out by the treasury when forming a navy. In contrast, owners would register 
their ships as being of high tonnage to make as a large a claim as possible from the 
government. This disparity between claims renders it impossible to determine the true size 
and carrying capacity of ships of that period. However, the different tonnages recorded do 
suggest ship sizes, whether small, medium or large for the time.
105
 Therefore, the problems 
relating to calculating a ship’s burden are the same for any medieval fleet.  
In order to be suitable for military purposes, a ship needed to be above a certain size 
to be effective.  While fishing and transport vessels could be small, military vessels needed to 
be above 50 tons.
106
 Records show that between the years 1400–1412, three-quarters of ships 
in English ports were below 100 tons. This means that relatively few ships were fit for 
impressment into the English navy, and such a navy would likely be composed of a large 
number of small ships, since they were the most common variety found in port. The royal 
flagship, the ‘Dieulagarde’, was 300 tons, there were four other royal ships of 200 tons and a 
further eleven of between 100 and 180 tons.  Since it was uncommon for English ships to be 
over 200 tons, these ships, the core of the English royal fleet prior to 1375 would have been 
visibly impressive when measured against other English ships.  By 1402, among the largest 
of the English ships was the ‘Trinity’, which was described as 300 tons.107 The true picture of 
the size, weight and carrying capacity for ships of this period is therefore impossible to 
determine, as is an accurate breakdown of the ship numbers and types which comprised the 
French-Breton fleet in question.  One notable difference between these nations’ naval forces 
was that instead of impressing their merchant vessels into military service, as was the 
common custom in England, the French preferred to hire foreign warships to supplement 
their navies. The English occasionally hired foreign vessels too; notably Dutch ships for 
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transport duties, but for the French, the inclusion of foreign warships, whether allies or 
mercenaries, was commonplace in this period.
108
  
Although there is no scope in this study for minutely detailing the different types of 
vessel of the period and their capabilities, a brief summary of terms used below might prove 
helpful. Although there were many types of smaller ships, from fishing boats to ‘pinnaces’ 
and ‘passagers’ which supported warships, this study focuses on the warships which might 
have comprised the French-Breton fleet that transported an army to Wales in support of 
Owain Glyn Dŵr in 1405.  
‘Balingers’ appear among the naval forces of both France and England and were 
common, multi-purpose vessels. As the name suggests, balingers were fishing vessels large 
enough to use for whaling while also being of a size suitable for cross-channel commerce. 
Sometimes called ‘barks’, balingers usually came equipped with between forty and fifty oars 
as well as sails, but were occasionally larger. ‘Barges’ were also vessels which used both sail 
and oar, but were usually larger than balingers, often having between eighty and a hundred 
and forty oars.  French and Italian oared-warships are usually called ‘galleys’ in 
contemporary manuscripts.  It is these oar and sail warships which formed the backbone of 
the English navy in this period and they also appear in abundance in French maritime forces. 
Although the fourteenth century saw the rise to prominence of the sailing ship, particularly in 
French fleets, balingers and barges were still in large-scale use in the channel.  
There were numerous types of large vessel afloat in 1405, such as ‘cogs’ and ’hulks’. 
However, the largest type of warship described in the manuscripts which concern this event is 
the ‘carrack’; a three-masted, high-sided warship commonly weighing several hundred tons. 
The size varied greatly from ship to ship, but it is commonly acknowledged that until the 
reign of Henry V, French and Italian carracks dwarfed their English contemporaries, making 
even the smallest of them upwards of 300 tons.
109
 
The French preference for larger warships at this time is noteworthy.
110
  It seems 
reasonable to propose that they would not have developed such large, expensive vessels if it 
did not serve their military purposes. A tale from this period exemplifies the value of larger 
vessels over smaller ones. Recounted as a tale of English derring-do from 1416, a skirmish 
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took place involving a single French carrack and more than six English vessels. On 24 
August, 1416, the earl of Warwick, acting captain of Calais, attacked a French carrack with 
his fleet of six balingers and an unstated number of support vessels called ‘passagers’. 
Although one balinger was separated from the rest during the night, the rest of Warwick’s 
force mounted a prolonged attack on the French vessel. The story is recounted in terms of 
English courage, harrying the enemy and leaving many wounded among the carrack’s 
crew.
111
 The attack, though led by an experienced soldier commanding a force which 
outnumbered the French, was unsuccessful in sinking, capturing, stopping or even inflicting 
notable damage on the carrack, despite repeated assaults. Heroism aside, this failure by at 
least five English warships to outmanoeuvre and take a larger, slower, seemingly less 
manoeuvrable, lone French vessel demonstrates that there was solid reasoning behind the 
French preference for large warships. This notion is further supported by the actions of Henry 
V who built a strong navy, including four of the largest vessels of the era.  They were the 540 
ton ‘Trinity Royal’ with five cannons, the 760 ton ‘Holigost’ with seven cannons, the 1000 
ton ‘Jesus’, all three recorded in 1416, and the huge, 1400 ton ‘Grace Dieu’ in 1418.  An 
investment of this scale was unlikely to have been undertaken without clear military necessity 
founded on valid conclusions learned from recent war experience.
112
 
  
Speed of the fleet 
Another area of difficulty concerns the calculation of the speed of the 1405 fleet.  Little work 
appears to have been done on this subject. However, one study of the London to Bordeaux 
trade route allows an overall average speed of merchant fleets of less than one knot per hour. 
This calculation does not allow for stopovers and thus the figure is inaccurate for a 
continuously moving fleet such as that of 1405, which clearly could not stop in England. 
Therefore, it offers limited information to this study. However, it is the only such study seen 
so far.
113
 Moreover, Friel’s assessment of the trade route does not provide a means of 
determining whether a war fleet would have moved at a different rate of knots. Equally, there 
are the elements to consider: wind, weather, tide and currents all affect nautical transport and 
fleets encountering different conditions would record accordingly different average speeds.  
The state of the elements in 1405 and how they affected this fleet are impossible to 
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determine. Given that the facts concerning the correct travel dates, the precise route taken, 
and thus the distance travelled, or whether they anchored at night or sailed continuously, are 
not recorded, the time taken is unknown. However, this effort to give a general idea of the 
distance and timescale proposes the following estimation:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
This conservative route from Brest where the army embarked, travelling as directly towards 
Milford as possibly but, for the sake of this exercise west of the Isles of Scilly and then 
straight to Milford, measured 258 nautical miles. Henry learned of the French invasion on 7 
August while at Pontefract castle, just over two hundred miles from Milford Haven as the 
crow flies. Considering land movement rates of the time, it seems reasonable to allow five 
days for the message from Milford to find Henry.
114
 Using the unreliably low speed of 1 knot 
per hour, this journey would have taken ten days and eighteen hours to achieve if the fleet 
sailed through the night. This is doubled to an implausibly slow three weeks if daylight-only 
travel is assumed. Therefore it seems fair to conclude that the fleet probably sailed at night 
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and generally moved faster than has so far been shown. This therefore exposes a gap in 
current knowledge in this area. Even the most modern and detailed work in this field is 
unable to offer further insight; Lambert offered a 1 knot per hour standard measurement and 
then guessed at journey times while using an estimated speed of 4 knots.
115
 Calculating this 
voyage at a speed of three knots, which roughly equates to a reasonable human swimming 
speed, gives a journey time of three and a half days of continuous travel or seven days during 
daylight hours. This suggestion is borne out in part by the record evidence. French and 
English records suggest that the fleet left Brittany in late July and arrived in Wales in at the 
beginning of August.
116
 The chronicler Thomas Walsingham claimed that almost all the 
horses perished from ‘lack of fresh water’, although no other sources mention this and it is 
unclear how Walsingham learned of it; the short journey time established here makes this 
unlikely. Around the same period Walsingham described French ships en route to Wales 
being defeated and captured at sea by English captains. While noteworthy, these two points 
lack corroboration and might be an attempt to denigrate the French as poor campaign 
planners and inferior in combat against English ships.
117
 Research on this matter has not 
yielded evidence of the place of Walsingham’s reported confrontation, nor, tellingly, have 
records emerged of captured crews or any noticeable number of prize ships that year.  
 
Size of the fleet 
Evidence suggests that the numbers of sailors required to man a fleet designed to transport an 
army were approximately the same as the number of soldiers it carried; this will help estimate 
the size of the 1405 fleet.
118
 It is suggested that any noticeable disparity of numbers was 
made up by those not included in the stated personnel totals, such as pages, grooms, 
attendants and other camp followers. Examples of contemporary fleets also mention that 
there were uncounted numbers of support ships in attendance to warships. In September 
1372, Edward III assembled a force comprising 6000 troops carried by 5000 sailors. 
Similarly, the English fleet of 1377–1378 sailed with twenty retinues totalling 4000 men at 
arms and archers in 100 ships manned by 3600 mariners. In 1385, a fleet of 43 vessels under 
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Sir Thomas Percy and Sir Baldwin Raddlington took to sea with approximately 2000 soldiers 
and the same number of sailors.  The figures for the fleet used by the earl of Arundel in 1387, 
in which Owain Glyn Dŵr served, are also available. It comprised a total of 2381 soldiers, of 
which there were 1091 men at arms and 1290 archers, and 2600 sailors in 51 vessels, of 
which there were 31 sailed ships, 19 barges and 1 balinger.  A small fleet of ten ships was 
also mustered in the Cinque Ports in 1387. It was manned by 580 sailors and intended to 
carry 600 troops. The ports were to pay for the ships and sailors while the crown covered the 
cost of the soldiers.
119
  Since these statistics also state the number of ships used to carry these 
soldiers and mariners, it is possible to calculate an average compliment per ship and per fleet: 
that of 1377-8 averaged 40 soldiers per vessel, Sir Thomas Percy’s fleet carried just over 46.5 
soldiers in each vessel; while Arundel’s 1387 fleet averaged 47 troops per vessel and the ten-
ship fleet of 1387 averaged 60 fighting men per vessel.  Lambert’s recent study offers 
numerous similar examples where English fleets listed a highest average of 45 soldiers per 
ship in large war fleets, to a low of fewer than 15 troops per vessel on other occasions, 
including the fleets for Sluys in 1340 and the army bound for France in 1355.
120
 This number 
only tells part of the story of course, each ship carrying a similar number of mariners, so the 
effective human burden should be considered double those figures stated above. These 
numbers do not include horses which clearly took up space. It is unknown how many, if any, 
horses the French transported in 1405 and therefore no allowance for them has been made 
excepting this comment. Also, it needs to be reiterated that these rough calculations consider 
English figures, whereas French ships have been shown to be larger, and consequently might 
have carried more troops on average. However, these averages might prove useful in 
comparison when attempting to construct a picture of the 1405 fleet. Accepting these 
numbers as probably relating to seaworthiness rather than expense, and being equally 
applicable to the French-Breton fleet, assists the tentative proposal of a formula to help 
calculate the size of the 1405 fleet. It seems likely that force integrity issues were also 
considered; losing ships packed with many troops would affect the combat ability of a force 
once it reached its destination, whereas it could afford to lose a few sparsely-populated 
vessels. 
The evidence from the chronicle of Saint-Denys says the fleet consisted of two large 
warships and thirty medium-sized ships, the ‘Chronique Normande’ says there were sixteen 
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large ships and two carracks, Monstrelet gives a figure of ‘six score’ ships, whereas English 
records claim the French put into Milford with either a hundred and forty or a hundred and 
forty-four ships.
121
 Considering the army figures below, this enables reasonable, although 
admittedly imperfect and inaccurate calculations. This aims to show that the 1405 invasion 
was no mere undertaking by the French.  
 
The Army 
The Saint-Denys chronicle gave figures for the size of the 1404 army as eight hundred men-
at-arms and an unspecified but large number of crossbowmen. The same authority described 
the 1405 force as eight hundred ‘élite fighting men’, six hundred crossbowmen and one 
thousand two hundred lightly-armoured troops. This force had arguably four leaders and was 
said to have been transported in two large warships and thirty medium-sized vessels.
122
 
Enguerrand de Monstrelet gave a figure of twelve hundred soldiers for each expedition bound 
for Wales.
123
  
Therefore, if the Saint-Denys chronicler were correct, his total army of 2600 soldiers 
(and no mention of the extra room required for the horses) and the same number of sailors 
fitting into 32 ships, this gives a less credible average of 81.25 soldiers per vessel or a 
combined human compliment of 162.5 men per ship – almost double the highest figure of any 
recorded contemporary English fleet. By contrast, Monstrelet’s fleet of 120 ships carrying an 
army of 1200 men, plus the same number of sailors, gives an average of 20 men per ship, or 
10 soldiers, leaving ample room for horses for the elite troops present, and the numerous 
uncounted attendants and others. Considering the range of statistics consulted, Saint-Denys’s 
figures seem unrealistically high and the loss of even one ship would gravely dent the force’s 
fighting capabilities, whereas those of Monstrelet appear to fit with the smaller figures given 
for English fleets that sailed a few decades previously.  The statistics from Saint-Denys cause 
most concern, however, particularly as Monstrelet claimed that the total campaign casualties 
among the French numbered around sixty.
124
 The loss of just one ship of Saint-Denys’s fleet 
would notably impact on the army’s capabilities, whereas it would not with a fleet composed 
with Monstrelet’s information. If Saint-Denys’s army were put aboard Monstrelet’s fleet, the 
average equates to a palatable 22 soldiers per ship, or combined compliment of 43.3. If Saint-
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Denys’s fleet carried Monstrelet’s army, this still leads to higher figures of 37.5 soldiers per 
vessel or 75 men combined on each ship. The fact that French and English sources suggest 
fleet sizes of well over a hundred ships, combined with these suggestive calculations here, 
gives credence to Monstrelet’s account being the more reliable, though still probably not 
entirely accurate.  
 
Possible Costs of the Fleet and Army 
In order to establish a picture, though imperfect, of the financial outlay on the part of the 
French crown, the following is an attempt to indicate the extreme minimum costs incurred for 
the 1405 expedition. Although it has ultimately proved impossible to render a complete 
break-down, since there is no explicitly accurate price, fleet or muster list, the following 
research has produced valuable, original information. 
 The calculations below are wage indications only. No account has been made, or can 
be made, of the costs incurred in equipping, arming, armouring or feeding the men. Nor has it 
been possible to produce a formula for hiring, running or equipping vessels, or for purchasing 
stores such as food or repair materials because the required amounts are unknown.
125
 
Statistics for certain fleets are available; three months’ service by ten Genoese galleys cost 
England £ 9550 in 1373 and twenty Castilian galleys cost the French 50, 000 francs in 1380, 
but there appears to be no standard rate, nor any description of this fleet’s composition.126 
While some information is available, such as long lists of campaigning equipment such as 
artillery, gunpowder, ropes, nails, winches, comestibles and so on, there is no indication of 
how much this force and fleet could have and should have carried on this mission.
127
 It has 
also been impossible to consider the amount earned in pillage and booty, or prisoners and 
ransoms, although both featured in the campaign and are detailed within the account rendered 
in Chapter 5.
128
 
This estimation will give an indication of the resources France invested in the 
expedition. In turn, this will reveal the importance France placed on the alliance, and the 
opportunities it offered to make war on English soil.  Nicolas’s assertion that wage rates at 
the time were equal to those of Edward III’s reign helps calculate a relatively accurate figure 
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for the cost of this expedition’s troops and mariners, since these sums are known.129 These 
costs can be compared to a similar sized English force, although it was raised to serve for a 
shorter period. Henry’s second son, Thomas, was commissioned to proceed against the 
French in February 1405. The army comprised the prince, two earls, twelve bannerets, eighty 
knights and six hundred and five esquires, therefore seven hundred men-at-arms, and fourteen 
hundred archers, all carried in a fleet of twenty large ships with castles, twenty barges and 
twenty balingers. It cost 8243 l. 17 s. 4 d.
130
  
There are some useful notes on the structure and practices of the French army of the 
time however. Firstly, commanders of the highest rank are identified as the (king’s) 
lieutenants, Constable, Marshal and the Master of Crossbowmen.
131
 Two of these appear in 
the 1405 force, and they were entitled to command any number of troops. Charles V’s army 
ordinances from 1369 show that his forces were divided into bodies of one hundred men, 
each of which was required to have a captain.
132
 This has been done with the troop 
calculations below, and the captain has been awarded a rate of pay concurrent with the pay 
band one place above that of the men he commanded. Whether there were sub-commanders 
between them and the overall expedition leaders is unknown. Although it is probable, no 
provision is made for it in the statistics below. In addition, for the sake of this exercise, 
captains of warships have also been assumed as high rank, and those of smaller ships have 
been classed at a higher rate of pay than the average fighting man. Although most ships 
appear to have constables, not all do, and so this is impossible to calculate. It has been 
assumed therefore that these constables were either men retained from the land army 
component or were part of the ship’s crew, so no extra allowance has been made for them. 
Equally, all ships appear to carry apprentice boys. No rate of pay for these appears anywhere, 
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yet they seem omnipresent, therefore they have been included at an approximated ratio of one 
apprentice per ten mariners, as some statistics appear to suggest.
133
 
French rates of pay prove problematic. While figures are given for bannerets, knights, 
esquires and varlets, there are no equivalents for the high ranks within the 1405 force, or for 
the lightly-armoured troops or crossbowmen which comprised the bulk of this army.
134
 Since 
fully detailed French rates of pay are not available, English equivalent daily rates are used 
instead. Expert opinion suggests English rates of pay were less than those of their French 
adversaries.
135
 An earl drew 6s 8d a day, a banneret 4s, a knight 2s, man-at-arms or spearman 
1s, an archer 6d.
136
 Ships’ crews were paid 3d per day, although apprentices were paid less, 
and ship’s masters probably more. 137 Each ship had a master, many had constables, and the 
number of apprentice boys varied apparently at random.
138
 
Finally, the figures below show the daily rates of each force described by the 
chroniclers. The 1405 force mustered in July and in both versions at least part of it returned to 
France at All Saints. Therefore, the costs for the minimum campaign period of 92 days, 1 
July to 1 November, are also included here to demonstrate the scale of investment by the 
French. The National Archives have developed software which calculated old money rates to 
modern equivalents. The statistics provided below equate to payments from 1410 being 
converted to an equivalent value in 2005.
139
 It should be noted here that this system produces 
small disparities throughout, so both figures are included within the calculations.
140
 The totals 
provided are the additions of their contemporary currency.   
Therefore, using the French army organisation and the above English rates of pay and 
currency system of twelve deniers to a shilling, or two hundred and forty deniers to one 
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pound sterling, and twenty shillings to a pound sterling, a rough estimate of the daily costs of 
this force can be calculated as follows:
141
 
Monstrelet’s Army 
No. Name Equivalent 
Rank 
Daily 
Rate of 
Pay 
Daily cost 
per unit 
(Daily rate 
x unit 
size) 
Modern 
equivalent 
(Daily rate x 
unit size) 
Minimum 
campaign 
cost  
(Daily unit 
cost  x 92) 
Modern 
equivalent 
(Daily unit 
cost  x 92) 
1 Renaud de 
Tries
142
 
Earl 6 s. 8 d.
 
 6 s. 8 d. £153.31 6 s. 8 d. x 92 = 
30 l. 13 s. 4 d. 
£153.31 x 92 
= £14, 104.52 
1 Jean de 
Hangest 
Earl 6 s. 8 d. 6 s. 8 d. £153.31 6 s. 8 d. x 92 = 
30 l. 13 s. 4 d. 
£14, 104.52 
12 Contingent 
captains 
Banneret143 4 s. 4 x 12 = 
48 s. or  
2 l. 8 s. 
£91.99 x 12 
= £1103.88  
2 l. 8 s. x 92 = 
220 l. 16 s.  
£1103.88 x 92 
=  
£101, 556.96 
1200 ‘fighting men’ Knights
144
 2 s. 2 x 1200 = 
2400 s. or 
120 l. 
£45.99 x 
1200 =  
£55, 188 
120 l. X 92 
= 11040 l. 
£55, 188 x 92 
=  
£ 5, 077, 296 
Total Daily Rate for  
Monstrelet’s army  
124 l.  
1 .s  4 d. 
 
Modern Equivalent
145
  
 
£ 56, 598.50  
Cost of minimum known service from 1 July to 1 November, 
1405 (92 days)  
11322 l.  
2 s. 8 d. 
 
Modern Equivalent
146
  
 
£ 5, 207, 062 
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Monstrelet’s naval force: ‘Six score ships.’ 
 
No. Name Equivalent 
Rank 
Daily 
Rate of 
Pay 
Daily cost 
per unit 
(Daily rate 
x unit 
size) 
Modern 
equivalent 
(Daily rate x 
unit size) 
Minimum 
campaign 
cost  
(Daily unit 
cost  x 92) 
Modern 
equivalent 
(Daily unit 
cost  x 92) 
120 Ship’s Masters Knights 2 s. 2 x 120 = 
240 s. or  
12 l. 
£45.99 x 120 
=  
£5, 518.80 
12 l. X 92 = 
1104 l.  
£5, 518.8 x 92  
=  
£ 507, 729.60 
1200 Mariners Mariner 3 d. 3 x 1200  
= 3600 d. 
or 300 s. 
or 15 l. 
£5.75 x 1200 
=  
£ 6, 900 
15 l. X 92 = 
1380 l. 
£ 6, 900 x 92 
=  
£ 634, 800 
120 Apprentice 
Boys 
Apprentice 1 d. 120 d. or 
10 s.  
£1.92 x 120 
=  £ 230.40 
10 s. x 92 = 
920 s. or 46 l. 
£ 230.4 x 92 =  
£ 21, 196.80 
Total Daily Rate for  
Monstrelet’s naval force  
27 l. 10 s.  
Modern Equivalent 
147
 
 
£ 12, 649.20  
Cost of minimum known service from 1 July to 1 November, 
1405 (92 days)  
2530 l.  
Modern Equivalent 
148
 £1, 163, 726.40 
 
 
 
 
The Totals for Monstrelet’s forces: 
 
Event Workings Total 
Daily Rate for both forces  
 
124 l. 1 .s  4 d. +  
27 l. 10 s. =  
151 l. 11 s. 4 d. 
The modern equivalent 
149
 
 
£ 56, 598.50 +  
£ 12, 649.20 = 
£ 69, 247.70 
Total campaign costs for 
both forces over 92 days 
11322 l. 2 s. 8 d. + 
2530 l. =  
 
13852 l. 2 s. 8 d. 
The modern equivalent
150
 £ 5, 207, 062 +  
£1, 163, 726.40 = 
£ 6, 370, 788.40 
 
 
 
 
 
Saint-Denys’s army: 
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No. Name Equivalent 
Rank 
Daily 
Rate of 
Pay 
Daily cost 
per unit 
(Daily rate 
x unit 
size) 
Modern 
equivalent 
(Daily rate x 
unit size) 
Minimum 
campaign 
cost  
(Daily unit 
cost  x 92) 
Modern 
equivalent 
(Daily unit 
cost  x 92) 
1 Jean de 
Rieux
151
 
Earl 6 s.  
8 d.
 152
 
6 s. 8 d. £153.31 6 s. 8 d. x 92 = 
30 l. 13 s. 4 d. 
£153.31 x 92 
= £14, 104.52 
1 Jean de 
Hangest
153
 
Earl 6 s. 8 d. 6 s. 8 d. £153.31 6 s. 8 d. x 92 = 
30 l. 13 s. 4 d. 
£153.31 x 92 
= £14, 104.52 
1 Robert de la 
Heuse 
Banneret154 4 s. 4 s. £91.99  4 s. x 92 =  
18 l. 8 s. 
£91.99  x 92 = 
£8,463.08 
1 Le Bègue de 
Bellay
155
 
Banneret 4 s. 4 s. £91.99 4 s. x 92 =  
18 l. 8 s. 
£91.99  x 92 = 
£8,463.08 
800 ‘elite fighting 
men’ 
Knights 2 s. 2 x 800 = 
1600 s. or 
80 l. 
£45.99 x 800 
= £36792 
80 l. X 92 =  
7360 l.  
£36792 x 92 = 
£3,384, 864 
8 Contingent 
captains 
Banneret 4 s. 4 x 8 =  
32 s. or  
1 l. 12 s. 
£91.99 x 8 = 
£735.92 
32 s x 92 = 
2940 l. 4 s.  
£735.92 x 92 
= £67, 704.64 
1200 lightly 
armoured 
troops 
Spearmen 1 s. 1200 s. or 
60 l. 
£23 x 1200 
= £27600 
60 l. X 92 =  
5520 l. 
£27, 600 x 92 
=  
£2, 539, 200 
12 Contingent 
captains 
Knights 2 s. 2 x 12 = 
24 s. or  
1 l. 4 s. 
£45.99 x 12 
= £551.88 
24 s. x 92 =  
110 l. 8 s.  
£551.88 x 92 
= £50, 772.96 
600 Crossbow 
men 
Archers 6 d. 6 x 600 = 
3600 d. or 
15 l. 
£11.50 x 600 
= £6900 
15 l. X 92 = 
1380 l.   
£6900 x 92 = 
£634, 800 
6 Contingent 
captains 
Knights 2 s. 2 x 6 =  
12 s 
£45.99 x 6 = 
£275.94 
12 s x 92 =  
55 l. 4 s. 
£275.94 x 92 
= £25, 386.48 
Total Daily Rate for  
Saint-Denys’s army  
159 l.  
9 s. 4 d. 
 
Modern Equivalent 
156
 £ 73, 343.50 
 
 
Cost of minimum known service from 1 July to 1 November, 
1405 (92 days)  
17463 l.  
18 s. 8 d. 
 
Modern Equivalent 
157
 £ 6, 747, 
863.28 
 
 
 
Saint-Denys’s naval force: 2 large warships and thirty medium-sized vessels. 
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 Marshal of France 
152
 This equates to £ 153.31 per day, roughly equivalent to that of a modern Lieutenant Colonel, an 
appropriate level rank to command such an expedition. 
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/TA_Pay.pdf  
153
 lord of Hugueville and Grand-Master of the Crossbows of France 
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 The modern equivalent is £ 91.99, slightly above that of a modern army captain. The higher ranks’ pay 
appears to equate favourably with their approximate modern counterparts, all of the lower ranks here, do not. 
Perhaps indicative of the comparatively higher pay awarded to the lower ranks in modern society.   
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 Although de Bellay was described as an esquire, the fact that he was said to have been left in command of 
over a thousand men has led to this notional higher pay claim.  
156
 NACC £73,343.50 
157
 NACC £ 8, 032,186.86 
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No. Name Equivalent 
Rank 
Daily 
Rate of 
Pay 
Daily cost 
per unit 
(Daily rate 
x unit 
size) 
Modern 
equivalent 
(Daily rate x 
unit size) 
Minimum 
campaign 
cost  
(Daily unit 
cost  x 92) 
Modern 
equivalent 
(Daily unit 
cost  x 92) 
2 Warship 
Masters 
Banneret 4 s. 8 s. £91.99 x 2 = 
£183.98 
8 s. x 92 =  
36 l. 16 s.  
£183.98 x 92 
=  
£12, 786.16 
30 Ship’s Masters Knights 2 s. 60 s. or  
3 l. 
£45.99 x 30 
= £1379.70  
3 l. X 92 =  
276 l.  
£1379.70 x 92 
=  
£126, 932. 40 
2600 Mariners Mariner 3 d. 7800 d. or  
32 l. 10 s. 
£5.75 x 2600 
= £14950  
32 l. 10 s x 92 
= 2990 l. 
£14950 x 92 
=  
£1, 375, 400 
260 Apprentice 
Boys 
Apprentice 1 d. 260 d. or 
1 l. 1 s.  
8 d. 
£1.92 x 260 
= £499.20 
1 l. 1 s. 8 d. x 
92 =  
98 l. 8 s. 16 d. 
£499.20 x 92 
=  
£45, 926.40 
Total Daily Rate for  
Saint-Denys’s naval force  
36 l. 19 
s. 8 d. 
 
Modern Equivalent
158
  
 
£ 17, 012.88  
Cost of minimum known service from 1 July to 1 November, 
1405 (92 days)  
3401 l.  
5 s. 4 d. 
 
Modern Equivalent
159
  £1,515, 
118.56 
 
The Totals for Saint-Denys’s forces: 
 
Event Workings Total 
Daily Rate for both forces  
 
159 l. 9 s. 4 d. + 
36 l. 19 s. 8 d. = 
196 l. 9 s. 
The modern equivalent
160
  
 
£ 73, 343.50 +  
£ 17, 012.88 = 
£90, 356.38 
Total campaign costs for 
both forces over 92 days 
17463 l. 18 s. 8 d. +  
3401 l. 5 s. 4 d. =  
20, 866 l. 4 s. 
The modern equivalent
161
 £ 6, 747, 234 .42 +  
£1,515, 118.56 = 
£8,262,352.98 
 
                                                          
158
 NACC £17,009.74 
159
 NACC £1,564,344.58 
160
 NACC £90,353.25 
161
 NACC £9,596,991.37 
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Appendix D 9:     Constance, 1417 – A Last Stand for Wales? 
The state of France between 1412 and 1417 requires little expansion here. Despite the 
restoration of peace and fine words of amity uttered and committed to writing at Buzançais, 
factional warfare continued in France during these years. The citizens of Paris revolted in 
1413, but were crushed and their preferred leader, the duke of Burgundy, was swept from 
power, allowing the Orleanists to regain control.
162
 Duke Jean attempted to make a 
treasonable compact with Henry V in 1414, promising to act against France in England’s 
favour.
163
 Irrespective of his stated intention to the other French princes, he made no effort to 
assist them or advance against Henry V’s invasion the following year.164 Burgundy was not 
entirely alone in this; the duke of Brittany failed to reach Agincourt either, the truce with 
England probably influencing his actions too.
165
 The scale of the French defeat in that battle 
requires no more description here other than to observe that Agincourt did not bring Henry V 
the campaign success he sought – his armies returned to England in the immediate aftermath 
without pressing their advantage. The heaviest cost to France was the scale of leaders lost that 
day. In addition, Louis of Guyenne, the heir-designate, died of illness in December 1415.
166
 
The Orleanists, now more commonly referred to as the Armagnacs, assumed control of the 
government for the majority of the remaining period of interest.
167
 
In an effort to finally heal the schism, the European powers determined to hold 
another ecclesiastical conference to make amends for that of Pisa in 1409. The Council of 
Constance met in a number of sessions between 1414 and 1418. There is neither space nor 
any reason for a description of the origins, debates or the findings of the Council here. It was 
populated by delegations from western and central European states. Although its purpose was 
to seek a solution to the schism, a number of other issues were also debated there. Arguably, 
the best-known event saw Church authorities renege on their promises of safe conduct to Jan 
Hus who was imprisoned, tried and then executed on 6 July 1415.
168
 During the course of the 
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council, English diplomacy, perhaps combined with a poor approach by their French 
counterparts, managed to win an alliance with the host, the Emperor Sigismond in August 
1416.
169
 However one argument at Constance encompassed French-Welsh relations. The 
debate of interest here took place between the French and English delegations during the 28
th
 
and 31
st
 sessions of the Council, held on the 3 and 31 March 1417. Although it constituted 
only a minor feature of the proceedings at Constance and had no bearing on the outcome of 
the Council, it nonetheless marks the final public assertion by the French, speaking in their 
own interests, naturally, but also in those of a rebel Wales. However, by 1417, the French 
ambassadorial party was engaged in its own conflict between the envoys of Armagnac or 
Burgundian adherence.
170
 
The French raised the issue of sovereignty with the English at Constance, and within 
the context of that evoked the plight of the Welsh and others, and demanded their 
ecclesiastical liberty.
171
 However, from the riposte offered by Thomas Polton, Henry V’s 
ambassador, to the French protest of 3 March, 1417, the tenor of the original French claim is 
revealed.
172
  
When the French delegation tried to deliver their protestatio in the 28
th
 session on 3 
March 1417, their representative, Jean Campagne, delivered a few lines before being jeered 
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and booed into silence by other delegates. Their protest was then formally submitted in 
writing. The aim of the protest, discussed below, appears to have been to reduce the size and 
weaken the influence of England’s representation within the Church council. Within that 
argument, the French sought ecclesiastical independence for Wales. The English response 
was delivered in writing by Thomas Polton at the 31
st
 session on 31 March 1417. Polton’s 
response listed and then rebuffed at length three principal French arguments. The English 
reply was a skilful but exhaustively long rebuttal, combining a variety of apparently well-
researched, incisive points, with verbose, misleading statements and humorous comments 
denigrating the French, to produce a compelling defence against the protestatio. From this 
reply, the detail of the French argument is discernable.  
The first French point was founded on a papal decree, ‘Extravagans, Vas electionis’, 
made during the reign of Pope Benedict XII (1334 – 1342).173 Their argument was that the 
decree divided Catholic obedience into four groups known as ‘nations’. The four primary 
nations were France, Germany, Castile and Italy. Other nations were classed beneath these 
four and thus came into their obedience ecclesiastically, for example, Navarre to France, 
Portugal to Spain, the eastern Mediterranean Latin possessions to Italy and England to 
Germany. Europe’s universities divided their students into those groups also, for 
administrative, teaching and logistical purposes such as accommodation. The Council of 
Constance had followed that arrangement. However, in the absence of the Spanish 
delegation, the English had assumed the Spanish position and voting rights. The French 
asserted that since England came within Germany’s obedience it was not an ecclesiastical 
nation in its own right. Just as other nations such as such as Wales, Scotland or Hungary had 
no individual representation at the Council, then England did not deserve the level of 
representation it enjoyed at that time, which put it on an equal footing to the four principal 
nations mentioned.  
The second French argument further detailed the divisions agreed during Benedict 
XII’s reign.174 He divided the papal obedience into thirty six parts and counted York and 
Canterbury as just one province. The French underlined the fact that since Benedict was born 
in Bordeaux, and therefore under English influence, he was in essence favourable towards 
England. The fact that he determined England to be just one thirty-sixth of the papal 
obedience should therefore stand and be applied to their level of representation at the council.  
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The third main French point challenged England’s geographical size and made a 
comparison of the two nations’ ecclesiastical provinces, concluding that England was far 
smaller than France and therefore should not have equal representation on the Council.
175
 
England only had two provinces, York and Canterbury, whereas France had eleven provinces 
and ‘one hundred and one wide and spacious dioceses.’176 Moreover, the French claimed that 
their Christian pedigree, in terms of the length of time they had been obedient, and to whom 
they had been obedient, made them superior to the English.
177
 Also, that the kingdom of 
France was composed of several duchies and counties, each being larger and richer in terms 
of ‘lands, cities, castles and walled towns than the kingdom of England.’178 Therefore, they 
argued, that it was ‘ridiculous and unreasonable’ that England should enjoy an equal number 
of delegates as France on the council, and that the French should have at least six times 
England's representation.
179
 
The French made a number of demands to accompany their three points of protest.
180
 
The first was that the council should await the absent Spanish delegation before continuing 
with its business. Within that demand they added that England, the fifth nation, should simply 
return to being part of the German nation, as established by Benedict XII’s decree. Their 
second demand offered an alternative to this too; that if the English were to retain their 
representation, then the other nations be divided also, creating new nations in the same 
manner that England had acquired its position within the council. The French insisted that 
failing to do so would be insulting to them because of the justifications present in the three 
points of their protest.
181
 The third French point reiterated that if the other delegations did not 
agree to an expansion of the nations represented, then they should reinstate the original 
arrangement of four nations; Italy, France, Spain and Germany. 
182
 
To a certain degree their points appear fair and balanced. Certainly, the call to await 
the return of their political allies, the Spanish, seems wholly reasonable.  The absence of such 
a major faction due to domestic matters certainly disrupted the business of the Council. The 
French questioned England’s right to the same level of representation on apparently 
reasonable grounds; historical precedence, ecclesiastical tradition based on papal decree, as 
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well as on a practical comparison of size, population and wealth. Their inference was that 
with the future of the Church at stake, it seemed important that the right people were leading 
the debate towards resolution. Superficially the French stance seemed generous to those 
without a voice and appeared designed to promote a fairness of representation at the Council 
called to heal the schism. French success in this ecclesiastical forum to elicit support for its 
causes would certainly have benefited many nations such as the Scots, Irish and Welsh.  
  Thomas Polton’s reply appears to take the air of an experienced school master 
rebutting one of his less capable students, and in so doing it makes comical, yet impressive 
reading. The French position was utterly demolished by the lengthy English reply. In the first 
case, it seems evident that Henry’s representatives had an intimate knowledge of 
‘Extravagans, Vas electionis’, and used that in-depth knowledge to deny that its author 
intended it to be a map of the divisions and obediences as the French claimed.
183
 They gave 
examples to illustrate their points, citing passages from the papal decree that put holes in the 
French case. One example is that the English provinces of York and Canterbury were listed 
among Occitan provinces, proving that England was not viewed as part of Germany and that 
the document was a convenient list of groupings, rather than a firm decree.
184
 On the point 
that England comprised only one province in the kingdom of England, and therefore should 
only have one place in council, Poulton replied: ‘It is the worst sort of argument. For in much 
of what they have written they argue from the kingdom of England alone to the whole 
English nation. These chaps write a lot of stuff like this.’185 The riposte then built a case 
regarding the peoples of ‘the English or British nation’. Polton frequently repeated that 
phrase, cleverly blurring the edges of the terms in use to an audience which was probably 
unsure and largely disinterested in determining the precise details of these definitions.
186
 The 
reply qualified how the English nation was composed of eight kingdoms; England, Scotland 
Wales were those of ‘greater Britain’, Man and the four Irish kingdoms.187 The English 
argument demolished that of the French, minutely picking apart the French argument which 
seems, in contrast, to have been airily composed on matters of general principle and with 
inadequate knowledge of the documents they cited. As the response dealt with the French 
points in a detailed way, it also took the opportunity to ridicule the authors of the protest and 
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their argument, using terms such as ‘feeble’ and denigrating their points ‘as these scribblers 
pretend.’188 
 So the argument ran, skilfully infusing well-made points with references, comparisons 
and ridicule, but also with flagrant untruths which broadened the argument to a degree that to 
pursue would be fruitless, pointless and demand a great deal of energy.
189
 For example, the 
French decried the size of England and its various regions. In a list of those places which 
belonged to the English nation, they said ‘and there is the famous principality of John, prince 
of the Orkneys and about forty other islands. Even these islands are equal to or larger than the 
kingdom of France.’190 While of course, they were not, to pick on every English point and 
respond to the high number of deliberate inaccuracies would be exhausting, which was 
probably their point. This discourse of stylish equivocation and solidly-made points easily 
bettered the French protest. The passage of interest responding to the French protest about 
Wales is riven with ambiguity, misdirection, fact and insult. On the whole it is an excellent 
sample of the tenor of the English reply: 
 
These people claim that Wales and the prelates and clergy of those parts do not pay any 
attention to the king of England, nor do they want to be part of the English nation, as is 
manifest here in this council.
191
 Always remembering the earlier disclaimer, the answer is 
that they can blush for putting out such a flagrant untruth. For the whole of Wales is 
obedient to the archbishop of Canterbury, as its primate, in spiritual matters and to the 
most serene king of England in temporal matters, peacefully and as a matter of routine. 
That is evident on the spot and in this council, where many venerable doctors and other 
graduates and clerks from Wales are participating in this famous English nation. 
Similarly, they are just as clearly mistaken about Ireland, which embraces four provinces 
and sixty spacious dioceses. It is well known and undoubted that these provinces are 
recognized parts of the English nation. 
  When they go on to propose that the suffragan bishops of Scotland are not and have no 
wish to be in the English nation, always with the same disclaimer, the answer is that they 
are undoubtedly, and ought to be, part of the English nation, since they have no way of 
denying that Scotland is a part of Britain, though not so large a part. The whole world 
knows that. Also they have the same language as the English. It is really remarkable that 
such educated men would want to write that Wales, Ireland or even Scotland are not part 
of the English nation, because they do not do what the king of England tells them to do. 
If that point were granted, which it is not, it is irrelevant. It is obvious that the point 
whether any nations obeys merely one prince or several does not apply. Are there not 
several kingdoms in the Spanish nation which do not obey the king of Castile as chief 
among the Spaniards? It does not follow, all the same, that they are not part of the 
Spanish nation. Are there not Provence, Dauphiné, Savoy, Burgundy, Lorraine and 
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several other territories, which have nothing to do with the adversary of France and yet 
are included in the French or Gallican nation? And it is the same with other nations.
192
 
 
Another point including Wales appears to convincingly triumph the original French protest: 
 
Where the French nation, for the most part, has one vernacular which is wholly or in part 
understandable in every part of the nation, within the famous English or British nation, 
however, there are five languages, you might say, one of which does not understand 
another. These are English, which English and Scots have in common, Welsh, Irish, 
Gascon and Cornish. It could be claimed with every right that there should be 
representation for as many nations as there are distinct languages. By even stronger right 
ought they, as a principal nation, to represent a fourth or fifth part of the papal obedience 
in a general council and elsewhere ... It should not be overlooked how these scribblers 
are working towards inequality between nations.
193
  
 
In this manner, each point of the French protest was taken to task and demolished. The 
righteousness of the principles involved seems to have been buried in the form and style of 
the exchange. There would be no ecclesiastical debate over the fate of Wales; the argument 
was lost in the avalanche of other, dominating matters and no thanks to a loquacious, 
dissembling reply by Thomas Poulton. 
 
Meanwhile, Wales was still problematic to the English crown; the revolt was still ongoing.
194
 
The notion that the revolt withered after 1405 and died in February 1409 is incorrect. 
Undeniably, the tenor and tempo of the conflict had changed following the English capture of 
Aberystwyth and Harlech. It seems as if the Welsh had a new leader, Maredudd, Owain’s 
son. The first evidence linking him to some form of power comes from June 1412, where 
men wishing to hold discussions were obliged to operate under his protection, which reveals 
that they required his permission.
195
 This was made explicit in letters written to English 
officials in Wales where it was claimed that a particular man was able to come to parley 
because he was ‘under the protexion of Mered’ ap Owein’.196 Despite Harlech falling in 
February 1409, the king realised that the Welsh were not finished and in November that year 
ordered the earl of Arundel, Roger le Strange, Edward Charlton, and Lord Grey of Ruthin to 
go in person and make war on the rebels.
197
  Orders for the castles to be repaired and 
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garrisons maintained within them run throughout the period 1409-1417.
198
 Even at that stage, 
after two sizeable armies had assaulted and eventually taken the two principal Welsh 
fortresses, these English commanders complained that ‘this cuntre of North Wales shall 
nevere have peese’, and a joint Franco-Scots attack on Wales was predicted for summer 
1409.
199
 The capture of the two French carracks, the ‘Sancta Maria’ and the ‘Sancta Brigida’, 
off Milford in 1409, lends credence to this notion.
200
 
In due course, rents had begun to be paid in the more anglicised lordships such as 
Brecon, Chirkland and on recaptured Anglesey. However, by 1409, even these areas they 
were only garnering approximately a third of the pre-revolt yield.
201
 There were negligible 
returns from some areas such as Merioneth, Caernarvon and northern Cardigan into the 
1420s; this should be considered as linked to ongoing rebellion in the form of hostile non-
cooperation, as opposed to the open warfare experienced previously. Crown authority, in the 
sense that the population was not consistently in arms and some revenue was raised from the 
area, returned across Wales asymmetrically, with each region offering a different challenge to 
crown officers.
202
 In 1412, parleys for submissions were still ongoing and the king’s chief 
stalwart in Wales, Dafydd Gam, was seized by Glyn Dŵr himself, presenting a curious 
landscape of neither outright warfare nor peace or submission. At the same time, a 180-strong 
force was posted to Bala to attempt to suppress rebel activity in the area.
203
 In this respect the 
conflict in Wales bears certain of the classic hallmarks of an insurgency and therefore, in 
contrast to Davies’s image of it being something that could die, this was a quarrel that could 
run for years in some form.
204
 In 1414, the Lollard leader, Sir John Oldcastle raised a revolt 
drawing thousands of soldiers to his banner. However, over the next three years his forces 
withered, rose again, then dispersed causing Oldcastle to go into hiding. By 1417, he was 
known to be in the Welsh borders, where it was believed that he had gone to those parts to 
hold talks with Maredudd ab Owain.
205
 English officials fell foul of their new king for 
holding discussions with rebels without permit, and troops were hurriedly sent to the south 
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while messengers called garrisons to alert.
206
 Despite oaths being sworn to English officials 
and fines being paid by communities in certain parts, more proved recalcitrant than 
submissive; threats and murders of Englishmen and crown administrators took place.
207
 Even 
as Henry V launched the first stages of his great French adventure, Wales appeared to be 
smouldering towards ignition once more. Officials held discussions with rebels in local 
initiatives, and were fined for so doing by the king. Gilbert Talbot was commissioned to 
locate and discuss peace with Owain: ‘Appointment of Gilbert Talbot, ‘chivaler’, to treat with 
Owin Glendourdy of Wales on certain matters declared to him by the king and to receive 
Owin and other Welsh rebels to the king’s obedience and grace if they seek them.’208 The 
entire parameters of Talbot’s brief are unknown, but he was unsuccessful in his efforts to 
persuade Owain to submit. Talbot was again appointed ‘to treat with Meredith ap Oweyn, son 
of Oweyn de Glendourdy, on certain matters declared to him by the king and to admit the 
said Owin and other Welsh rebels to the king’s obedience and grace if they offer.’209 This 
shows that the authorities were attempting to use Maredudd as a conduit to Owain, to mediate 
his ongoing intractability. However, this also demonstrates that Owain was believed to be 
alive in February 1416. If this is correct, he did not die on the feast of Saint Matthew, 20 
September, 1415, as pedalled by Gruffydd Hiraethog.
210
  
 Although Sir John Oldcastle was captured, tried and brutally executed in 1417, thus 
eliminating that potential foe, the Welsh appeared to be ready to rise again.
211
 The constable 
of Harlech wrote to the chamberlain of North Wales warning him that an alliance had been 
forged between Maredudd ab Owain, the Scots and the men of the Outer Isles. A landing was 
expected between Mawddwy and Dyfi and the Welsh were preparing to meet it:
212
 
 
This is the credence by mouth that is to say howe John Salghall constable of Harglagh 
certeified and warned by lettre to the chamberleyn of Carnarvane howe that a gentell 
man of Walys that most knewe and pryueist was with Mereduth ap Owyn in grete 
specialte warned hym of an accorde made betwene the same Mereduth and men of the 
owt yles and of Scotland throgh lettres in and owt as he enfourmed hym that they 
sholden come a lond and aryve at Abermowth and Eve betwix this and midsommer  
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neghst with her power and that the same Mereduth shold priuely do warne his ffrendes to 
make hym redy with hors and harneys again the same tyme, for which warnyng the same 
gentell man dar noght passe the toun of Harglagh etc. And likest hit semeth to be soth be 
cause of the gouernance of the Walsh peple, for they selleth her catell and byeth hem 
hors and harneys. And sume of hem stelleth hors and sume robbeth hors and purveyen 
hem of sadles, bowes and arowes and other harneys etc. And other recheles men of many 
dyuers cuntreis voidem her groundes and her thrifty gouernance and assemblen hem in 
dissolate places and wilde and maken many diuers congregaciones and mee[t]ynges 
pryuely, thogh her counsaile be holden yit secrete fro us, wherthogh yong peple ar the 
more wilde in gouernance.
213
 
 
Henry V’s government sought to defeat this by offering Maredudd ab Owain a pardon in 
1417, which he refused.
214
 This offer by the Crown should be seen as an effort to neutralise 
any threat in west and perhaps an effort to prise the son from the father, rather than a 
demonstration of even-handedness and magnanimity, albeit calculated, as Davies infers.
215
 
Perhaps in light of this, in May 1417, absentee lords were ordered to return to their Welsh 
estates, to fortify and prepare to defend them with Englishmen.
216
 Smith believed that the 
Welsh rebellion had been ‘revitalised with external alliances’ in 1417.217 Discounting the 
extinguished Lollards, this is a credible assertion. The Scots, revived after a number of bleak 
years following Homildon, had begun to again act beyond their borders. While small 
numbers of Scots mercenaries had earlier found their way into continental retinues, notably 
those of Jean sans Peur, by 1417 the government was able to deploy Scots forces further 
afield.
218
 Traditional northern targets such as Penrith, Roxburgh and Berwick were assaulted 
with no success during 1415.
219
 The hope or fear of a Scots landing in Wales in 1417 was 
entirely credible. However, it never materialised. While it remains possible that the French 
mention of Wales at Constance coincidentally occurred two months before a security crisis 
there, with apparent Scots connivance, amid a background of ongoing revolt, the notion of 
this being accidental seems improbable. While there are no proven written connections 
between the Welsh, French and Scots at this time, the links are probable. Perhaps the most 
obvious conduit for these three powers was Gruffudd Yonge, whose career enjoyed a 
measure of elevation even as the Glyn Dŵr regime dwindled. He had been with the French 
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delegation at Constance, and was translated to the bishopric of Ross in Scotland in 1418, and 
this position is likely to have been initially supported by the French and the Scots.
220
 He 
appears in the detailed accounts of Jean sans Peur’s government of 1418-9 as a bishop and an 
ambassador, but could easily have figured during the previous years of more chaotic 
governance.
221
 Certainly by 1418, the dauphin Charles was openly casting about for foreign 
allies, traceably approaching the Scots and Castilians, as well as others such as the Lombards 
and the Savoyards.
222
 Within the context of these diplomatic initiatives, it is entirely possible 
that these and earlier discreet efforts included sending messengers to Wales. 
 However, the view of continental events from Wales would probably have caused 
great concern. After the heavy defeat sustained at Agincourt, Henry V re-invaded France in 
August 1417 and then pressed further inland than the largely coastal sortie of 1415.
223
 Jean 
sans Peur’s troops won a grand sweep of towns and castles that year, although no field battles 
were fought and the final military picture remained unclear, though apparently favourable to 
him.
224
 The diplomatic scene clearly boded well for him though; Jean made alliances with 
Brittany and the Emperor that year, and another with the Queen early in 1418.
225
 That same 
year, the Burgundians seized Paris and many of the Armagnacs, including the dauphin 
Charles, fled.
226
 The duke then proceeded to massacre perhaps two thousand Armagnacs in 
Paris.
227
 In a calculated counter-stroke, the Armagnacs murdered Jean sans Peur at Montereau 
in September 1419, causing a further descent into bitter civil strife in France.
228
 More 
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notably, the event proved to be the catalyst for a full Anglo-Burgundian alliance.
229
 The 
resulting treaty of Troyes in May 1420 promised the French crown to Henry V.
230
 On 9 
January 1420, John, duke of Bedford, was commissioned to persuade Maredudd ab Owain to 
serve the king in Normandy, in the company of the many other Welshmen already fighting in 
crown forces.
231
 The fact that a man of such esteem and rank as John of Bedford was sent to 
treat with Maredudd demonstrates the respect and gravity with which the government treated 
the rebels and the situation. In July the same year, the king authorised the sheriffs of 
Caernarvon and Merioneth, as well as Thomas Walton, the chamberlain of North Wales, to 
treat with the Welsh rebels.
232
 The rebels were clearly still a force worthy enough to be 
approached by the local administrators as well as Bedford, one of the most respected English 
nobles of the age. While Maredudd and his supporters maintained their resistance, Henry V 
might have been satisfied with his progress in France. His forces held perhaps as much as the 
northern quarter of the country, his alliance with Burgundy had great potential and the Breton 
truce was still in force. With this view dominating the horizon, with the English seemingly 
triumphant in France and the French retreating further south, deep into central France, a 
reconsideration of the Welsh position seems natural. The end of this second ‘Glyn Dŵr’ 
revolt, under Maredudd, came in early 1421. This conclusion seems to have been in part 
caused from below, rather than solely an action decided by the leader. Evidence suggests that 
the Welsh communities determined how they should be organised and led, and more 
importantly, how they should be brought to peace.
233
 It seems probable that the opinions of 
the native communities served as a mediating influence on his thinking, at least, and possibly 
that they forced Maredudd’s hand. Certainly, the native culture in which he lived was one 
which engaged numerous elements of society in the decision making processes, particularly 
those involving war, peace and the laws of the land. Whatever his motivations, letters patent 
to receive the rebel leader date from April; Maredudd ab Owain submitted and was granted a 
pardon on 8 May 1421. 
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Pardon to Meredyth son of Owyn de Glendordy of Wales for all reasons, felonies, 
insurrections, adherences to the king’s enemies, trespasses, rebellions, contempts, 
deceptions, misprisions, ignorances, concealments, and other offences; as on the 
testimony of holy writ the son shall not bear the iniquity of his father nor for the offence 
of one is another to be punished but each shall bear his own burden and receive reward as 
he has done, whether it be good or evil, and although Owyn rebelled against the king and 
the crown, prodigal of his honour and forgetful of his due fealty, nevertheless Meredyth 
after his father’s death did not follow his malice but having it in hatred dwelt peaceably 
among the king’s subjects and came as soon as he could to the king’s presence in spirit of 
humility and demeanour of a penitent, and the king has inclined ears of pity to his 
supplication on that account.
234
 
 
Epilogue to ‘Constance, 1417’ 
This French-English exchange at Constance seems significant because it appears to 
demonstrate that the French were committed to honouring their promises to support Wales, 
among others. Also, this debate opened another, different forum for the conflict between 
England and France. It appears that this is perhaps the only occasion during the Middle Ages 
where the Welsh were represented by a major power in multi-lateral discussions on the 
grander, continental stage. Under the veil of the ecclesiastical discourse put forward by the 
French, it seems likely that the real reason was to disrupt the English effort in northern 
France. However, it is noteworthy that this unique approach to resolving France’s problems 
sought to include Wales as a part of the solution. Moreover, the French faction then in power, 
the Armagnacs, included Wales as one of the focal points of their protest, seeking for them 
independent representation within the Church. While this recalls in part the terms of the 
Pennal Declaration, it also envisaged a continuation, perhaps even a blossoming of the 
French-Welsh relationship. In some ways therefore, this protest could be seen as an effort by 
the Armagnacs to honour their union with the Welsh. This ongoing consideration suggests 
that the military and diplomatic relations between Wales and France in the first decade of the 
fifteenth century were more than an exchange of brave verbiage. It is perhaps irrelevant 
whether those words of friendship were genuine, although there is no reason to doubt that 
they were; the facts are that both parties wanted to see Wales wrested from English dominion 
and ruled by its native princes and allied to France. It would be simplistic and incorrect to 
view the Welsh as little more than agents of French polity; the Welsh rebellion was not 
precipitated by the French, and the Welsh were not doing their bidding. Their friendship 
                                                          
234
 CPR 1416-22, 335; (Note: the first line says ‘reasons’ but perhaps should read ‘treasons’, also, this evidence 
clearly shows that the authorities believed Owain had died by this point.); Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the 
Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 255-6; Davies, Revolt, 2, 293, 310.  
 392 
 
seems genuine then and the French representation of a Welsh cause at Constance showed that 
they saw merit in continuing their relationship.  
Therefore, the ultimate failure of the alliance to secure a pro-French independent 
Wales was not through a lack of desire, planning or effort on either part. Unfavourable 
circumstances and unfortunate events on the rough seas of politics and war prevailed over 
them. From a Welsh perspective, the French move at Constance saw the final appearance of 
any mention or remnant of Glyn Dŵr’s Wales on an international stage, whether in a military, 
diplomatic or any other context. This event therefore effectively marks the closure of contacts 
between the kings of France and Welsh leaders striving for independence. From this point 
until Henry Tudor’s exile to Brittany in 1471, the French only encountered the Welsh as 
contingents of English armies, mostly in northern France. Although some of those Welshmen 
changed sides and willingly surrendered to the French the towns and castles placed in their 
charge by the English, these seem to have been largely individual acts and not due to 
adherence to any Welsh political goals.
235
 Therefore, not only does this quarrel at Constance 
represent the final flourish of the alliance between Charles VI’s government and Owain Glyn 
Dŵr on a wider, continental stage, but it is the last such contact between the Welsh and the 
French, drawing to a close more than two hundred and fifty years of intermittent diplomatic 
contact. Therefore, no matter how unsuccessful Jean Campagne’s protestatio, it remains a 
significant part of French–Welsh relations. 
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